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This thesis examines the rights of people with mental disorder under Irish law against 
the background of the European Convention on Human Rights. It proposes that Irish 
law does not meet the minimum standards laid down by the Convention and that 
significant law reform is required to achieve this aim. The main issues concern the 
admission, detention and treatment of adults and children in psychiatric care and the 
safeguards provided in the Irish legal system. These matters are considered against the 
Convention requirements in the context of the current and ongoing process of law 
reform in Ireland.
The rights addressed are: the right to protection from arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
under Article 5, particularly the liberty of the compliant incapacitated patient. This 
includes an empirical study of the habeas corpus provision in Ireland. Article 8 and 
Article 12 rights are examined, specifically, the right to self-determination in a 
number of spheres including: consent to treatment, the right to marry, to have a sexual 
relationship and children and the right not to be sterilised. The right to protection from 
inhuman and degrading treatment in Article 3 includes consideration of positive state 
obligations to protect physical integrity in relation to conditions of detention, 
seclusion and aspects of treatment. The right in Article 2 to have one’s life protected 
from foreseeable risks and the obligation on the state to investigate following death is 
examined. The restrictions on the removal of civil rights and obligations in relation to 
access to court to take civil action and to have control over one’s property and affairs 
are examined for compliance with Article 6.
The outcome of the examination confirms the proposal that Irish law does not meet 
the minimum standards of the Convention.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the rights of people with mental disorder under Irish law against 
the background of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). It is 
proposed that current law in Ireland does not meet the minimum standards laid down 
by the Convention and that significant law reform is required to achieve this aim. The 
importance of this work is threefold. It is the first time that these issues have been 
examined and following the recent adoption of the Convention into Irish law this 
work will contribute to a new area where knowledge is essential. Second, the 
empirical study on habeas corpus included in this work (Chapter 2) had never been 
done before and it establishes the facts on its use and provides a clear basis for reform 
and future research. Finally, the conclusions reached in this thesis will contribute 
towards statutory reform due in 2007.
The issues concerning admission and detention in psychiatric care and the safeguards 
provided in the Irish legal system will be weighed against Convention requirements in 
the context of the current and ongoing process of law reform. Ireland is going through 
a period of transition with both the Mental Treatment Act 1945 (1945 Act), as 
amended, and the Mental Health Act 2001 (2001 Act) in place, albeit that the 2001 
Act is only partially in force.1 This period of transition will continue until the full 
introduction of the 2001 Act.2 Ireland has recently incorporated the Convention into 
Irish law with the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. 
Prior to the 2003 Act the Convention applied to Ireland but not within Ireland. The 
incorporation is an opportunity to examine the standard of human rights protection 
within the State having regard to the fact that Ireland has lost nine cases before the 
European Court of Human Rights, six of which followed directly from constitutional
’The 1945 Act has been amended by the Health Act 1953, the Mental Health Act 1953, the Health and 
Mental Treatment Act 1957, the Health and Mental Treatment Act 1958, the Mental Treatment 
(Detained in Approved Institutions) Act 1961, the Mental Treatment Act 1961, Health and Mental 
Treatment Act 1966 and the Health Act 1970. Sections 1-5 incl., (definitions and statutory principles) 
section 7, and sections 31-55 incl. (setting up the Mental Health Commission and tribunals) of the 2001 
Act are operational.
2 The complete introduction is currently (Feb. 2006) being delayed by the refusal of consultant 
psychiatrists to become involved in new public service work until there is a government commitment to 
providing the necessary resources for the additional work involving extra work created by tribunal 
hearings.
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decisions by the Supreme Court.3 Two cases involving mental health detention 
reached a friendly settlement before the Strasbourg Court.4
The 1945 Act provides a statutory framework for the civil detention of people with 
mental disorder and for the administration of psychiatric services. This legislation was 
adopted at a time prior to the drafting of the Convention. Human rights were not a 
prime consideration and admission to hospital was often for life. The focus of 
treatment was on seclusion and restraint as forms of patient management. Although 
various medications were in use to control the symptoms of mental disorder, this was 
prior to the development of anti-psychotic and anti-depressant medication. Treatment 
without consent was not an issue which received attention in its own right. There are 
no safeguards relating to treatment without consent in the 1945 Act. The provisions of 
this legislation are described throughout this thesis as they arise in connection with 
the relevant Articles of the Convention. The 1945 Act as amended is a very 
inaccessible piece of law, particularly to professionals who need to operate its 
provisions. This situation has invited comment from the judiciary on the need for 
reform. For example, Kelly J. stated in the High Court, “I wish to record that I have 
the greatest sympathy for the medical and nursing personnel who are called upon to 
operate the provisions of the Act. It is now fifty five years old and badly in need of 
reform.”5 The 2001 Act was introduced to replace the 1945 Act.6 This new Act comes 
in the wake of many previous attempts to reform the area of mental health law. The 
Irish Constitution, Bunreacht na hEireann, is a fundamental aspect of this reform, 
guarding as it does the personal rights and the right to liberty of the people. The 
provisions of the Constitution are examined, where applicable, as part of the 
framework of safeguards lying outside the range of specific legislative provisions for 
mental health.
3 Norris v. Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186 (homosexuality), Pine Valley v. Ireland (1992) 14 EHRR 319 
(aftermath of invalid planning permission), Open Door Counselling Ltd. & Dublin Well Woman Centre 
Ltd. v. Ireland (1993) 15 EHRR 244 (banning distribution of information regarding abortion clinics), 
Keegan v. Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342 (rights of natural fathers), Heaney v. Ireland (2001) 33 EHRR 
264 (right to silence) and DG v Ireland (2002) 35 EHRR 1153 (detention of unruly juveniles).
4 O ’Reilly v. Ireland Application No. 24196/94 and Croke v. Ireland Application no. 3326/96.
5 Gooden v. Waterford Regional Hospital, Unreported High Court, 14th December 2000.
6 Apart from the exclusions in Part VIII and sections 241, 276, 283 and 284 of the 1945 Act dealing 
mainly with the jurisdiction of the High Court, both generally and in relation to wardship.
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Reform of mental health law has been a prolonged and unsatisfactory process where 
there has been little political support or commitment from various governments over 
the years. Mental health represents the “Cinderella” service, providing for the 
marginalized in the health system, as is evidenced by the constant reduction in 
funding, the scant attention paid to the annual reports from the Inspector of Mental 
Hospitals and the continuing failure to introduce the 2001 Act.7 Pressure for change 
has come from many sources, ranging from the service-user movement, professional 
bodies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to external sources promoting 
human rights, such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe.
Many of the factors that influence the discussion on reform of mental health law relate 
to a desire for autonomy by mentally disabled people and the opportunity to 
participate fully in society. Such participation has been hindered by the traditional 
psychiatric care system with its emphasis on social control and paternalism. The 
rights of disadvantaged groups, particularly those with negatively ascribed statuses 
like psychiatric patients, were not included in the rights discourse elsewhere until the 
1970s and 1980s. In Ireland, change is slower than in many similar jurisdictions and 
the acceptance of new principles relating to empowerment, self-determination and 
participation is only beginning.
Influences on law reform
One of the purposes of mental health legislation is to ensure adequate and appropriate 
care and treatment and the protection of the human rights of people with mental 
disorders. The World Health Organisation states,
The fundamental aim of mental health legislation is to protect, promote and 
improve the lives and mental well-being of citizens, ... progressive legislation 
can be an effective tool to promote access to mental health care as well as to 
promote and protect the rights of persons with mental disorders .. .8
7 As discussed above, the government would defend itself on this issue by blaming consultant 
psychiatrists, most of whom are refusing to become involved in the tribunals as a means to get extra 
resources necessary for additional workload.
8 World Health Organisation, WHO Resource Book on Mental Health, Human Rights and Legislation, 
Switzerland, 2005, pi.
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The use of other legislative mechanisms to supplement mental health legislation 
includes anti-discrimination measures such as the Employment Equality Acts 1998-
2004 and the Equal Status Acts 2000-2004, intended to redress inequality by 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds that include mental disorder. The Disability Act
2005 may provide a source for accessing health and education services.
Growth o f the service- user movement
The 1996 report of the Government Commission on the Status of People with 
Disabilities resulted in a turning point in relation to people with disabilities in 
Ireland.9 The Commission included an equal representation of people with disabilities 
along with able-bodied people. The report placed the person with the disability at the 
centre of planning and recommended a rights-based approach. This document has 
proved to be an important touchstone for policy and legislative development. The 
growing importance of service-users as partners in policy and planning is now being 
recognised at government and non-governmental level.10 The Department of Health 
Expert Group on Mental Health Policy included service-users and many of the 
working subgroups included both service-users and carers.11 The development of the 
government supported Irish Advocacy Network (IAN) and peer advocacy services 
have strengthened this position.12 In addition, the health service executives have 
employed IAN to carry out a number of service audits to assess satisfaction with 
treatment provision, as well as models, methodologies and the systemic barriers to 
well-being and recovery. The mainstreaming of service-users in the mental health care 
system in this way has provided quality feedback on the impact of mental health 
legislation and the inadequacies that need to be addressed. Negative attitudes to 
mental disorder creating stigma are believed to stem from a lack of awareness, fear 
and misconceptions about the nature of mental illness. The National Disability 
Authority survey on attitudes to disability revealed that attitudes to people with 
mental disorders were less positive than those expressed towards people with physical
9 Department of Justice, The Report of the Commission for the Status of People with Disabilities, A 
Strategy for Equality, Government Publications, Dublin, 1996.
10 Partnership agreements have referred to the involvement of service-users in policy-making.
11 Department of Health & Children, Expert Group on Mental Health Policy, Speaking Your Mind,- A 
Report on the Public Consultation Process, Dublin, 2004 and What we heard -  A Report on the 
Service User Consultation Process., Dublin, 2004.
12 The Irish Advocacy Network exists to promote and facilitate peer advocacy on an island-wide basis.
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disabilities.13 Negative stereotyping compounds the difficulties for people seeking 
early treatment and acts as a barrier against the use of services, particularly when 
these services are inadequate or non-existent. Mental health legislation that does not 
focus on human rights adds to these difficulties. The person-centred approach along 
with the growing service-user movement should contribute to a greater focus on these 
issues.
English influence on Irish law
The influence of English mental health law is significant with many Irish statutes 
modelled on English equivalents due to the historic and unavoidable ties between the 
two countries. The common law system is an important factor in English case law 
having a persuasive influence in Irish law.14 The 1945 Act is a copy of the English 
Mental Treatment Act 1930, which was extended to Northern Ireland in 1932. Current 
law reform is modelled somewhat on the Mental Health Act 1983, though in less 
detail, and it does not include provisions for mentally disordered offenders, wards of 
court, guardianship and adult care orders. The incorporation of the Convention into 
Irish law came well after the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 in England 
and Wales which has been a rich source of jurisprudence and may influence the 
development of Irish law.
International human rights standards
The Irish government is obliged under international human rights law to ensure that 
their policies and practices in relation to the protection of people with mental 
disorders conform to binding international law. The UN Declaration on Human 
Rights, together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCRj form the International Bill of Rights and all include a prohibition on 
discrimination. The protection of the right to dignity and the need for affirmative 
action to protect the rights of persons with disabilities including people with mental
13NDA Research Unit & Research Evaluation Services, Attitudes to Disability: Preliminary Findings o f  
a Survey commissioned by the National Disability Authority’, Dublin, October, 2001.
14 R v. Airdale Trust ex parte Bland [ 1993] 1 All ER 821.
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disorders is affirmed in both the ICESCR and the ICCPR. The concluding 
observations of the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR in 2000 required Ireland 
to take further action to ensure full enjoyment of the rights by people with 
disabilities.15 The report of the Committee of the ICESCR in 2002 was critical of 
Ireland and the continued discrimination against people with physical and mental 
disabilities in many areas including health, employment, social welfare, education and 
in sheltered accommodation. The Committee expressed concern that principles of 
non-discrimination were not included in the Health Strategy 2002.16 The UN 
Principles for the Protection o f People with Mental Illness and the Protection o f  
Mental Health Care, which establish minimum human rights standards, have also 
been influential in the reform of mental health law in Ireland with the government 
openly acknowledging these principles by appending them to both the Green and 
White Papers on mental health reform.17
The Council of Europe documents that have influenced mental health law reform 
include Recommendation 1235 on Psychiatry and Human Rights (1994), which lays 
down criteria for involuntary admission, procedures and safeguards against abuse, 
Recommendation 99(4) on Incapacitated Adults and Recommendation (2004) 10 
Concerning the Protection o f  the Human Rights and Dignity o f  Persons with Mental 
Disorder, which proposes improved protections of the dignity, human rights and 
freedoms of people with mental disorders, particularly those who are subject to 
involuntary placement or involuntary treatment. Commentators frequently discuss the 
standards in the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, even though 
Ireland, like the United Kingdom, is not yet a signatory.18 The Convention fo r the 
Prevention o f Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987) 
through its Committee for the Prevention of Torture, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment (The CPT) has visited psychiatric hospitals and residential care centres in
15 http:/www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. Next report is due end 2005.
16 Department of Health and Children, Quality and Fairness, A Health System for You, Government 
Publications, Dublin, 2002. Other issues commented on by the Committee impact indirectly on mental 
health including: housing, adequacy of standards of living and poverty issues.
17 Department of Health and Children, Green Paper on Mental Health, 1995 PL 8918, White Paper A 
New Mental Health Act 1995 PL 1824.
18 Mills S., Clinical Practice and the Law, Butterworths, Dublin, 2002 para 18.11, Madden, Medicine, 
Ethics and the Law, Butterworths, Dublin, 2002.
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Ireland and commented on the poor conditions in some locations.19 The role of the 
CPT is examined in the context of Article 3 of the Convention. The CPT visits to 
Ireland have resulted in a greater focus on planning for change and some progress 
relating to conditions of detention both for people in high security detention and for 
highlighting conditions in residential care for people with intellectual disabilities.20
Formal Recognition o f  the European Convention on Human Rights
The Irish Constitution provides for the incorporation into domestic law of
international treaties intended to be in harmony with or similar to the principles of the 
0 1Constitution. The Convention has formed part of Ireland’s international legal 
obligations since 1953. The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (The 
Court) in relation to breaches of the Convention’s provisions are binding on the State. 
Until the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 (The
ECHR Act 2003), the Convention was law for Ireland but not actually law in
00Ireland. More recently, there has been a growing tendency for the Irish judiciary to 
refer to the jurisprudence of the Convention in reaching their conclusions in contrast 
with earlier cases when the Courts were decidedly more negative and dismissive of 
references to the Convention. During the past two decades, the Irish courts have
0 “Xacknowledged a presumption that Irish law is in conformity with the Convention. 
This change has been evident in a number of cases, including Glencar Exploration 
Pic’s v. Mayo Co. Council in which the High Court stated,
The judgments of the Court of Human Rights may be a useful source of 
persuasive authority where they contain reasoning ... relevant to the 
interpretation of legal rights guaranteed by the Convention and which our 
courts have to apply.24
19 Reports of CPT visit to Ireland in 2001 on www.irlgov.ie Report also available at www.cpt.coe.int or 
at www.irlgov.ie.
20 Visits were made to the Central Mental Hospital, St Ita’s Hospital intellectual disability unit, and a 
number of other residential centres for people with intellectual disabilities.
21 Article 29.6. Ireland was among the first nations to adopt the Convention in 1950 and ratified it in 
1953, and along with Sweden, was first to adopt the right of individual petition.
22 A total of seven cases resulted in decisions against Ireland ranging from the need for civil legal aid, 
rights of non-marital children, decriminalisation of homosexual behaviour, abortion information, 
property rights, rights of natural fathers and the right to silence. See fii 3.
3 Hogan & Whyte, J.M. Kelly: The Irish Constitution, Butterworths, Dublin, 2003, paras 5.3.120. and 
7.1.157. Budd J. in Croke v. Smith Unreported High Court, July 31s* 1995, Gooden v. Waterford 
Regional Hospital Unreported Supreme Court, February 21s* 2001.
24 [2002] 1 IR 84 p i52.
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The Supreme Court in Murphy v. IRTC, acknowledged that the Convention was not 
part of Irish law, but regard could be had to its provisions when considering a 
fundamental right and the limitations that could be imposed on such rights. In 
Gooden v. Waterford Regional Hospital, the Supreme Court cited with approval the 
views expressed in an earlier case that the Convention might be a useful source for an 
Irish judge attempting to identify unspecified rights guaranteed by Article 40.3 of the 
Constitution.26
The Constitution provides that the sole law-making body of the State is the 
Oireachtas. Arguments regarding Convention rights were not of persuasive effect
9 o
and generally were not raised or permitted to be raised before the courts. This is 
similar to the situation that applied in the English courts before the incorporation of 
the Convention. The House of Lords ruled in R v. Secretary o f State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Brind that those invested with ministerial powers under 
legislation had no obligation to take the Convention into account when exercising a 
discretion which Parliament had conferred on them. No action was available in the 
domestic courts to challenge in judicial review proceedings the exercise of a power on 
the ground that it was contrary to the Convention. Vindication of Convention rights 
required exhaustion of all national remedies before presenting the case in the 
Strasbourg Court.30 The failure to exhaust all available national remedies resulted in
•> i
the first of three cases being deemed inadmissible by the Commission. In the other 
two cases, a friendly settlement was reached with Ireland.
The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement 1998, commonly known as the Good Friday 
or Belfast Agreement, was the catalyst for the introduction of the ECHR Act 2003. It 
was intended that human rights protection would accord with best international
25 [1997] IRLM 467 p476.
26 Unreported Supreme Court, 21s* February 2001. Also Doyle v. Commissioner o f An Garda Siochana
[1999] 1 IR249p268.
27 Irish Constitution, Article 15 .2.1 vests the sole and exclusive power for making laws in the 
Oireachtas.
28 Croke v. Smith (No.2) [1998] 1 IR 101.
29 [1991] 1 AC 696.
30 Article 35 of the Convention.
31 O ’Dowd v. Ireland Application no. 10296/83.
32 O ’Reilly v. Ireland Application no. 24196/94 (1997/, Croke v. Ireland Application no.33267/96
(2000). These cases are discussed in more detail in chapters 1 & 2.
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standards and there would be an equivalence of human rights protection north and 
south of the border.
... [the] incorporation of the ECHR should be viewed not as an inconvenience 
to be endured in fulfilment of a loose obligation (probably of a political 
nature) under the Belfast Agreement 1998 but, rather, as the beginning of a 
more fruitful ‘dialogue’ between international human rights obligations and 
municipal law.33
The method of incorporation has been viewed as unsatisfactory in that it stopped short 
of giving full direct legislative effect to the Convention. The Report of the 
Constitution Review Group in 1996 rejected the notion of direct incorporation of the 
Convention into the Constitution on the basis of the high degree of overlap with 
Convention rights already in existence.34 The second objection was that there could be 
a diminution in some individual rights in the Constitution. The Report stated that the 
substantive rights provided by the Convention were already recognised by the 
Constitution, specifically, or as an unenumerated right under Article 40.3.1, the 
personal rights section. Partial incorporation was seen as the solution by way of 
addition or replacement in the following circumstances: where the right was not 
expressed in the Constitution, where the standard of protection was superior in the 
Convention and where the wording of the Constitution in relation to the specific right 
might be improved.35
The interpretative or indirect incorporation is considered to be a minimalist response 
with limited legal redress for litigants.36 The approach has been criticised due to its 
“weaknesses, anomalies and drawbacks”, echoing the views of the Human Rights 
Commission. The legislature rejected the notion of incorporation by means of a
33 O’Connell D., “Ireland” in Blackburn & Polakiewicz (eds.) Fundamental Rights in Europe: The 
European Convention on Human Rights and its Member States, 1950-2000, OUP, Oxford, 2000.
34 Government Publications, Report o f the Review Group o f the Constitution, PN 2632, 1996.
35 “For years we were able to hide our semi-detached relationship to the Convention behind the 
substantial bulk of our nearest neighbour, the United Kingdom.” Farrell, “Semi-detached or Joined-up 
Rights? Making the European Convention a Reality for Irish Lawyers-and their Clients”. Paper 
delivered at Law Society of Ireland Conference, 14th October 2000.
*Op. cit., 23 p24.
37Binchy W., “The European Convention on Human Rights Bill, the Advantages and Disadvantages of 
the Approach Taken, and the Possible Alternatives”, Paper presented to the Law Society of Ireland 19th 
October, 2002. Also a submission to the Government on the Bill, O Connell D., said that Ireland 
followed the British approach in the Human Rights Act 1998, (1998 Act) without having the same 
reasons for doing so and arguably adopted a weaker form of incorporation, in “Human Rights
9
Referendum to amend the Constitution. Other commentators believe that there was no 
other choice,
... short of a constitutional amendment... it is plain that the Oireachtas could 
not have gone any further than it did in the European Convention on Human
Rights Act 2003 if it had purported to give the courts power to declare a
law invalid -as opposed to a declaration of incompatibility (which leaves the 
offending law in place pending later legislative amendment or repeal) -  on the 
ground that it contravened the Convention, there would have been a significant 
risk that the 2003 Act itself would have been found to be unconstitutional on
o
the ground that it purported to create a form of parallel Constitution.
Incorporation was seen by some commentators as being most important on a symbolic 
level and that the impact on constitutional jurisprudence will be limited due to “a 
striking degree of overlap between the respective guarantees -  (as judicially 
interpreted) contained in the Constitution and the ECHR.”39 Another reason is that 
there are a number of Supreme Court decisions referring to the equivalence of 
protection in the Constitution with that in the Convention and where the Constitution 
does not go as far as the Convention, the interpretation of the Constitution in light of 
the Convention may result in little substantial difference.40 A third reason posited is 
that the judicial review system and remedies under the Constitution provide a superior 
remedy and will remain a first choice.
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003
The purpose behind the legislation is to facilitate bringing cases of alleged breaches of 
rights under the Convention before the Irish courts leading to a more expeditious 
approach than previously applied. Ensuring compatibility with the Convention is at 
the centre of the requirements of the 2003 Act.41 The interpretation of the law must be
Commission Bill: A Critical Perspective”, Paper presented at Political Association Conference of 
Ireland, Wexford, 1999.
38 Hogan & Whyte, JMKelly: The Irish Constitution (4thed.) Butterworths, Dublin, 2003, Preface to 
Fourth Edition.
39 Hogan G., ‘The Belfast Agreement and the Future Incorporation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in the Republic of Ireland’ (1999) Bar Review 205 at 208
40 Gooden v. Waterford Regional Hospital Unreported Supreme Court, 21st February 2001, Enright v. 
Ireland Unreported High Court, December 18th 2002.
41 O’Connell D., “The Incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into Irish law: 
Clever and Elegant or Too Clever by Half’ Brian Walsh Memorial Lecture 2002 for the Irish Society 
for European Law.
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carried out in a manner compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention 
provisions.42 The 2003 Act provides for “organs of the State” to perform their 
functions in a manner compatible with the Convention 43 The definition of “organs of 
the State” is narrow and refers to,
a tribunal or any other body (other than the President or the Oireachtas or 
either House of the Oireachtas or a Committee of either such House or a Joint 
Committee of both such Houses or a court) which is established by law or 
through which any of the legislative, executive or judicial powers of State are 
exercised.44
The Mental Health Commission and Mental Health Tribunals set up under the 2001 
Act are covered by the Act. Changes to the definition of “organs of the state” had 
been suggested to encompass the courts and semi-public authorities such as regulatory 
bodies, privately owned hospitals and schools. Clarification is needed on whether the 
“organs” include wholly private organisations. This could have an impact on the area 
of psychiatric care in private hospitals, independent providers of community services, 
and the standards of the medical and nursing regulatory bodies. In Dublin City 
Council v. Fennell, the AG & Irish Human Rights Commission (as amicus curiae) the 
Supreme Court ruled that the 2003 Act did not have retrospective effect with regard to 
the actions of public bodies 45
Section 5 of the Act reflects the disappointing approach to incorporation; it provides 
that the High Court or the Supreme Court may, “where no other legal remedy is 
adequate,” make a declaration that a piece of legislation or rule of law is incompatible 
with the Convention. The litigant has no other source of legal redress and the 
legislation or rule of law remains in force. This is not the same as a declaration of 
invalidity and will “not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the
42 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, section 2.
43 Ibid, section 3.
44 Ibid, section 1(1).
45 Unreported Supreme Court, 12th May 2005. The case involved the eviction of tenants and the 
requirements under the Convention that the public authority would give reasons for the action. The 
proceedings regarding the eviction commenced prior to the enactment of the 2003 Act and therefore 
they were not subject to the requirements of the Convention.
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statutory provision or rule of law in respect of which it is made.”46 In addition, the 
Government will be under no obligation to pay compensation but the successful 
litigant may apply to the Attorney General for compensation and this will be 
considered by the Government, which has discretion to appoint an advisor to make an 
ex gratia payment. The Taoiseach is then obliged to lay a copy of the declaration 
before the Dail and Seanad within 21 days, but there is no obligation to have a 
remedial plan. The 2003 Act provides that where a person has suffered a loss or 
damage as a result of a violation of the Convention and where no other remedy in 
damages is available, he or she can institute proceedings in the courts to recover the 
damages. Other forms of redress are not available such as an injunction or orders for 
release from custody. The Strasbourg Court has held that a discretionary remedy is no 
remedy. The Human Rights Commission has been critical of this aspect of the 
legislation saying that,
It clearly contemplates a situation where a litigant may have gone all the way 
to the Supreme Court to obtain a declaration of incompatibility, which may be 
of no practical use to him or her and which may not entitle him or her to any 
other relief ... It is unacceptable to place the courts in a position where they 
can identify a breach of human rights and not be in a position to give an 
effective remedy. The whole procedure ... is of questionable constitutional 
validity.49
The restrictive time limit of six months associated with complaints to Strasbourg 
would also be a factor in a decision to forego the inadequate national remedies 
because of the length of time to pursue an action here, against the inadmissibility due 
to the time constraint. In effect, despite the incorporation of the Convention and 
taking into account the enormous costs of such litigation in Ireland with no guarantee 
of a remedy on a finding of incompatibility, it seems litigants might fare better by 
going straight to Strasbourg for a more effective remedy. The limitation on this 
approach of course is that litigants are obliged to exhaust their domestic remedies 
before being entitled to approach the Strasbourg Court.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid, section 3(2)
48 Keenan v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 913.
49 Human Rights Commission, Submission to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Justice, Equality, 
Defence and Womens Rights 2001, p4.
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The Irish Human Rights Commission
The Human Rights Commission is an independent national human rights body set up 
under the Human Rights Commission Act 2000 with the task of protection of human 
rights in Ireland and in the context of the whole island.50 The links between the 
Human Rights Commission and the incorporation of the Convention into Irish law are 
important.
The Human Rights Commission Act 2000 places the institution at the 
intersection of national and international rights protection in its clear 
designation of the interpretation to be accorded to the term “human rights.” 
Human rights are “the rights, liberties and freedoms conferred on, or 
guaranteed to, persons by the Constitution, and the rights, liberties or freedoms 
conferred on or guaranteed to, persons by any agreement, treaty or convention 
to which the State is party.”51
The functions of the Commission include reviewing law and practice relating to 
human rights and consulting with relevant national and international bodies with 
knowledge or expertise in human rights. There are limitations in the reviewing power 
in that the Commission does not have an automatic right to vet legislation. The 
Commission is expected to make appropriate recommendations on measures to 
strengthen, protect and uphold human rights in the State and to promote 
understanding and awareness of human rights. The Commission has a role in the 
conduct of enquiries and information gathering and, where necessary, to have 
recourse to the courts. It can prepare and publish reports on its research and enquiries. 
The Commission can undertake legal proceedings to vindicate human rights and 
provide legal aid as experts in the court and as amicus curiae or friend of the court in 
human rights matters. The growing awareness of international human rights and the 
impact of the Convention, particularly in other jurisdictions, were driving forces 
behind law reform elsewhere. The more recent developments involving the
50 The membership had been initially selected through competition from a specially convened 
independent board and later the government sought to impose some of its own choices instead.
51 Byrne, “Human Rights” in Byrne & Binchy, Annual Review o f Irish Law 2000, Round Hall Sweet & 
Maxwell, Dublin, 2001, p272.
52 An example is the Immigration Bill 2004 which at first reading contained controversial provisions 
regarding entry requirements, one of which permitted an immigration officer to decide if someone had 
a mental disorder as per the definition under the Mental Health Act 2001. This would appear to 
contravene the Winterwerp principles. The offending section has since been removed.
53 Mental Health Act 1983, Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Act 1986.
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incorporation of the Convention into Irish law and the establishment of the Human 
Rights Commission represent the growing awareness of human rights in Ireland.
Mental health law reform
The process of reform began with the Commission of Inquiry into Mental Illness in 
1966 that recommended a community approach to mental health and that inpatient 
care would take place in small units attached to general hospitals. The proposals 
foundered due to a failure to propose a suitable framework for development of 
community care. However, these recommendations had a certain influence on the 
direction of service provision adopted by the Health Boards under the Health Act 
1970. This Act provided for the restructuring of the health services and focused 
primarily on community care for mental disorder, with mental health policy being 
driven by the move to de-institutionalise mental health services.54 Other jurisdictions 
were planning to reform mental health legislation and Ireland followed suit with the 
Health (Mental Services) Act 1981, which was intended to repeal the 1945 Act.
Had the 1981 Act been introduced, it would have focused on the rights of patients and 
introduced, inter alia, review tribunals and limited provisions on consent to treatment. 
The 1981 Act provided for the narrowing of the criteria for detention and clearer 
procedures leading to detention as well as automatic review of long-term detention. 
Despite the narrowing of the criteria, it would have permitted detention where the 
person had a mental disorder “in the interests of the person’s health, safety or for the 
protection of others or property.” The inclusion of property as a ground for detention 
would have breached Convention requirements. Some of the provisions lacked the 
required level of independence under the Convention such as the safeguards for 
consent to treatment.55 The review of detention included a right of appeal against the 
tribunal to the Minister for Health which would not have satisfied the requirement of 
independence of the executive. Many aspects of the 1981 Act had been surpassed by 
reforms elsewhere, the provisions did not meet international obligations and the Act 
was never enforced. The Mental Treatment (Amendment) Bill 1992, a private
54 Government Publications, Planning for the Future, PL 3001 Dublin 1984.
55 The Act stated that the Medical Council would draw up the rules for consent.
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members bill, was initiated to provide for review tribunals and to abolish the 
restriction in the 1945 Act on leave to take civil action.56 This Bill was defeated.
The government subsequently published the Green Paper on Mental Health 1992 
which set out the fundamental objectives of policy on the care of the mentally ill and 
included a discussion on the need for reform of mental health legislation and invited 
submissions from interested parties.57 The focus for legislative change was on the 
1945 Act and the recognition that Ireland did not adhere to international obligations, 
including the Convention. This was followed by the White Paper on Mental Health 
Legislation, A New Mental Health Act, in 1995 which outlined detailed proposals for
ro
new mental health legislation. It provided extensive recommendations on mental 
health legislation. Following the introduction of the Mental Health Bill 1999, the 
Minister for Health and Children acknowledged that a number of issues which had 
been discussed in the White Paper had been omitted from the proposed Act but that 
“these issues would not be overlooked or forgotten”. The Minister stated that,
legislation was not the only means by which to effect change in the health 
service. The most acute problem for the mental health services for many years 
has been inadequate resources and, as I have indicated earlier, I am taking 
steps to ensure that the position is improved on that front.59
The Mental Health Bill 1999 was the embodiment in legislation of many of the White 
Paper proposals and subsequently enacted in the 2001 Act.60 The main impetus for the 
immediate introduction of the 2001 Act was the friendly settlement reached in Croke 
v. Ireland, requiring the government to introduce the Act without delay.61 This case 
underlines the rare occasion when there are real gains from the Convention. Two Irish 
cases had been deemed admissible before the Strasbourg Court: O ’Reilly v. Ireland, 
concerning arbitrary deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1 )(e) and Croke v. Ireland,
56 Deputy Nuala Fennell introduced this private members Bill.
57 Department of Health PL 8918.
58 Department of Health, Pn 1824. July 1995. The Minister for Health and Children, Minister Martin 
referred to the Bill as “a culmination of a long and detailed process of consultation and careful 
consideration.” (517 Dail Debates Cols.997-998). The Act omitted many of the White Paper proposals 
including procedures affecting the detention of children, the omission of adult care orders, safeguards 
relating to the right to communicate, and relating to seclusion and clinical trials.
59 (517 Dail Debates Col. 1004).
60 A total of 108 amendments were made to the Bill.
61 Application no. 3326/96.
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concerning the sufficiency of the protections under Article 5(4).62 In both cases a 
friendly settlement was reached. The pressure to introduce legislation that complied 
procedurally and substantively with the requirements of the Convention was no longer 
avoidable.
The most significant aspect of the 2001 Act is the shift in focus from the medical 
discretion model encompassed in the 1945 Act to a rights-based approach where the 
patient will have statutory entitlement to various protective measures which have been 
standard in many other jurisdictions since the 1980s. Many of the rights included in 
the 2001 Act are a recognition of what the Strasbourg Court referred to in 
Herczegfalvy v. Austria as “the particular situation of inferiority and powerlessness 
which is typical of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals.”63 During the debates on 
the Bill, the Minister for Health and Children said,
as a group these people are among the most vulnerable people in our society. 
They are often unable to speak for themselves. It is incumbent on us as a 
society to recognise our obligations in relation to these people.64
The 2001 Act has a dual purpose. First, is to provide a modem framework for the 
involuntary admission to approved centres of those suffering from mental disorder 
and in need of treatment and protection, either in their own interests or the interests of 
others.65 The second purpose of the Act is to put in place mechanisms by which the 
standards of care and treatment in the mental health services can be monitored, 
inspected and regulated. This modem framework includes the establishment of a 
Mental Health Commission, mental health review tribunals and the replacement of the 
existing Inspector of Mental Hospitals with an Inspector of Mental Health Services, 
having a broader remit.66
The narrowing of the criteria for detention will lead to compliance with the 
requirements under the Convention in Winterwerp v. Netherlands.67 The Act 
introduces mental health tribunals to review initial decisions to detain and to review
62 Application no. 24196/94. Application no. 3326/96.
63 (1992) 4 EHRR 188.
64 (166 Seanad Debates Col. 1446).
65 The Minister for Health and Children (517 Dail Debates Col. 997).
66Mental Health Act 2001, sections 32,48 & 50.
67 (1979) 2 EHRR 387.
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continuing detention, and includes the right to legal representation. The right to self- 
determination in regard to consent to treatment is recognised to some extent in the 
Act, along with a right to a second opinion. Information rights, which were clearly 
absent from the 1945 Act, are in marked contrast with the emphasis on such rights in 
the 2001 Act. The Act provides for both voluntary and involuntary admission of 
children under 18 years, in contrast with the 1945 Act, which provides only for 
voluntary admission of children under 16 years. The courts will be involved in all 
detentions of children with mental disorders.69
The 2001 Act has been deemed to be a minimal response, in that it provides 
safeguards only for those who are detained, about 11% of all admissions to 
psychiatric care, and creates no obligations regarding the provision of community 
services.70 The Mental Health Commission is already involved in a wide range of 
activities including: the preparation of a code of practice, the power to register 
approved centres, and the establishment of the Inspectorate of Mental Health Services 
to ensure quality of care and treatment for all residents.71 The Inspector is responsible 
to the Commission and monitors the standards of care and treatment in all approved 
centres. Statutory regulations will be drafted concerning the standards in mental 
health centres including: the standard of accommodation, the care of the residents, 
staffing levels and the provision of individual care plans. These requirements give 
statutory force to many of the guidelines in the Department of Health Guidelines on 
Good Practice and Quality Assurance in Mental Health Services (1998) which have 
provided guidance on best practice in areas like consent to treatment and other issues 
not addressed in the 1945 Act. One of the principal functions of the Mental Health
noCommission under the 2001 Act is to produce a code of practice. This code of
68 The 1945 Act provided for a ministerial review, with the assistance of the Inspector of Mental 
Hospitals, of all detention orders, but this was later repealed by the Mental Treatment Act 1961. This 
provision would not have satisfied the independence requirement under Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. See chapter 2 for full discussion of this issue.
69 See chapter 9 for full discussion of Irish mental health law and children.
70 Amnesty International, Mental Illness: the Neglected Quarter (Dublin 2003), the author’s own 
opinion in, Keys M., “Issues for the New Mental Health Act,” (2001) Medico Legal Journal o f Ireland 
97. Department of Health and Children, Report o f  the Inspector ofMental Hospitals for year ending 
2003, Government Publications, Dublin, 2004. Figures for 2003 indicate that there were 18,969 
admissions and of these approximately 11% or 2,527 were compulsory admissions.
71 Mental Health Act 2001, sections 50-55. The first report was published in July 2005.
12lbid, section 33(3)(e).
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practice will be a vital adjunct to the legislation and many of the inadequacies in the 
legislation will have to be dealt with in the code.
Vulnerable adults
The protection of vulnerable adults and their recognition in the legal system, 
including safeguards to protect their rights to dignity, autonomy and self- 
determination has been the subject of recent or on-going law reform in many 
jurisdictions. The trend in some jurisdictions, like England, Wales and Scotland, is for 
separate statutory regimes for the treatment of mental incapacitated people without
TXconsent and for the management of their property and affairs. The formal legal 
procedures currently available in Ireland are the Ward of Court system and the 
Enduring Power of Attorney. These provisions are examined for compliance with the
*7 A
Convention. The lack of a modem legal framework for decision-making for 
vulnerable adults is currently under consideration by the Law Reform Commission 
which proposes a whole new approach to capacity assessment and guardianship 
orders.75 This is the first indication from the Government of their intention to fill the 
gap which currently excludes many vulnerable adults from the decision-making 
process. The effect of such a vacuum results in a failure to protect their autonomy and 
privacy in many areas including personal relationships.
Summary of contents
This work will address the requirements of the Convention under Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 
and 12 as they apply to people with mental disorder and examine Ireland’s level of 
compliance with the Convention. The order in which these Articles are considered in 
the body of this work does not follow the sequence in the Convention, but is ordered 
in a manner thought to provide a logical sequence. This includes a separate chapter on 
children that considers the impact of Articles 3, 5, and 8 of the Convention and the 
safeguards for children in Irish law. The transitional state of Irish law is
73 Mental Capacity Act 2005 and in Scotland the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.
74 See chapters 3 and 6 of this work for further discussion.
75 The Law Reform Commission Reports, The Law and the Elderly (LRC CP 23-2003), Vulnerable 
Adults and Decision-Making (LRC CP 25 2005)
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acknowledged in the examination of two statutes currently in force, the 1945 Act and 
the 2001 Act.
Chapter One examines the right to liberty in the context of Irish law against the 
requirements in Article 5. Article 5 is at the core of this work, as it is the only Article 
of the Convention that refers to “persons of unsound mind” and also because all the 
other rights may be affected by the removal of the right to liberty. The provisions of 
the legislation, both the 1945 Act and the 2001 Act, are outlined with regard to 
compulsory admission and the chapter includes an examination of the criteria and 
procedures leading to detention. A number of cases have established a failure to
*7 ( \comply with the 1945 Act and these will be discussed. The question of the 
appropriate environment for mental health detention is raised as to whether there are 
conditions of detention in Ireland that might destroy the therapeutic purpose and 
thereby breach Article 5. The question of what constitutes a deprivation of liberty in 
Irish law involves a discussion of the safeguards for some voluntary patients and 
whether Article 5 might apply to them. The provision of information in both Acts 
about the right to challenge detention is considered in light of Article 5(2).
Chapter Two addresses the right to review of detention under Article 5(4), a right long 
established in other jurisdictions. Review of detention is a core right for people 
detained in psychiatric care and both the 1945 Act and the 2001 Act are examined for 
compliance with Article 5(4). The use of habeas corpus and judicial review, as the 
only means available currently for independent review of detention, are considered 
against Article 5(4) requirements. The results of a study on the accessibility of habeas 
corpus to people in mental health detention will be included in this chapter. The right 
to review of detention and the procedures involved under the 1945 and 2001 Acts will 
be assessed for compliance with the right to a fair hearing and a speedy review under 
Article 5(4).
Chapter Three focuses on an examination of the right to respect for private life in 
Article 8, addressing in particular the right to self-determination in relation to medical 
treatment for mental disorder. The safeguards concerning the right to consent to
76 Melly v. Moran & NWHB, Unreported Supreme Court, May 28th 1998, Kieman v. Kieman & Harris 
& MWHB Unreported High Court, May 12th 1998, Bailey v. Gallagher [1996] ILRM 433.
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treatment and to make advance directives, driven by efforts to uphold autonomy and 
dignity and supported by Article 8, will be discussed together with the use of 
seclusion in Irish mental health law. The right to confidentiality is another important 
aspect of private life that will be addressed in this chapter. Other aspects of the right 
to respect for private and family life that are discussed include proxy decision-making 
for children and incapacitated adults. Recognition in Irish law of the right to respect 
for home and correspondence is also considered.
Chapter Four deals with the impact of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading 
treatment in Article 3 and compliance in Irish law. The role of the CPT is examined 
together with its implications for defining what is inhuman and degrading treatment 
for people with mental disorder and for prisoners. The key questions raised in this 
chapter are whether the conditions in which mentally disordered people are detained 
could reach the minimum level of severity to come within the scope of Article 3, 
whether medical treatment could amount to inhuman and degrading treatment, 
whether the side effects of treatment could be severe enough to engage Article 3 and 
whether the failure to treat an individual could amount to a breach of Article 3.
Chapter Five deals with the nature of civil rights and obligations under Article 6, the 
requirement to have a fair and public hearing in a reasonable time affecting access to 
court. The right to litigate under Irish law is examined as well as the right to legal 
representation and legal aid. The restrictions on access to court under the 1945 Act 
and the 2001 Act are examined through case law to see if they are proportionate to the 
aims sought to be achieved.
Chapter Six considers Article 6 requirements in the context of the provisions relating 
to the law on the management of the person or property and affairs of mentally 
incapacitated adults under Irish law. The ward of court system, which is paternalistic, 
cumbersome and totally restrictive of individual autonomy, is examined against the 
background of Article 6. These provisions include capacity assessments and proxy 
decision-making for incapacitated adults where necessary. The enduring power of 
attorney is an example of the right to self-determination in anticipation of incapacity.
77 Council of Europe, CPT Standards on Health Care Services in Prisons, Extract from the 3rd General 
Report [CPT/Inf (93) 12].
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The Law Reform Commission proposals for reform of this area of the law include a 
comprehensive system of proxy decision-making for incapacitated adults, as well as 
procedures for the removal of an individual’s capacity to make decisions and the
no
protections of vulnerable adults.
Chapter Seven considers the right to life and the obligations on the State to safeguard 
this right under Article 2. People in detention are vulnerable and create an onus on the 
state to protect their lives. This obligation is particularly important in relation to 
people who die in custody where there is knowledge both of the vulnerability of such 
individuals and the higher suicide risk associated with them. The key questions that 
will be addressed under Article 2 are: the action of state agents and non-state agents in 
the deaths of individuals in their custody, individuals taking their own lives and the 
risk to the public from mental disorder. The duty on the State to investigate any death 
arising in these circumstances will be examined and compared with the obligations 
under Article 2.
Chapter Eight deals with the right to marry and found a family under Article 12 and 
examines Irish law against the requirements in relation to people with mental 
disorder. The focus of this chapter is on the legal basis of the right to marry and the 
scope of the restrictions imposed on people who have a mental disorder. The right to 
found a family and the limits on this right in relation to having a sexual relationship 
and reproduction are also considered. The Law Reform Commission has made 
proposals for reform in this area based on the right to autonomy and self- 
determination and these are examined.
Chapter Nine considers the admission of children to psychiatric care and the 
safeguards in Irish legislation to comply with the Convention in relation to 
deprivation of liberty, the right to respect for private and family life, including the 
right to self-determination, and the right to protection from inhuman and degrading
78 Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper, Law and the Elderly (LRC CP-23 2003) recommends 
the abolition of the system and replacement with a whole new system. The operation of the system in 
relation to the welfare of the person and medical treatment will be dealt with under Article 8. See 
chapter 3.
Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper, Vulnerable Adults and the Law: Capacity, (LRC CP 37- 
2005).
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treatment. The fact that children are generally subject to parental control and also 
have child-care laws applying to them necessitates a somewhat different approach. 
The recognition of parental authority under Article 5 and also under the Constitution 
is discussed.79 The safeguards for consent to treatment for children are examined in 
relation to Article 8 and the particular problems associated with older children and 
their right to self-determination under the 2001 Act are addressed. The influence of 
international and regional human rights instruments support the decision-making
o n
autonomy of children as a factor associated with age and maturity. These covenants
O 1
also require that children are treated in an appropriate environment. Children and 
vulnerable adults are treated similarly under the Convention and need independent 
representatives to advocate for them when they are receiving psychiatric treatment 
and to prevent them from being exposed to unwarranted interferences by the state, or 
other private individuals.
Finally, the question that arises in relation to reform of Irish mental health legislation 
is whether the Mental Health Act 2001 will obviate the need to have to resort to the 
human rights legislation to affirm safeguards for psychiatric patients, to provide 
support for and to assist across a spectrum of civil rights and obligations.
... if there is a single moral imperative to which we must respond in the 
context of mental health law it is the human rights obligation to translate the 
core ethical principles of respect for personal autonomy, justice, and 
paternalistic caring into the legal code ... law has an essential role to play in 
this area.82
Irish mental health law will now be examined using the Convention as a yardstick 
against which to measure human rights compliance.
79 Nielsen v. Denmark (1988) 11 EHRR 175, North Western Health Board v. HW & CW Unreported 
Supreme Court, November 8th 2001.
80 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 12 and Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine 1997, Article 6(2).
81 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Recommendation (2004) 10 on the protection o f  the 
human rights and dignity o f persons with mental disorder.
82 Cooney T., “Psychiatric Detainees and the Human Rights Challenge to Psychiatry and Law: Where 
Do We Go From Here?”, in Heffeman, (ed.), Human Rights A European Perspective, Round Hall 
Press, Dublin, 1994, p i27.
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Chapter 1
ARTICLE 5 AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY UNDER IRISH MENTAL 
HEALTH LAW
Introduction
This chapter considers the right to liberty under Article 5 of the Convention and the 
provisions in Irish law regarding compulsory admission and detention of patients. Article 
5 is the only Article of the Convention that refers to “persons of unsound mind” and it 
impacts on many other rights due to the removal of the right to liberty. The provisions of 
the legislation, both the 1945 Act and the 2001 Act are outlined with regard to 
compulsory admission, including the criteria and procedures leading to detention. For the 
purpose of detention on the grounds of unsoundness of mind, detention must take place in 
a hospital, clinic or similar institution. The question of the appropriate environment for 
mental health detention is raised as to whether there are conditions of detention in Ireland 
that might destroy the therapeutic purpose and breach Article 5(1 )(e). What constitutes a 
deprivation of liberty in Irish law is considered in light of the problems arising under both 
Acts regarding the compliant incapacitated person in the context of the decisions in HL v. 
United Kingdom and Storck v. Germany and the State obligations arising as a result.1 The 
provision of information in both Acts about the right to challenge detention is considered 
in light of Article 5(2). The right to review of detention in Article 5(4), as an aspect of the 
right to liberty in Irish law, will be considered in Chapter 2.
Article 5(1) provides,
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law:
1 HL v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004, and Storck v. Germany Application 
no.61603/00 16th June 2005.
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(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of 
infectious diseases, persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or 
vagrants.
Article 5(2) Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language, 
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.
Article 5 (1) protects the “right to liberty and security of the person” and is referred to as 
the “liberty5’ Article; it is designed to prevent arbitrary deprivation of liberty. In 
Winterwerp v. Netherlands, the Court referred to the importance of the aim underlying 
Article 5 in a democratic society subscribing to the rule of law, “that no-one should be 
dispossessed of his liberty in an arbitrary fashion.”2 The state is prohibited from 
depriving an individual of his or her liberty except in one of the circumstances listed in 
Articles 5(1). Article 5 covers all forms of detention and it is the only Article that 
expressly refers to persons of unsound mind comprising one of the exceptions to the right 
to liberty. The right to liberty is not absolute, but a person can only be detained in 
accordance with domestic law and while this is primarily a question for the national 
courts, domestic law must be consistent with the standards of the Convention, including 
its general principles.3 The Court, in Litwa v. Poland, referring to the least restrictive 
alternative, emphasised the seriousness of detention that it is only justified where other 
less severe measures have been looked at and found to be insufficient to safeguard the 
individual or public interest, so that “the deprivation of liberty must be shown to have 
been necessary in the circumstances.”4 Many of the other Convention rights are 
somewhat based on Article 5 because of the effect detention has on an individual, 
particularly with regard to private and family life. Along with the curtailment of liberty, 
the state has power to impose restrictions that impact on various fundamental rights, such 
as the right to privacy, autonomy, self-determination, freedom of expression and 
association. Safeguards are provided by which a person who is detained is entitled to 
information concerning his detention and the right to initial and regular review of 
continuing detention.
2 (1979) 2 EHRR 387 para 37.
3 Ibid, para 39.
4 (2001) 33 EHRR 53 para 78.
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In order to comply with the lawfulness requirement in Article 5(1) domestic legal 
procedures must be followed correctly, so that an examination of the lawfulness of 
detention for Convention purposes requires consideration of whether this has been the 
case. These domestic procedures must accord with Convention standards of lawfulness 
and principles such as proportionality. In the Irish courts, failure to comply with the 
requirements of the 1945 Act has been established in cases dealing with the examination 
for detention,5 the use of the second opinion procedure6 and the use of documents that are 
out of date.7 These cases arose in the context of applications to the High Court for leave 
to take civil action and, in each case, the detention procedures were found to be invalid 
and leave to proceed was, therefore, granted.
Article 5(1) Deprivation of liberty
The essence of Article 5(1) is that any detention must be in keeping with a procedure 
prescribed by law and this lawfulness covers procedural as well as substantive rules. In 
Engel v. Netherlands, the Court referred to the fundamental right of “unhindered physical 
freedom” or physical liberty.8 The right to freedom cannot be removed in an arbitrary 
manner because detention that is arbitrary cannot be regarded as “lawful.”9 Fennell 
comments that the “... primary impact of the Convention on psychiatric patients has been 
in relation to protection against arbitrary detention under Article 5, unsoundness of mind 
being one of the permitted grounds of deprivation of liberty under Article 5(l)(e).”10 
There are no minimum procedural guarantees laid down in 5(1 )(e); it is left to the 
discretion of national laws. However, in Winterwerp v. Netherlands and in Reid v. United 
Kingdom, the Court held that the safeguards must be of a kind which are appropriate to 
the deprivation of liberty in question and include rights to representation.11 No right to 
treatment can be derived from Article 5(1 )(e), though Gostin comments that “lawful”
5 Melly v. Moran & NWHB Unreported Supreme Court, May 28th ,1998.
6 Kieman v .Kieman, Harris & MWHB Unreported High Court, May 12th, 1998.
7 Bailey v. Gallagher [1996] ILRM 433.
8 [1976] 1 EHRR 647 para 58.
9 Guzzardi v. Italy [1980] 3 EHRR 333.
10 Fennell P., “The Third Way in Mental Health Policy: Negative Rights, Positive Rights, and the 
Convention.” (1999) 26(1) Journal of Law and Society pp 103-127.
11 (1979) 2 EHRR 347, Application no 50272/99.
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detention may require a minimal therapeutic environment on the basis of the connection 
between the purpose of detention and treatment.12 In order for Article 5 to be engaged, 
there must be a deprivation of liberty.
The primary focus of Article 5 is deprivation of liberty, and “a deprivation of liberty 
which does not fall within one of the six categories listed in Article 5(1 )(a) to (f) will, 
without more, be unlawful under the Convention”.13 There is a distinction between a 
deprivation of liberty to which Article 5 applies and a restriction on liberty, which is 
protected by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.14 A significant body of case 
law from the Convention considers the meaning of deprivation of liberty under Article 5 
and the distinction between this and the protections under the Fourth Protocol. One of the 
early landmark decisions is Guzzardi v. Italy where the Court held that the distinction 
between these two factors is “merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or 
substance”.15 In Ashingdane v. United Kingdom the applicant’s detention under the 
Mental Health Act 1959 in an open ward constituted continuing deprivation of liberty 
even though he was free to move within the hospital grounds.16 The Court held that his 
liberty had been circumscribed both in fact and in law. In considering whether a 
deprivation of liberty has taken place, the starting point or test is the concrete situation of 
the individual in question and the Court has affirmed in both Guzzardi and Ashingdane 
that, in assessing that concrete situation, account must be taken of a whole range of 
factors,
such as the type, duration, effects and the manner of implementation of the 
measure in question. The distinction between deprivation of and restriction upon 
liberty is merely one of degree, and not one of nature or substance.17
In HM v. Switzerland, the applicant complained that she was placed by court order, of 
unlimited duration, in a foster home while she was able to care for herself in her home
12 Gostin “Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities, The European Convention of Human 
Rights”, (2000) 23(2) lnt.J.L.& P.. p i43.
13( 1987) 9 EHRR 297 para 125.
14 This Protocol is included in the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003.
15 (1981) 3 EHRR 333 para 93.
'Vl985)7EHRR 528.
1 Ibid, para 41.
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and this was a breach of her rights under Article 5. The Court had to consider if this 
amounted to deprivation of liberty and, if so, whether it complied with the requirements 
of Article 5(1 )(e). The applicant also pointed out that Article 5 referred to “vagrancy” and 
not “neglect”, which was the reason for her removal. The foster home was an open 
institution with complete freedom of movement and the applicant was never in a closed 
ward. She could have personal contacts and communicate with others by phone or letter 
and the only restriction she had was to be available at certain hours for medical treatment. 
There was evidence that she welcomed the environment and agreed to stay of her own 
free will, so much so that the order was lifted. The Court followed Ashingdane v. United 
Kingdom in holding that “the distinction between a deprivation of and restriction upon 
liberty is merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance” and held 
that she was not detained for the purpose of Article 5(1).19
The dissenting judgment of Loucaides J. raises issues worth noting.20 The first issue he
addressed was whether HM was willing to be admitted and he followed the Court in De
0 1Wilde, Ooms & Versyp v. Belgium by saying they should not use voluntariness to 
disguise what was a mandatory deprivation of liberty. The willingness of the patient to 
submit to a deprivation of liberty cannot be the sole reason for losing the benefit of 
Article 5. He was also critical of the Swiss Court’s apparent reliance on the applicant’s 
best interests as a reason for her placement. He considered this to be irrelevant. He cited 
Winterwerp in support of his decision and referred to the lack of medical examination to 
support the finding of a mental disorder.
The Court later in HL v. United Kingdom adopted much of the reasoning employed by 
Louciades, in what was the first opportunity for the Court to examine whether a 
compliant but incapacitated person admitted informally under the English Mental Health 
Act 1983 and then subjected to the hospital regime was actually deprived of liberty under
18 (2004) 38 EHRR 17.
19 H985) 7 EHRR 528 para 41.
20 HM v Switzerland (2004) 38 EHRR 17. Application no. 39187/98 26th Feb. 2002, pp 16-20 Loucaides J.
21 (1971) 1 EHRR 373.
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Article 5.22 In the domestic courts, the majority of the House of Lords specifically 
distinguished actual restraint of a person (which would amount to false imprisonment) 
and restraint, which was conditional upon his seeking to leave (which would not 
constitute false imprisonment). The Court did not consider such a distinction to be of 
central importance under the Convention. It did not accept as determinative the fact relied 
on by the Government that the regime applied to the applicant (as a compliant 
incapacitated patient) did not materially differ from that applied to a person who had the 
capacity to consent to hospital treatment, neither objecting to their admission to hospital. 
In fact, this would seem to totally ignore the fundamental differences between these two 
groups. The Court referred to the importance of not undermining the benefit of the 
Convention because a person is compliant, especially when it is not disputed that that 
person is legally incapable of consenting to, or disagreeing with, the proposed action. The 
Court believed that, like the Ashingdane judgment, “the health care professionals 
exercised complete control over his movements and care from the outset.”23 The hospital 
staff had complete and effective control over his assessment, treatment, contacts, his 
movements and his residence. He had been sedated and his foster family were unable to 
meet him or take him home. The argument regarding the “locked or lockable” ward was 
not a deciding factor in whether someone was deprived of liberty or not.24
Accordingly, the concrete situation was that the applicant was under continuous 
supervision and control and was not free to leave. Any suggestion to the contrary 
was, in the Court's view, fairly described by Lord Steyn as “stretching credulity to 
breaking point” and as a “fairy tale.”25
The Court concluded that HL was detained and this was consistent with Neilsen v. 
Denmark where parental rights permitted the mother to remove her son at any time 
following his voluntary admission at her behest.26 The fact that the hospital had to rely on 
the common law doctrine of necessity and, subsequently, on the involuntary detention 
provisions of the 1983 Act “demonstrates that the hospital did not have legal authority to
22 HL v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004 para 89.
23 Ibid, para 91.
24 Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (1984) 6 EHRR 69 paras 24 and 42.
2:> Ibid, para 91.
26 (1989) 11 EHRR 175 para 93.
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act on the applicant's behalf ...”27 The Court, therefore, concluded that the applicant was 
deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Convention.
In order to establish that a deprivation of liberty has occurred, the Court must be satisfied 
regarding the actual situation of the individual, that the degree or intensity of such 
deprivation results in the individual being subject to a level of control that he is not free 
to leave and is subject to supervision, even when in an open ward. In Storck v. Germany, 
the Court referred to the requirement of an objective and a subjective element to satisfy 
the notion of deprivation of liberty. The objective element involves a person’s 
confinement in a particular restricted space for a not negligible length of time. The 
applicant had been placed in a locked ward, had been under the continuous supervision 
and control of the private clinic personnel and had not been free to leave during the
90twenty months at the clinic. She had attempted to flee on several occasions and had to 
be fettered in order to ensure she remained. On one occasion, she had to be brought back 
by the police. She had been unable to maintain contact with the outside world and the 
court regarded this as satisfying the objective element of deprivation of liberty. The 
subjective element requires that the person has not validly consented to the confinement 
in question. The applicant had capacity to consent, but there was no evidence that she had 
agreed to her continued stay at the clinic.30 Affirming the statement in HL, the Court 
stated that “the right to liberty is too important in a democratic society for a person to 
lose the benefit of the Convention protection for the single reason that he may have given 
himself up to be taken into detention.”31 The decision follows on the decision in HL and 
is distinguished from HM  on the basis that the applicant in that case was undecided about 
staying in the nursing home, thereby permitting the conclusion that she did not object.
In each of these cases, the Court examined the elements of a deprivation of liberty which 
requires an examination of the specific situation of the individual in question. This 
involves consideration of a range of factors, such as the type, duration, effects and
2 HL v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004 para 93.
28 Application no. 61603/00 16th June 2005 para 74.
29 Ibid, para 73
30 Ibid,paras 75-76.
31 Ibid, para 75.
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manner of implementation of the measures in question. The factual, or objective, element 
of a deprivation of liberty involves the confinement of a person to a particular limited 
area for a period of time where the evidence indicates the person has not validly 
consented to such confinement. Even if the person has seemingly consented to being in 
detention initially, the safeguards of the Convention will not be lost to him or her based 
on the importance of the right to liberty.
Irish law and deprivation of liberty
Mental Treatment Act 1945
The provision in the English Mental Health Act 1983 whereby a person is admitted as an 
informal patient and is later prevented from leaving is replicated in the voluntary 
admission provisions of the 1945 Act.32 The 1945 Act provides for a degree of formality 
in voluntary admission to hospital in that adults, people over 16 years, are required to 
make their own application for admission and the application must be accompanied by a 
recommendation from a doctor based on an examination carried out in the previous seven 
days. The situation of a compliant incapacitated elderly person being admitted in this way 
is that he would be unable to assert a right to leave hospital or refuse treatment. The 
hospital staff are constantly present, and if the person attempted to leave he would be 
brought back. There is control over the assessment, treatment, movement and residence, 
in that the applicant would only be released when the hospital deemed it appropriate and 
frequently would be involved in a decision on the most appropriate residence.33 
Accordingly, the factual situation of these patients is that they are under continuous 
supervision and control and are not free to leave. The 1945 Act makes provision where a 
person is not capable of being a voluntary patient as follows,
Section 195. -Where a person who has been treated in an approved institution as a 
voluntary patient becomes mentally incapable of expressing himself as willing or 
not willing to remain in the institution, he shall be discharged from the institution
32 Mental Health Act 1983 section 131, Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 190.
33 HL v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004, para 91.
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into the custody of such person as the person in charge of the institution approves 
of not later that twenty eight days after becoming so incapable unless he sooner 
becomes capable of expressing himself as aforesaid or a Reception Order relating 
to him is obtained.
This section recognises that the patient may not be truly voluntary and mandates that the 
compliant incapacitated person is either detained or discharged to a more suitable 
environment. This clearly is not the practice as there are many patients who are de facto 
detained and not capable of deciding to leave or remain.34 A second problem with the 
section is that the procedure does not have to be instigated for 28 days during which time 
the patient is de facto detained and the power to have complete control over such patients 
for this period is enshrined in the section. While it appears to be a safeguard on one level, 
the excessive time limit permitted seems disproportionate to the aim of ensuring the 
patient does not remain as a voluntary incapacitated patient. There is no guidance on 
whether the person can be compulsorily treated during this period. The notice of intention 
to leave increases the possibility for the imposition of restrictions on such patients and 
provides,
Section 194(1) A person not less than 16 years of age who is being treated in an 
approved institution as a voluntary patient may give written notice that he wishes 
to leave the institution not earlier than seventy-two hours from the giving of the 
notice and he shall be entitled and shall be allowed to leave the institution on or at 
any time after the expiration of the said seventy-two hours.
The power to detain during this period was raised in Gooden v. Waterford Regional 
Hospital, involving a habeas corpus application where the applicant argued 
unsuccessfully that he should not be subject to detention after the expiration of the 72 
hour notice period.35 The Supreme Court stated that a voluntary patient who has given 
notice may not be released prior to the expiration of the notice period, but may be 
permitted to leave on or at any time after its expiry. Rejecting a literal interpretation of 
section 194(1) which would have resulted in mandatory release of ill patients after the
34 Evidence for this practice comes from the author’s own work experience in addition to information given 
at mental health conferences. On a visit to a large psychiatric hospital many of the patients were on 
voluntary admission forms and these patients were deemed not to have the capacity to make such a 
decision.
35 [2001] IESC 6 21st February 2001.
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notice period had expired, the Supreme Court read sections 194 and 195 together to 
imply a power of detention for such patients. McGuinness J. referred to the “weaknesses 
in the current legislation” where no express provision is made for admitting voluntary 
patients who want to leave hospital but are too ill, and that “it had been necessary for the 
court to imply such a provision. This is not a satisfactory situation.” The provision 
implied was that it was possible to detain a voluntary patient following the expiry of the 
notice requirement in section 194(1) by reading it along with section 195 which permits 
the detention of voluntary patients who are no longer capable of being voluntary. There is 
no indication that section 195 was drafted to deal with patients wanting to leave hospital 
against advice and the impact of this decision means that the courts are forced to find a 
basis for detaining such patients. This decision exposes the arbitrariness in the current 
law and its unpredictability in such circumstances.
Apart from those voluntary patients who give notice of their intention to leave, the 1945 
Act is clear that patients who are not capable of being voluntary should be discharged or 
detained. Failure to comply with this procedure amounts to a breach of national law and 
of the Convention. It also confirms that patients who are de facto detained require 
safeguards that are not available and as a result the 1945 Act is in breach of Convention
in t
requirements following HL v. United Kingdom and Storck v. Germany. The uncertainty 
in these sections confirms that the law lacks the requirement of accessibility and 
precision under the Convention.
Mental Health Act 2001
The 2001 Act does not impose any formal admission requirements on voluntary patients, 
but has a 24 hour holding power pending a decision on detention where necessary and 
provides,
Section 29 -Nothing in this Act shall be construed as preventing a person from 
being admitted voluntarily to an approved centre for treatment without any
36 Ibid, para 53.
37 (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004, Application no. 61603/00 16th June 2005.
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application, recommendation or admission order rendering him or her liable to be 
detained under this Act or from remaining in an approved centre after he or she 
has ceased to be so liable to be detained.
The use of the word “voluntarily” might be expected to embrace not only the truly 
voluntary patient with capacity, but also those patients without capacity as is the case in 
the Mental Health Act 1983. However, the 2001 Act may have a narrower intention and 
imply that the person has the capacity to understand that consent is being given to the 
admission, to remaining in hospital and to any treatment received. This interpretation is 
confirmed by the discussions of the section during the Dail debates on the introduction of 
the legislation.38 The question here is whether only those who are truly voluntary will be 
admitted under this section and those without capacity will be detained. This outcome 
would be inconsistent with the expected workloads of the tribunals outlined during the 
debates prior to enactment.39 There is no section similar to section 195 of the 1945 Act 
that recognises lack of voluntariness. The 2001 Act provides only that, if a voluntary 
patient wants to leave hospital and the staff are of the opinion that the patient has a 
mental disorder, he can be detained on a holding power for 24 hours in order to get a 
second opinion and can be then be formally detained on foot of this opinion or 
discharged.40 This second opinion is not required to be independent and arguably creates 
a lower standard of safeguard for voluntary patients facing detention compared with 
someone in the community being detained who would have the benefit of an application 
for admission, as well as an opinion from the recommending doctor. It may expose an 
inequality that might engage Article 14 combined with Article 5 unless there is objective 
and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment.41 This justificiation may be 
that the patient is already in hospital and subject to continuous assessment prior to formal 
detention.
In the debates in the Bill both junior and senior Ministers for Health and Children stated that unless the
person was capable of being voluntary they should be detained. (536 Dail Debates Cols 1455-1459). 
j9 The expected volume was discussed in the Dail Debates. (536 Dail Debates Cols 1439-1443).
40 Mental Health Act 2001, sections 23(1) & 24.
41 Wintermute R. “’Within the Ambit’: How Big Is the ‘Gap’ in Article 14 European Convention on Human 
Rights?” [2004] 4 EHRLR pp366-382. He considers the greater use of Article 14 as a means of providing 
general protection against discrimination by recognising that not only an opportunity denied, but a ground 
for denial may fall within “the ambit” of another Article of the Convention .
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The limited approach to the issue of voluntariness in the 2001 Act creates uncertainty 
about how the compliant incapacitated patient will be dealt with when the Act is in 
operation. Such patients will continue to be admitted with no additional safeguards 
provided. However, where such admissions meet the requirements to establish a 
deprivation of liberty, procedures are needed to ensure that these are lawful. These 
procedures include the presentation to a competent authority of objective medical 
evidence of a true mental disorder which is of a kind or degree justifying detention, and 
regular rights to review of detention.
Article 5 (l)(e) Criteria for detention
The purpose behind Article 5(1 )(e) is to protect persons of unsound mind against 
arbitrariness in the deprivation of their liberty.42 Therefore, any removal of liberty must 
be in keeping with the specific purposes laid out in Article 5(1 )(e). The purpose of 
psychiatric detention is therapeutic and it must be clearly established before a competent 
authority that the person is of unsound mind. Exceptions to this requirement are made in 
emergencies and the Court has afforded a discretion or margin of appreciation to national 
authorities in evaluating the evidence presented to them.
The links between the four categories of people referred to in Article (5)(l)(e) have been 
acknowledged by the Court on the basis that all of them can be detained under domestic 
law, provided it accords with the requirements of Article 5. The term “vagrant” was 
addressed by the Court in De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp and the Court acknowledged the 
definition in national law, referring to persons of no fixed abode as those who had no 
means of subsistence, trade, or profession.43 The Court held that anyone coming within 
this Belgian definition was in principle a vagrant for the purpose of Article 5(1 )(e). In 
Litwa v. Poland, the Court referred to the link between all the categories and stated,
42 Herczegfalvy v..Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437, Winterwerp v. Netherlands 2 EHRR 387, X  v. United 
Kingdom (1981)4 EHRR 181.
43 (1971) 1 EHRR 373.
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... There is a link between all those persons in that they may be deprived of their 
liberty either in order to be given medical treatment or because of considerations 
dictated by social policy, or on both medical and social grounds.... a predominant 
reason why the Convention allows the persons mentioned in paragraph 1(e) of 
Article 5 to be deprived of their liberty is not only that they are dangerous for 
public safety but also that their own interests may necessitate their detention”.44
Articles 5(1 )(e) groups together those who are largely marginalized in society and who 
can be forcibly detained without a criminal conviction. Gostin is critical of this grouping 
and refers to the lack of justification for state intervention with these categories and finds 
justification on public health grounds only in relation to infectious diseases.45 He refers to 
the other groups as a series of “personal health statuses based on health or socio­
economic status.”46 These would not of themselves necessitate detention without the 
justification of a finding of dangerousness and possible benefit from receiving treatment 
and could expose potential for conflict with Article 3, on inhuman and degrading 
treatment, as well as Article 3 read with Article 14 on possible discrimination.47
In Winterwerp v. Netherlands the Commission stated that no one may be confined as 
person of unsound mind in the absence of medical evidence establishing that his mental 
state is such as to justify his compulsory hospitalisation.48 There is no definition of 
“persons of unsound mind” in Article 5(1 )(e), but the Court in Winterwerp v. Netherlands 
stated that,
the Convention does not state what is to be understood by the words ‘person of 
unsound mind’ ... it is a term whose meaning is continually evolving as research 
in psychiatry progresses, an increasing flexibility in treatment is developing and 
society’s attitude to mental illness changes, in particular so that a greater 
understanding of the problems of mental patients is becoming more widespread. 49
44 (2001) 33 EHRR 53 para 60.
43 Op. cit., 12 p i36.
4 7  I b l d 'See discussion on Mental Treatment Act 1945 sections 163(2) and 166(1) pp 41 and 42 this chapter.
48 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387, Commission Report para 76.
49 Ibid, para 37. This interpretation o f ‘person of unsound mind’ was followed by Budd J. in the High Court 
in the Irish decision in Croke v. Smith & Eastern Health Board, Unreported High Court, July, 1995.
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The Court confirmed that it is not possible to give a definitive meaning to “person of 
unsound mind” due to the evolving knowledge in psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. 
The interpretation of that phrase is to be gathered from domestic law and accord also with 
developments at an international level. A person cannot be detained “simply because his 
views or behaviour deviate from the norms prevailing in a particular society.”50 The 
applicant in Koniarska v. United Kingdom had been diagnosed as suffering from a 
psychopathic disorder and her detention was found to be needed as there was a danger of 
her injuring herself or other persons.51 There could thus be said to be both medical and 
social reasons for her detention.
The applicant in Winterwerp had been committed to hospital initially for a short period, 
later for a longer term on a non-emergency procedure and a District Court order. He 
regularly sought his discharge.52 The Commission was unanimous that there was no 
breach of Article 5(1) but there was a breach of Article 5(4). His detention could be 
justified under Article 5(1 )(e) on the basis of unsoundness of mind. The Court agreed 
with the Commission that no one could be detained as a person of unsound mind in the 
absence of medical evidence to justify compulsory hospitalisation. The Court listed the 
well established three pronged Winterwerp requirements for lawful detention that apply, 
except in emergencies,
• There must be reliable evidence of a true mental disorder based on objective 
medical expertise and presented to a competent authority,
• The mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting confinement,
• The validity of the continued confinement depends on the persistence of such a 
disorder.
The Court confirmed that it is for national authorities to evaluate the evidence before 
them in a particular case and that the Court’s task is to review the decisions of those 
authorities against this background.53 The defendant state is allowed a margin of 
appreciation in making the assessment of the particular person’s situation. In the case of
50 Ibid, para 37.
31 (2000) 30 EHRR 139. Application no. 33670/96 12th October 2000.
32 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387.
33 Ibid, para 40.
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the release of an individual where there is a concern regarding danger to the public, 
national authorities are entitled to exercise caution.54 The test arising from such 
statements is whether it can be reliably shown that the patient suffers from a mental 
disorder sufficiently serious to warrant detention. Medical assessment must be based on 
the actual state of mental health of the person concerned and not solely on past events and 
is not sufficient to justify deprivation of liberty if a significant period of time has 
elapsed.55
The nature or degree of a mental disorder required for detention was raised in HL v. 
United Kingdom. There, the applicant maintained that he had a mental disorder, but it 
was not of such a nature or degree as to justify his subsequent admission to hospital or, 
alternatively, it ceased to be of such a degree shortly afterwards.56 The Court held on the 
evidence that he had a mental disorder that was persistent and warranted continuous 
confinement.
In Winterwerp and in X  v. United Kingdom the Court held that the requirement of
cn
objective evidence of a true mental disorder did not apply to emergency detentions. The 
Court said that if domestic law provides for emergency detention where there is a danger 
to others, then it would not be practical to expect a thorough medical examination prior to 
detention. According to the Court, national authorities with power to order emergency 
detentions enjoy a wide discretion as they are better placed to evaluate the evidence 
adduced before them and the Court’s task is limited to reviewing under the Convention 
the decisions they have taken.
Thorold refers to Winterwerp as the “first landmark interpretation of Article 5” regarding 
mental illness and the decision which held that “lawful” detention presupposed 
conformity with both domestic law and the Convention and covered procedural, as well
54HL v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004 para 98.
55 Varbanovv. Bulgaria (2000) MHLR 263. Application no. 31365/96.
^  HL v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004.
3 X  v. United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 188 para 42.
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as substantive, rules.58 Even if national law is clear and has been complied with, 
currently, deprivation of liberty will not be “lawful” if domestic law does not comply 
with the Convention and allows for arbitrary or excessive detention.
The Winterwerp criteria are unambiguous on the issue of the necessity for objective 
medical expertise to avoid arbitrariness in detention in non-emergency situations.59 The 
lack of medical evidence in Varbanov v. Bulgaria was highlighted and the Court held 
there was a violation of Article S(l).60 While the Court acknowledged that in emergency 
cases such evidence may not be necessary, there was no such emergency in his case and 
while in detention he had not undergone psychiatric assessment. When the issue of 
danger arises as a consideration in detention and the required procedures have not been 
adhered to, the Court has shown considerable deference to national authorities in relation 
to the application of the Winterwerp criteria.
Failure to carry out a medical examination for recall at the end of a prison sentence was 
held to violate Article 5(1) in Kay v. United Kingdom.61 The recall power lacked the 
required pre-condition of a medical recommendation and no medical report was sought 
by the Home Secretary indicating that the applicant needed hospital treatment. The power 
is far wider than Article 5 permits. The Home Secretary had the opportunity to have an 
assessment carried out in prison and to produce reports, but failed to do so. Thorold states 
that any use of the recall power, except in an emergency, without a medical 
recommendation will be likely to constitute a violation of Article 5.62
The issue of treatability was raised by the applicant in Reid v. United Kingdom, and the 
question arose as to whether his detention in psychiatric care, receiving only minimal 
medical treatment, infringed Article 5(1).63 The Court referred to the need to establish 
that the person is suffering from a mental disorder of a kind or degree warranting
58 Thorold O., “The Implications of the European Convention on Human Rights for the United Kingdom 
Legislation”, (1996) EHRLR Issue 6 619.
59 (1979) 4 EHRR 387.
60 (2000) MHLR 263. Application no. 31365/96 5th October 2000.
61 Application No. 11468/85 15th April 1988.
6~ Op. cit., 56.
63 Hutchison Reid v. United Kingdom,(2003) 37 EHRR 9. Application no.50272/99 para 47.
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compulsory confinement and held that such confinement may be necessary where the 
person needs therapy, medication or other treatments to alleviate the condition and to 
have control and supervision to prevent harm to himself and others. There was objective 
evidence of a true mental disorder and due to the risks involved the disorder was regarded 
as being of a degree warranting compulsory confinement. The decision to detain him was 
not arbitrary and so not in conflict with Article 5(1). The Court held that,
compulsory confinement, may be necessary not only where a person needs 
therapy, medication or other clinical treatment to cure or alleviate his condition, 
but also where the person needs control and supervision to prevent him, for 
example, causing harm to himself or others.64
One of the key questions in Article 5 is to understand the extent to which the Convention 
imposes positive obligations to detain mentally disordered people in institutions where 
they are offered suitable treatment. In Winterwerp, the applicant argued that Article 5(1) 
engenders for any individual confined as a person of unsound mind, the right to 
appropriate treatment in order to ensure that he is not detained any longer than absolutely 
necessary. He complained that the meetings with his psychiatrist were too short and 
infrequent and that the medication administered to him was unduly made up of 
tranquillisers. The Commission affirmed the view that Article 5(1 )(e) was concerned with 
the question of actual deprivation of liberty of psychiatric patients and not their treatment. 
The Court held that a patient’s right to treatment appropriate to his condition cannot, as 
such, be derived from Article 5(1 )(e) and the evidence indicated no breach of the 
Convention provisions.65 In Dhoest v. Belgium, the applicant argued likewise that there 
was a breach of Article 5(1 )(e) because he was detained as a person of unsound mind and 
was entitled to appropriate treatment in order to ensure that he was not detained longer 
than was absolutely necessary, as his treatment was limited to drug therapy.66 The 
Commission reaffirmed the principle that Article 5(1 )(e) was concerned with the question 
of the actual deprivation of liberty and not with the notion of treatment. Article 12 of 
Council of Europe Recommendation (2004) 10 refers to “appropriate individually
64 Ibid, para 57.
63 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 para 51.
66 Dhoest v. Belgium (1987) 12 EHRR 97.
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prescribed treatment plans,” though this document does not have the force of law. The 
tension between autonomy and the right to impose detention and treatment is heightened 
by the lack of a guarantee of appropriate treatment.
The importance of the therapeutic environment was raised in Aerts v. Belgium, 
reaffirming the approach in Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, which held that although 
there must be a relationship between the ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied 
on and the place and conditions of detention, Article 5(1) is not, in principle, concerned 
with treatment or conditions.6* Where the absence of appropriate treatment has a serious 
impact on the person, it may be argued that this would breach the positive obligations on 
the state in Article 3 to prevent torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. In Ashingdane, 
the Court held that detention would only be lawful if carried out in an appropriate 
environment, such as a hospital or clinic.69 Where the sole basis of detention is unsound 
mind, such an environment may breach Article 5(1 )(e), even where it is not in breach of 
Article 3.70 The prison where Aerts had been detained had been criticised by the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (CPT) as 
unsuitable for the treatment of mental illness because it did not have regular medical 
attention or a therapeutic environment. The CPT report also stated that the standard of 
care fell below the minimum acceptable from an ethical and humanitarian point of view. 
The applicant complained that he was detained in breach of Article 5(1 )(e) as there was a 
real risk of deterioration in the mental state of persons of unsound mind through 
continuing or prolonged detention in such place. It was argued that since “person of 
unsound mind” was the sole ground for detention, there had to be a relationship between 
the aim, the place and conditions of the detention, implying a therapeutic involvement 
with the patient. Breach of Article 5(1) occurred because of the delay in finding the 
applicant an appropriate hospital. The Court stated,
6 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation 2004 (10) on the protection of the human 
rights and dignity o f persons with mental disorder. Council of Europe Recommendation (83)2 refers to the 
need to administer treatment as a legitimate indicator for detention but it does not give rise to a right to 
treatment Article 3(b).
68 (2000) 29 EHRR 50 para 49, (1985) 7 EHRR 528 para 44.
*9 Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 528.
0 Fennell P., “The rights of psychiatric patients under Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights” (1999) 7 Med. L. Rev. p355.
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... There must be some relationship between the ground of permitted deprivation 
of liberty relied on and the place and conditions of detention. In principle, the 
detention of a person as a mental health patient will only be ‘lawful’ for the 
purposes of sub para (e) of 1 if effected in a hospital, clinic or other appropriate 
institution.71
There was no regular medical attention or therapeutic environment, and so, the proper 
relationship between the aim of the detention and the conditions in which it took place 
was deficient. Therefore, the only appropriate place was a hospital or other similar place. 
The Court found a violation of Article 3 in Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, where the applicant 
developed a serious skin condition and the failure to provide treatment amounted to 
degrading treatment.72 This decision raises questions for mental health care where the 
adequacy of medical treatment is in question, even if this much more difficult to establish 
compared with identifiable physical symptoms.
Irish law and criteria for detention
Mental Treatment Act 1945
There are two main categories of detention in the 1945 Act: the “person of unsound 
mind” (PUM) category and the “temporary” category, both of which are further divided 
into public and private categories with some associated differences in procedure. The 
person of unsound mind category has origins in the 1800s and is now used relatively 
infrequently and totalled 91 admissions for 2003.74 The PUM admission requires,
Section 163(2)
(2000) 29 EHRR 50 paras 46-49.
'  Application 54825/00 para 87. See Chapter 4 ppl62-164 for further discussion of this case and Article 3 
implications.
3 Mental Treatment Act 1945, sections 162 & 184.
4 Department of Health, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for Year ending 2003, Government 
Publications, Dublin, 2004, Appendix 1, p310. The concerns around this type of admission are the 
permitted use of social factors as the basis for detention and the lack of review and time limit, contrary to 
the requirements under the Convention. In practice, these admissions are used as a means of getting Garda 
transport to hospital. The 2003 statistics indicate that 91 of these admissions took place mainly in services 
along the western seaboard.
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(b) The recommendation shall contain a certificate that such person is of 
unsound mind, is a proper person to be taken charge of and detained under 
care and treatment, and is unlikely to recover within six months from the 
date of such examination.
(c) The recommendation shall contain a statement of the facts upon which 
the authorised medical officer has formed his opinion that such person is a 
person of unsound mind, distinguishing facts observed by himself and 
facts communicated by others.
The 1945 Act provides no definition of “unsound mind” and the standard to be met must 
satisfy “proper person” and “unlikely to recover within six months”. It is almost 
impossible to meet these criteria with so little guidance from the statute. Some hints on 
the meaning of “unsound mind” are to be found in another section of the Act.
Section 166-(1)
Where the appropriate assistance officer is informed or knows that a 
person believed to be of unsound mind is not under proper care or control 
or is neglected or cruelly treated by any relative or other person having the 
care or charge of him, such officer shall apply in the prescribed form to 
the authorised medical officer for a recommendation...
This section indicates that social considerations, with no objective medical evidence of 
mental disorder, can lead to detention.75 The 1945 Act permits detention on broad 
grounds including social grounds.76 In practice, people are not detained nowadays on 
social grounds as this would not accord with acceptable professional standards and with 
best practice. However, this gap between law and practice presents the very real risk of 
arbitrariness where the rule of law does not apply; it leads to uncertainty, imprecision and 
lack of forseeability in the application of the law for the individual. It creates difficulties 
for professionals attempting to match current practice with legislation which is out of 
date.
There is a further subsection providing for the detention of persons of “no fixed 
residence” where the doctor examining the person has to ensure “it is proper to make the
5 See p35 this chapter for discussion of Article 5(1 Xe) groupings.
6 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 166.
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recommendation,” with no further guidance either.77 These provisions are in breach of 
Article 5(1 )(e) of the Convention as outlined by the Court in the Winterwerp judgment in 
that they do not satisfy the requirement of true mental disorder of a kind or degree 
warranting compulsory confinement and instead are based on social factors.78 Apart from 
the time constraints, within which the application and recommendation are required to be 
made, the only substantive restriction applying in the section is that the doctor is expected 
to make his own assessment independently of other opinions.79
The temporary admission criteria provide,
Section 184 (4)(a) that such person-
(i) is suffering from mental illness, and
(ii) requires, for his recovery, not more than six months
suitable treatment, and
(iii) is unfit on account of his mental state for treatment as a 
voluntary patient, or
(b) that such person-
(i) is an addict, and
(ii) requires, for his recovery, at least six months’ preventive
and curative treatment.
An addict is defined as a person who,
Section 3
(a) By reason of his addiction to drugs or intoxicants is either 
dangerous to himself or others or incapable of managing himself or 
his affairs or of ordinary proper conduct, or
(b) By reason of his addiction to drugs, intoxicants or perverted 
conduct is in serious danger of mental disorder.80
The term “suitable treatment” in section 184(4)(a)(ii) has never been interpreted but 
would comply with Article 5(1 )(e) if treatment takes place in a hospital, clinic or other 
appropriate institution based on the decisions in Ashingdane and Aerts*x Unfitness on 
account of mental state is not based on any criteria and is open to broad interpretation
7 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 166(2).
8 (1979) EHRR 186. See p36 of this chapter for a full discussion of these requirements.
9 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 163(2Xc).
80 Mental Treatment Act 1945, sections 3 & 184(4).
81 (2000) 29 EHRR 50 and (1985) 7 EHRR 528.
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when the difference between a detained patient and a voluntary one is more to do with 
compliance in the admission than severity of illness or mental state. This does not reflect 
the least restrictive alternative. The requirement of preventative and curative treatment 
for the addict seems to envisage a difference in treatment from someone with a mental 
illness. The definition of addict does not comply with the Winterwerp criteria and is far 
too broad and defined to include a person “incapable of managing himself or his affairs 
or of ordinary proper conduct” with no additional requirement of proportionality.82 
However, in Litwa v. Poland, the Court gave a wide discretion in relation to the detention 
of alcoholics and held that the purpose of Article 5(1 )(e) cannot be interpreted as only 
allowing the detention of “alcoholics” in the limited sense of persons in a clinical state of 
“alcoholism”. The Court stated that persons who are not medically diagnosed as 
“alcoholics”, but whose conduct and behaviour under the influence of alcohol pose a 
threat to public order or themselves, can be taken into custody for the protection of the 
public or their own interests, such as their health or personal safety. However, the Court 
also requires that such detentions must be a proportionate response to the situation.
Incapacity to manage one’s person or affairs in the Act is not evidence of true mental 
disorder. The inclusion also of “ordinary proper conduct” without any definition provides 
such a wide sweep that would permit almost anybody to be detained and is in breach of 
Article 5(1 )(e). The requirement of “being in serious danger of mental disorder” indicates 
that the person may not have a current mental disorder, but failure to admit might result 
in one. This seems to permit preventive detention and would also fall foul of Article 
5(1 )(e) and the Winterwerp requirements. The inclusion of perverted conduct as an aspect 
of addiction would not be a reason for detention according to Winterwerp, as mere 
deviance from society’s norms is not enough to constitute mental disorder.84 The 
requirement of a true mental disorder based on objective medical expertise would seem to 
rule out the inclusion of perverted conduct as a legitimate reason for detention.
82 De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp v. Netherlands (1971)1 EHRR 373.
83 Litwa v. Poland (2001) 33 EHRR 53 para 61.
84 Winterwerp v. Netherlands [1979] 2 EHRR 387.
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Mental Health Act 2001
The criteria for detention in the 2001 Act are more specific and provide an umbrella 
definition of mental disorder which will cover specific categories: mental illness, 
significant intellectual disability and severe dementia.
Section 8(1)
A person may be involuntarily admitted to an approved centre pursuant to 
an application ... and detained there on the grounds that he or she is 
suffering from a mental disorder.
The section provides that the person may be detained in hospital, but there is no reference 
to treatment. The question is whether the section unintentionally provides a power of 
detention based on mental disorder, but without any treatment being necessary. This 
would be a major interference by the State with no acknowledgement of the therapeutic 
aim or of the exceptions to the deprivation of liberty provided for in Article 5(1) and also 
ignores the notion of reciprocity following the removal of liberty. This principle of 
reciprocity was raised by the Richardson Committee ???The decision of the Court in Reid 
v. United Kingdom held that it was not a precondition of detention under the Convention
that there be an effective therapy and that a person may be detained where he needs
control and supervision to prevent harm to himself or others.85
The umbrella term mental disorder is defined as follows,
Section 3(1)
In this Act “mental disorder” means mental illness, severe dementia and 
significant intellectual disability where-
(a) because of the illness, disability, or dementia, there is a serious 
likelihood of the person concerned causing immediate harm to himself 
or to other persons, or
(b)(i) because of the severity of the illness, disability or dementia, the 
judgment of the person concerned is so impaired that failure to 
admit the person to an approved centre would be likely to lead to a 
serious deterioration in his or her condition or would prevent the
83 Hutchison Reid v. United Kingdom, (2003) 37 EHRR 9. Application no.50272/99 para 47.
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administration of appropriate treatment that could be given only by 
such admission, and
(ii) the reception, detention and treatment of the person concerned in 
an approved centre would be likely to benefit or alleviate the 
condition of the person to a material extent.
A person may not be involuntarily admitted “by reasons only of the fact that she or he is 
suffering from personality disorder, is socially deviant, or is addicted to drugs or 
intoxicants”.86 There are uncertainties in the various phrases used in the above section 
e.g., the severity of illness required to prove that there is a serious likelihood of the 
illness, as opposed to likelihood, is not clear, nor is the associated question of immediate 
harm, serious harm, or immediate and serious harm. Then, if one relates these 
requirements to the three categories, the question is if it will be possible to establish that 
there is a serious likelihood of immediate and serious harm because, for example, of the 
person’s significant intellectual disability. The interpretation of some of the provisions 
may pose difficulties, terms like “serious likelihood of immediate and serious harm”, 
indicates there will be reliance on the predictability of dangerousness which has not been 
shown to be accurate.87 Recent behaviour is an important factor in such predictions, but 
there is no reference in the section to this factor.88 It is not clear if this applies only to 
physical harm or there may be a possibility that it will also apply to emotional harm. The 
“appropriate treatment” provision is similar to the “suitable” treatment under the 1945 
Act and the question arises that, if there is no possibility of appropriate treatment, will it
on
be the most appropriate treatment available or the only treatment available? There is no 
further elaboration, thereby leaving the scope of the provision open to broad 
interpretation.
The requirement that the admission would “benefit” the person requires some guidance 
on what this means and those carrying out the admission will have to have further
86 Mental Health Act 2001, section 8(2).
87 Monahan et al, Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study o f Mental Disorder and Violence, 
OUP, Oxford, 2001.
88 Sromberg & Stone, “A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111”, (1983) 20 Harvard J  
on Legislation p275.
89 See chapter 9 on “The Impact of Articles 3, 5, and 8 for the Protection of Children with Mental Disorder 
in Irish Law” for discussion of appropriate treatment in relation to children.
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information in order to apply this section. The addition of the requirement to “alleviate 
the condition... to a material extent” in section 3(l)(b)(ii) may provide some clue as to 
the meaning of the section overall and seems to require an identifiable potential result 
with the use of the word “material.” It seems to be suggesting that there must be a clear 
benefit from compulsory admission over and above what might be gained by any other 
form of intervention. Where this is related to “appropriate treatment”, or an appropriate 
environment, and there is only one form of treatment, though not necessarily the most 
appropriate, the question is if that will prevent the detention, or make it illegal. 
Treatability is not a pre-requisite of compulsory admission from the point of view of 
Article 5.90 Treatment is defined broadly in the Act and includes “the administration of 
physical, psychological, and other remedies relating to the care and rehabilitation of a 
patient under medical supervision, intended for the purposes of ameliorating a mental 
disorder.”91 The “other remedies” provision could include secure care for unmanageable 
behavioural conditions.
The three categories within mental disorder are defined as follows,
Section 3(2)(1) provides,
“mental illness” means a state of mind of a person which affects the 
person’s thinking, perceiving, emotion, or judgement and which seriously 
impairs the mental function of the person to the extent that he or she 
requires care, or medical treatment in his or her own interest, or in the 
interest of other persons.
“severe dementia” means a deterioration of the brain of a person which 
significantly impairs the intellectual function of the person thereby 
affecting thought, comprehension and memory and which includes severe 
psychiatric, or behavioural symptoms such as physical aggression.
“significant intellectual disability” means a state of arrested or incomplete 
development of mind of a person which includes significant impairment of 
intelligence and social functioning and abnormally aggressive or seriously 
irresponsible conduct on the part of the person.
90 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387.
91 Mental Health Act 2001, section 3(1).
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The third category, significant intellectual disability, refers to a state of “arrested or 
incomplete development of the mind” which, it could be argued, is not really a 
developmental condition. The level of impairment of intelligence is not stated and 
impairment itself is not necessarily significant. Where there is significant impairment of 
social functioning, it is more likely to be associated with a behaviour disorder, 
personality disorder, or another cause rather than anything to do with a significant 
intellectual disability.92 Aggression is not necessarily the product of an arrested or 
incompletely developed mind. The reference to “seriously” irresponsible conduct is also 
unclear as to how different in degree it is from “irresponsible” conduct. The use of the 
words serious, immediate, significant and severe throughout the criteria for detention 
indicate an exacting or high level of proof will be required for any detention.
Similar issues arose in a number of English cases and the Code of Practice of the Mental 
Health Act 1983. In the first of these, R v. Hall, the Court of Appeal interpreted the words 
“severe impairment of intelligence and social functioning” as ordinary English words “to 
be measured against the standard of normal persons” rather than those used by a 
professional.93 Bartlett comments that this case may be accepted as a guide to the 
definitions in the Mental Health Act 1983 but that the differing contexts should be 
noted.94 In contrast the Code of Practice emphasises multidisciplinary professional 
involvement in the assessment as to whether the behaviour falls into a “severe” category. 
In a later case, Re F (Mental Health Act: Guardianship), the words “abnormally 
aggressive and seriously irresponsible” were raised.95 The case concerned an application 
for a guardianship order under the Mental Health Act 1983 and the necessity to establish 
mental impairment. The court did not hold with the professional’s view of the 
individual’s behaviour as confirmation of incapacity even though F wishes to return to a 
very abusive and dysfunctional home. These varying standards have led to what Bartlett
9~ Eldergill A., “Mental Health Act 2001, An Outsider’s Perspective,” Paper presented at Law Society of 
Ireland Conference May 30th 2005.
93 (1988) 86 Cr App R 159. The issue was the capacity of the person to consent to sexual intercourse.
94 Bartlett & Sandland p45.
95 [2001] 1 FLR 192.
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refers to as examples of “ambiguities and uncertainties as to the role of medical 
professionals in the interpretation and administration of the Act.”96
The decision of the US Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas, considering the proof 
requirement for loss of liberty and the stigma associated with such loss, held that the 
burden of proof falls somewhere between the civil standard and the criminal standard, 
which probably means clear and convincing evidence.97 However, the vagueness 
throughout the criteria creates an opportunity for arbitrariness in application without the 
guidance in a code of practice as is the case under the Mental Health Act 1983. The 
definition of mental illness has been referred to as circular and based on paternalistic
AO
welfare philosophy. The criteria are not defined in functional or behavioural terms and 
there is no requirement of incapacity as an essential threshold requirement for detention.
Finally, the criteria for detention in the 1945 Act, which are over inclusive, do not meet 
the requirements of Article 5(1 )(e) and are not a proportionate response to the therapeutic 
aim of treating the mentally disordered person. Many of the provisions of the 1945 Act 
are not clear, foreseeable in their effect or precise. Their current application reveals a gap 
between law and practice, making the law even more difficult to predict and arbitrary in 
application. There are similar difficulties in the 2001 Act in relation to the vague criteria 
for mental disorder and these have been highlighted also in the Mental Health Act 1983. 
The interpretation of various words and phrases would seem to create ambiguity 
regarding the standard to be met and the level of proof required. It is essential that the 
proposed code of practice from the Mental Health Commission will provide some 
assistance to ensure some consistency on these points.
Procedure prescribed by law
A deprivation of liberty must be carried out “in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law,” complying with the procedural and substantive rules of national law. Domestic
96 Bartlett p 46
97 441 US 418 (1978).
98 O’Neill AM., Irish Mental Health Law, Firstlaw, Dublin, 2005, p i04.
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law must be of a particular standard involving clear and accessible rules that allow the 
state to remove an individual’s liberty. Domestic law must, in addition, comply with the 
principles of law under the Convention.
The procedures leading to the detention of an individual must be clear and not arbitrary in 
their application. In Winterwerp v. Netherlands, the Court explained that that the notion 
underlying the terms “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” is one of “fair 
and proper procedure, namely that any measure depriving a person of his liberty should 
issue from and be executed by an appropriate authority and should not be arbitrary...”99 
In HL v. United Kingdom, the Court said that it must be established that the detention was 
in conformity with the essential objective of Article 5(1) of the Convention which is to 
prevent individuals being deprived of their liberty in an arbitrary fashion. This objective, 
and the broader condition that detention be “in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law”, requires the existence in domestic law of adequate legal protections and “fair 
and proper procedures.”100
The failure to hold a hearing prior to detention as required under Dutch national law was 
raised in Van der Leer v. Netherlands and held to be a breach of Article 5(1).101 The 
legislation provided that the national court had power to dispense with the presence of the 
patient at the detention hearing only if it served no purpose or was contra-indicated for 
medical reasons. Otherwise, the person had to be heard. No opinion had been received 
from the applicant’s psychiatrist objecting to such a hearing. The applicant’s husband 
applied to have her committed and she was not present at the hearing and no reasons were 
given as required. The Commission found this was in breach of Article 5(1) as the 
detention was not in accordance with procedures prescribed by law. As a result, the 
applicant had not known of the decision concerning her detention because she did not 
have a hearing. The Dutch Government, in its defence, adopted a narrow approach and 
rejected the need to inform the applicant on the basis that this was not an arrest. The 
Court accepted the Commission’s decision without comment and Warbrick refers to this
99 Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 para 45.
100 HL v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004 para 115.
101 (1990) 12 EHRR 567.
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as “a recognition of the importance of procedural protection when decisions are taken to 
interfere with an individual’s liberty.”102
Breach of a procedure under domestic law will automatically breach Article 5(1) as it 
fails to accord with a procedure prescribed by law. Compliance requirements were 
addressed in HL v. United Kingdom.103 The Court referred to the “striking” contrast 
between the lack of any fixed procedural rules by which the admission and detention of 
compliant incapacitated persons is conducted, compared to the extensive network of 
safeguards applicable to psychiatric committals covered by the Mental Health Act 1983. 
In addition, there were no formalised admission procedures which indicate who can 
propose admission, for what reasons and on the basis of what kind of medical and other 
assessments and conclusions. The Court referred to the absence in HL of a requirement to 
fix the exact purpose of admission, assessment or treatment and, consistently, no limits in 
terms of time, treatment, or care, attached to the admission. The nomination of a 
representative of a patient who could make certain objections and applications on his or 
her behalf is a procedural protection accorded to those committed involuntarily under the 
1983 Act and which would be of equal importance for patients who are legally 
incapacitated and have, as in this case, extremely limited communication abilities.
As a result of the lack of procedural regulation and limits, the Court observed that the 
hospital's health care professionals assumed full control of the liberty and treatment of a 
vulnerable incapacitated individual solely on the basis of their own clinical assessments 
completed as and when they considered fit.104 While the Court did not question the good 
faith of those professionals or that they acted in what they considered to be the applicant's 
best interests, the very purpose of procedural safeguards is to protect individuals against 
any “misjudgments and professional lapses.”105 The Court held that the further element of
102 Warbrick, European Convention of Human Rights Yearbook o f European Law {1990) Vol. 10, Oxford, 
pp538-348. Further examples of failure to follow procedures are found in the following cases: 27th Sept 
1990 Series A. No. 185-A, Application no.23807/94 28 (1999) 28 EHRR 509 and Application no. 
58973/00, 24th March 2004. Similar issues arose in DSE v. Netherlands App. No.23807/94 (1998) EHRLR 
99.
103 HL v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004 para 120.
104 Ibid, para 90.
105 Ibid, para 121.
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lawfulness, the aim of avoiding arbitrary deprivations of liberty on grounds of necessity, 
had not been satisfied.106 Any procedure depriving a person of his liberty should issue
• 1 ft7   #from and be executed by an appropriate authority and should not be arbitrary. This 
authority does not have to be a court and can be the hospital manager or the head of the 
psychiatric service and may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In Storck v. Germany, a case involving detention in a private clinic, the Court, in deciding 
the question of whether a deprivation of liberty is imputable to the State, must look at the 
interpretation and application of Article 5(1), that it raised issues going to the merits of 
the case.108 There were three aspects that could engage state responsibility for detention 
in a private clinic: the direct involvement of public authorities in the detention, where the 
courts in compensation proceedings fail to interpret the provisions of civil law in the 
spirit of Article 5 and where the state could have breached its positive obligation to 
protect the applicant against interferences with her liberty by private persons.109
In relation to the first point, the police, as part of the machinery of state authority, were 
involved towards the end of the applicant’s placement and this was enough to engage 
State responsibility. Her detention, otherwise, would have ended then. In relation to the 
second point, the German Court of Appeal had taken a restrictive view of the moment at 
which time started to run for the purpose of limitation in a claim in tort, resulting in the 
applicant being time-barred. The Court compared this with the six month rule laid down 
in the Convention which requires that it is applied without excessive formalism, taking 
account of special circumstances, such as a mental state rendering a person incapable of 
making the complaint within the period prescribed and, which permits interruption of the 
limitation period. The difficulties of the applicant’s situation during detention and 
afterwards were not considered by the German court and neither was her inability to 
access her medical records. The Court held that there was an interference imputable to 
the respondent State with the applicant’s right to liberty as guaranteed by Article 5(1).
106 Ibid, para 124.
10 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 para 39.
108 Application no. 61603/00 16th June 2005 para 89.
109 Fennell P., “ The Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Mental Health Act 1983 and the Common Law.”(2005) 
Journal of Mental Health Law pp 163-168.
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The State was held to have failed to meet its positive obligations to take measures 
providing effective protection of vulnerable persons, including reasonable steps to 
prevent a deprivation of liberty of which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge. 
The State could not “completely absolve itself of its responsibility by delegating its 
obligations to private bodies or individuals”.110 “Such institutions, in particular those 
where persons are held without a court order, need not only a licence, but also competent 
supervision on a regular basis of whether the confinement and medical treatment is 
justified.”111 This last statement of the Court has application to all residential centres 
where people are “held” and creates positive state obligations to safeguard their human 
rights.
Irish law and procedure prescribed by law
In order for a detention to be lawful, there are two requirements which Irish legal 
procedures must satisfy. The first requirement of lawfulness of detention depends on 
conformity with the procedural and substantive aspects of domestic law, as demonstrated 
in Van der Leer. The second requirement is that the relevant national law must meet the 
standard of “lawfulness” set by the Convention, which requires “that all law be 
sufficiently precise to allow the citizen - if need be, with appropriate advice - to foresee, 
to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given 
action might entail.”112 This was outlined by the Court in the HL case. The detention 
must be in conformity with the essential objective of Article 5(1) of the Convention to 
prevent individuals being deprived of their liberty in an arbitrary fashion. This requires 
the existence in domestic law of adequate legal protections and “fair and proper 
procedures.”113 Irish courts have found that the failure to carry out any examination prior 
to making a recommendation for detention or where an examination for such 
recommendation for detention was based partly on a telephone conversation, did not
110 Ibid, para 102, 103.
111 Ibid, para 103.
112 HL v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32) 5th October 2004 para 114.
113 Ibid, para 115.
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comply with national law.114 The courts have held that using a recommendation for 
reception that is out of date in order to remove a person’s liberty with a view to hospital 
detention is a breach of national law.115 The failure to inform the patient that he is entitled 
to a second opinion prior to being taken to hospital was held to breach national law 
also.116
Mental Treatment Act 1945
114 Melly v. Moran & North Western Health Board, Unreported Supreme Court, 28th May 1998, and 
Kiernan v. Harris, Kiernan & Midland Health Board, Unreported High Court, 12th May 1998.
1,5 Bailey v. Gallagher [1996] ILRM 433.
116 Kiernan v. Harris, Kiernan & Midland Health Board, Unreported High Court, 12th May 1998.
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Many of the procedures leading to detention under the 1945 Act are vague, unforeseeable 
in their effect, imprecise and allocate wide discretionary powers. Starting with the 
applicants for a recommendation for detention, the range of applicants is over-inclusive, 
allowing anyone who is over 21, who has seen the person in the previous 14 days, and 
has a connection with the person to make an application under the “any other person” 
category.117 This does not exclude spouses who are separated, or where there is serious 
marital disharmony, or relatives with whom there is conflict, as long as they come within 
the permitted degree of relationship.118 The Act requires a statement of reasons as to why 
the application is being made by “any other person”, not by the named categories, what 
the connection with the person is and the circumstances of the application.119 Health 
service personnel, community welfare officers and gardai can make applications. Various 
other personnel in health boards, like senior administrative officers, have carried out this 
task. In Gooden v. Waterford Regional Hospital, the Supreme Court stated that “the 
community welfare officer was a perfectly proper person to make the application in the
190circumstances of the case.” A research study carried out on a cohort of cases between 
1989-1991 found that relatives made 82% of the applications, followed by Gardai at 8% 
and others at 10%.121
However, in Bailey v. Gallagher, the High Court warned about the dangers of spouses in 
serious marital disharmony being involved as applicants and the risk of injustice arising
199in such circumstances. The lack of forseeability for the patient with regard to the wide 
range of applicants may mean that this section is too broad and vague to meet the “fair 
and proper procedure” requirement. As far as domestic law is concerned, the Courts have 
used the shield of paternalism to affirm the procedures in the 1945 Act.123 In In re Philip 
Clarke, involving a habeas corpus application challenging the lack of procedures,
117 Mental Health Act 2001, section 9.
118 Mental Treatment Act 1945, sections 162(2X3) and 184(4).
119 Ibid, section 162(4).
1 20 [2001] IESC 6 21st February, 2001 para 42.
1-1 Carey & Owens, “Involuntary Admission to a district mental health service-implications for a new 
mental treatment act,” Irish Journal of Psychological Medicine 10(3): 139-144.
122 [1996] ILRM 433.
123 In re Philip Clarke [1950] IR 235. See also Hardiman J. in Gooden v Waterford Regional Hospital 
[2001] IESC 6 21s* February 2001.
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specifically the lack of a judicial determination between the time of his arrest and his 
committal to hospital as being unconstitutional, the Supreme Court stated,124
The impugned legislation is of paternal character, clearly intended for the care 
and custody of persons suspected to be suffering from mental infirmity and for the 
safety and well being of the public generally. ... [Section 165] is carefully drafted 
so as to ensure that the person alleged to be of unsound mind shall be brought 
before and examined by responsible medical officers with the least possible 
delay.125
This issue of medical assessment of the person prior to admission to hospital has been 
raised a number of times in proceedings before the courts.126 The Act provides for the 
examination for detention of the Person of Unsound Mind (PUM) public patient as 
follows:
Section 163 (1)
(a) In cases where the medical practitioner to whom the application is made 
has visited and examined the person to whom the application relates within 
twenty four hours before the receipt of the application, either
(i) if he is satisfied that it is proper to make the recommendation and is of 
opinion that the person to whom the application relates will, if 
received be a chargeable patient, he shall make the recommendation in 
the prescribed form, or
(ii) in any other case he shall refuse the application.
(b) In any other case,
(i) The registered medical practitioner to whom the application is 
made, may, or if he is the authorised medical officer shall within 
twenty four hours after the receipt of the application, visit and examine 
the person to whom the application relates and
(ii) after such examination either,
1 if he is satisfied that it is proper to make the recommendation 
and is of the opinion that the person to whom the application 
relates will, if received be a chargeable patient, he shall make the 
recommendation in the prescribed form, or
2 In any other case refuse the application.
124 [1950] IR 235.
125 Ibid, p247.
1-6 O ’Dowd v. NWHB, [1983] 1 ILRM 186 O’Reilly v. MWHB, Unreported, Supreme Court, November 16, 
1993. Melly v. Moran & NWHB, Unreported Supreme Court, May 28th, 1998.
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It is clear that there are unsustainable differences in section 163(l)(b)(i). Where the 
registered medical practitioner “may” examine or where he is the authorised medical
127officer, he “shall” examine the person within 24 hours of receipt of the application. 
There is no guidance in the first instance on what the options are for someone who 
“may”’ examine within 24 hours. A further difference relates to private PUM patients 
who are detained on the order of two doctors following receipt of an application and prior 
to going to hospital.128 This means that two inexperienced general practitioners, even 
those on locum or weekend work, are in a position to make a detention order which has 
no time limit. In reality, these orders are not used very often, but the point remains that 
they can be made and they do not have any safeguards, such as an expert hospital 
assessment. This raises the issue of asserting a true mental disorder on the basis of 
objective medical expertise and before a competent authority as required under the 
Winterwerp criteria. It is arguable that none of these requirements would be satisfied, as 
there is no guarantee of objective medical expertise of a true mental disorder if the 
doctors do not have any experience of psychiatry. In Schurs v. The Netherlands, the 
Court held that a recommending doctor can be a general practitioner rather than a 
psychiatrist. In my opinion, a locum general practitioner, unfamiliar with the patient or 
family, and with limited expertise in mental illness might well not meet the required 
“objective evidence of true mental disorder” standard in Article 5. Second, the 
application and recommendation for detention are not presented to a competent authority 
as the same doctors make the detention order. These issues raise the possibility of 
discrimination under Article 14 read with Article 5 of the Convention where there is no 
objective or reasonable justification for the difference in treatment between public and 
private patients arising from the provisions. The decision in Storck v. Germany confirms 
that there is no diminution in the positive obligations on the state with regard to the 
detention of patients in private facilities.130
127 Many of these differences in title were eliminated by the Health Act 1970.
128 Mental Treatment Act 1945, sections 177 & 178.
129 41 D & R 186. para 188-189.
130 Application no 61603/00 16th June 2005.
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The provisions for the detention of temporary patients are different and provide that the 
doctor examines the person not earlier than seven days before the date of the application
i l land confirms whether the grounds for detention are satisfied.
There is no definition of “examination” in the Act and practices have varied with the 
individual doctor and the circumstances of the case resulting in arbitrariness. In O ’Dowd 
v. North Western Health Board, a PUM detention, the Supreme Court said that “when the 
doctor speaks of seeing a patient this is equivalent to saying that he examined him”, and 
the Court accepted the examination of the doctor from a distance, for the purpose of
1 ^9making the PUM detention order, three hours after the patient had been sedated. The
statutory requirement is that a patient in this category should be examined ’’forthwith”,
but this did not influence the judgment. There were other legal requirements that were
allegedly not complied with, including the failure to inform the patient he had the option
of being voluntary. There were inconsistencies in the timing of the examination of the
patient and the signing of the order. In a strongly dissenting judgment, Henchy J. referred
to the formalities and obligatory aspects of the Act and, taken with constitutional rights,
pointed to the similarity between the form for recommending detention in hospital and a
1 ^warrant for arrest, where each part had to be strictly accurate. Subsequently, in 
O ’Dowd v. Ireland, the issue of emergency detention arose in the admissibility decision 
of the Commission, where the failure to carry out a medical examination prior to 
detention was the basis of the alleged illegality. The case was deemed inadmissible for 
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, and the Commission re-affirmed the view held in 
Winterwerp on emergency detention, where a clear margin of appreciation with regard to 
fulfilling all procedures prior to detention is permitted.134
The nature of the examination required for a medical recommendation for admission was 
considered in O ’Reilly v. Moroney & Mid Western Health Board. The Supreme Court 
ruled that the doctor’s unseen and unknown observation of the patient from a distance of
131 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 184(4).
132 [1983] 1 ILRM 186 at pl94. Mental Treatment Act, section 165(3).
133 Ibid, pp 201-202.
134 O’Dowd v. Ireland Application number 10296/83.
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15 yards was sufficient to constitute an examination for a recommendation for
admission.135 The dissenting judgment of Blaney J. in the case, opining that the patient
should have been examined physically and questions should have been put to her for the
purpose of examining her mental and emotional state is worth noting. In addition, the
principle of audi alteram partem required that the patient give her side of the story before
1any intervention took place. Another case questioning the statutory medical 
examination arose in Melly v. Moran & North Western Health Board, where the Supreme 
Court held that telephone conversations were not adequate to form part of the 
examination for the purpose of certification under the 1945 Act and their inclusion for 
this purpose indicated a want of reasonable care.137
The failure to examine the plaintiff prior to signing the recommendation for admission 
certification arose in Kiernan v. Harris, Kiernan & Midland Health Board, in an 
application for leave to take civil action, and was held to constitute a want of reasonable
I 3ftcare. The Court granted leave on the examination ground and also on the failure to 
inform the patient that he was entitled to a second opinion prior to detention.139 The 
requirement for a second opinion was not widely known until this case arose and was not 
generally used, partly because there is no particular space provided on the detention form 
for the second opinion.140 The only accessible information on the second opinion is 
contained in small print at the end of the detention form. To this extent, this requirement 
is not only not foreseeable for patients, but crucially, is not either accessible of 
foreseeable for staff. An omission to meet the requirement in this procedure is serious 
enough to engage Article 5(1). The reliance on past medical examination was held not to 
meet Article 5 requirements in Varbanov v. Bulgaria in which the Court held that the 
assessment must be based on the actual state of mental health.141
135 Unreported Supreme Court, November 16, 1993. Subsequently, O ’Reilly v. Ireland Application no. 
24196/94 was the subject of a friendly settlement.
136 Ibid, pp 17-20.
137 Unreported, Supreme Court, May 28th, 1998.
138 Unreported, High Court, May 12th 1998. The allegation that the patient had not been examined by the 
doctor for 15 years was not refuted.
139 Mental Treatment (Amendment) Act 1953, section 5(3XaX0-
140 Mental Treatment Act 1953, Section 5(3XaX0-
141 [2000] MHLR 263 para 47.
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The right to a second opinion was addressed by the Supreme Court in Gooden v. 
Waterford Regional Hospital, where McGuinness J. stated that “the right to request a 
second opinion and the necessity to be informed of such a right are extremely important 
protections in the case of a person who is facing involuntary detention in a mental 
hospital.”142 The Supreme Court referred to this second opinion which applies in 
particular circumstance when the patient is to be “conveyed” to hospital and not to all 
patients. The Supreme Court, referred to this as one of a number of “differences or 
discriminations” and “undesirable features” in the Act between public patients and those 
who can afford to pay for their own care and stated that,
the crucial protection of a right to an independent second opinion does not extend 
to all “chargeable” or public patients, while two opinions are automatically 
required for all private patients. This is one of a number of invidious differences 
between the treatment of public patients which arise under the Act. Again this 
situation is far from satisfactory.14
The Supreme Court illustrated further weaknesses in the current legislation where 
voluntary patients wanted to leave hospital, yet were unfit to do so, but there was no 
express provision in the Act to deal with this event. The Court commented that this is not 
an infrequent occurrence. In fact, the number of voluntary patients whose status is 
changed is recorded at 455 for 2003.144 This situation resulted in the Supreme Court 
having to imply the provision from the interpretation of the particular section along with 
another section in order to avoid an absurd conclusion on a literal interpretation, all of 
which was unsatisfactory.145 The reaction of the Supreme Court confirms the lack of 
precision and forseeability of the current legislation in relation to “procedures prescribed 
by law” and that some of these provisions are not being complied with.
The Supreme Court in Gooden raised two important issues: the first is the difference in 
treatment between categories of public patients, and the second is the difference between
142 Gooden v. Waterford Regional Hospital [2001] IESC 6 21st February 2001 para 45.
143 Ibid, paras 45 and 54.
144 Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for Year ending 2003, 
Dublin, 2004, Appendix 1.
143 Ibid, para 53.
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public and private patients.146 The second opinion procedure applies only to one category 
of public patient-those who are “conveyed” to hospital. The Court also referred to the 
right of all private patients who are being detained to a second independent examination 
for the recommendation for admission.147 These were referred to as one of a number of 
“unnecessary and invidious differences between the treatment of public and private 
patients under the Act.”148 Such differences in treatment may be serious enough to 
engage Article 14 in conjunction with Article 5, unless there is an objective and 
reasonable justification for the differences. The law should be sufficiently precise and 
accessible to enable the person to foresee the consequences of these restrictions.149 The 
prescribed legal procedures in relation to the examination of the patient and also the 
second opinion procedure were not complied with and such detentions would be illegal 
under both national law and Article 5(1).
Another provision that raises issues of precision and foreseeabilty is the 12 hour holding 
power under the temporary detention procedure pending the making an order. The 1945 
Act does not state whether treatment can be imposed during this time or if the provision 
is for assessment and observation.150 The common law would apply to treatment that was 
necessary during this period.
The Gardai are permitted to transport a patient to hospital on foot of a PUM public order 
only.151 The reported figures for such involvement are not accurate and do not reflect the 
frequency of such orders. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a temporary order is also 
filled in by the recommending doctor and, on arrival at the hospital, the PUM order is 
dispensed with and not used to establish the patient’s status. This fact was evident in 
Bailey v. Gallagher where the plaintiff had been removed by the Gardai to a Garda 
station on foot of a temporary order, despite the requirements of the 1945 Act, but the
146 Gooden v.. Waterford Regional Hospital [2001] IESC 6 21st February 2001 para 54. Mental Treatment 
Act 1945 as amended by the Mental Treatment Act 1953, section 5(3)(a)(i).
147 Ibid, sections 178(1) and 185(4).
148 Gooden v. Waterford Regional Hospital [2001] IESC 6 21st February 2001 para 54.
149 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245.
130 Mental Treatment Act 1953, section 5(lXb)(i).
131 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 165(1).
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Court did not address the issue.152 This failure to comply with the provisions of the 1945 
Act is in breach of national law and of the Convention.
Mental Health Act 2001
The 2001 Act provides statutory principles that will apply to all actions carried out 
regarding admission, care and treatment and should inform the manner in which those 
involved carry out procedures under this Act. These principles apply to all patients, 
voluntary patients as well as detained patients and children.
Section 4
(1) In making a decision under this Act concerning the care or treatment of 
a person (including a decision to make an admission order in relation to a 
person), the best interests of the person shall be the principal consideration 
with due regard being given to the interests of other persons who may be 
at risk of serious harm if the decision is not made.
(2) Where it is proposed to make a recommendation or an admission order 
in respect of a person, or to administer treatment to a person, under this 
Act, the person shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be notified of the 
proposal and be entitled to make representations in relation to it and before 
deciding the matter due consideration shall be given to any representations 
duly made under this subsection.
(3) In making a decision under this Act concerning the care or treatment of 
a person (including a decision to make an admission order in relation to a 
person) due regard shall be given to the need to respect the right of the 
person to dignity, bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy.
One issue that may need to be clarified is whether it is possible to have the best interests 
of the person as the principal consideration, while at the same time having due regard to 
the interests of others, on the basis that there can only be one principal consideration. The 
notification requirement in the second paragraph will be adhered to as far as is 
practicable. It is not clear what the boundaries are with practicability and whether a wide 
margin of discretion will apply to the authorities in this regard.
152 Bailey v. Gallagher [1996] ILRLM 433.
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Along with the principles, there will be tighter procedures regarding admission orders 
and certain categories of applicants will be excluded from the detention procedure. The 
list of applicants for examination for detention includes relatives and spouses as well as 
an authorised officer and the Gardai. The broad “any other person” category of applicant 
is also replicated in this Act.153 A spouse is defined in the Act as a “husband or wife or a 
man or a woman who is cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex for a continuous 
period of not less than three years but is not married to that person.”154 The “spouse” 
category excludes those who are separated or where applications have been made under 
domestic violence legislation. It is arguable that the exclusions are too narrow and should 
also have excluded persons who have committed crimes against the prospective patient. 
These exclusions will also mean that staff in approved centres will be prevented from 
making applications.155
The role of the proposed authorised officer as an applicant is not clear and such position 
will permit a large measure of discretion throughout the country.156 This is less than 
satisfactory when compared with the role of the approved social worker (ASW) in other 
jurisdictions, including the English Mental Health Act 1983. An ASW is recognised as a 
professional applicant providing a balance in the medical assessment through the 
recognition of the importance of social factors in detention.157 The number of 
applications by an ASW, instead of family, in Northern Ireland has risen to 70% of 
applications compared with 30% by relatives in 2002.158 It was hoped that this aspect of 
the detention procedure would be followed in the 2001 Act. Rather, a limited approach to 
the professional applicant has been adopted and this authorised officer will be of “a 
prescribed rank or grade” and selected within each health board.159 The result is that the
153 Mental Health Act 2001 section 2(1). There are various exclusions in the Act where a relative or doctor 
has a connection with the centre to which the person is being committed. The patient’s ‘relative’ is defined 
in the 2001 Act as “a parent, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, niece, nephew or child of the person or of 
the spouse of the person, whether of the whole blood, of the half blood, or by affinity.”
154 Mental Health Act 2001, section 2(1).
155 Ibid, section 9(2Xc).
156 Ibid, section 9(8).
157 Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 and the Mental Health Act 1983.
138 Mental Health Commission Northern Ireland Annual Report for 2002, Belfast, 2002.
139 Mental Health Act 2001, section 9(8). The Act refers to a person ”of a prescribed rank or grade who is 
authorised by the CEO to exercise powers under the Act.
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social context of mental health is regarded as irrelevant and merits no recognition in Irish 
law. It would benefit families and carers if the role of the applicant for detention could be 
assigned to someone outside the family to relieve such a burden on relationships. These 
are factors that are outside the remit of Article 5(1), but are important at national level 
and have been taken up for consideration by the Mental Health Commission.160
The examination requirement in the 2001 Act places a greater onus on the doctor to 
provide objective medical evidence of mental disorder and comply with the Winterwerp 
principles. The requirements are specific and the Act provides that
“examination” in relation to a recommendation, an admission order, or a renewal 
order, means a personal examination carried out by a registered medical 
practitioner or a consultant psychiatrist of the process and content of thought, the 
mood and the behaviour of the person concerned.161
The 2001 Act requires that the person must be informed of the purpose of the 
examination, unless this would be damaging to his mental or emotional health.162 Some 
concerns have been raised that such therapeutic privilege could be misused and that the 
section requires tighter control such as “serious” damage to the person’s health.163 Unlike 
the 1945 Act, there is no option for the patient to require a second opinion prior to 
hospitalisation. The provision of a right of response in the principles section is a factor 
that will have to be considered before any action is taken. Failure to comply with the 
principles may involve a breach of Article 5(1) unless there was justification, such as an 
emergency. The examination must be carried out within 24 hours of the receipt of the 
application. A copy of the recommendation must be given to the clinical director and to 
the patient.164 The 24 hour holding power, which can be used as a form of assessment and 
also to prevent voluntary patients from leaving, does not elaborate on whether the patient 
can be forcibly treated during this period, although the common law would provide a
160 Mental Health Commission, Discussion Paper on the Authorised Officer, Dublin, 2005.
161 Mental Health Act 2001, section 2(1).
162 Ibid, section 10(2).
163 Op. cit., 90 pl31.
164 Ibid, section 10(4).
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defence.165 The provisions applying to a voluntary patient in these circumstances are 
different from an admission from the community in that there is no applicant or 
recommendation for detention. Instead, a second opinion in the hospital recommends 
admission.166 It is arguable that the difference in treatment between these two categories 
of patient may be justified by the presence in the hospital of the voluntary patient, 
although the Winterwerp requirements will have to be satisfied.
Article 5(2) Introduction
The right to information giving the factual and legal basis of a detention arises under 
Article 5(2).167 The information is intended to facilitate a challenge to the legality of 
detention and avail of the right guaranteed by Article 5(4). Article 5(2) contains an 
“elementary safeguard” that a person arrested should know the reasons for the arrest and 
the charges against him.168 The word “arrest” includes all kinds of deprivation of liberty. 
It extends beyond the initial detention to where someone is recalled after his release.169 
The individual is entitled to be told in a language he can understand, “simple non­
technical language”, of the reasons for the arrest in order to be able to challenge the 
lawfulness of the detention as permitted under Article 5(4). The Court has stated,
This provision is an integral part of the scheme of protection afforded by Article 
5; by virtue of paragraph 2 any person arrested must be told, in simple, non­
technical language that he can understand the essential legal and factual grounds 
for his arrest, so as to be able if he sees fit, to apply to a court to challenge its 
lawfulness in accordance with Para 4.170
Promptly
The information has to be given “promptly” and it does not have to be given entirely at 
the very moment of detention. A stricter requirement with regard to detail will apply to
165 Mental Health Act 2001, section 23(1).
166 Ibid, section 24(1X2).
167 Van der Leer v. Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 567.
168 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 157.
169 X  v. United Kingdom (1982) 14 EHRR 188 para 66.
170 Kerr v. United Kingdom Application no. 40451/98 7th December 1999.
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information given afterwards. The applicant in Van der Leer v. Netherlands was a 
voluntary patient and had no official communication regarding a decision to have her 
detained.171 She challenged the actions of the Dutch authorities in their failure to provide 
her with information concerning her detention. The Government conceded that she 
should have been informed promptly, but disputed that this obligation arose under Article 
5(2) because of the reference to “arrest” and “charge” which they believed was relevant 
only to criminal law and not to psychiatric detention. The Commission held that these 
words should be interpreted autonomously in accordance with the aim of the overall 
Article 5, which is to protect everyone from arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The Court 
held that,
The close link between Articles 5(2) and 5(4) supports such an interpretation and 
... any person who is entitled to take proceedings to have the lawfulness of his 
detention decided speedily cannot make effective use of that right unless he is 
promptly and adequately informed of the reasons why he has been deprived of his 
liberty.1 2
The Court held that it was all the more important to bring the measures in question to the 
applicant’s attention since she was already in hospital prior to the decision and it did not 
change her situation in factual terms. While the actual time lapse is a matter for each 
case, a delay of ten days in Van der Leer was held to breach Article 5(2). Whether the 
content and promptness of the information conveyed is sufficient will be assessed in each 
case according to the circumstances. Article 5(2) requirements overlap with those in 
Article 5(4), which also requires that a person be told “promptly” of the reasons for his 
detention.
The requirement to inform applies not only at the initial detention stage, but at later 
points also. The obligation on the authorities to inform a restricted patient of the reasons 
for recall to hospital arose in X  v. United Kingdom.173 The Commission found there was a 
violation of Article 5(2) by the failure to inform the person of the reasons for the recall.
171 (1990) 12 EHRR 567.
172 (1990) 12 EHRR 567 para 28.
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Following this decision, the English government introduced new information procedures 
for this group of patients.
Intelligible information
The person must know why they are being detained and the information must be detailed 
enough to show which category of detention applies. The information must be in a 
language the person understands and this may involve simplifying, translating or signing, 
in order to communicate the relevant information. Consideration must be given to the 
capacity of the individual to absorb and understand the information and often, at the point 
of entry to psychiatric care, this may not be possible. In these circumstances, it must be 
given to a legal representative or another person expected to act as proxy on the patient’s 
behalf.174 Recommendation 2004 (10) provides that the person should be informed 
regularly and appropriately of the reasons for the decision and the criteria for its potential
175extension or termination. Information should also be given to the personal 
representative. The state is given a margin of appreciation in that the reasons for the 
detention do not have to be given in a particular format, such as in writing, as long as the 
essential facts are given.176
Irish law and Article 5(2)
Irish law and provision o f prompt information
There is no right to information under the Mental Treatment Act 1945 regarding the 
initial decision to detain as required under Article 5(2). The only mandatory right to 
information relates to the extension of a detention order when the patient and the 
applicant must be informed that they have a right to send an objection to the Minister for
173 (1982) 4 EHRR 188.
174 A" v. United Kingdom B 41 (1980) Commission Report para 111.
173 Op. cit., 65 Article 22.
176 A v. Netherlands (Application no. 2621/65), (1966) 9YB 474 at p 480.
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Health, the Inspector of Mental Hospitals and the President of the High Court.177 While 
there are some limited statutory rights provided under the 1945 Act, such as the right to 
forward an unopened letter, there is no obligation to inform the person of these rights and 
notices regarding the information are at the discretion of the Minister for Health and 
Children.178 The lack of information about the limited safeguards in the 1945 Act, or even 
the habeas corpus provision under the Constitution, would seem to breach Article 5(2).
The 2001 Act places significant emphasis on the provision of information. The principles
in the Act provide a right to be notified of proposals about the admission and treatment
under the Act where practicable.179 This does not include the reasons for the detention
which is a much more substantive piece of information that must be given as established
in Van der Leer v. Netherlands.180 The purpose of an examination for an admission or a
renewal order must be disclosed to the person unless it might damage his mental
health.181 In addition, information must be given to the patient within 24 hours of an
admission or a renewal order being made.182 The 24 hour time limit will satisfy the
“prompt” requirement. The patient must be told whether the detention is under an
admission or a renewal order; that he is entitled to legal representation, to a general
description of the proposed treatment, to contact the Inspector of Mental Health Services;
and to have the detention reviewed with a right of appeal to the Circuit Court against the
1 8^tribunal decision. The person must also be told he can choose to be a voluntary patient.
The information provided in the 2001 Act at this point is not required to be in an 
accessible format, only that it be in writing. This raises concerns about compliance with 
Article 5(2) where there are literacy, language, or other difficulties. In contrast, adequate 
treatment information for consent must be given to the patient in a form and language the 
patient understands on the nature, purpose and likely effects of the treatment. The Act
177 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 189 as amended by Mental Treatment (Amendment) Act 1961, 
section 18.
178 Ibid, section 267.
179 Mental Health Act 2001, section 4(2).
180 (1990) 12 EHRR 567.
181 Ibid, section 10(2).
182 Ibid, section 16(2Xa)-(g).
183 Ibid, section 16(2Xg).
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requires that specific measures are taken to ensure information about such rights is 
communicated to patients as a condition of registration of the mental health centre.184
The essence of the right to information will be protected, provided the purpose of Article 
5(2) is ensured, that the factual and legal basis of the detention be communicated to the 
patient in order to be able to challenge the detention under Article 5(4). It remains to be 
seen if the proposed code of practice provides that this must be in a form the patient or a 
representative understands and whether it will include access to advocacy for patients 
without capacity. The real challenge is to ensure that the provision of information is not a 
paper exercise and is actually transmitted to the person and continues throughout all the 
mental health services, not just inpatient services.
Conclusion
The chapter considered Articles 5(1) and 5(2) and the compliance of Irish law with these 
provisions. Four major areas were addressed under Article 5(1): the deprivation of 
liberty, the criteria for detention, the procedures prescribed by law and the right to 
information.
The provisions under the 1945 Act requiring the detention or discharge of incapable 
voluntary patients are not being complied with, thereby breaching both national and 
Convention law. Many of these patients may be under the control of the hospital to such 
an extent that they are actually deprived of their liberty, but without any safeguards, 
similar to the situation in HL v. United Kingdom and Storck v. Germany.185 The limited 
approach to the issue of voluntariness in the 2001 Act may mean that the position of such 
patients will be no better because there are no safeguards expressly provided in the Act. 
Where such admissions satisfy the requirement of deprivation of liberty, proper 
procedures must be in place to avoid a breach of Article 5.
184 Ibid, section 64(6XbXvii).
185 (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004, Application no.61603/00 16th June 2005.
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The criteria for detention in the 1945 Act are over-inclusive, do not meet the 
requirements of Article 5(1 )(e) and are not a proportionate response to the mentally 
disordered person. Nor are the criteria provisions clear or precise. The application of 
these provisions reveals a gap between law and practice, rendering the law even more 
difficult to predict. Social considerations can lead to detention without any requirement
1 fiAof objective evidence of a true mental disorder in breach of Article 5(1 )(e). Many 
terms used in the Act, like “unfitness on account of mental state” for voluntary 
admission, are not based on any criteria and are open to broad interpretation. The 
definition of addict is far too broad, permitting detention on grounds that do not require 
evidence of a true mental disorder allowing the possibility of preventive detention, which 
would also breach Article 5 requirements. The difference between a detained patient and 
a voluntary patient is much more to do with compliance than severity of illness or mental 
state.
Under the 2001 Act, the right of response in the principles section is a factor that will 
have to be considered before an admission order is made or treatment imposed and 
guidance will be needed on the meaning of limiting words like “as far as is reasonably 
practicable”, as well as the meaning of “such representations” from the patients. Failure 
to comply with the principles may involve a breach of Article 5(1) unless there is 
justification, such as an emergency. The 2001 Act meets the first two requirements in 
Winterwerp and complies with Article 5(1 )(e). However, there may be difficulties with 
the interpretation of some of the provisions which, for example, refer to “harm” and 
“appropriate treatment” and their reliability as factors leading to detention. The “benefit” 
requirement needs further clarification and seems to be related to detention in an 
appropriate environment and the receipt of appropriate treatment, which is not always 
possible.
186 Ibid, section 166(2).
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Many of the procedures leading to detention under the 1945 Act have wide discretionary 
powers and are vague, unforeseeable in their effect and imprecise.187 The Supreme Court 
has had to imply provisions into the 1945 Act in order to deal with statutory 
deficiencies.188 The Supreme Court has referred to “differences and discriminations” in 
the Act and affirms the real possibility of discrimination under Article 14 by the 
application of different procedural safeguards to patients in similar circumstances and to 
public and private patients.189 The provision whereby the detention of a private PUM 
patient under the 1945 Act requires two opinions prior to hospital admission appears to 
give greater respect to the admission of such patients compared with the requirement of 
one opinion for a temporary admission and contrasts with the position of the public PUM 
patient. In this instance, the recommendation is made by the medical practitioner and the 
order is subsequently made at the hospital by a psychiatrist. This difference was based on 
the belief that private patients needed extra safeguards for their wealth and against 
improper motives for the detention. Secondly, the different treatment meted out to similar 
patients under the 1945 Act arises in connection with temporary patients and the 
situations in which a right to a second opinion arises. Where the patient is to be conveyed 
to hospital along with the application form then he is entitled to a second opinion. 
However, where the admission form is taken to the hospital in advance of the patient in 
order to have the order made, as provided for in the Act, then there is no right to a second
i onopinion. This omission applies also where the patient is already a voluntary patient in 
hospital and is to be detained under a temporary order.
The procedures for Garda involvement in transporting patients to hospital indicate 
creative use of the law in the absence of clear procedures and may well breach both 
national law and the Convention. The proposal in the 2001 Act to have an authorised 
officer has been diluted to permit a potentially broad range of applicants throughout the 
country. This matter may be dealt with by the Mental Health Commission. The 2001 Act
187 The lack of a definition of examination has resulted in a number of court challenges. Melly v. Moran & 
NWHB, Unreported Supreme Court, May 28th , 1998, Kieman v. Kiernan, Harris & MWHB, Unreported 
High Court, May 12th, 1998, Bailey v Gallagher [1996] ILRM 433.
188 Gooden v. Waterford Regional Hospital [2001] IESC 6 21st February 2001.
|89 Ibid.
190 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 5(3XaXi) See pp59-60 for further discussion.
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does not differentiate between public and private detention. There is a clear requirement 
in regard to the examination of the patient that should eliminate some of the difficulties 
under the 1945 Act. The procedures for the detention of voluntary patients are still vague 
with regard to the holding power.
The failure in the 1945 Act to provide information to the patient is in breach of Article 
5(2), even if the right to challenge detention is limited to habeas corpus or judicial 
review. The 2001 Act emphasises the right to information in a number of sections and 
will largely comply with Article 5(2). There is one exception and it is the failure to 
require that the actual reasons for the detention be given to the patient, as required under 
Article 5(2).
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Chapter 2
ARTICLE 5(4) AND THE RIGHT TO REVIEW OF DETENTION UNDER 
IRISH LAW
Introduction
This chapter considers the right to review of detention in Irish law against the 
background of Article 5(4) of the Convention and examines both the 1945 Act and the 
2001 Act to see if they meet the required standard. The limited administrative 
provision for review of detention in the 1945 Act necessitates using habeas corpus 
and judicial review as the only means available to patients for an independent review 
of detention. Both habeas corpus and judicial review are not regarded as adequate or 
appropriate means of reviewing initial and continuing detention under the 
Convention. An empirical study on the use of habeas corpus by people in mental 
health detention was carried out as part of this examination and is included in the 
chapter. The 2001 Act provides a right to review of detention by introducing mental 
health tribunals and these will be assessed for conformity with the right to a fair 
hearing and a speedy review under Article 5(4).
Article 5(4) provides,
Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled 
to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided 
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful
Article 5(4) originated in the writ of habeas corpus and applies to each of the 
exceptions to the right to liberty listed in Article 5(1).1 This includes Article 5(1 )(e), 
the detention of persons of unsound mind. The rights contained in the Article include 
a right to speedy and regular review of detention and to be represented and heard 
before a court.2 The opportunity for legal review must be provided soon after the 
person is taken into detention and at reasonable intervals where necessary. Article
1 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law o f the European Convention on Human Rights, Butterworths, 
London, 1995 pl45.
2 X  v. United Kingdom (1992) 14 EHRR 188 para 52.
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5(4) is not satisfied by an administrative procedure based on unchallenged medical 
evidence. It can only be satisfied by a properly conducted judicial procedure adapted 
to dealing with psychiatric detention. This involves periodic review to see if the 
original grounds for detention still exist because the original decision to detain, even 
if carried out by a court, is not enough.3 There is a requirement to have certain 
procedural safeguards in place, such as a fair hearing, as well as representation before 
the court. The existence of mental disorder must be proven in a fair and objective 
manner based on the criteria set out in Winterwerp v. Netherlands.4 This “due process 
guarantee” has had admissibility success even though the subsequent proceedings 
might take a long period of time to reach a conclusion before the Court.5
Article 5 (4) covers all forms of arrest and detention and is closely related to Article 
5(1) as it permits the person to challenge whether his detention is consistent with 
domestic law and the Convention and is not arbitrary.6 In relation to psychiatric 
detention, the Court would examine the detention in accordance with the criteria laid 
down in Winterwerp. In E  v. Norway, the limitations on the scope of Article 5(4) were 
described by the Court,
Article 5(4) does not guarantee a right to judicial review of such a scope as to 
empower the court on all aspects of the case, including questions of pure 
expediency, to substitute its own discretion for that of the decision-making 
authority. The review should be wide enough to bear on those conditions 
which are essential for the lawful detention of a person according to Article 
5(1).7
Article 5(4) does not guarantee a right to judicial control of the legality of all aspects 
or details of the detention. In Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, the applicant 
complained to the Commission about his inability to challenge the lawfulness of the 
refusal to transfer him to a less secure setting.8 The claim that the applicant was 
prevented by operation of the Mental Health Act 1959 from pursuing a case before the
3 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 para 55.
4 (1979) 2EHRR 387.
5 Harding “The Application of the European Convention of Human Rights to the Field of Psychiatry”, 
(1989; 12 Int.J.L.& Psych. p247.
6 Van Droogenbroeck v. Belguim (1982) 4 EHRR 443.
7 E  v. Norway (1990) 17 EHRR 30 para 50.
8 (1985) 7 EHRR 528.
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national courts did not fall within the scope of the judicial determination of 
“lawfulness” which Article 5(4) guarantees.9
Initial and regular review proceedings
The right to review of continuing detention following an initial order by a court was 
not considered necessary in the early case, De Wilde Ooms and Versyp,
Where the decision depriving a person of his liberty is one taken by an 
administrative body,... Article 5(4) obliges the Contracting States to make 
available to the person detained a right of recourse to a court; but there is 
nothing to indicate that the same applies when the decision is made by a court 
at the close of judicial proceedings. In the latter case the supervision required 
by Article 5(4) is incorporated in the decision.10
In Winterwerp, this approach was not followed and the decision of the Commission 
held that the earlier conclusion by the Court was unsustainable in the case of detention 
of a person on the ground of “unsound mind” when it is for an indefinite period, 
stating,
This is on the basis that the reasons initially warranting confinement of this 
kind may cease to exist ... Consequently, it would be contrary to the object 
and purpose of Article 5 ... to interpret paragraph 4 read in its context, as 
making this category of confinement immune from subsequent review of 
lawfulness merely provided that the initial decision issued from a court. Such 
deprivation of liberty required a review of lawfulness to be available at 
reasonable intervals.1
The first question to be addressed is whether the purpose and scope of the Winterwerp 
requirements one and two are still met in the initial and regular review of detention. In 
X  v. United Kingdom, involving a recall to hospital, the applicant complained that 
habeas corpus would not provide a full investigation of the merits of the decision to 
detain him and would be limited to a procedural examination as to whether the recall
19complied with the Mental Health Act 1959. The applicant in X  believed Article 5(4)
9 Mental Health Act 1983, section 141.
10 De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp v. Belguim (1980) 1 EHRR 373 para 76.
11 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 para 55.
12 (1981) 4 EHRR 188. The case was taken by the Mind organisation.
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had been violated as he had not been able to have the lawfulness of his detention 
decided speedily by a court and there was no system of review open to him.
Article 5(4) requires an oral hearing and the scope of the hearing should be wide
enough to bear on those conditions which according to the Convention are essential
for lawful detention and in the case of psychiatric detention this involves reviewing
1 ^whether the condition that led to the initial detention is still present. If not, there 
must be a power of release. The review is not limited to considering the merit or 
reasonableness of the initial decision to detain, but is more substantive.14 The review 
body must establish whether the reasons which initially justified the detention 
continue to apply. In order for the hearing to be fair, there must be a guarantee of 
impartiality in the conduct, organisation and composition of the court or tribunal. 
Impartiality is an important feature of the court that must be determined by a 
subjective test, that is on the basis of the personal conviction of a particular judge in a 
given case, and also by an objective test, that is ascertaining whether the judge offered 
guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.15
The absolute minimum for judicial procedure for the detention of a person of unsound 
mind is the right of the individual concerned to present his own case and to challenge 
the medical and social evidence adduced in support of his detention.16 Otherwise, he 
is deprived of the fundamental guarantees in matters of deprivation of liberty,
Mental illness may entail restrictions or modifying the manner of exercise of 
such a right ... but it cannot justify impairing the very essence of the right. 
Indeed, special procedural safeguards may prove called for in order to protect 
the interests of persons who, on account of their mental disabilities, are not17fully capable of acting for themselves.
In X , the court did not allow a determination of the merits of the question as to 
whether the mental disorder persisted. Article 5(4) required an appropriate procedure 
allowing a court to examine whether the patient’s disorder still persisted and whether
13 X  v. United Kingdom 4 EHRR 188 para 57-58, Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (1984) 6 EHRR 69 
para 52, E. v. Norway{ 1990) 17 EHRR 30 para 50, and Hutchison Reid v. United Kingdom Application 
no. 50272/99 20th May 2003 para. 64.
14 X  v. United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 188 para 53.
15 D N \. Switzerland (2003) 37 EHRR 21 para 44.
16 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 para 58.
17 Ibid, para 60. The 2001 Act provides for legal representation before review bodies.
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the Home Secretary was entitled to think that a continuation of the compulsory
1 ficonfinement was necessary in the interests of public safety. The Court held that the 
habeas corpus proceedings brought by X  did not meet the guarantees in Article 5(4) 
and the procedures in place were not independent, whether judicial or administrative. 
The tribunal did not have the power to order his release as required; that was the remit 
of the Home Secretary.19
Judicial review and habeas corpus are not adequate remedies to test the legality of the 
detention since they go to the lawfulness in a less substantive sense than is required 
by the Convention. They have been held not to provide a sufficient remedy as they 
are commonly used to challenge procedural irregularity, not medical evidence. 
Habeas corpus does not empower the review body to test the substantive lawfulness 
of detention. The review should be sufficiently broad to deal with the essential 
requirements for detention on the grounds of unsound mind, as the original reasons 
for detention may no longer exist. The Court stated that it was not within its 
jurisdiction to decide on the best, or most appropriate, system of judicial review in 
this sphere. It was for the contracting states to choose different methods of performing 
their obligations.
The Court did not dismiss the utility of habeas corpus entirely and said that it can be 
an effective check against arbitrariness for emergency measures for the detention of 
persons on the ground of unsoundness of mind. Provided the measures are of short 
duration, they are capable of being “lawful” under Article 5(1 )(e) even though they 
are not attended by the usual guarantees such as thorough medical examination. The 
Court allowed a wide margin of discretion in emergency detentions and court 
involvement is correspondingly reduced. In non-emergency circumstances, the 
limitations on the nature of the review in habeas corpus are not sufficient for 
circumstances like the X  case.
The review of X's detention by way of habeas corpus passed the first test, because the 
High Court had the power to order discharge, but failed the second test, because
18 Ibid, Para 58.
19 Ibid, para 59.
20 Fennell P., “Doctor Knows Best Therapeutic Detention under Common Law, The Mental Health Act 
and the European Convention”, (1998) 7 Med. L. Rev. p 349.
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habeas corpus did not consider the substantive merits of the detention, only its formal 
legality. The United Kingdom government accepted the consequences of this 
judgment and altered English, Welsh and Northern Irish mental health legislation to 
confer on the tribunal a power to discharge restricted patients in the position of X.
Specific tribunals have been set up to carry out this task under legislation in England,
91Wales and Northern Ireland and a similar system will be introduced in Ireland. The 
review system must be able to carry out a substantive review of the detention and not 
solely whether the legalities have been complied with. Accordingly, this is why 
judicial review and habeas corpus are not equal to this task. The Tribunal must have 
power to order release if the detention is unlawful and the decision must be made 
speedily.22
In Winterwerp v. Netherlands, the Principle Delegate of the Commission, in his 
submissions, pointed out “the unreality of expecting a mentally ill person to take the 
initiative in commencing proceedings.” Subsequently, the Court stated that it should 
not be left to the individual patient to initiate a review of the detention and this point 
was later affirmed in Meygeri v. Germany24 The mere possibility of a safeguard was 
not enough. There had to be certainty that the proceedings would be applied in each 
case. In Herczgefalvy v. Austria, the Court stated “... the position of inferiority and 
powerlessness which is typical of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals calls for 
increased vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with.”25 
There is, therefore, an onus on the state to ensure access to review proceedings to rule 
out arbitrariness.
Similar statements have been made in HL v. United Kingdom in relation to judicial 
review largely to the effect that it does not provide the depth of review that is
21 Mental Health Act 1983, Mental Health (NI) Order 1986, Mental Health Act 2001, sections 17, 18, 
48 &49.
22 X  v. United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 188 para 64, para 138.
23 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387. Muchlinski, “Mental Health Patients Rights and the 
European Human Rights Convention,” (1987) 5 Human Rights Review p99.
24 (1992) 15 EHRR 584.
25 Herczgefalvy v. Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437 para 82.
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necessary for mental health detention.26 Even with the application of the “super- 
Wednesbury” principles on judicial review,
...the bar of unreasonableness would at the time of the applicant's domestic 
proceedings have been placed so high as effectively to exclude any adequate 
examination of the merits of the clinical views as to the persistence of mental 
illness justifying detention...
The Court referred to the English decision involving the Human Rights Act 1998 in R 
(Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor Hospital, which affirmed these views in a case where the 
necessity for medical treatment against the wishes of the patient was contested by the
7 7patient. The English court held that pre-incorporation judicial review of necessity in 
accordance with “the super-Wednesbury” criteria was not sufficiently intrusive to 
constitute an adequate examination of the merits of the relevant medical decisions. 
The intensity of the review is greater under the proportionality approach and Lord 
Stein in R v. Secretary for the Home Department, ex p. Daly stated that this may 
necessitate the assessment by the court of the balance which the decision maker has 
struck, not just that it is a reasonable decision. In addition, it may require an
7 0examination of “the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations.” He 
stated that the heightened scrutiny or “super Wednesbury” test may not be appropriate 
to the protection of human rights.
Habeas corpus and Irish law
Habeas corpus is a safeguard for the right to liberty to challenge the legality of 
detention and the Constitution is now the most frequent legal basis for such 
applications.30 Article 40.4.2 of the Constitution provides,
Upon complaint being made by or on behalf of a person before the High Court 
or any judge thereof alleging that such person is being unlawfully detained, 
the High Court or any judge thereof to whom such complaint is made shall 
forthwith enquire into the said complaint and may order the person in whose 
custody such person is detained to produce the body or such person before the
26 (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004.
27 [2000] EWCA Civ 1545.
28 Ibid, para 139.
29 [2001] 2 AC 532 (HL) at 547.
30 Article 6 of the 1922 Constitution, Article 40.4.2 of the 1937 Constitution.
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High Court on a named day and to certify in writing the grounds of his 
detention, and the High Court shall, upon the body of such person being 
produced before that Court and after giving the person in whose custody he is 
detained an opportunity of justifying the detention, order the release of such 
person from such detention unless satisfied that he is being detained in 
accordance with the law.
Given the absence under the 1945 Act of opportunities for review of the lawfulness of 
detention by a tribunal, habeas corpus occupies a position of fundamental importance. 
The Irish Government has relied on the availability of habeas corpus to discharge its 
responsibilities under Article 5(4) to provide speedy review of the lawfulness of 
detention.31 There is no legislative provision for review of detention by a mental 
health review tribunal under the 1945 Act and until the 2001 Act is fully in force, 
habeas corpus will continue to provide the sole mechanism for independent review of 
the lawfulness of detention.
Access to information about the availability of the limited administrative review 
procedure is wholly arbitrary under the 1945 Act. This stems from the fact that there 
is no statutory obligation under the 1945 Act to inform people who are detained in 
psychiatric care of the limited rights that are available. The reliance on habeas corpus 
as a means for testing detention has been explored in a study, which will be discussed 
below, and the results indicate a low level of usage by people in psychiatric 
detention. The Irish Government however, has contended in the admissibility 
decision in Croke v. Ireland, that habeas corpus is an effective remedy for the purpose 
of Article 5(4) of the Convention. In Croke v. Ireland, the applicant complained about 
the absence of an automatic and independent review of detention either before or after 
his initial detention and about the absence of a periodic, independent and automatic 
review of his ongoing detention. The Government pointed, inter alia, to Article 40.4
31 Application No. 33267/96.
32 The Mental Health Act 2001 was signed in July 2001 and a limited number of sections were 
commenced in April 2002. Sections 1-5, 7, 31-55 were introduced pursuant to S.I. No. 90 of 2002 and 
deal with the criteria for detention, principles to guide the legislation including that of the ‘best 
interests’ of the person, the organisation and appointment of the Mental Health Commission and the 
Review Tribunals. The Act will eventually provide for automatic review of detention of all patients 
with the exception of those who have been sent by the courts or transferred from prison to the Central 
Mental Hospital and who do not come within the terms of the Act..
33 See later in this chapter. There was slightly more use of the procedure by patients detained in the 
Central Mental Hospital. Detention in the CMH takes place in two ways: through various routes within 
the criminal justice system and following transfer from local psychiatric hospitals.
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of the Constitution as satisfying the requirements of Article 5(4) reviews with regard 
to “speedy access.”34
Habeas corpus applications are given priority in the High Court which must conduct 
an inquiry “forthwith” into the lawfulness of the detention. The Court must be 
satisfied that the detention is in accordance with the law and that, in the case of 
psychiatric detention, the procedures outlined in the 1945 Act have been complied 
with. There is no limitation on access to the courts except where the decision has been 
made to refuse the order and a new application does not have fresh evidence to 
support it.35
The applicant in In Re Philip Clarke challenged his detention by the Gardai, by way 
of habeas corpus, on the grounds that there was no judicial determination between his 
detention in the Garda Station and later removal to hospital under the 1945 Act. 
Relying on the paternalistic basis for the Act, the Supreme Court held that it did not 
violate the personal rights of the citizen.37 The Supreme Court decided that the 
Constitution did not require a judicial inquiry or determination before a person could 
be detained in psychiatric care. The Court decided the sections applying to such 
detentions did not constitute an unjust attack on the personal rights of the citizen, but 
rather vindicated and protected the rights of citizens concerned by providing for their 
care and treatment. The relevant sections were not repugnant to the Constitution, 
Therefore, the substantive issue of whether or not the applicant had a mental illness 
was not regarded as relevant to the review. The concentration of the Court was on 
whether on not the 1945 Act permitted the action taken and so was confined to the 
formal legality of the action.
The first of two applications for habeas corpus involving the same applicant arose in
38Croke v. Smith O ’Connor, Eastern Health Board, Ireland and the AG and resulted 
from the applicant’s escape from temporary detention and later transfer to the Central
34 Croke v. Ireland Application number 33267/97.
7,5Re Me Donagh Unreported High Court 24th November 1969 (ninth application).
36 [1950] IR 235.
37 Ibid, pp 247 & 250.
38 [1995] 3 IR 525 and Croke v. Smith O ’Connor, Eastern Health Board, Ireland and the AG (No. 2) 
Unreported High Court, July 31st 1995.
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Mental Hospital(CMH). The applicant in Croke applied for an order of habeas 
corpus on the basis that he had been detained in excess of the six months applying in 
the original temporary detention order and that the subsequent transfer to the CMH 
had not been properly authorised.40 As a result, he alleged he was not properly 
detained and did not have the safeguards built into the legislation against arbitrary 
detention. In addition, there was no limitation on the period of detention and the CMH 
was not a lawful place for those transferred under the 1945 Act for the purpose of 
special treatment not available in the original hospital, which he alleged he had not 
received. The High Court refused the order and, on appeal, the Supreme Court granted 
the order on the basis that he was not properly detained in the CMH and he was 
released but readmitted immediately.41
A second application for an inquiry under Article 40.4.2 of the Constitution arose in 
Croke v. Smith (No. 2), the basis of which was a two-pronged challenge to the 1945 
Act.42 The grounds of challenge were first, that there was no provision for either 
judicial intervention or a process to determine the rights of the involuntary patient, 
and second, that there was no independent review mechanism.43 The High Court held 
that the applicant was properly detained in accordance with the provisions of the 
section but that the section fell below the norms required by the constitutional 
guarantee of personal liberty. Budd J. acknowledged that even though the habeas 
corpus inquiry pursued under Article 40.4 “may probe more deeply than the common 
law habeas corpus procedure, it was not a regular, or automatic form of review.”44 
The judge concluded that the absence of an independent review of the decision to 
detain and the lack of an automatic review of the long-term detention meant that the 
provisions authorising the admission were repugnant to the Constitution.45 Budd J. 
quoted extensively from Costello J. in RT v. Central Mental Hospital in support of his 
decision,
39 [1995] 3 IR 525, section 184 of the 1945 Act
40 There are no time limits on detention in the CMH, therefore extensions to detention would not apply 
while detained there.
41 [1995] 3 IR 525.
42 Unreported High Court, July 31st 1995.
43 The sections challenged were sections 163, 171 and 172 which provide for the detention and removal 
of a PUM patient and the time frame which is either discharge, or death.
44 Croke v. Smith, O ’Connor, Eastern Health Board and AG Unreported High Court, 31st July 1995 
p47.
45 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 172. This section provides for the detention of persons of 
unsound mind including social considerations and indefinite detention.
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... the State’s duty to protect the citizen’s rights becomes more exacting in the 
case of weak and vulnerable citizens, such as those suffering from mental 
disorder ... the constitutional imperative [right to liberty]... requires the 
Oireachtas to be particularly astute when depriving persons suffering from 
mental disorder of their liberty and that it should ensure that such legislation 
should contain adequate safeguards against abuse and error in the interests of 
those whose welfare the legislation is designed to support.46
In RT v. Director o f the Central Mental Hospital, where a habeas corpus application 
challenged the transfer procedure from psychiatric hospital to the CMH, the High 
Court referred to the serious consequences for temporary patients as a result of the 
defects in these procedures:
[TJhere are no adequate safeguards against abuse or error both in the making 
of the Transfer Order, and in the continuance of the indefinite detention which 
is permitted by the section. These defects not only mean that the section falls 
far short of internationally accepted standards but ... render the section 
unconstitutional because they mean that the State has failed adequately to 
protect the right to liberty of temporary patients.47
Budd J., in Croke v. Smith, stated that statutes, like the 1945 Act, should be very 
strictly and narrowly construed, that a law which “trammels liberty must be consistent 
with a legal order based on democratic principles and be protective of fundamental 
rights” and there had to be proper safeguards to prevent the risk of abuse or error 
when dealing with such patients 48 He outlined two relevant principles requiring a 
different approach by the Court. The first recognised that human rights evolve over 
time and therefore necessitated the application of contemporary norms, rather than an 
originalist approach from the time of the drafting of the Constitution in 1937. The 
second principle followed from the first and cast doubt on the certainties espoused in 
Clarke’s case in 1949 due to the growing knowledge of psychiatry, the nature of 
mental illness and changing patterns of behaviour.49
46 RT v. Director o f Central Mental Hospital [1995] 2 IR 65 p79.
41 RT v. Director o f Central Mental Hospital [1995] 2 IR 65 p81, Croke v. Smith, O ’Connor, Eastern 
Health Board and AG Unreported High Court 31st July 1995 p45.
48 Croke v. Smith O ’Connor, Eastern Health Board and AG [1995] IEHC 6 (31st July, 1995) p51.
49 Ibid, p48.
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The Court acknowledged that a wide-ranging inquiry could take place under Article 
40.4, but said it could present practical difficulties for someone detained in a 
psychiatric hospital who does not have a family,
... the situation of a mental patient who is illiterate, harmless and without kith 
and kin to initiate such an inquiry on his behalf by way of habeas corpus 
perhaps poses the problem in a stark form. Such a patient may not be aware of 
his or her rights to seek habeas corpus and may be incapable of the necessary 
written or verbal communication to trigger such an inquiry.50
In a strongly worded statement, Budd J. confirmed that habeas corpus is not suitable 
as a means of review of detention,
In no way can this procedure, of possible availability only, be equated with or 
amount to a regular, periodic, automatic and independent scrutiny of the 
continued lawfulness of, and necessity for, the patient’s detention.51
Budd J. said that the State has to be particularly “solicitous and vigilant” in the 
protection of the citizen’s rights, particularly the right to liberty, when dealing with a 
person who is vulnerable and disadvantaged, such as a patient suffering from mental 
disorder. In addition, the legislators have to be careful, when framing statutes which 
deprive such a person of liberty, to ensure that proper safeguards are in place to lessen 
the risk of error or abuse. He held that this lack of automatic review of long-term 
detention was repugnant to the Constitution. Therefore, he referred the question of the 
constitutionality of the section to the Supreme Court by way of case stated. The 
Supreme Court overturned the High Court decision, while emphasising that those in 
authority are obliged,
... to act in accordance with the principles of constitutional justice, and are not 
entitled to act in an unlawful manner, are not entitled to act arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or unreasonably and must have regard to the personal rights of 
the patient, including the right to liberty which can be denied only if the 
patient is a person of unsound mind and in need of care and treatment who has 
not recovered and must be particularly astute when depriving or continuing to 
deprive a citizen, suffering from mental disorder of his or her liberty.54
50 Ibid, pl8.
51 Ibid, p47.
52 Ibid, p51.
53 Article 40.4.3 provides where the person is lawfully detained but the law is invalid according to the 
provisions of the Constitution then it can be referred to the Supreme Court for a decision as to legality.
54 Croke v. Smith, O ’Connor Eastern Health Board & AG (No. 2) [1998] 1 IR 101 p 121.
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The Court held that the section was not constitutionally flawed because of the 
protections and safeguards in the Act and the lack of any systematic failure regarding 
these safeguards. The decision to set aside such a detention order could be made by a 
court on application for judicial review, or under habeas corpus. The Court did not 
acknowledge State efforts to introduce independent review mechanisms in recognition 
of the inadequacy of the system. The abandoned Health (Mental Services) Act 1981 
and the Green and White Papers on Mental Health reflected state awareness of the 
outcome in X  v. United Kingdom.55 Instead, the Court held that “such detentions did 
not require automatic review by an independent tribunal because of the statutory and 
inherent obligation on the person in charge to regularly and constantly review such 
patients and to discharge a patient who had recovered.”56 In effect, the Court accepted 
the medical and administrative review as adequate, even though it is not independent 
and does not provide due process safeguards. The annual reports of the Inspector of 
Mental Hospitals have referred to many omissions in this regard, despite the view of 
the Supreme Court.57 The following is an extract from the 2002 Report,
... it is often impossible to ascertain the date of a patient’s admission to, or 
discharge from, in-patient care or from the case notes to determine a patient’s 
legal status. Furthermore, the date of the making of a temporary patient 
reception order is often not apparent from the record so that there is no clear 
indication when that order should be extended or renewed. To worsen matters, 
as likely as not there will be no entry indicating that the order has been 
extended and why, on clinical grounds, it was deemed necessary to renew or 
extend the involuntary order rather than convert to voluntary status.58
An application for an oral hearing was subsequently made in Croke v. Ireland before 
the Strasbourg Court.59 The applicant claimed breaches of Articles 5(1), 5(1 )(e) and 
5(4) of the Convention.60 The Government relied on habeas corpus as providing both
55 Department of Health/*/, 8918 1993 and Pn 1824. July 1995. (1981) 4 EHRR 188.
56 Croke v. Smith, O ’Connor, Eastern Health Board & AG (No. 2) [1998] 1 IR 101 pl31.
57Department of Health and Children, Reports o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending
2001, Government Publications Dublin, 2002. See also reports for years 2002 and 2003.
58 Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending
2002, Government Publications, Dublin, 2003, pi 1.
59 Application no. 3326/96 21s* December 2000.
60 One of the questions posed by the applicant to the Irish Government was, “Why does the government 
deny it is in breach of the applicant’s rights under the Convention when at the same time the 
government admits that it is in breach of the Convention in terms of its mental health legislation?” The 
question was not answered.
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a substantive and speedy review, arguing that the review under Article 5(4) is “not 
required to be automatic but rather that an opportunity exists for such proceedings to 
be taken by the patient.”61 This presupposes that access to information regarding the 
review exists. Those who are detained may not be aware of their rights or of the 
possibility of High Court applications and there is no procedure by which the patient 
is informed. In response to the allegation of a lack of review at reasonable intervals, 
the government argued that, in habeas corpus proceedings, the only matter that is res- 
judicata is the constitutionality of the section of the Act and that there is no bar to the 
applicant taking further proceedings at reasonable intervals. The Supreme Court itself 
has held that repeat applications will be permitted only where new evidence arises.
A friendly settlement was reached, one of the terms of which was a commitment by 
the Irish Government to introduce the Mental Health Act 2001.
Habeas corpus is clearly not adequate in offering substantive and regular review of 
initial and continuing detention under Article 5(4) of the Convention. The study 
conducted by the author and outlined in the next section on habeas corpus 
demonstrates the dearth of cases challenging detention in psychiatric care and the lack 
of access to the procedure in Ireland.
Study into the applications for habeas corpus from 1923-1999
The aim of this study was to determine the extent to which habeas corpus is used by 
psychiatric patients.63 The study established that habeas corpus is little used by those 
in local psychiatric hospitals compared with prisoners, but that there is increased use 
of the procedure at the interface between detention in a high security hospital through 
the criminal justice system, and detention in such hospital following transfer from a 
local psychiatric hospital.
61 Croke v. Ireland Application no. 33267/96 21s* December 2000 p i5.
62 Re McDonagh 29th November 1969.
63 Keys M., “Challenging the Lawfulness of Psychiatric Detention under Habeas Corpus Law in 
Ireland”, (2002) 24 Dublin University Law Journal pp26-57 for a more detailed discussion of these 
issues.
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Methodology
The data on applications from those in psychiatric detention was collected from the 
central records held at the Four Courts in Dublin relating to the period from 1963 to 
1999. Records relating to pre-1963 applications for habeas corpus were available from 
the National Archives.64 The records had to be traced in the entry books or register 
containing all stateside orders and had to be filtered out from the bail and judicial 
review applications. This was done by selecting and examining all those records 
containing either the word “detention” or the name of a hospital as the indicator that 
the entry may well involve a habeas corpus application, Irrelevant records were 
excluded and the records examined were the total available matched with the case 
entry registers.65 The total number of files examined was 275 and this resulted in 111 
applications on record for habeas corpus from those in psychiatric detention during 
that period.
The data identification and collection of prisoner applicants was completed at the 
Four Courts and records for the period 1998 and 1999 were available on computer. 
The data on prisoners was examined in order to compare the manner in which others 
who experience detention and loss of liberty use the habeas corpus provision.66 The 
decision to confine the figures to these two particular years was made on the basis that 
the main focus of the study was the use of habeas corpus by those in psychiatric 
detention and a recent two year period for comparative purposes was deemed 
adequate.67 The habeas corpus procedure is used by both groups to seek an 
examination of the legality of their detention. Two separate Data Analysis Schedules 
were prepared, one for psychiatric detention and one for prisoners and the common 
factors in both cases focussed on the availability of legal representation, the outcome 
of the applications, and the age and gender of the applicants
64 These records were obtained following an initial examination of the record books to identify possible 
cases; some by reference to words like ‘detention’ and others which mentioned the name of a hospital.
65The record book did not always indicate if the application involved psychiatric detention; frequently 
it turned out to be a habeas corpus application involving a child custody dispute.
66 The total number of committals to prison for 1998 and 1999 was 22,141 , Government Publications, 
Irish Prison Service Report 1999 & 2000 p78.
6?. The total number of applications made by or on behalf of people detained in psychiatric care was 
111 for the 76 year period from 1923 to 1999. 94% of applicants were male and 6% female.. This 
compares with a total number of applications for prisoners for the two year period from 1998-1999 of 
113; 97% were male and 3% female.
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Extent o f the use o f habeas corpus
Table 1
Prison Hospital68
1998 and 1999 1998 and 1999
Total committals 22.006 
Total applications 113 
Percentage of total 0.5%
Total detentions 4,900 
Total Applications 5 
Percentage of total 0.09%
The number of applications on record for habeas corpus between 1923 and 1999 was 
examined.69 This resulted in 111 applications on record for habeas corpus applications 
from those in psychiatric detention during that period.70 Data on prisoners was 
examined in order to compare the manner in which the habeas corpus provision is 
used by other people who experience detention and loss of liberty.71 Table 1 shows 
the total number of applications for 1998 and 1999 by patients and prisoners, together 
with the total number of patients and prisoners during those years.
The study revealed that habeas corpus is little used by those in local psychiatric 
inpatient facilities and that there is slightly more use of the procedure by patients 
detained in the high security hospital, the Central Mental Hospital (CMH).72 The Irish 
Government has contended that habeas corpus is an effective remedy for the purposes
68 Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending, 
1998, Government Publications, Dublin 1999. See also Report for year ending 1999. Note, in 1998 
there were 2,500 detentions and in 1999 there were 2,400, (given in the reports as approximate figures).
69 The method of research was to examine the central records of habeas corpus applications to compare 
patient applications with prisoner applications focussing on the availability of legal representation, the 
outcome of the applications, and the age and gender of the applicants. Records on applications for 
habeas corpus for psychiatric patients were available in the court records from 1923 onwards.
70This figure of 111 was extracted from a total of 275 files which were examined based on reference in
the title to a hospital.
71 Records on prisoners applications for the period 1998 and 1999 were computerised and the total was 
113 applications. The total prison population for 1998 and 1999 was 22,500. It was decided to confine 
the data to these two years for this group as being sufficient for the purpose of the study. The total 
number of applications made by or on behalf of people detained in psychiatric care was 111 for the 76 
year period from 1923 to 1999. 94% of applicants were male and 6% female. This compares with a 
total number of applications for prisoners for the two year period from 1998-1999 of 113, 97% were
male and 3% female.
72 Detention in the CMH takes place in two ways: through various routes within the criminal justice 
system and following transfer from a local psychiatric hospitals.
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of Article 5(4) of the Convention, but this study indicates otherwise.73 It is useful to 
compare these figures with the number of Mental Health Review Tribunal hearings 
for patients in England. In 2000, there were 11,535 hearings and 1,100 orders for 
discharge (10-11 %)74
Source o f applications to the High Court
The applications came from the individual patient in 65% of cases, though it was 
evident in the applications from the CMH that many of these were made in the 
handwriting of one individual, possibly on behalf of fellow patients, though this could 
not be absolutely ascertained.75 The assistance of a solicitor was evident in 28% of 
applications and friends or family accounted for the remaining 7%.
Legal representation
Of the total sample, 31% had legal representation while, in 69% of cases, there was no 
information concerning legal representation. The figure for legal representation for 
prisoners confirmed that 44% had legal representation. During the period 1990-1999, 
18 of the 22 applications for habeas corpus from psychiatric detention had legal 
representation.
Spread o f applications
The number of psychiatric hospitals and treatment units attached to general hospitals, 
public and private, in 1999 was 50, including the CMH. This figure has changed over 
the years with the closure of some large hospitals and the development of smaller 
units attached to general hospitals instead.76 The greatest number of applications,
73 Croke v. Ireland Application no. 33267/96 21st December 2000.
74 Mental Health Act Commission, Eighth Biennial Report 1999. HMSO, London, 2000. The figure 
includes civil and criminal patients.
75 There were 29 applications for habeas corpus in the handwriting of one individual in the period from 
1969-1974. One file seemed to belong to that individual, no. 29ss, however, it is possible, but 
improbable, that a member of staff, or a relative could have made the applications on behalf of the 29 
people.
76 Finnane, Sanity and the Insane in Post-Famine Ireland, Croom Helm, London 1981. In the early 
1900s there were 18 Asylums in the country. Department of Health, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental 
Hospitals for years 1977-1979 Government Publications, Dublin, 1980, indicated that there were 22
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63%, came from the CMH.77 Applications came from less than 40% of psychiatric 
hospitals and psychiatric units attached to general hospitals. The results confirm that 
no applications for habeas corpus were received from over 60% of hospitals and units.
Central Mental Hospital
The CMH is the only high security psychiatric hospital in the country and the people 
are sent there in various circumstances. Patients may be transferred from local
78psychiatric hospitals to the CMH based on the need for a more secure environment. 
Prisoners, including a significant number of remand prisoners, may be transferred to 
the CMH temporarily, when they have a serious mental disorder. Defendants who are 
found unfit to plead in criminal trials are detained at the CMH until found fit to plead. 
Those who are found guilty but insane on indictment are detained there at the pleasure
7 0of the government These last three categories formed almost 70% of the total in­
patient population of the CMH in 2000.80
The CMH accounted for 63% of all applications from those who had been sent there 
from a number of other services. Among these patients, the greatest number of 
applications, 48%, came from those who had been transferred from prisons, many of 
whom were on remand. This further diminished the use of the provision from those 
applicants who were not connected with the criminal justice system. A further 44% of 
the applicants had been transferred from local psychiatric hospitals. The remaining
public psychiatric hospitals and 13 private hospitals. In the period 1995-1998 there were nine private 
hospitals registered with the Department of Health and Children, two of which closed during this 
period. The growth in the number public psychiatric in-patient facilities to a current figure of 49 
(excluding the CMH) reflects the policy change to move from large hospitals to a greater number of 
smaller units attached to general hospitals and to reduce inpatient numbers over the years in the move 
to community care.
77 The next highest number of applications came from St Brendan’s Hospital, Grangegorman in Dublin 
with a figure of 10%, followed by St. Luke’s Hospital, Clonmel. Various other hospitals had two and 
three applications each and six hospitals had just one application from each of them.
78 Croke v. Smith, O ’Connor, Eastern Health Board & AG (No 2)[ 1998] I IR 101 and RT v. Central 
Mental Hospital, [1995] 2 ILRM 354.
79 This is a special verdict that is effectively an acquittal. Proposals for reform of this area of law have 
been ongoing since the Third Interim Report of the Interdepartmental Committee [chaired by Mr. 
Justice Henchy] on Mentally 111 and Maladjusted Persons. Treatment and Care o f Persons Suffering 
from Mental Disorder who Appear before the Courts on Criminal Charges. (Dublin: 1978). These have 
culminated in the proposed Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill 2003. Gallagher v. Central Mental Hospital, 
Minister for Justice and the AG [1996] 3 IR 1.
80 Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospital for the year ending 
2000, Government Publications, Dublin, 2001, p24.
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8% indicated they had been sent from Garda Stations, though there is no legal basis 
for such direct transfer. There may have been an interim court disposal, details of
o 1
which were omitted from the files.
One mechanism used to transfer a patient to the CMH was the section 207 procedure 
in the 1945 Act which provided that a district court judge held a hearing in the 
hospital to establish if the patient would be charged with an indictable offence, 
usually an assault on another patient or member of staff. When the evidence given 
constituted prima facie evidence that the person had committed the offence and 
would, if put on trial, be unfit to plead, the judge made an order stating that the patient 
was suitable for transfer to the CMH. This order was conveyed to the Minister for 
Health, who requested that the Inspector of Mental Hospitals would visit and report 
on the mental state of the person. The final decision on transfer would be left to the 
Minister. There were many difficulties with the procedure, such as the right to legal 
representation, no criteria for Ministerial involvement, the status of such “offence,” 
whether it went into abeyance following transfer and the issue of indefinite detention 
in the CMH. The procedure was deemed unconstitutional by the High Court in RT v.
50Central Mental Hospital A transfer procedure under section 208 has been used 
instead. Transfer can lead to indefinite detention and no statutory protections are in 
place yet for review of continuing detention.83 The system of transfer from local 
psychiatric hospitals to the CMH under section 207 was used more frequently in the 
1960s and Creaby et al recorded a figure of 112 transfers between 1955-1994.84 
During this period, two patients had been released on habeas corpus and three had 
been discharged previously, but were later readmitted under section 207.85 At the end 
of this period, 15 of these patients remained in the CMH. Their study observes that 
section 207 referred only to “detained” patients being transferred from the local
81 An examination of the method of transfer revealed that a total of 35% of cases were sent directly by 
the courts, following either a guilty but insane verdict, or where the person was found unfit to plead 
and would be detained until deemed fit. Section 207 of the 1945 Act was used in 40% of transfers from 
local psychiatric hospitals to the CMH. There was no information recorded in the files on the method 
of admission in a further 25% of cases.
82 [1995] 2 ILRM 354
83 See Croke v. Smith, O ’Connor, EHB Ireland and the AG [1994] 3 IR 525, Croke v. Smith(No 2)
[1998] 1 IR 101.
84 Creaby, Huthinson, O’Malley, O’Connor, “Section 207 of the Mental Treatment Act 1945 A Critical 
Review of Its Use 1955-1994” (1995) M U I11.
85 Mental Treatment Act 1945 section 207 is now unconstitutional and section 208 is used and does not 
specifically refer to detained patients. This section was not intended to be used to transfer patients to 
the CMH.
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psychiatric hospitals; the files in this study revealed four voluntary patients who had 
been transferred this way. This is a surprising finding in view of the fact that the 
legislation is unambiguous in stating that only detained persons can be transferred to 
the CMH, but it accords with Creaby’s findings.86
Outcome o f all the applications for habeas corpus
Release was ordered in 11% of cases and was refused in 43% of applications. There 
was no reference to the outcome in the remaining 46%. More releases were ordered in 
the cases arising from the applications in the 1990s; 56% of all orders for release 
occurred during this period. During this period, 54% of the applicants had legal 
representation, when compared with the overall figure which indicated that 31% of all 
applicants had legal representation.87 Hoggett has commented in relation to tribunal 
hearings in England and Wales that “the involvement of lawyers as advocates for 
patients should focus minds on the proper legal issues; it should lead to a more careful
OQ
scrutiny of assumptions about the future made on the basis of past events ...”
The court ordered transfer from the CMH to a local hospital in 4% of cases, but the 
legal basis for such an order is not clear. The transfer procedure in the 1945 Act 
would have permitted the Minister for Health to return the person to the local hospital 
from the CMH. This section was deemed unconstitutional in RT v. Central Mental 
Hospital89 and a compromise section is now used instead.90
Conclusions from study
The key finding in this research is the low rate of applications for habeas corpus from 
patients in local psychiatric hospitals and the difference between the prisoners and the 
patients in the rate of applications for the comparative period.91 Differences between
86 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 207.
87 The information on file was limited; 16% were recorded as having appealed the decision of the High 
Court and release was ordered in three cases.
88 Hoggett B., Mental Health Law A^ed., Butterworths, London, 1996, p202.
89 [1995] 2 ILRM 354.
90 Section 208. The reports of the Inspector of Mental Hospitals have outlined the procedures to be 
followed in the transfer of patients to the CMH and these are appended to the recent reports.
91 The applications from psychiatric detainees came from local hospitals and from the CMH.
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local hospitals and the CMH were exposed in relation to the frequency of use of the 
provision between those from local hospitals and those from the CMH. The total 
figure of 111 for all applicants for habeas corpus between 1923 and 1999 is stark 
when compared with a total figure of 113 applicants from prisons for 1998 and 1999. 
The results in Table 1 indicate that, as a percentage of prisoners and hospital 
detentions for the years 1998 and 1999, the rate of applicants in both categories is 
low, 0.5% of all prisoners made applications and 0.09% of all patients made 
applications. The question must be raised as to whether the situation is as it should be. 
The rate of applications may be low because people in detention decide it is not 
relevant to them. Alternatively, other reasons, such as lack of information as to the 
rights available to people in detention, impact on the rates.
From 1990-1999 there were eighteen separate habeas corpus applications, (not part of 
a cluster), indicating a growing awareness of the procedure as the only available 
opportunity for independent review of detention.92 However, the total is still small by 
comparison with the figure for prison applications for the two year period. It is clear 
that part of the problem is the information deficit arising from the absence of any 
statutory requirement to inform patients of their rights to challenge detention in this 
way.93 This has been recognised in previous studies and Creaby et al, in recognition of 
the low level of legal representation for their patients, stated, “in recent years we have 
strongly advised all patients to avail of the services of a solicitor.”94 They 
acknowledge also that, despite the fact that two patients in their study were released 
under habeas corpus, “most patients (and doctors) are unaware of this avenue and it is 
not often used.” This observation is an indication of the true position for many 
patients, even those at the interface with the criminal justice system where there is a 
perception that greater awareness of legal rights exists.
Habeas corpus is the only form of independent review of continuing detention in Irish 
law. Yet a total of 111 applications by, or on behalf of, psychiatric patients over an 85 
year period hardly suggests an effective and accessible means of redress against 
psychiatric detention. This figure was exceeded in a two year period in 1998-1999 by
92 The Mental Treatment Act 1945 does not provide any system for independent review of detention as 
required under Article 5(4) of the Convention.
93 Croke v. Smith, O ’Connor, Eastern Health Board & AG [1995] IEHC 6 31st July 1995 p51.
94 Op. cit., 84. Note that the authors were working as psychiatrists in the CMH.
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113 prisoner applications. When one adds to this the influence of clusters of 
applicants from the CMH, such as the 29 applications made by one individual in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s 95 and nine repeat applications by another patient in the 
CMH,96 it becomes clear that the remedy is not widely used and the true number of 
applicants from psychiatric detention is probably even lower than documented here.
Many factors might be at play here, including the lack of information about rights and 
the lack of a “rights culture” in psychiatric hospitals. One of the ingredients of a rights 
culture is the belief that there is a point to asserting one’s rights. Given the low 
success rate then this may well have an influence on a decision to pursue such a 
course of action. The difficulty of accessing legal representation is a factor that cannot 
be ignored either. Added to this aspect is the possibility that some detained people 
may be apathetic and lacking in motivation to pursue such action and believe it is 
pointless. The statement of the Court in Herczgefalvy v Austria is worth repeating 
here,
The Court considers the position of inferiority and powerlessness which is
typical of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals calls for increased
0 7vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with.
Undoubtedly, the lack of rights based mental health legislation that does not comply 
with the Convention has had an impact on this situation with no provision for access 
to information regarding the rights available in the 1945 Act. This information deficit 
includes a lack of information on the availability of habeas corpus and might explain, 
to some extent, the fact that the number of prisoner applications were more than five 
times the total of applications from patients. Prisoners usually have lawyers who have 
defended them at trial. This would explain the fact that 44% of the prison applicants 
had legal representation, compared with 31% of the applicants in psychiatric 
detention. There is a certain rights culture in prisons emanating from having been 
involved with the criminal justice system. This might account for the fact that the 
CMH, with its significant population of mentally disordered prison transfer patients, 
had the greatest number of habeas corpus applications in the patient group. Recent
95In relation to one such applicant it was stated in the medical evidence that “The patient is feeble 
minded, is unable to order himself or his affairs, another patient had compiled and written the letter.”
96 In re McDonagh, Unreported, High Court, 24 November 1969. The issue arose in court as to whether there 
should be a limit on the number o f such repeat applications by one individual.
97 (1992) 15 EHRR 437 para 82.
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reports confirm those who have been through the criminal justice system make up 
almost 70% of the inpatients.98 The CMH patients accounted for 63% of the total 
applications from patients, with the remaining 37% spread over all other local 
hospitals.
The manner in which the detained person reaches the High Court is an important one 
in that it gives an indication of the level of access to constitutional rights by those in 
detention. Access to habeas corpus is dependent on having information about the 
procedure and, without information, this right to have recourse to the courts cannot be 
availed of by patients, particularly those in the local psychiatric hospitals. The 
findings in this study, if taken along with the fact that there is no system of 
independent review under the 1945 Act, reinforce the belief that this provision has 
been inaccessible as a legal right. In effect, it is a denial of a constitutional right. 
Obviously, there is need for change in a system which perpetuates this level of 
inequality. The next section will address the alternative system available for review of 
detention under Irish law.
Judicial review and Ireland
The option, in appropriate circumstances of applying for judicial review of detention 
may be an alternative to habeas corpus. The link between these two procedures arose 
in the context of a practice whereby habeas corpus applications to the High Court 
were converted into applications for judicial review and leave for such review was 
granted instead of an inquiry under Article 40.4. In Sheehan v. O ’Reilly, the Supreme 
Court held the practice to be wrong,
Such an application in its urgency and importance must necessarily transcend 
any procedural form of application for judicial review or otherwise. 
Applications which clearly, in fact raise an issue as to the legality of the 
detention of a person must be treated as an application under Article 40, no 
matter how they are described.99
98 Department of Health and Children, Report o f Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for Year ending 2003, 
Government Publications, Dublin 2004.
99 [1993] 2 IR 81 p89.
This statement clearly confirms the difference between the two procedures, one is 
urgent and directed particularly at the right to liberty, compared with judicial review 
and its “consequential procedural delays” which is “quite inappropriate.”100 This view 
of the Supreme Court on judicial review is directly relevant to review of mental health 
detention and demonstrates, at the least, that it would not be a speedy means of 
review.
The question of whether judicial review in Ireland can offer a substantive review 
sufficient to satisfy Article 5(4) requirements is also doubtful. The test of 
“unreasonableness” in Irish law is whether the impugned decision “plainly and 
unambiguously flies in the face of fundamental reason and common sense”101 A 
number of Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that the test will be strictly applied 
“and suggest that it will be difficult to set aside an administrative decision on the 
grounds of unreasonableness or irrationality.”102 The onus for establishing 
unreasonableness should be on the party alleging it and the circumstances in which a 
court could intervene in an administrative decision on the basis of irrationality are 
“limited and rare.” 103 It would be necessary to satisfy the court that the administrative 
body “had before it no relevant material which would support its decision.”104 These 
elements have been described as “formidable obstacles,” as it would be difficult for 
the applicant to get the documentation held by the decision maker.105
The intensity of the intervention may vary according to the subject matter. The test in 
R v. Ministry for Defence ex p. Smith, an English case, held that the more substantial 
the interference with human rights, the more the court will require by way of 
justification before it is satisfied that the decision is reasonable and the court should 
carry out a heightened scrutiny, the “super Wednesbury test.”106 This approach would 
lower the boundaries of intervention and allow the court to consider substantive issues 
as well as procedural ones. The High Court, in Bailey v Flood, accepted the test laid
m  Ibid, p92.
101 State (Keegan) v. Stardust Victims ’ Compensation Tribunal [1986] IR 642 per Henchy J. p658.
102 Delaney H., Judicial Review o f Administrative Action: A Comparative Analysis, Round Hall Sweet 
& Maxwell, Dublin, 2001, p75.
103 p  & F Sharpe Ltd.v. Dublin City and County Manager [1989] IR 701, O ’Keeffe v. An Bord Pleanala 
[1993] 1 IR 39.
104 O ’Keeffe v. An Bord Pleanala [1993] 1 IR 39.
105 Op. cit, 1 p76.
106 [1996] QB 517.
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down in Smith as one which the Court “ought to apply when reviewing a decision that 
impinges on constitutionally guaranteed rights.”107 In the English case, R (Wilkinson) 
v. Broadmoor Hospital, where the patient’s Article 3 rights were in danger, Hale LJ 
held that “super Wednesbury” review was not enough.108 The appellant was entitled 
to a proper hearing on the merits of whether the grounds permitting treatment against 
his will were made out.109
In HL v. United Kingdom, the Strasbourg Court confirmed that a “super Wednesbury” 
type review would not be adequate as the threshold for a finding of irrationality was 
too high to permit an examination on the merits of the evidence of persistence of 
mental disorder justifying continuing detention.110 On this basis, and having 
considered the restrictive Irish position on judicial review, it would not meet the 
requirement for substantive review. Reliance on these provisions as providing 
adequate review of detention under the 1945 Act is in breach of Article 5(4). Access 
to an independent judicial body, such as a court, is a necessary part of review.
Access to court
The person detained must have access to a court. In X  v. United Kingdom the meaning 
of the word “court” arose. The Court described it as a body with judicial character, 
offering certain procedural guarantees. The court does not have to be “a court of law 
in the classic kind integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the 
country.”111 It must be independent of the executive and of the parties to the case to 
rule out any conflicts of interest. There must also be guarantees appropriate to the 
kind of deprivation of liberty in question.112 In addition, the judicial character requires 
that it must have the power to order release if the detention is unlawful. X  v United 
Kingdom established that a recommendation to this effect is insufficient.113 The 
Strasbourg Court considered that the sheriff may be regarded as a “court” for the
107 Unreported High Court 6th March 2000. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court 14th April 
2000.
108 [2001] EWCA Civ 1545 para 83.
109 Bartlett & Sandland, Mental Health: Law Policy and Practice, OUP, Oxford, 2004, p233.
110 (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004 para 139.
111 Weeks v. United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 293 para 61.
ll2Tv. United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 188 para 53.
113 (1982) 4 EHRR 188 para 61.
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purposes of Article 5(4) satisfying the requirements of independence and impartiality 
and offering judicial guarantees of an adversarial procedure.114 The person must have 
the opportunity to present his own case and the right to challenge all the evidence 
presented. X  was detained as a restricted patient in Broadmoor and a conditional 
discharge was ordered by the Home Secretary. He was unsuccessful in seeking his 
release either through habeas corpus or following a tribunal hearing. Even if the 
tribunal had recommended discharge the final decision would rest with the Home 
Secretary. He alleged breaches of Articles 5(1) and 5(4). Both the Commission and 
the Court held there was no violation of 5(1), but there was violation of 5(4).
Placing the burden on the patient to establish that his continuing detention is not 
necessary is not compatible with Article 5(4). The imposition of the burden of proof 
on the patient with regard to appealing the tribunal decision has been criticised by 
many commentators. Thorold believes that there may be uncertainty if the person is 
on medication that it is controlling an underlying mental disorder.115 Where the 
person is unmedicated, there can be a suspicion, but no proof, as to the persistence of 
the illness. The onus of proof was raised in Reid v. United Kingdom and the Court 
held that it was implicit in the case law that it was for the authorities to prove that an 
individual meets the conditions for detention.116
The Court stated in Winterwerp that the judicial proceedings in Article 5(4) need not 
always be attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6(1) for 
civil or criminal litigation. The individual must have access to a court and the 
opportunity to be heard in person or through representation. Warbrick comments that 
the Court should be cautious in allowing decisions having serious consequences for 
the individual to be taken on the basis of the statements of persons where all the 
contents are not revealed and there is no confrontation.117
114 Hutchinson Reid v. United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 9 Application no.50272/99 20th February 
2003 para 67.
115 Thorold O., “The Implications of the European Convention on Human Rights for the United 
Kingdom Legislation”, (1996) 6 EHRLR 619, p629.
116 Hutchinson Reid v. United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 9.
117 Warbrick C., European Convention o f Human Rights Yearbook o f European Law, (1990) Vol. 10, 
Oxford, pp338-348.
98
Irish law and review of detention
Mental Treatment Act 1945
There is no automatic right to review under the 1945 Act and habeas corpus is used
instead to challenge the legality of the detention. The 1945 Act provides a limited
1 1 0form of administrative review of detention and related safeguards. The Inspector of 
Mental Hospitals has a particular duty to detained patients where he has reason to 
doubt the propriety of their detention.119 The Inspector must also ascertain whether 
the periods of detention of any temporary patients have been extended since his 
previous visit. If so, he must give particular attention to the patients concerned. Any 
person may apply to the Minister for Health and Children for an examination order for 
the examination of a detained person by two medical practitioners and the Minister, 
on consideration of their report, may direct the discharge of the patient.120 Any 
relative or friend of a person detained may make an application for the discharge of a
191patient to his or her care. When the period of detention of a temporary patient is 
extended, the patient’s psychiatrist is expected to advise the patient and the person 
who applied for the original reception order that either of them may make their 
objections known to the Inspector of Mental Hospitals, the HSE, and the President of 
the High Court.122 On receipt of an objection, the Inspector must take such steps as he 
deems necessary to satisfy himself of the propriety or otherwise of the continued 
detention of the patient. Every patient has the right to have a letter forwarded 
unopened to the Minister for Health & Children, the President of the High Court, the 
relevant health services executive, the Inspector of Mental Hospitals or, if the patient 
is a ward of court, to the Registrar of Wards of Court.123
The President of the High Court may require the Inspector to visit and examine any 
patient detained as a person of unsound mind and to make a report, but it is not known 
if this ever happens.124 The Act specifically prevents any power being exercised in
118 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 240
119 Ibid, section 240.
120 Ibid, section 222.
121 Ibid, section 220.
122 Ibid, section 189.
123 Ibid, section 266.
124 Ibid, section 241.
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relation to wards of court by providing a saver clause relating to the power of the 
High Court, which means that the limited provisions of the Act do not apply to 
them. There are 100 wards of court detained in psychiatric care based on the most 
recent reports.126 The position of wards potentially breaches Article 5(4) given that 
there is no regular review carried out. It raises issues under Article 14 unless there is 
objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment, which is based 
on their different legal status, compared with other detained patients.
The safeguards of the 1945 Act do not conform to Article 5(4) requirements as there 
is no provision for independent review of either the initial decision to detain, or of 
continuing detention. As recently as 1997, the Supreme Court held that this lack of 
safeguards did not offend against the Constitution.127 This was due mainly to the 
presumed availability of the habeas corpus procedure in Article 40.4 of the 
Constitution, that it met the requirement of substantive review. This included the 
Court’s over-reliance on the perceived obligations of the medical staff to review the 
patient’s continuing illness on a regular basis. This is not a satisfactory form of 
review.
Mental Health Act 2001
The 2001 Act will provide a right to independent review of the initial decision to
178detain and of each decision to extend a detention order. This will not include wards 
of court who will be monitored by the President of the High Court and are not entitled 
to review of continuing hospitalisation, which itself is in breach of Article 5(4). In all 
other detentions, a tribunal will carry out the review. The main function of the tribunal 
is to provide initial and continuing review of the detention of patients. Other functions 
include a role in decisions regarding psychosurgery and in relation to transfers to the
1 9QCMH. The members of the tribunal will be appointed by the Mental Health
125 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 283.
i260p. cit., 98.
127 Croke v. Smith O ’Connor & Eastern Health Board (No. 2) [1998] 1 IR 101.
128 Mental Health Act 2001, section 18.
129 Ibid, sections 21(2)(b) and 58(3).
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Commission. Membership will consist of a consultant psychiatrist, a lawyer and a lay 
person.130 Decisions of the tribunal will be by majority vote.
The independent psychiatrist appointed by the Commission to report to the tribunal 
must visit, interview and report back to the Tribunal within 14 days and the tribunal 
has a further seven days to make its decision.131 There is provision for a first 
extension of time of 14 days, either at the behest of the tribunal, or the patient and for 
a second extension at the behest of the patient only.132 The tribunal will have to be 
satisfied that the patient is suffering from a mental disorder and that the required 
procedures have been complied with under the Act.133 Where there is a failure to 
comply with any of the provisions and it does not affect the substance of the order, or 
does not cause an injustice, then the order can be affirmed.134 The extent, or boundary 
of this discretion is of concern, as it is not defined and may not survive a legal 
challenge if an application for habeas corpus were made to the High Court. The 
Convention requires that the law must indicate the scope of any discretion conferred 
on the authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give 
protection against arbitrariness.135 Where the tribunal is not satisfied, the order can be 
revoked and the patient discharged.136
The patient will have a right to attend the tribunal unless, in the opinion of the
1 7 7tribunal, it would damage their “mental health, well-being or emotional condition”. 
There is no statutory right to an independent medical report for the tribunal hearing. 
There is a right to legal representation before the tribunal, but the patient may engage 
his own legal representative. If the patient objects to the lawyer appointed by 
Commission there is no obligation to provide a replacement.
It is not clear if the tribunal is inquisitorial, but arguably it is. The tribunal is based on 
the provision that questions are asked by the tribunal on the one hand, and by the
130 Ibid, section 48(2)-(3).
131 Mental Health Act 2001, section 17(l)(c)iii.
132 Ibid, section 18(4).
133 Ibid, sections 9,10,12, 14,15,16.
134 Ibid, section 18(l)(a)(ii).
135 Malone v. United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 14 para 68.
136 Mental Health Act 2001, section 18(l)(b).
137 Ibid, section 49(11).
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patient or his lawyer on the other hand. There is no specific reference to the question 
of the burden of proof, but it rests with the authorities to demonstrate the presence of 
mental disorder and adherence to the procedures. The tribunal has no statutory power 
to make a conditional discharge, defer a discharge, or direct that a patient’s disorder 
be reclassified. When a patient is being discharged before a tribunal hearing, the 
psychiatrist must notify the patient of his right to continue with a review.138 If the 
patient wishes to continue, he must notify the Commission within 14 days of 
discharge. Otherwise, the review will be discontinued.
The decisions of the tribunals can be reviewed by way of judicial review and this will 
probably be a significant source of case law in future. Some of the possible reasons 
for such review might be that the tribunal was acting ultra vires its statutory powers, 
breached the rule against bias {nemo iudex in causa sua), breached the principle of 
audi alteram partem, breached formal or procedural requirements or failed to give
adequate reasons for its decision. The tribunal must comply with rules of natural
1 ^ 0justice and this includes giving proper and adequate reasons for its decisions. The 
tribunal must also give reasons why it accepted particular evidence where there is a 
conflict.140 One of the concerns of staff is that patients will be discharged by a tribunal 
against their wishes, but, based on English law, a new admission order can be made 
soon after tribunal discharge, provided that those involved in the admissions act 
objectively and bona fide.141
Where the patient is discharged before the review has commenced, the review will not 
go ahead unless the patient has contacted the Mental Health Commission within 14 
days of discharge.142 It is reasonably predictable that many patients will not pursue a 
right to review in these circumstances. Having regard to the decisions in Winterwerp 
and Meygeri, leaving the initiative to the patient may not meet Article 5(4) 
requirements, though this is coloured by the fact that the patient is already discharged. 
Good practice would indicate that the number of such patients who fail to pursue that 
right should be carefully documented to ascertain the reasons for not pursuing such a
138 Ibid, section 28(3)(b).
139 R v .MHRTexp Clatworthy (1985) 3 All ER 699.
140 R v. Ashworth Hospital Authority, ex parte H. [2002] EWCA Civ 923.
141 R v. South Western Hospital Managers, ex p. M. [1994] 1 All ER 161.
142 Section 28(3)(b). Health Research Board, Activities o f Irish Psychiatric Hospitals 2003, Dublin,
2004 confirm that 80% of all admissions are discharged within 17 days.
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course of action, in order to rule out information deficits and any extraneous 
pressures. It is important also to ensure that the right to review is not usurped by early 
discharge.143
There will be a right of appeal to the Circuit Court against the decision of the Tribunal 
and an appeal is permitted to the High Court only on a point of law.144 The burden of 
proof will rest with the individual to establish that he no longer has a mental disorder. 
The Circuit Court must not revoke the order “unless it is shown by the patient to the 
satisfaction of the Court that he or she is not suffering from a mental disorder ...”145 
Placing the onus on the patient is almost certainly in breach of Article 5(4) in light of 
the decision in Reid v. United Kingdom.146
Commentators on the tribunal system have suggested that the therapeutic relationship 
between psychiatrist and patient must be protected for the future.147 Others were 
concerned that the preferred outcome was imposed on the evidence by tribunal 
members and that the decisions are dictated by psychiatrists and that there is little 
standardisation of procedures.148 There is evidence that patients understand little of 
what the hearing is about.149
Finally, the lack of independent review in the 1945 Act is a clear breach of Article 
5(4) and the specific exclusion of wards of court compounds the situation. The 2001 
Act will meet the requirements of the Convention by providing a right of access to a 
tribunal that will satisfy the requirement of independence, but will not include wards 
of court. The scope of the discretion with regard to the failure to comply with some 
provisions of the Act is unclear. The question of early discharge to avoid engaging 
with the tribunal will have to be monitored when the 2001 Act is in place. A more
l43Blumenthal & Wessely, The Patterns o f Delay in Mental Health Review Tribunals. HMSO, London, 
1993.
144 Mental Health Act 2001, sections 19(1) & (16).
145 Ibid, section 19.
146 Hutchinson Reid v. United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 9 .
147 Obomanu and Kennedy, “Juridogenic harm: statutory principles for the new mental health tribunals” 
(2001) Psych. Bulletin. 25, 331-333.
148 Peay J., Tribunals on Trial: A Study o f Decision-Making under the Mental Health Act 1983, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.
149 Dolan et al, “Mental Health Review Tribunals: a survey of Special Hospital Patients’ Opinions”
(1999) 10(2) Journal o f Forensic Psychiatry, p24.
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serious concern is the need to reverse the burden of proof to avoid a breach of Article 
5.
Speedy review
The decision regarding the detention must be taken speedily. Usually, time begins to 
run when Article 5(4) proceedings are initiated.150 The word “speedily” has been the 
subject of many applications, most recently under the English Human Rights Act 
1998.151 A speedy review depends on all the circumstances of each case including 
access to speedy legal aid and the need to get medical reports in psychiatric
152detention. In Baranowski v. Poland, involving a pre-trial detention and a delay in 
obtaining bail, it took the domestic court six weeks to obtain evidence from a 
neurologist, a psychiatrist and a cardiologist and this was held to be a lack of due 
diligence and a violation of Article 5(4).153 The procedure for holding a person under 
Polish law was not based on clear rules. Where domestic law allows for arbitrary or 
excessive detention, even in the face of compliance with domestic procedures, the 
deprivation of liberty will not be lawful.
The second of two applicants, in Keus v. Netherlands and Koendjbiharie v 
Netherlands,154 Koendjbiharie had waited for four months for review that included an 
unexplained adjournment of more than three months and more than a month for the 
Court of Appeal to draft a simple order. This time scale was held to breach Article 
5(4). The Court distinguished between newly detained patients and those needing 
periodic review of detention on the degree of urgency required in each case. Less 
urgency applies to the latter situation, but a four months delay in this case was held to 
be unreasonable in relation to review of continuing detention.155
Article 5(4) was violated in Van der Leer v. The Netherlands, because the applicant 
did not have the lawfulness of the detention reviewed speedily by the court and they
150 Van der Leer v. Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 567.
151 R v. MHRT&Sec o f State for Health ex parte KB,MK, J R , GM, LB, PD, & 72. [2002] EWHC 639.
R vMHRT; Torfaen Co. Council & Gwent HA (exparte Hal)l (1999) 3 All ER 132.
152 Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland (1987) 9 EHRR 71 para 55.
153 Application no. 28358/95 28th March 2000.
154 (1990) A/185-C, (1990) A/185B.
155 Ibid, para 24.
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regarded the relevant period of five months as too long.156 The Court said that the 
initial failure to inform the applicant of the detention order put a special responsibility 
on the authorities to proceed expeditiously. In Musial v. Poland, the applicant 
complained that the length of time for a speedy judicial decision was breached and the 
Court considered that a lapse of one year, eight months and eight days was 
incompatible with Article 5(4) unless there were exceptional grounds to justify it.157 
The delay between the clinical examination and preparation of a medical report is 
capable of running counter to the principle underlying Article 5; namely the 
protection of individuals against arbitrariness as regards any measure depriving them 
of their liberty. Such difficulties do not reduce the obligation on national authorities to 
provide a prompt review of detention.
A review of the applicant’s detention at intervals of 15 months and two years was 
held by the Court in Herczegfalvy v. Austria not to be reasonable.158 In E  v. Norway, 
the review and judgment was given just one day under eight weeks and the Court held 
this did not conform to speedy access.159 Harris comments that a period of eight 
weeks from the filing of the summons to the judgment appears difficult to reconcile 
with the notion of “speedily” except that the application had been filed in the 
vacation.160 The long delay in giving judgment could not be justified. Where there is 
evidence of a change in the mental state of a detained person, a hearing within a 
shorter period may be required.161 Warbrick says the more complicated the decisions 
under Article 5(4) the harder it is to satisfy the requirement of speed, which puts a
1A9burden on the state to show the time actually taken was necessary. Where the state
cannot explain the delay or can only do so by reason of the organisation of its judicial
1system, the Court has shown that it is likely to find a violation.
Thorold says that the “standard set requires a high degree of administrative urgency 
which other than in assessment tribunal hearings, the United Kingdom tribunals
156 (1990) 12 EHRR 567 para 28.
157 (2001)31 EHRR 29.
158 (1993) 15 EHRR 437 para 77.
159 (1994) 17 EHRR 30 para 66.
160 Op. cit., 1 p i56.
161 Mv. FRG No 10272/83,38 DR 104 94 (1984).
162 Op. cit., 1 at p i56.
163 Koendjbiharie v. Netherlands A 185 B paras 28-30 (1990).
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system frequently fails to achieve.”164 He believes that rules are in part responsible, in 
that the “responsible authority” is allowed three weeks to forward its reports on the 
patient and a further three weeks for the restricted patients and the Home Office 
opinion. A further 14 days notice of the hearing is required and the Tribunal will have 
seven days to communicate its decision. He believes it was impossible to meet the 
requirements set in E  v Norway, even though specific difficulties arose in that case. 
Tighter time limits will have to be set to avoid breaches of Article 5(4) and, to some 
extent, his warnings have been realised in the decision on this issue under the Human 
Rights Act 1998.165
This decision involved the examination of administrative procedures by the court in R 
v. MHRT & Sec o f State for Health ex parte KB & others, an English case, that 
established a breach of Article 5(4) because of unreasonable delay in holding tribunal 
hearings with a view to discharge, involving a number of people.166 In each case, the 
tribunal hearings had been repeatedly adjourned. The complaint concerned the delay 
between making the applications and the dates of the hearings. This resulted in 
unjustified detention and uncertainty for the patient. Hearings for patients were 
frequently cancelled, resulting in anxiety and loss of trust in the system and waste of 
resources where arrangements had been made to free up staff to attend. The Court 
addressed the issue of “speedily,” assuming reasonable availability of resources and a 
reasonably efficient administrative system. It would depend on the nature and 
importance of the subject matter of the case, the complexity of the issues, the 
preparation required beforehand and the evidence to be considered. Other factors, 
such as the sudden increase in other applications, or, a holiday period, or “the fact that 
a patient’s case is perceived to be unmeritorious” do not deprive him of this right to a 
speedy hearing.167 Domestic law confirms the time period as seven days in the case of 
section 2 detentions. No such time applies to the section 3 applications, which are the 
most common. The Court examined in detail the workload of the tribunals and the
164 Op. cit., 115 p626.
165 R v. MHRT & Sec o f  State for Health ex parte KB ,MK, JR ,GM, LB, PD, & TB.[2002] EWHC 639. 
R v MHRT; Torfaen Co. Council & Gwent HA (exparte Hall) (1999) 3 All ER 132.
166 R v. MHRT & Sec o f State for Health ex parte KB,MK, JR , GM, LB, PD, & TB. [2002] EWHC 639. 
There were variations in the legal status of the individuals with one on a section 2 Assessment Order 
necessitating a hearing within seven days but had to wait for four weeks. The remainder were waiting 
between nine weeks and 27 weeks.
167 Ibid.
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unexpected increases each year caused by changes to community care. This should 
have been taken into account by the State. The Court held that it was the 
responsibility of the State to ensure speedy hearings and they are obliged to have 
sufficient resources, including tribunals or courts to ensure speed. Having held all 
applicants suffered a breach of their rights under Article 5(4), Bumton J. went on to 
hold central government, not the actual tribunals, responsible for the delays.168
The requirement of speed applies to the appellate procedures, as well as to the initial 
review, unless there are exceptional grounds to explain the delay.169 The decision in 
Reid v. United Kingdom, reinforces this view as applying to the Scottish four-tier 
review system.170 The Court held Article 5(4) was breached by a delay of three years 
between the application to the Sheriff and the final decision in the House of Lords.
Irish law and speedy review
Mental Treatment Act 1945
The Irish government sought to rely on habeas corpus as a means of speedy review 
for people detained under the 1945 Act in Croke v. Ireland}11 Two cases were relied 
on, Gallagher v. Central Mental Hospital, Minister for Justice and the AG 172and In
172
re Shane Donnelly as evidence of the speed with which a review of detention 
under Article 40.4 can occur. The requirement of speed would appear to have been 
satisfied in both these cases, though the detention had been pursuant to the Trial of 
Lunatics Act 1883, not the Mental Treatment Act 1945. It may be successfully argued 
that the requirement of speed is satisfied by a habeas corpus inquiry. The High Court 
stated in Croke v. Smith, O ’Connor, Eastern Health Board & AG, that habeas corpus 
“is undoubtedly a speedy and efficacious remedy.”174 The Constitution is 
unambiguous that the High Court judge to whom the application is made must
168 Ibid, para 113.
169 Rutten v. The Netherlands Application no. 32605/96 24 July 2001.
170 Hutchinson Reid v. United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 9.
171 Application no 33267/96 21st December 2000.
172 [1996] 3 IR 1.
173 (1995) Unreported, referenced in Admissibility Decision in Croke v Ireland 33267/96 21st 
December 2000.
174 [1995] IEHC 6 31st July 1995 p i8.
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proceed to make the inquiry immediately, but this does not prevent adjournments 
being made. It was clear from the study on habeas corpus in Ireland that, as soon as 
the Court received a request, the matter was immediately addressed and set in motion. 
It was difficult to estimate the time of the final outcome in each case, as the 
information was missing from files, in many cases dates of completion were not 
recorded and, it was not possible to assess the time element with any accuracy. 
Judicial review procedures would not be able to satisfy the speed requirement.175
Mental Health Act 2001
The automatic review of the initial decision to detain will take place within 21 days of
1 7 f\making the detention order. There will be a right to review of each extension to a 
detention order, after three months, six months, one year and annually thereafter. The 
time scales are dependent on what Thorold refers to as a “high degree of 
administrative urgency” and it is impossible to predict its success.177 The statutory 
time scales will provide for a speedy review as long as the necessary resources are 
provided to avoid a breach of Article 5(4). The English case, R v. MHRT & Sec o f 
State for Health ex parte KB & others, dealt with this issue rather forcefully.178
Legal Aid
The Court affirmed the right to legal aid for adults with mental disorder in Meygeri v. 
Germany}19 In addition, the initiative to obtain legal representation should not rest 
with the individual.180 The necessity of having to meet particular criteria before being 
able to commence legal proceedings was addressed in Winterwerp where the 
Government claimed that those with substantial grounds for taking the case could 
have access to legal representation. The Court held that,
having substantial and well founded grounds for denying the lawfulness of the 
detention cannot be a pre-condition for access to the proceedings contemplated
175 Sheehan v. Reilly [1993] 2 IR 81 p89.
176 Mental Health Act 2001, section 18(2).
177 Op. cit., 115.
178 R v. MHRT & Sec o f State for Health ex parte KB ,MK, JR ,GM, LB, PD, & TB. [2002] EWHC 639.
179 (1993) 15 EHRR 584.
180 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387.
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by 5(4) since this is precisely the issue the domestic courts should decide. ... 
Article 5(4) does not require that persons committed to care under the head of 
“unsound mind” should themselves take the initiative in obtaining legal 
representation before having recourse to a court.181
The failure to provide legal aid in judicial separation proceedings in Airey v. Ireland 
constituted a violation of Article 6.1.182 The need for legal aid in situations involving 
the liberty of the individual is established following Airey. Thorold says that the need 
for legal aid in Article 5(4) proceedings in a mental health system “where the issue 
involves liberty and the applicant is presumed mentally disordered could reasonably
| o i
be considered a fortiori. ” The applicant in Meygeri v. Germany complained that he
had no lawyer at the review of his detention, despite having asked for one, and the 
Court held,
... where a person is confined in a psychiatric institution on the ground of the 
commission of acts which constituted criminal offences for which he could not 
be held responsible on account of mental illness, he should- unless there are 
special circumstances-receive legal assistance in subsequent proceedings 
relating to his detention. The importance of what is at stake for him-personal 
liberty-taken together with the very nature of the affliction- diminished mental 
capacity-compels this conclusion.184
Thorold interprets this statement as imposing a positive duty to ensure the patient is
• I O Clegally represented and not simply the duty to introduce a legal aid scheme. The 
Court in Winterwerp recognised the right of access to court and to be heard in person 
or “where necessary, through some form of representation failing which, he will not 
have been afforded ‘the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of 
deprivation of liberty.’”186 In Meygeri v. Germany the Court seemed to place an 
obligation on the judicial body to ensure the patient is represented.187
181 Ibid, para 66.
182( 1980) 2 EHRR 305 para 26.
m Op. cit., 115 p627.
184 (1992) 15 EHRR 584 para 23.
185 Op. cit., 115.
186 (1979) 2 EHRR para 60.
187 (1992) 15 EHRR 584.
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Irish law and legal aid
Mental Treatment Act 1945
Habeas corpus is the review system associated with the 1945 Act and provision is 
made for legal aid through the non-statutory Attorney General’s Scheme.188 The 
purpose of the scheme is to provide legal representation for persons who need it, but 
cannot afford it. The applicant must satisfy the court that he is unable to retain legal 
representation without the benefit of the Scheme.189 It is not an alternative to costs 
and a person wishing to avail of it must do so at the commencement of the 
proceedings.
Mental Health Act 2001
The 2001 Act provides a right to legal representation for all tribunal hearings and 
where there is an appeal to the Circuit Court.190 The Mental Health Commission will 
assign a legal representative to represent the patient unless he proposes to engage his 
own. This legal representation will be assigned for the tribunal hearing, but where 
other legal issues of concern arise, the patient will have to apply for legal aid under 
the Civil Legal Aid Act 1995. This system is seriously under-funded so that 
emergency family law issues get priority, leaving other issues on long waiting lists.
Information rights
The right to information regarding the detention is essential to the other rights 
provided within Article 5(4). These informational rights can be considered 
autonomously or can be subsumed in Article 5(4) in that a breach of Article 5(2) can 
mean a breach of Article 5(4) and vice versa.191 In X  v United Kingdom, the Court 
held that a person cannot make use of a right of review “unless he is promptly and 
adequately informed of the facts and legal authority relied on to deprive him of his
188 www.irlgov.ie/attomev
189 The right to legal representation will be available to all patients in relation to tribunal hearings in the 
2001 Act.
190 Mental Health Act 2001, section 17(1 )(b).
191 4 EHRR 188 para 66.
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liberty.”192The improvement in information rights followed the decision in X  in which 
the Court pointed out the need for the applicant to be appraised of the reasons for his 
recall to hospital. While the majority did not rule on this issue, the dissenting 
judgment of Evrigensis J. emphasised the importance of information,
the right of an individual deprived of his liberty to be informed promptly of 
the reasons for his being taken into custody constitutes a safeguard of personal 
liberty whose importance in any system which is democratic and founded on 
the rule of law cannot be underestimated. Quite apart from enabling the person 
detained to make proper preparations for bringing legal proceedings in 
accordance with para 5.4 it is the embodiment of a kind of legitimate10lconfidence in the relations between the individual and the public powers.
He believed the right to information was so important that it should be considered 
autonomously under Article 5(2), not subsumed under Article 5(4).
Irish law and information
Mental Treatment Act 1945
The right to information about the limited safeguards and access to habeas corpus is 
not provided in the legislation. The provision of information is at the discretion of the 
Minister for Health and Children.194 The impact of this deficiency is believed to have 
contributed to the low rate of applications for habeas corpus from patients detained 
under the 1945 Act. The failure to provide information is a clear breach of Article 
5(4).
Mental Health Act 2001
The 2001 Act provides for the right to information about review of detention at the 
point of making the detention order or extension of the order.195 The information also 
confirms the right to legal representation. However, there is no requirement to give 
the reasons for the detention, only information about the formal legal situation. This is
192 Ibid.
193 (1981) 4 EHRR 18 8-dissenting judgment of Evrigensis J.
194 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 267.
195 Mental Health Act 2001, sections 16 & 64(6)(b)(vii).
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in breach of Article 5(2).196 The 2001 Act includes a section that requires measures 
regarding information rights to be specified as a condition of registration of mental 
health centres.197 This is one of the positive features of the 2001 Act.
De facto detention
The English Mental Health Act 1983 allows incapable patients to be admitted as 
informal patients and then prevented from leaving on the basis of their best interests. 
They are admitted and treated under the common law on grounds of necessity based 
on their best interests. Gostin refers to such patients as “confined in fact but not under
1 Qfithe force of law.” The reason such patients are of concern to Article 5(4) is that if 
their hospital admission meets the criteria for deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1), 
they are entitled to the safeguards of Article 5(4). These issues were raised in R v. 
Boumewood Community and Mental Health Trust ex parte L, an English case, 
concerning an autistic man who had been admitted to a psychiatric unit informally 
and was later prevented from leaving or seeing his family.199 The applicant in L 
sought judicial review of the decision to detain him and an order of habeas corpus and 
an action for false imprisonment. Because there was no legal formality in the 
admission, he was deprived of any challenge before a tribunal. Fennell questions how 
the common law detention can “accord with a procedure prescribed by law” if, as the 
Court says, “disregard of domestic law entails breach of the Convention.” 200 Lord 
Steyn stated,
The common law principle of necessity is a useful concept but it contains none 
of the safeguards of the 1983 Act. It places effective and unqualified control in 
the hands of the hospital psychiatrists ... Neither habeas corpus or judicial 
review are sufficient safeguards against misjudgements and professional
A A  j
lapses in the case of compliant incapacitated patients’.
196 Van der Leer v. Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 567.
197 Ibid, section 64(6)(b)(vii).
198 Gostin, “Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities The European Convention of Human 
Rights”, (2000) 23(2) InU.L.Psych. p i35.
199 (1998) 3 All ER 289.
200 Op. cit., 20 p353.
201 (1998) 3 All ER 289 p309.
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He also said that the law “would be defective if it failed to provide adequate 
protective remedies to a vulnerable group of incapacitated mental patients.” Fennell 
refers to The Good Practice Guidelines, drafted after the case and not binding 
which state,
if the patient lacks capacity it is particularly important that both clinical 
and social care requirements are considered and that account is taken of the 
patient’s ascertainable wishes and feelings and the views of immediate 
relatives or carers on what would be in their best interests. It is good practice 
for the clinical team to arrange for such patients to be visited periodically by 
the hospital managers or by an independent advocate if no-one from outside 
the hospital would otherwise take an interest in their care.204
The jurisdiction of tribunals extends only to the detained, so if there is detention under 
the common law powers of necessity, it would appear to infringe not only Article 
5(1), but also 5(4). The de facto detention of compliant incapacitated patients, 
highlighted in Boumewood, remains to be comprehensively addressed. The 1983 Act 
Code of Practice was amended in 1999 to acknowledge the compliant incapacitated 
patient by providing for limited safeguards with regard to information and consent to 
treatment.
This case was subsequently brought before the Strasbourg Court, in HL v. United 
Kingdom, which held that the applicant was detained and the requirements of Article 
5(4) were not satisfied.205 The Government had asserted that an action in judicial 
review (combined with a writ of habeas corpus) allowed an assessment of the
0C\(\essential conditions bearing on the lawfulness of his detention. The Court held that 
Article 5(4) was breached as the applicant did not have a procedure available to him
• 7 0 7  . _ . •which satisfied the requirement of independent review of detention. The decision in 
Storck v. Germany confirms that there is no diminution in the positive obligations on 
the state with regard to the detention of patients in private facilities.
202 Ibid.
203 Op. cit., 20.
204 NHS Circular HSC, 1998/122.
205 (2005) 40 EHRR 32 5th October 2004 para 126. Because of the finding of a breach of Article 5(4), 
the Court held that it was not necessary to examine the applicant's additional submissions.,
206 Ibid, para 124.
207 Ibid, para 142.
208 Application no 61603/00 16th June 2005.
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Irish law and de facto detention
Mental Treatment Act 1945
Where voluntary admission under the 1945 Act results in the level of control 
necessary for deprivation of liberty, such patients are de facto detained and are subject 
to the requirements of Article 5(4) following the decision in HL and Storck.209 Even 
though the 1945 Act expressly provides that when voluntary patients are not capable 
of being voluntary they must be detained or discharged, this provision is largely 
ignored. Compliant incapacitated patients are admitted to locked wards where their 
freedom and contacts are severely curtailed and in which the level of control is high 
enough to meet the criteria for deprivation of liberty. Where this is the case and there 
are no safeguards in place for these patients, the lack of formality in admission and 
the lack of access to review is in breach of Article 5(4) of the Convention.
Mental Health Act 2001
The situation under the 2001 Act is similar in this regard to the 1945 Act in that 
patients can be admitted voluntarily, but those who are compliant and incapacitated 
will have no safeguards. The fact that the word “voluntarily” is used may mean that 
greater care will have to be taken to ensure that such patients are truly voluntary and 
may result in an increase in the number of compulsory admissions. Where such 
patients meet the standard laid down in HL for deprivation of liberty, this Act is also
9 1 0in breach of Article 5(4) for failure to provide adequate safeguards.
Discharge and delay
The problem of delayed discharge following a tribunal hearing arose in Johnson v.
911 .«United Kingdom. The Tribunal ruled that there was no mental illness, but because 
the applicant would be unable to live without the support of rehabilitation, he was 
granted a conditional discharge. The condition involved a requirement of residency in
20; HL v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32.
210 (2005) 40 EHRR 32.
21'(1999) 27 EHRR 296.
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a supervised hostel. Since there was no hostel accommodation available, he was sent 
to a less secure hospital and his conditional discharge was deferred. The applicant 
complained that the delay of four years for his release was a violation of Article 5(1). 
On the issue of admissibility, the Commission stated,
It could, in principle, have been justified in deciding that a phased discharge 
was called for even if this entailed some period of deferment of the applicant’s 
release. ... such a release cannot be indefinitely deferred ... The margin of 
appreciation afforded to the national authorities, allowing deferral of the 
discharge for a person who has been found to have recovered from mental 
illness, must be correspondingly limited and must be subject to strict
procedural safeguards to ensure the discharge of such a person at the earliest
212opportunity.
The Court held that domestic lawfulness was not adequate. There must be compliance 
with the Convention and conformity with Article 5(1) and the Winterwerp criteria. 
The Court stated, “... it does not automatically follow from a finding by the expert 
authority that when the mental disorder which justified a patient’s confinement no 
longer persists that the latter must be immediately and unconditionally released into 
the community.”213 The Court believed such a requirement would be far too rigid an 
approach to the Winterwerp criteria. The Court cited Luberti v. Italy for the 
proposition that the responsible authority is entitled to exercise a similar measure of 
discretion in deciding on the right circumstances and interests at stake on the 
appropriateness of discharge.214 Following the reasoning in Luberti, the Court stated,
The authority should be able to retain some measure of supervision over the 
progress of the person once he is released into the community and to that end 
make his discharge subject to conditions. ... It is, however, of paramount 
importance that appropriate safeguards are in place so as to ensure that any 
deferral of discharge is consonant with the purpose of Article 5(1) and with 
the aim of the restriction in sub-paragraph (e) and, in particular, that discharge 
is not unreasonably delayed.
The Court held that the failure of a mechanism by which a restricted patient could 
challenge a deferment that unreasonably delayed his discharge or a tribunal that could
212 Application no. 22520/93 May 18th 1995.
213 Johnson v. United Kingdom (1997) 27 EHRR 296 para 61.
214 (1984) 6 EHRR 440.
215 (1997) 27 EHRR 296 para 63.
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review its initial decision violated Article 5(1) and 5(4).216 The Tribunal finding in 
Johnson implies that the patient is potentially eligible for discharge and this depends 
on adequate resources from the State. If properly resourced, then it is probable that a 
patient could be discharged when deemed well enough. Where this is not the case, 
patients will remain longer in hospital at further cost. The principle of the least 
restrictive alternative cannot be applied when resources are inadequate. The 
individual is kept as an inpatient in the face of being well enough for discharge which 
is probably, depending on the length of time, in breach of Article 5 and the 
Winterwerp principles.
State obligations in this regard were addressed in the English courts in R v. Secretary
217o f State for the Home Department and Secretary o f State for Health, exp. IH, an 
English case, where the Court of Appeal held that, although Winterwerp required that 
patients who no longer had a mental disorder were entitled to discharge, that may be 
subject to conditions, the Convention does not bestow a right to discharge. The 
decision to discharge is subject to the availability of appropriate resources in the 
community, along with considerations of public safety and there is no duty on the 
State to ensure that appropriate community based facilities exist. However, the 
postponement of discharge without any tribunal hearing for an unreasonably long 
period was a breach of Article 5(4), unless the postponement was reasonable and 
based on relevant considerations. Where the difficulty in meeting the conditions 
continues, it is open to the tribunal to adjourn in order to investigate the feasibility of 
options it proposed and, to ensure no inappropriate and impossible conditions are 
imposed. Where all efforts to meet conditions have failed and discharge deferred, the 
tribunal can, and should, monitor the situation and consider further deferral, amending 
or varying conditions, order conditional discharge with no specific conditions or 
continuing detention. The situation may not be resolved if the conditions cannot be 
met and the patient condemned to remain in hospital, despite not meeting the 
Winterwerp criteria. This case exposes the difficulties where resources are 
constrained, thereby counteracting the effect of the Convention.
216 Johnson v. United Kingdom (1997) 27 EHRR 296 para 66.
217 [2002] EWCA Civ 646.
218 Ibid, para 86-87.
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Irish law and discharge and delay
Mental Treatment Act 1945
The 1945 Act provides for discharge on recovery of the patient with a notice
requirement to that effect to any relatives as appropriate.219 Other provisions permit
discharge, following application by a relative or friend and, following a direction by
the President of the High Court for a report from the Inspector of Mental Hospitals.
Where there is concern regarding the propriety of the detention and following an
application for two independent medical examinations, the Inspector can
investigate.220 The 1945 Act provides for two forms of temporary discharge, absence
on leave which can extend to 48 hours and absence on trial which can extend to 90
221 .days, following which a patient can be re-admitted or discharged. The Department 
of Health Guidelines on Good Practice and Quality Assurance in Mental Health 
Services advise that well planned discharge policies and procedures should be in place
222and, where necessary, packages of care should be available. Where community 
facilities are not available, the patient may be kept in hospital for longer than is 
necessary, in breach of the Winterwerp requirements.
Mental Health Act 2001
The 2001 Act provides that the patient must be discharged where he is no longer 
suffering from a mental disorder and in reaching this decision, the Act provides,
Section 28-
(1) Where the consultant psychiatrist responsible for the care and treatment of 
a patient becomes of opinion that the patient is no longer suffering from a 
mental disorder, he or she shall by order in a form specified by the 
Commission revoke the relevant admission order or renewal order, as the case 
may be, and discharge the patient.
219 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 218.
220 Ibid, sections 220, 222, 240,241.
221 Ibid, sections 203 & 204.
222Department of Health and Children, Guidelines on Good Practice and Quality Assuramce in Mental 
Health Services, Government Publications, Dublin, 1998.
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(2) In deciding whether and when to discharge a patient under this section, the 
consultant psychiatrist responsible for his or her care and treatment shall have 
regard to the need to ensure:
(a) that the patient is not inappropriately discharged, and
(b) that the patient is detained pursuant to an admission or a renewal order 
only for so long as is reasonably necessary for his or her proper care 
and treatment.
Whether “inappropriate discharge” might embrace permissible delay due to lack of 
appropriate facilities remains to be seen. Delayed discharge is not expressly permitted 
in the 2001 Act and this will necessitate the State providing adequate resources to 
ensure that services are available as soon as the patient is ready to be discharged, a 
lofty ideal in today’s resource starved services. The meaning of “proper care” is also a 
difficult one if the patient no longer has a mental disorder and where the 
appropriateness of discharge is in issue. This means that the consultant psychiatrist 
has a far greater degree of discretion at his disposal than the tribunal. The ambiguity 
in the scope of this discretion needs to be addressed. The tribunal does not have any 
express discretion to postpone discharge pending a service plan being in place, but 
Johnson v. United Kingdom confirmed that immediate discharge is not a right in
99^relation to restricted patients. This case is not a decision of the Strasbourg Court 
and may not have such persuasive authority. It may not be practical in all 
circumstances to have immediate discharge, provided the delay is reasonable and 
justifiable. The provision permitting extension of the time limit for a decision by the 
tribunal does not expressly provide for delayed discharge, but the use of such 
provision would, in effect, postpone discharge.224 The margin of appreciation afforded 
to national authorities may not apply where there is no express provision for delayed 
discharge in the 2001 Act.
There is a requirement to notify the discharge to the Mental Health Commission and,
99  ^where appropriate, the housing authority and relevant health board. This in itself is 
not an obligation to provide services. Some restricted patients have languished in 
hospitals for years as is evident from the Report of the Inspector of Mental Hospitals 
2003, where particular attention is paid to such patients in the Central Mental
(1997) 27 EHRR 296.
224 Mental Health Act 2001, section 18(4).
225 Ibid, section 28(4).
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Hospital.226 Some may be waiting for a less secure hospital place, but there is no 
power to force the provision of an appropriate facility.
Conclusion
This chapter endeavoured to examine Ireland’s compliance with Article 5(4) and the 
results indicate that there are serious failures to comply with the Convention under the 
1945 Act. Most significant are the exclusion of wards of court from the minimal 
safeguards in the Act and the reliance on habeas corpus and judicial review as a 
means of satisfying Article 5(4) requirements. While habeas corpus is not regarded 
as adequate in providing the required substantive review of initial and continuing 
detention, it is likely to satisfy the requirement of speed under Article 5(4) and in 
emergencies. The actual use of habeas corpus in Ireland was examined in a study that 
confirmed a low rate of applications from patients in local psychiatric hospitals when 
compared with patients in the high security hospital and with prisoners. The results 
revealed a widespread failure to inform patients about this right and there was some 
evidence that even staff were not aware of habeas corpus. Access to habeas corpus as 
the only form of independent review under the 1945 Act is dependent on having 
information about the procedure and, without information, this right to have recourse 
to the courts cannot be availed of by patients, particularly those in the local 
psychiatric hospitals. The findings in this study, if taken together with the fact that 
there is no system of independent review under the 1945 Act, creates a bleak picture 
regarding rights to review of detention.
The alternative remedy is judicial review. It is clear that the approach of the Irish 
courts to this provision is restrictive and would not meet the requirement of 
substantive review. In addition, it would not satisfy the requirement of speed under 
Article 5(4). The 1945 Act does not provide any right to information necessary to 
enable a challenge to the legality of the detention in breach of Article 5(4) 
requirements.
226 Op. cit., 98.
227 X v. United Kingdom (1981)4 EHRR 181.
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Both statutes may well breach Article 5(4) where compliant incapacitated patients are 
deprived of their liberty based on the decision in HL v. United Kingdom and have no 
access to review. The 2001 Act will largely satisfy the requirements of Article 5(4) 
with regard to review of detention by putting in place an independent review 
mechanism. Again, the exclusion of wards of court will breach Article 5(4). There are 
concerns regarding aspects of the tribunal system, such as the discretion regarding the 
compliance with procedures in the detention order. The restriction of the tribunal with 
regard to discharge may have an unforeseen impact on the patient and it is predictable 
that the rigidity of this approach will cause difficulties when resources do not match 
patients’ needs. The time scales are sufficiently limited and will need to be resourced 
adequately to be fulfilled. Legal representation will also be provided before the 
tribunal and on appeal to the Circuit Court. However, the burden of proof is placed on 
the patient in the appeal and this is clearly in breach of the Convention in light of the 
decision in Reid v. United Kingdom.229 The right to information enabling a challenge 
to the legality of detention is provided in the 2001 Act, thereby complying with 
Article 5(4). However, this right to information does not entitle the patient to 
information concerning the reasons for his detention and, to this extent, will breach 
Article 5(2).
The failure of the 1945 Act to comply with Article 5(4) is clearly outlined in this 
chapter and highlights the need for the urgent introduction of the 2001 Act. The 2001 
Act provides for a review of its operation in 2007 so that the deficiencies in this Act 
with regard to Article 5(4) can be addressed.230
(2005) 40 EHRR 32.
229 (2003) 37 EHRR 9.
230 Mental Health Act 2001, section 75.
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Chapter 3
ARTICLE 8 AND THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY 
LIFE, HOME AND CORRESPONDENCEUNDER IRISH LAW
Introduction
This chapter considers the nature of the right to respect for private life, family life, 
home and correspondence under Article 8 and the enforcement of these rights in Irish 
law. The main focus for consideration is the right to respect for private life, 
particularly the right of self-determination in relation to consent to treatment for 
mental disorder. The safeguards for consent to treatment in both the 1945 Act and the 
2001 Act are examined in order to assess the adequacy of Irish law having regard to 
Article 8 requirements. Incapacitated voluntary patients’ rights to self-determination 
are considered in light of the adequacy of common law powers to treat without 
consent, particularly following the decisions in HL v. United Kingdom and Storck v. 
Germany.1 Related to the right of self-determination is seclusion, which involves a 
significant interference with Article 8 rights and advance directives, which are at the 
opposite end of the spectrum in support of such rights. These issues are the subject of 
law reform in many jurisdictions in an effort to uphold rights to dignity, autonomy 
and self-determination. Other aspects of the right to respect for private life, such as 
the right to confidentiality and proxy decision-makers, as well as the right to respect 
for family life, home and correspondence, are considered.
Article 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.
1 (2005) 40 EHRR 32, Application no. 61603/00 16th June 2005.
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The object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by 
public authorities.2 The basis for the Article is the protection of this private sphere 
from interference, except where it is lawful and justified as necessary by reference to 
paragraph 2. Such interference would be considered necessary where it corresponds to 
a pressing social need, is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the 
reasons presented by the national government are logical and sufficient. The 
obligation in Article 8 refers to the right “to respect for,” not the right to, private and 
family life, home and correspondence.
Harris refers to the dual focus on the state with regard to aspects of Article 8 - on the 
one hand the need to control state interference in “central matters” of inter-personal 
relationships “where the principal concern of the right-holder is to keep the state 
out”.3 The other role is to protect the individual’s right to physical and psychological 
integrity, the right to mental stability and privacy rights that include self- 
determination in relation to medical treatment and confidentiality. There is often a 
tension between the need to balance these competing requirements, particularly for 
people with mental disabilities where autonomy rights sometimes clash with welfare 
rights.
Private life
The right to respect for private life under Article 8 includes a person’s physical and 
psychological integrity. It is primarily intended to ensure development, without 
outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other 
human beings.4 The right can embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social 
identity.5 Article 8 also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with 
other human beings and the outside world.6 The ability to conduct one's life in a 
manner of one's own choosing may also include the opportunity to pursue activities 
perceived to be physically or morally harmful, or of a dangerous nature for the
2 Glaser v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 1 para 63.
3 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law o f the European Convention on Human Rights, Butterworths, 
London, 1995, p353.
4 X  and Yv. Netherlands, (1985) 8 EHRR 235 para 22.
5 Mikulic v. Croatia, Application no. 53176/99, para 53.
6 Bensaid v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 205 para 47.
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individual concerned.7 In Bensaid v. United Kingdom, involving the deportation of a 
person with schizophrenia, the Court stated,
Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The Court 
has already held that elements such as gender identification, name and sexual 
orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere 
protected by Article 8. Mental health must be regarded as a crucial part of
O
private life associated with the aspect of moral integrity.
The right to dignity as an aspect of private life is regarded as fundamental under the
Convention.9 This dignity right in Article 8 has been interpreted as including the
preservation of mental stability.10 The Court's case law does not exclude treatment
which does not reach the level of severity to breach Article 3, but which may breach
Article 8 in its private-life aspect where there are sufficiently adverse effects on
physical and moral integrity.11 This does not mean that every act or measure which
adversely affects moral or physical integrity will interfere with the right to respect for
10private life guaranteed by Article 8. The Court, in Bensaid v. United Kingdom, held 
that there was not enough evidence that the applicant’s moral integrity would be 
substantially affected to engage Article 8. Even if the deportation did affect the 
applicant’s private life, this interference complied with Article 8(2) as being in 
accordance with the law to protect the economic well-being of the country, the 
prevention of disorder and crime, as well as being “necessary in a democratic society” 
for those aims.
State obligations regarding the moral and physical integrity of the person were held, 
in Ranninen v. Finland, to extend to situations of deprivation of liberty which can
1 Xinclude seclusion of a patient. The English Court of Appeal has applied Ranninen in 
holding that the practice of seclusion could engage Article 8 and that the Mental 
Health Act Code of Practice ought to be followed, unless there was a good reason to 
the contrary, in order to give the necessary degree of predictability to meet the
7 Pretty v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 para 62.
8 Bensaid v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 205 para 47, Dudgeon v United Kingdom 4 EHRR 149 
para 52.
9Pretty v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 para 63.
10 Bensaid v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 205 para 49.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, para 46.
13 Ibid, para 63.
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requirements of Article 8(2).14 In X  v. Austria, the Commission stated that 
“compulsory medical intervention, even if it is of minor importance, must be 
considered as an interference with [the right to respect for private life].”15
The scope of the state’s positive obligation under Article 8 to ensure the right to physical 
and moral integrity of citizens extends to a duty to supervise and control private 
psychiatric institutions. The applicant, in Storck v. Germany, had been admitted to a 
private psychiatric clinic, initially aged 15 years, for a seven month period between 
1974-1975. She was readmitted again, from July 1977-April 1979, and placed in a 
locked ward without any judicial order as the clinic had no authority to admit detained 
patients. She was medically treated against her will and the Court stated that “even a 
minor interference with the physical integrity of an individual must be regarded as an 
interference with the right of respect for private life if it is carried out against the 
individual’s will.”16 This may indicate the requirement of resistance, but in an earlier 
decision, HL v. United Kingdom, the Court stated,
The right to liberty in a democratic society is too important for a person to lose 
the benefits of Convention protection simply because they have given 
themselves up to detention, especially when they are not capable of consenting 
to, or disagreeing with, the proposed action.17
The Court strongly supported different treatment of a compliant incapacitated patient 
compared to a capable consenting patient in relation to deprivation of liberty under 
Article 5. Fennell argues that the same principle must apply to interferences with 
physical integrity and states that, “[I]t is too important to be lost simply because a 
person has given themselves up to the intervention, especially if they lack capacity to
1Rconsent.” Where there is complete control over imposing treatment, such as strong 
medication or ECT, Fennell submits that this would effectively lean towards a
14 Munjaz v. Mersey Care National Health Service Trust & Others [2003] EWCA Civ 1036 and S v. 
Airedale National Health Service Trust & others Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Woolf MR, 
Hale and Latham L.J. [2003] EWCA Civ 1036.
15 (1980) DR 154 para 156.
16 Application no. 61603/00 para 143.
17 (2005) 40 EHRR 32 para 90.
18 Fennell P., “The Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Mental Health Act 1983, and the Common Law”. 
(2005) Journal o f Mental Health Law pp 163-168.
123
deprivation of liberty necessitating appropriate safeguards.19 The Court held that her 
right to personal integrity under Article 8 had been infringed as there was a lack of state 
supervision of the actions of private institutions.
Article 8 is a qualified right which may be interfered with provided that the 
interference is justified as being in accordance with the law, for a legitimate aim and 
necessary in a democratic society.20 Compulsory treatment will be justified if it is in 
accordance with domestic law which must be predictable, having regard to the legitimate 
aim of the treatment, in order to give the person adequate protection against arbitrary 
interference21 It must pursue a legitimate aim such as the protection of health, the 
prevention of crime or the protection of the rights of others. The requirement that the 
interference is necessary in a democratic society means that it fulfils a pressing social 
need and is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The requirement of 
proportionality is satisfied where the means used to achieve the aim are not excessive. 
The state is permitted a margin of appreciation where a range of discretion is available to 
states to make a decision as to which interests fall to be protected under health, or under 
the rights or freedoms of others.
Private life and the right to self-determination
The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom. 
In Pretty v. United Kingdom and Glass v. United Kingdom, the Court held that Article 
8 addresses quality of life issues and includes the right to self-determination in regard 
to medical treatment.22 In Pretty v. United Kingdom the applicant argued that, while 
the right to self-determination ran like a thread through the Convention as a whole, it 
was Article 8 in which that right was most explicitly recognised and guaranteed. The 
Court stated that, although no previous case had established any right to self- 
determination as such as being contained in Article 8, it considered that the notion of
19 Bellhouse et al, “Capacity-based mental health legislation and its impact on clinical practice 1) 
admission to hospital,” (2003) Journal o f Mental Health Law pp9-24 and Bellhouse et al, “Capacity- 
based mental health legislation and its impact on clinical practice 2) treatment in hospital,” (2003) 
Journal o f Mental Health Law pp24-38 for examination of capacity assessments applied to (1) 
admission and (2) treatment.
20 Munjaz v. Mersey Care National Health Service Trust &Others[20Q2>] EWCA Civ 1036.
21 Malone v. United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 14 par 68.
22 (2002) 35 EHRR 1 para 65 (2004) 39 EHRR 15.
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personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its 
guarantees.23 The right to autonomy is expressed as a fundamental human right and is 
recognised by Article 8.
... the personal autonomy protected by Article 8 means that in principle it is 
for the competent patient, and not his doctor, to decide what treatment should 
or should not be given in order to achieve what the patient believes conduces 
to his dignity and in order to avoid what the patient would find distressing.24
Refusal to accept a particular treatment might inevitably lead to death, but the 
imposition of medical treatment, without the consent of a mentally competent adult 
patient, would interfere with a person's physical integrity in a manner capable of 
engaging the rights protected under Article 8(1) of the Convention. Where consent 
is normally required, as in medical treatment, action without consent will not be an 
interference if the state can convincingly show that it was necessary and the 
individual was not in a position to give informed consent. This arose in Herczegfalvy 
v. Austria, where the Court gave,
Decisive weight ... to the lack of specific information capable of disproving 
the government’s opinion that the hospital authorities were entitled to regard 
the applicants’ psychiatric illness as rendering him entirely incapable of taking 
decisions for himself.26
The Court had earlier decided that the treatment of the applicant was in accordance
9 7with psychiatric principles generally accepted at the time. Harris refers to the danger 
that any “irrational” unwillingness to consent will be classed as a failure to consent at
90
all, thereby undermining the individual’s right to exercise his rights as he sees fit. 
This may seem contrary to efforts to enable decision-making wherever possible.
There is strong rhetoric concerning the right to autonomy and self-determination 
which is upheld across many jurisdictions, including the United States, Canada, 
Australia and England, and its importance is highlighted worldwide in judicial
23 Ibid, para 61.
24 Burke v. GMC & DRC and OS (2004) EWHC 1879 para 131.
25 Ibid, para 63.
26 Herczgefalvy v. Austria (1992) 15 EHRR 437 para 83
27 See chapter 4 for full discussion of this case.
28 Op. cit., 3 p 338.
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statements.29 The legality of any intervention to treat an individual rests on the 
existence of consent, or where the individual is incapable of consenting, some other 
lawful authority. Any interference with this right which impacts on both private and 
family life in Article 8(1) must, according to Herczgefalvy v. Austria, “be 
convincingly shown to be necessary,” must be justifiable as being in accordance with 
the law, pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to the achievement of that aim.
30
The Court in R (on the application o f N) v. M, an English case, said that what was 
convincingly shown to be medically necessary would depend on a number of factors: 
the certainty of mental disorder and its seriousness, the risks to others, the potential 
alleviation of the condition by the treatment and the extent of alleviation, and the 
severity of the adverse consequences for the patient.31 Where treatment is 
administered against the will of the patient, the phrase “in accordance with the law” in 
Article 8(2) means that: the “best interests test” must be satisfied, that the treatment 
must be in accordance with a responsible and competent body of professional opinion 
and no less invasive treatment achieving the same results is available.
Under the common law, the doctrine of necessity provides the legal basis for the
TOtreatment and care of voluntary patients who are compliant but incapacitated. In 
English law, when a person lacks capacity, for whatever reason, to take decisions 
about medical treatment, it is necessary for other persons with appropriate 
qualifications to take that decision for him.33 The principle of necessity applies and 
the requirements of the principle are that there must be a necessity to act when it is 
not practicable to communicate with the assisted person and that the action taken must 
be what a reasonable person would in all circumstances take, acting in the best 
interests of the assisted person.34 Best interests have been subjected to a double test: 
the Bolam “not negligent” test, together with a separate duty to act in an incapacitated
29Schloendorff v. Society o f New York Hospitals [1914] 211 NY 125,. Malette v. Shulman 67 DLR (4th) 
321 at 336, Department o f Health vJWB & SMB (1992) 66 ALJR 300 at 317, ReT[  1993] Fam 95 
pl02.
30 (1992) 15 EHRR 437 para 82.
31 [2002] EWCA Civ 1789 para 19.
32 Re F  [1990] 2 AC 1, R v. Boumewood ex parte L [1998] 3 ALL ER 289.
33 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1 para 55.
34 Ibid, para 75.
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person’s best interests.35 In Re A (Male Sterilisation), Butler-Sloss P. said that best 
interests encompasses “medical, emotional and all other welfare issues.” An 
evaluation of best interests would involve a balance-sheet approach whereby the 
actual and potential benefits would be balanced against actual and potential dis- 
benefits along with the gains and losses from each option proposed by the doctor. In 
cases requiring court involvement, these would be presented as options to the judge 
who would make the final decision.
Irish law and the right to self-determination
Constitutional law
Rights to privacy, autonomy and bodily integrity are recognised as unenumerated 
rights under the Irish Constitution. In Ryan v. Attorney General the Supreme Court 
held that the right to bodily integrity existed as an unspecified right in the Constitution 
in Article 40.3.39 Eventually, this was broadened into a more general right not to have 
one's health endangered by the actions of the State.40 One of the unspecified rights of 
the person under the Constitution is the right to be treated with dignity, which is 
progressively diminished by increasingly invasive medicine.41 The right to refuse 
medical treatment is recognised as part of the right to privacy and bodily integrity 
contained in Article 40.3.1. In In re a Ward(Withdrawal o f Medical Treatment), the 
right to autonomy in the context of medical treatment, as a related right to privacy, 
was given strong support.42 In that case, the Irish courts addressed, for the first time, 
issues around incapacity and consent and said that the constitutional rights of every 
person included the right to privacy, autonomy and self determination.43 These rights 
were held to apply to people without capacity to consent equally with those who could 
consent. The Supreme Court held that to rule otherwise would “differentiate between
35 Bolam v. Friem Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118.
36 [2000] 1 FLR 549.
37 Ibid, para 560.
38 Ryan v. Attorney General [1965] IR 294. Kennedy & Arnold v. Ireland [1987] IR 587.
39 [1965] 1 IR 294.
40 State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365.
41 In re a WardfWithdrawal o f Medical Treatment)[\ 995] 2 ILRM 401.
42 [1995] 2 ILRM 401 and Hogan & Whyte, JMKelly The Irish Constitution (2003) para 7.3.130.
43 In re a Ward (Withdrawal o f Medical Treatment) [1995] 2 ILRM 401 p404.
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the well and the infirm.”44 The position regarding the right to consent to treatment 
was outlined by Denham J.,
Medical treatment may not be given to an adult person of full capacity without 
his or her consent. .. .The consent which is given by an adult of full capacity 
is a matter of choice. It is not necessarily a decision based on medical 
considerations. Thus, medical treatment may be refused for other than medical 
reasons, or reasons most citizens would regard as rational, but the person of 
full age and capacity may make the decisions for their own reasons. ... The 
requirement of consent to medical treatment is an aspect of a person’s right to 
bodily integrity under Article 40.3 of the Constitution... 45
The Court held that mental incapacity did not result in the diminution of personal 
rights under the Constitution, including, the right to life, to bodily integrity, to 
privacy, and the right to refuse medical care or treatment.46 The requirements of the 
common good, public order or morality in the particular case did not require 
restriction of the ward’s rights 47 The Court stated that these rights are administered in 
a different way, in this case by the Court acting as proxy decision-maker.48 Denham J. 
stated,
If the ward were of full capacity ... she would be required to consent before 
the current medical treatment were to be given to her. She is unable to do so. 
The issue then is whether anyone else can make the decision for her.49
The test applied in the case was whether it was in the best interests of the ward that 
her life should be prolonged by continuance of the particular medical treatment she 
was receiving. This test is consistent with that used by the wardship jurisdiction being 
essentially paternalistic and probably incompatible with the value of autonomy. This 
aspect was counteracted somewhat by the Court’s reliance on its substituted judgment 
for the ward’s wishes, as far as these were ascertainable. While the Court 
acknowledged the wishes of her family in supporting the withdrawal of treatment, the 
Court had the power to make the final decision in the case of a ward of court.50 The
44 Ibid, p431.
45 Ibid, p454.
46 [1995] 2 ILRM 401 p 404.
47 In re a Ward o f Court (Withdrawal o f Medical Treatment) [1995] 2 ILRM 401 at p428, [1996] 2 IR 
79.
4*Ibid.
49 Ibid, p456.
50 Ibid, p454.
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Supreme Court reaffirmed the commitment to autonomy and self-determination in 
North Western Health Board v. HW & CW, acknowledging that a competent adult can 
refuse treatment for reasons that include non-medical reasons that may be regarded by 
others as irrational.51 The parens patriae jurisdiction of the High Court was used 
instead of the Constitution in directing treatment, in JM v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, for a 
patient who was incapable of consenting. The President of the High Court held that 
the refusal of treatment prior to incapacity was not a “clear final decision,” thereby 
justifying the intervention by the High Court.
Common law
Arising from principles of autonomy and self-determination and in compliance with 
Article 8, the common law in Ireland provides that the consent given by an adult of 
full capacity is a matter of choice. The decision may not be based wholly on medical 
considerations. Treatment can be refused for other than medical reasons, even those 
that most citizens would not regard as rational. Adults who are competent are 
entitled to make decisions without any consultation with others. The voluntary refusal 
of medical treatment by an adult of full capacity who has been informed of all the 
issues is determinative. The rare exceptions applying to this position are in relation to 
contagious diseases and to emergency treatment.
The duty of disclosure regarding the risks or side-effects of treatment is similar to the 
duty of care in diagnosis and treatment and is an essential component of decision­
making. Irish law is somewhat unclear on the requirements for informed consent. The 
standard required appears to be the Bolam standard with the proviso that if the court is 
not happy with this standard it can set a higher standard.54 The Bolam standard 
requires that actions taken are in accordance with a practice accepted at the time by a 
responsible body of medical opinion skilled in the particular form of treatment in
51 North Western Health Board v HW & CPF Unreported Supreme Court, 8th November 2001.
52 [2003] 1 IR321.
53 In re a WardfWithdrawal o f Medical Treatment) [1996] 2 IR 79 pi 56. An irrational decision has 
been interpreted in English law as “a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or 
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be 
decided could have arrived at it.” Re MB [1997] 2FLR 426.
34 Bolam v. Friem Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118.
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question.55 In Walsh v. Family Planning Services, involving informed consent to 
elective treatment, the Supreme Court applied the test laid down in Dunne v. National 
Maternity Hospital, which provides that the doctor is negligent where he is “guilty of 
such failure as no medical practitioner of equal specialist or general status and skill 
would be guilty of if acting with ordinary care.”56 While this aspect is similar to 
Bolam, the Supreme Court did not adopt the Bolam test entirely, as it added a further 
requirement that the doctor would not be protected by a general and approved practice 
if this practice had inherent defects that would be obvious to anyone giving it due 
consideration. The disclosure of risks of treatment was considered to be a matter for 
professional judgment except where the disclosure of a particular risk was so 
obviously necessary to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no
en
reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make it. However, in Geoghegan v. 
Harris, the High Court changed the focus away from the medical standard to the 
needs of the reasonable patient to have information on the material risk of severe pain
co
resulting from particular treatment, regardless of statistical frequency. This decision 
has not been appealed, so it is likely that the uncertainty of Walsh will remain 
authority for the time being despite some commentators taking for granted that 
informed consent is part of Irish law.59
Where someone does not have capacity to decide and the treatment involves an 
emergency, or is medically necessary, doctors carrying out the treatment will be 
justified by the common law doctrine of necessity based on what is regarded as the 
“best interests” of the person according to the standard of a responsible body of 
professional opinion, the Bolam standard, or in Ireland, the Dunne standard.60 The 
Supreme Court, in In re a Ward (Withdrawal o f Medical Treatment), weighed a 
number of factors in the balance in arriving at a decision on best interests.67 The Court 
took account not only of medical best interests, but a very broad range of factors, 
including the ward’s life history, the views of family and carers and spiritual aspects
55 Ibid.
56 [1989] IR 91 pl36.
57 [1992] 1 IR 496, [1989] IR 91.
58 Geoghegan v. Harris [2000] 3 IR 536.
59 Byrne & Binchy, Annual Review o f Irish Law, Round Hall Press, Dublin, 1997.
60 Bolam v. Friem Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 Dunne v. National Maternity 
Hospital [ 1989] IR 91.
61 [2000] 3 WLR 1288.
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of her life.62 The common law is different in England and requires a two-stage step, 
whereby the doctor proposes a number of options for treatment in the patient’s best 
interests in accordance with a responsible body of medical opinion. The judge then 
makes the decision as to which of the proposed treatments is in the patient’s best 
interests.63 The common law in England reflects a more exacting requirement in 
decisions on best interests.
Incapacity legislation
An adult who is of unsound mind and incapable of managing himself or his affairs 
may be made a ward of court and all rights to self-determination are lost.64 The 
President of the High Court will then make all serious medical treatment decisions for 
the individual whose welfare is the paramount consideration.65 The “Committee of the 
Person” (the person to whom the ward’s affairs are committed) will take minor 
decisions, including minor medical decisions of an everyday nature.66 The High Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction to grant or withhold consent to the treatment of a ward of 
court, subject to the principle that, in an emergency, a doctor is entitled to take urgent 
action to preserve life and health. This system does not support the right to self- 
determination or autonomy, is disproportionate to the aims of the protective 
jurisdiction and is likely to breach Article 8 in its private life aspects.67 In JM  v. Board 
o f Management o f St. Vincent’s Hospital, the Court used its parens patriae 
jurisdiction to give consent to life-saving medical treatment on behalf of a patient in a 
coma where prior refusal on religious grounds was deemed unclear.68 In this case, the 
patient had refused the proposed treatment prior to becoming incapable, so there were 
uncertainties regarding management as it did not fit the profile of the incapacitated 
person needing emergency treatment. The gap in Irish law for this kind of situation 
means that the system of wardship is the only option for proxy decision-making. The
62 In re a Ward o f Court(Withdrawal o f Medical Treatment) [1995] 2 ILRM 401 pp463-465.
63 Re S (Sterilisation)[2000] 2 FLR 389.
64 Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871 and in the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961. The 
procedure is set out in Order 67 of The Rules of the Superior Courts 1986. See chapter 6 for full 
discussion of wardship.
65 JM  v. St. Vincent’s Hospital [2003] 1 IR 321. Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871 (1871 Act) and 
in the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 (1961 Act). The procedure is set out in Order 67 of 
The Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 (1986 Rules).
66 In re an Application by the Midland Health Board [1988] ILRM 251. See pl38 this chapter.
67 See chapter 6 for full account of the wardship system.
68 [2003] 1 IR 321.
131
High Court will, in these circumstances, rely on the opinion of doctors to provide 
evidence of the patient’s incapacity and proceedings will have to be instigated in 
order to ensure the intervention is lawful. The Law Reform Commission is examining 
the introduction of a comprehensive framework dealing with proxy decision-making 
system for incapacitated adults.69
Advance Directives
The right to self-determination can be expressed in an advance directive under the 
common law where a mentally capable person makes a decision regarding future 
treatment in anticipation of incapacity. In the English case, Re C (Adult: Refusal o f  
Medical Treatment), the Court of Appeal accepted that where the individual had
capacity to make an advance directive at the time it was made, that directive remains
1( \
binding and effective even where there is subsequent loss of capacity. There is no 
Irish decision on the issue, but the Supreme Court, in In re a Ward (Withdrawal o f  
Medical Treatment), indicated that the wishes of a person were relevant to a court
71decision permitting withdrawal of treatment. Similarly, in JM  v. St Vincent’s 
Hospital the President of the High Court seemed to adopt a form of substituted 
judgment test in stating that he did not regard the patient’s pre-coma decision as 
having been a final one and considered that it was based primarily on her wish to
77please her husband who wanted her to have the treatment. The Power of Attorney 
Act 1997, which provides for an enduring power of attorney, does not include medical 
treatment decisions to be made by the attorney on the onset of incapacity.73 Even if 
such powers were extended to cover health care decisions, this would not provide a 
solution for adults who never had capacity to execute such a power, or did not execute 
a power when they had the capacity to do so. The Law Reform Commission includes 
these powers in their recommendation on capacity legislation and proposes to 
introduce assisted and substitute decision-making regimes.74 The English Mental
69 Law Reform Commission, The Law and the Elderly (LRC CP 23-2003), and Vulnerable Adults and 
the Law (LRC CP 37 2005).
70 [1994] 1 All ER 819. See also Re T (Adult Refusal o f Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, ReAK (Medical 
Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129, HE v. A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408.
71 [1995] 2 IR 79.
72 [2003] 1 IR321.
73 See chapter 6 for discussion of enduring power of attorney.
74 Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Vulnerable Adults and the Law (LRC CP 37- 
2005).
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Capacity Act 2005 provides for recognition of advance decisions to refuse treatment 
which have specific formalities attached, including an express statement in writing
nc
that the decision is to apply “even if life is at risk.” The position in English law is 
that an advance directive refusing specific psychiatric treatment may be overridden if 
the patient is subject to detention under mental health legislation and treatment can be 
imposed using the powers of such legislation.
Mental health legislation
Mental Treatment Act 1945
The Mental Treatment Act 1945 contains no express provision for personal or proxy 
consent to treatment, nor is there any judicial decision on the matter. One of the 
assumptions about the legal basis for compulsory treatment of detained patients is that 
compulsory admission incorporates a right to compulsorily treat the patient. This 
assumption has never been challenged in the Irish courts. Jacob, writing in the 1970s 
about the assumption that compulsory admission impliedly authorised compulsory 
treatment under the English Mental Health Act 1959, argued that the assumption of 
legality of treating a detained patient without consent, and differently from voluntary
7  f \patients, is invalid. He argued that there was no express power in the 1959 Act to 
treat detained patients compulsorily, because the Act is relevant to admission and 
discharge only. These arguments apply equally to the 1945 Act, which has no express 
provision granting authority to the hospital staff to impose treatment. One of the 
problems is that the language used in the 1945 Act is of a paternal character and the 
Act was primarily intended to provide for the “prevention and treatment” of mental 
disorders. To this extent, the presumption is understandable, even if unacceptable.77 
The legislation was passed at a time when such assumptions were made in the 1940s 
and 1950s and issues of autonomy were not considered. The presumption of lack of 
capacity for detained patients is strengthened by the failure to differentiate between 
those patients who have capacity and those who do not, as there is no capacity 
assessment and treatment is imposed on the basis of the legal status of the patient.
75 Mental Capacity Act 2005, sections 24-26.
76 Jacob J., “The Right of the Mental Patient to his Psychosis”, (1976) 39 Mod. L. Rev. 17.
77 In re Philip Clarke [1950] IR 235.
133
The wording in the 1945 Act leading to treatment may provide some clues as to the 
assumption that treatment can be given based on detention status. The “person of 
unsound mind” is a category where the recommendation from the certifying doctor is 
for “admission, care and treatment,” thereby linking the compulsory admission and 
treatment.78 The word “treatment” is not defined in the 1945 Act and the presumption 
again is that all forms of treatment can be administered without consent. There is no 
statutory definition of “unsound mind,” but based on various statutory references, in 
my opinion, it means mental illness and an inability to care for oneself and one’s
79property, as in wardship, and is therefore closely related to being incapacitated.
There are no safeguards provided in the legislation where treatment is given to a 
resisting patient. In SC v. Smith & Others, the Supreme Court warned that in the 
exercise of powers under the 1945 Act, the clinical director is required to act in 
accordance with the principles of constitutional justice and to be conscious not only of 
the power and discretion in the Act, but also of the constitutional rights of the 
person.80 Such rights include the right to bodily integrity. In contrast to treatment, the 
1945 Act provides safeguards around the use of “bodily restraint” and provides that it 
can only be used “if necessary for the purpose of medical or surgical treatment or to
O 1
prevent the person injuring himself, or others”. However, the legislators did not 
extend this necessity requirement to other forms of treatment, such as electro- 
convulsive therapy, which was used frequently at that time.
There are two categories in temporary detention, one comprising those persons 
admitted for mental illness and the other comprising people admitted for addiction. 
The criteria for admission of the first category include being “unfit on account of his 
mental state for treatment as a voluntary patient.”82 The presumed inability to consent 
to necessary hospital treatment is the basis for both compulsory admission and
78 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 163(2)(b).
79 Mental Treatment Act 1945, as amended by Mental Treatment Act 1961, section 12. The PUM 
admission procedure is used instead to ensure Garda involvement in the admission and transportation 
of the patient.
80 [1998] 1 IR 101.
81 Mental Treatment Act 1945, sections 263 and 264.
82 Ibid, section 184(4)(a)(iii).
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treatment without consent.83 The second category of persons under temporary 
admission are addicts and the reference to unfitness for voluntary admission is 
replicated here.84 The definition of addict refers to a person “incapable of managing 
himself or his affairs or of ordinary proper conduct.”85 Many addicts have fluctuating 
capacity and may well be capable of consenting to treatment, but the presumption that 
applies to other categories regarding consent is applied to this group, even though 
they are treated separately in the Act. The treatment for all detained patients should be 
confined to the management and treatment of the addiction or mental illness, in order 
to comply with the principle of proportionality. If another condition arises, like a 
physical illness, consent will be required in that instance. The practice then is to have 
someone to consent on the person’s behalf where he is deemed incapable, even 
though this has no legal basis. The common law will provide the legal basis for any 
urgent treatment.86
A second assumption about the legal basis for treatment without consent for mental 
disorder is that treatment can be given to all detained patients on the basis of the 
common law doctrine of necessity based on the best interests of the patient. The use 
of the common law would seem to fit better with Jacob’s conclusions about the 
absence of express legislative provisions around consent. Since neither of these 
assumptions has been litigated in Ireland, the legal basis for compulsory treatment of 
such patients remains uncertain.
People admitted as voluntary patients should be able to give legally effective consent 
to treatment as there is nothing in the Act or common law to suggest otherwise. The 
reality is that those admitted voluntarily who have capacity and want to refuse 
treatment may consent in order to avoid being detained. The 1945 Act provides that a 
voluntary patient “who becomes mentally incapable of expressing himself as willing 
or not willing to remain” should be detained or discharged.87 Patients are not dealt 
with as the 1945 Act requires, but given treatment on the basis of necessity and best
83 Casey & Craven, Psychiatry and the Law, Oaktree Press, Dublin, 1999, p504.
84 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 184(4)(a)(ii).
85 Ibid, section 3(a).
86 In re F  [1990] 2 AC 1.
87 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 195.
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interests.88 The deficiencies and lack of safeguards, outlined above, demonstrate the 
urgent need to implement the provisions of the 2001 Act regarding consent to 
treatment in order to comply with Article 8.
Mental Health Act 2001
The Mental Health Act 2001 contains principles that go some way to supporting the 
right to self-determination and set the tone for its interpretation. The 2001 Act 
requires that, in a decision concerning care and treatment, the best interests of the
89person is the principal consideration with due regard to the interests of others. As far 
as possible, the person should be notified about the decision to give treatment and be 
given the right to make representation and his views should be considered in the 
decision.90 Any decision under the 2001 Act is required to respect the right of the 
person to dignity, bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy.91 These principles 
incorporate the constitutional rights to dignity and autonomy and apply to voluntary 
and detained patients. Separate sections in the Act on both admission and treatment 
provide clear demarcation on the requirements applying to each area, thus ensuring
09that no assumptions should be made arising from detention.
Bearing in mind the principles outlined, treatment can be given without consent to an 
individual detained under the 2001 Act. Safeguards apply only to those who are 
formally detained and not to voluntary patients who are compliant, but incapacitated, 
and are, in reality, de facto detained. The sole statutory test for competency to consent 
requires that the patient understand the nature, purpose, and likely effects of
88 Many of these issues were highlighted in HL v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32.
89 Mental Health Act 2001, section 4(1).
90 Ibid, section 4(2).
91 Ibid, section 4(3).
92 Ibid, section 8 and Part 4 of the Mental Health Act 2001.
93 Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending 
2003, Government Publications, Dublin, 2004. Total of 23,234 admissions in 2003, meeting the 10% 
annual figure for compulsory admissions..
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treatment.94 The word “patient” means a person detained under the Act and does not 
include voluntary patients.95 The Act defines informed consent as,
Section 56.-
In this part “consent”, in relation to a patient, means consent obtained freely 
without threats or inducements, where-
(a) the consultant psychiatrist responsible for the care and treatment of the 
patient is satisfied that the patient is capable of understanding the nature, 
purpose and likely effects of the proposed treatment; and
(b) the consultant psychiatrist has given the patient adequate information, in a 
form and language the patient can understand, on the nature, purpose and 
likely effects of the proposed treatment.96
This standard is in line with the common law position and is close to the reasonable 
patient standard in informed consent as the focus is on the patient’s needs and it
0 7places responsibility on the doctor regarding communication of information. It 
would seem that there is an onus to ensure that this communication is not solely a 
paper exercise as the consultant has to be satisfied regarding the patient’s “capacity to 
understand,” suggesting an intellectual capacity to understand, rather than actual 
understanding. The capacity of the patient will need to be addressed in this regard 
and, where it is apparent that the patient is lacking in capacity to understand, the 
second opinion safeguard is involved. The English Mental Health Act Commission 
examined this issue and advised all second opinion doctors to require “both a capacity
QO
and adequate understanding of the treatment and its consequences.” In these 
circumstances two factors are required, one to ensure capacity and the second is to 
avoid negligence.99
Capacity in English law is issue specific and will depend on the type of decision to be 
made and is commensurate with the gravity of the decision. In Re C (Adult:Refusal o f 
Medical Treatment), 100 modified by Re MB (Medical Treatment), the Court of Appeal
94 Mental Health Act 2001, section 56. At time of writing, (Feb. 2006) this legislation is not yet in force 
and the 1945 Act continues to apply. This provides no protection against enforced treatment falling 
back on the common law doctrine of necessity, best interests and the professional standard.
95 Mental Health Act 2001, section 2(1). Section 69 provides for the inclusion of voluntary patients in 
the definition of patient.
96 Mental Health Act 2001, section 56(b).
97 Geoghegan v Harris unreported High Court 21st June 2000.
98 Jones R., Mental Health Act Manual (9th ed.), Thomson, London, 2004, p 298..
99 It is interesting to note that capacity comes from the law of battery, a factor that is often overlooked.
100 [1994] 1 All ER 419, [1997] 2 FLR 426.
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held that there are three stages to the decision: to take in and retain treatment 
information in relation to a particular decision, to believe it and to weigh that 
information, balancing risks and needs. Thorpe J., in Re C, stated,
Although his general capacity is impaired by schizophrenia, it has not been 
established that he does not sufficiently understand the nature, purpose and 
effects of the treatment he refuses ... he has understood and retained the 
information that in his own way he believes it, and that in the same fashion he 
has arrived at a clear choice.101
In In re MB (Medical Treatment) the decision in Re C was slightly modified to 
provide that a person lacks capacity where he is unable to comprehend and retain the 
information which is material to the decision, especially as to the likely consequences 
of having or not having the treatment in question, and the patient is unable to use the 
information and weigh it in the balance as part of the process of arriving at a 
decision.102
In the 2001 Act, different requirements apply in relation to psychosurgery, electro- 
convulsive therapy (ECT) and medicine. In each case, consent must be in writing and 
there is no express provision in the Act for the withdrawal of consent. The provision 
of a second opinion is obtained by the patient’s consultant psychiatrist in a form 
specified by the Commission and “following referral of the matter to him or her.”103 
There is no requirement that the opinion is independent of the service and, on this 
basis, it is likely to be someone nearby, particularly in rural areas with limited access 
to other psychiatrists. Unlike the English Mental Health Act 1983, the second opinion 
request does not go to the Commission, but remains with the patient’s psychiatrist. A 
consultant will be unlikely to choose a second opinion which may be challenging and 
may contravene his own opinion. The Commission does not have an express function 
in the 2001 Act to provide a panel of independent psychiatrists for second opinion 
medical examinations for consent to treatment, only for a tribunal hearing.104 It may 
be possible to derive such a duty from the 2001 Act, which contains a general section 
stating that the Commission “shall undertake or arrange to have undertaken such
101 [1994] 1 All ER 819.
102 [1997] 2 FLR 426 p437.
103 Mental Health Act 2001, sections 59 (l)(b) (ii), 60(b) (ii) and 61(b).
104 Ibid, section 33.
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activities as it deems appropriate to foster and promote ... high standards and good 
practice in the delivery of mental health services.”105 The Act then lists specific 
Commission functions and states that this list is “without prejudice” to this general 
provision, implying a basis for other activities which could include second opinion 
panels in consent to treatment.106 The Commission will have to prepare a code of 
practice for the 2001 Act and will have to address this issue. These omissions are 
significant in relation to the imposition of treatment against the wishes of a mentally 
competent adult.
Another issue that arises in relation to the second opinion procedure is that there is no 
requirement that reasons are given for the decision reached. This contrasts with the 
decision in the English case, R (on the application o f Wooder) v. Feggetter and the 
MHAC, which held that the question of fairness requires a second opinion doctor to 
give reasons in writing for a decision that permits overriding the self-determination of
107a mentally competent patient. There is no right of appeal, other than judicial 
review, against the second opinion. Additional requirements apply in relation to 
psychosurgery in that the Mental Health Commission and tribunal must be notified of 
such proposal, but there is no requirement to have a second opinion for the tribunal.
All of the 2001 Act safeguards for consent to treatment are broadly modelled on the 
English Mental Health Act 1983, but the provisions of the 1983 Act are more 
stringent in requiring an addition to the independent second opinion. The doctor must 
consult two others concerned with the patient’s treatment one of whom must be a 
nurse and the other neither a doctor or nurse.108 These people must confirm that the 
patient is capable of understanding the nature, purpose and likely effects of the 
treatment and has consented to it. The doctor must, in addition, confirm that the 
treatment would be likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration in the patient’s 
condition.109 The 2001 Act does not require a second opinion to affirm the patient’s 
knowledge about the treatment or to affirm that the patient has consented.
105 Ibid, section 33(2).
106 Ibid, section 33(3).
107 [2002] EWCA Civ 554.
108 Mental Health Act 1983, sections 57(2)(a)and section 57(3).
109 Ibid, section 57(2)(b).
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In regard to the treatment for psycho-surgery, the Act provides,
Section 58.-
(1) Psycho-surgery shall not be performed on a patient unless-
(a) the patient gives his or her consent in writing to the psycho­
surgery, and
(b) the psycho-surgery is authorised by a tribunal.
(2) Where it is proposed to perform psycho-surgery on a patient 
and the consent of the patient has been obtained, the consultant 
psychiatrist responsible for the care and treatment of the patient 
shall notify in writing the Commission of the proposal and 
Commission shall refer the matter to a tribunal.
(3) Where such a proposal is referred to a tribunal under this 
section, the tribunal shall review the proposal and shall either-
(a) If it is satisfied that if it in the best interests of the health of 
the patient concerned, authorise the performance of the psycho­
surgery, or
(b) If it is not so satisfied, refuse to authorise it.110
The tribunal can refuse to permit such treatment as not being in the patient’s best 
interests, even though the patient has consented to it. There is no requirement of 
access to an independent second opinion in this regard. In comparison with the 
English 1983 Act, the safeguards are limited, omitting any requirement that the 
tribunal or a second opinion psychiatrist affirms that the patient’s consent is real and 
is based on adequate information. An appeal can be made to the Circuit Court against 
the decision of the tribunal and no treatment can commence until either the appeal 
period ends or the decision of the court is announced.111 The tribunal will not be in a 
position to authorise such treatment for patients who lack capacity. Instead, where 
such intervention is necessary, it will have to be referred to the High Court for a 
declaration as to its lawfulness.
In regard to the treatment for ECT, the Act provides,
Section 59.-
(l)(b) where the patient is unable or unwilling to give such consent-
(i)the programme of therapy is approved (in a form specified by 
the Commission) by the consultant psychiatrist responsible for 
the care and treatment of the patient, and
110 Mental Health Act 2001, section 58(3).
111 Ibid, section 58(4).
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(ii)the programme of therapy is also authorised (in a form 
specified by the Commission) by another consultant 
psychiatrist following referral of the matter to him by the first- 
mentioned psychiatrist.112
The provisions are again broadly similar to section 58 of the 1983 Act without the 
provision that the patient’s consent is affirmed by the second opinion and the two 
other persons.113 There is no requirement that the second opinion is independent, is 
Commission approved or that any reasons must be given for the decision. These same 
provisions apply to the administration of medicine, but the second opinion will only 
apply after the three month period has elapsed.114
Section 60.-
Where medicine has been administered to a patient for the purposes of 
ameliorating his or her mental disorder for a continuous period of 3 months, 
the administration of that medicine shall not be continued unless either-
(a) the patient gives his or her consent in writing to the continued 
administration of that medicine, or
(b) where the patient is unable or unwilling to give such consent-
(i) the continued administration of that medicine is approved 
(in a form specified by the Commission) by the consultant 
psychiatrist responsible for the care and treatment of the 
patient, and
(ii) the continued administration of that medicine is also 
authorised (in a form specified by the Commission) by another 
consultant psychiatrist following referral of the matter to him 
by the first-mentioned psychiatrist.
The failure to get the patient’s consent or to provide a second opinion prior to the 
three month “stabilising period’ is difficult to justify, particularly in the case of a 
mentally competent patient refusing the treatment. The effect of the section means 
that patients, whether mentally competent or not, can be forcibly treated against their 
wishes for a three month period which is not subject to any review mechanism until 
afterwards. In Petition o f WM, the Court of Session in Scotland dealt with the 
question as to whether the scope of the consent provision in the Mental Health 
(Scotland) Act 1984, providing for a three month period before the safeguards 
applied, was broader than necessary in a democratic society, incorporated apparently 
arbitrary limits and lacked appropriate procedural safeguards. The Court held that the
112 Ibid, section 59(1).
113 Mental Health Act 1983, section 58(3)(b).
114 See Chapter 4 p i77 et seq. for further discussion.
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three month period during which consent was not required did not violate Article 8 
and though there was a clearly defined departure from the principle of personal 
autonomy, the requirement of proportionality was not breached.115 This was not a 
Strasbourg Court decision so it would have limited persuasive authority in Ireland.
The imposition of treatment constitutes an interference with private life under Article 
8(1) and can only be justified under Article 8(2) if it is convincingly shown to be 
necessary and the terms of the law are sufficiently precise to enable the individual to 
foresee its consequences for him. It is arguable that Irish law, in relation to the 
imposition of ECT and medicine, is not precise enough in that there is no certainty 
that the second opinion is independent or that those providing second opinions will be 
approved by the Commission. The result is that the patient cannot rely on this 
provision to provide any degree of independence. The requirement of foreseeability 
should apply whether the patient is competent or not. There appears to be 
unquestioned acceptance in these jurisdictions of the three month stabilising period 
and, even if this is medically justifiable, there should be some review of the plan at 
the outset and during the period, due to the severe effects of some medications for 
mental disorder.
The 2001 Act does not differentiate between those detained adults who have capacity 
for self-determination and those who do not in relation to the above treatments. Where 
the patient is either unable or unwilling to consent to treatment, the outcome is the 
same. Those who are unwilling to consent may have capacity for self-determination 
but that capacity will be overridden by the provisions of the Act. This interference 
will need to be justified as necessary and must be proportionate to its aim in order to 
comply with the requirements of Article 8(2). In this regard also, there is a question as 
to the proportionality of the decision to forcibly treat people who are compulsorily 
admitted and whose capacity has not been assessed.116 
The Act provides for treatment not requiring consent,
Section 57.-
115 [2002] MHLR 367. Also Jones, op. cit., 97 p303.
116 R (Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor Hospital [2001] EWCA Civ 1545.
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(1) The consent of a patient shall be required for treatment except 
where, in the opinion of the consultant psychiatrist responsible for the 
care and treatment of the patient, the treatment is necessary to 
safeguard the life of the patient, to restore his or her health, to alleviate 
his or her condition, or to relieve his or her suffering and by reason of 
his or her mental disorder the patient concerned is incapable of giving 
such consent.
(2) This section shall not apply to the treatment specified in section 58, 
59, or 60.
This section provides for urgent medical treatment in four specific circumstances 
ranging from life-saving, to restoration of health, alleviation of the illness and relief of 
suffering where the patient is unable to consent due to incapacity. This is clear 
acknowledgement of the difference in the capacity of patients and complies with the 
Constitution and the common law on the right of the capable adult to refuse medical 
treatment. The section does not apply to psycho-surgery, ECT and medicine for 
mental disorder. There is no provision for a second opinion procedure. Treatment is 
defined in the Act as including the “administration of physical, psychological and 
other remedies relating to the care and rehabilitation of a patient under medical
117supervision, intended for the purposes of ameliorating a mental disorder.” It is a 
broad definition that potentially embraces all possible treatments, particularly under 
the “other remedies” clause.
The section is somewhat similar to sections 62 and 63 of the English Mental Health 
Act 1983 where a number of unsuccessful challenges have sought to establish a
1 1 o
breach of Article 8(1). The imposition of compulsory medical treatment without the 
consent of the patient is an interference with the respect for private life under Article 
8(1), but it will not be a breach if justification is found in Article 8(2) and if the 
treatment is necessary and proportionate.119 In Storck v. Germany, the applicant had 
resisted both her continued stay at the clinic and her medical treatment. As a result, it 
had to be administered by force and constituted an interference with her right to 
respect for private life, which could not be justified due to the illegality of the 
detention.120
1 l7Mental Health Act 2001, section 2(1).
118 B v. Croydon Health Authority [1995] 1 All ER 683, Petition ofWM, Outer House, Court of Session 
[2002] MHLR 367.
119 R (Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor Hospital [2001] EWCA Civ 1545.
120 Storck v. Germany Application no .61603/00 16th June 2005 para 144.
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Medical examinations for compulsory admission, tribunal hearings and discharge can 
be carried out without the patient’s consent and without any assessment of capacity to
191  , .consent to such examinations. The Act provides no guidance on the issue of 
capacity in any of these circumstances, but if the examination does not involve any 
physical contact, the need for consent may not arise.
The right of self-determination arises in relation to seclusion and restraint. The 2001 
Act provides that seclusion applies to voluntary patients and children and cannot be 
used unless it is necessary for the purposes of treatment, or to prevent the patient from
199injuring himself or others and it must comply with the Commission rules. The Act 
has no express reference to capacity or to rights of appeal regarding continuity of this 
management technique. In Munjaz v. Mersey Care National Health Service Trust & 
Others, an English case, the Court of Appeal held that seclusion is capable of being 
medical treatment for the purposes of section 63 of the 1983 Act and there is a power 
to seclude both detained and informal patients under common law principles, where it 
is reasonably necessary and proportionate to protect others from harm.123 The Court 
of Appeal required that the guidance in the Code of Practice would be followed in this 
regard as a means of securing the justification for interfering with the right to respect 
for private life. The law must have the necessary degree of predictability and 
transparency to comply with Article 8(2). The decision of the Court in Raininen v 
Finland, held that the notion of physical and moral integrity of the person extends to 
situations of deprivation of liberty which can include seclusion of a patient.124 The 
issue then is the justification for these management techniques in the 2001 Act and 
need for guidance in the proposed code of practice from the Mental Health 
Commission.
In the context of medical treatment, a voluntary patient means a person who is 
capable of consenting and a voluntary patient is defined in the 2001 Act as “a person
121 Mental Health Act 2001, section 10(3) for admission, section 56, 58, 59 & 60 for consent to 
treatment, and section 49(6)(g) for tribunal hearing.
122 Ibid, section 69. Commission rules refer to the Code of Practice being drafted by the Commission 
under section 33(3)(e). See chapter 9 for full discussion of children and treatment.
123 [2003] EWCA Civ 1036.
124 (1997) 26 EHRR 563, [2003] EWCA Civ 1036 para 63.
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receiving care and treatment in an approved centre who is not the subject of an 
admission or a renewal order.”125 Voluntary admission in the Act provides,
Section.-29.-
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as preventing a person from 
being admitted voluntarily to an approved centre for treatment without 
any application, recommendation or admission order rendering him or 
her liable to be detained under this Act, or from remaining in an 
approved centre after he or she has ceased to be so liable to be 
detained.
Voluntary patients will be subject to common law principles in relation to their 
treatment. Individuals admitted voluntarily fall into two categories: those who have 
capacity and consent to admission and those who do not have capacity, but are not 
objecting to the admission. The compliant incapacitated group are treated on the basis 
of the common law principles and are referred to as de facto detained. Such patients 
should theoretically be able to leave hospital and refuse treatment, but these choices 
are not open to them, nor do they have the safeguards available to detained patients 
such as the second opinion procedure. In R v. Boumewood Community and Mental 
Health NHS Trust, ex parte L, an English case, one of the judges, Lord Steyn, spoke 
about relying on the doctrine of necessity to justify the deprivation of liberty of 
compliant incapacitated patients,
The common law principle of necessity is a useful concept, but it has none of 
the safeguards of the 1983 Act. It places effective and unqualified control in 
the hands of the hospital psychiatrist and other health professionals. It is, of 
course true that such professionals owe a duty of care to patients and they will 
almost invariably act in what they consider to be the best interest of the 
patient.126
The decision in HL v. United Kingdom and the more recent decision in Storck v. 
Germany are directly relevant to the 2001 Act.127 The question is whether, in order to 
be voluntary, one has to be capable and consenting, or if it is possible to be incapable 
and non-objecting. Both decisions would suggest that section 29 should be interpreted 
so that the person can only be admitted if they are capable and consenting. If 
compliant incapacitated patients are admitted and the level of control outlined by the
125 Mental Health Act 2001, section (2)(1).
126 [1998] 3 All ER 289 pp 308,309.
127 (2005)40 EHRR 32, Application no.61603/00 16th June 2005.
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Court in HL and Storck is applied to them, this may well result in a deprivation of 
liberty for the purpose of the Convention. Fennell argues that, when a compliant 
incapacitated person is admitted as a voluntary patient and strong treatment like 
neuroleptics or ECT is used without consent, then the level of control involved in
100
giving this treatment may tip the balance in favour of a deprivation of liberty. 
Where a person is incapable and deprived of liberty and is given treatment, the 
question is whether it is in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law and 
justified by reference to the requirements of Article 8(2). Under the 2001 Act, patients 
who are detained can be compulsorily treated when they are unable or unwilling to 
consent, provided the safeguard of a second opinion is obtained in the case of ECT or 
medicine after three months. The compliant incapacitated voluntary patient has no 
safeguards and is not entitled to any representative to act on his behalf. The 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine provides that treatment of such 
patients must be for their direct benefit and should be authorised by a representative
1 ?Qor a body provided by law. In addition, Recommendation (2004) 10 urges member
110states to provide appropriate safeguards for compliant incapacitated patients.
The 2001 Act prohibits research on people who are detained on the assumption that 
they are unable to consent.131 This is an example of the status approach to capacity 
and fails to take account of the fact that many people in this category have capacity to 
consent. The fact that a person has been detained under mental health legislation does 
not automatically rebut the presumption of capacity. The assumption is that those who 
have voluntary status are capable of consenting to being involved in clinical trials, but 
this fails to take account of the compliant incapacitated patient. The decisions in HL 
and Storck apply to patients whose circumstances meet the requirements to establish a 
deprivation of liberty. The assumption that all detained patients are incapable of 
consenting and all voluntary patient are capable is invalid. The core issue in this 
assumption is the failure to take account of capacity as the only legitimate way of 
ensuring who is able to consent to the procedure.
li8 Op. cit., 18.
129 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997 Article 6(1) & (3).
130Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2004) 10. on the protection o f the 
human rights and dignity o f persons with mental disorder, Article 26.
131 Mental Health Act 2001, section 70.
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The Control of Clinical Trials Acts 1987-1990 require that ethical approval for the 
clinical trial is given by the Minister for Health and Children. These Acts provided 
some minimum protection for those without capacity to consent: that information is 
given to the participant concerning the trial, the right to withdraw consent at any time, 
and that for an incapacitated person a written and signed consent is given on their
1 ^9behalf by someone who is independent of the person in charge of the trial. The
standard of safeguards in this legislation does not meet human rights standards with
regard to independence of the proxy decision-maker. The EU Clinical Trials Directive
has been transposed into Irish law through Ministerial Regulations providing for
1greatly improved safeguards for all participants in clinical trials. Those who do not 
have capacity to consent, including children, must have a representative, who may be 
a family member, to act and give informed consent on their behalf. The Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997 requires that, unless there is a direct benefit 
for the person who is unable to consent, they should not be involved in research, other 
than in exceptional circumstances.134 This problem has been recognised also in 
Recommendation (2004) 10 which advocates the application of “appropriate
135provisions” to protect those who are compliant, but without capacity to consent. 
Confidentiality of medical information
This right to respect for private life in Article 8 embraces a right to confidentiality 
whereby medical information receives a high level of protection. Restrictions on the 
right of access to personal files must be in accordance with Article 8(2). Duties of 
confidentiality are not absolute and are liable to be overridden where there is a 
stronger interest in disclosure. A margin of appreciation is left to states in reaching a 
balance between the various private and public interests, the extent of which depends 
on the seriousness of the interference and the nature of the information at stake. The 
Court has affirmed the importance of this right,
132 Control of Clinical Trials Act 1987, section 9(7)(b).
133 Directive 2001/20/EC and European Communities (Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for 
Human Use) Regs. 2004.
134 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, Articles 6,and 17. Ireland has not yet ratified 
this Convention due to difficulties around the right to life in Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution and the 
provision in the Convention on research on embryos in Article 18.
135 Op. cit., 130. See also Article 7 on protection of vulnerable persons.
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The protection of personal data, not least medical data, is of fundamental 
importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private 
life and family life ... Respecting the confidentiality of health data ... is 
crucial not only to respect the sense of privacy of a patient but also to preserve 
his or her confidence in the medical profession and in the health services in 
general. Disclosure must be justified by an overriding requirement in the 
public interest.
The right to privacy in medical records was held to be part of the right to respect for 
privacy in MS v. Sweden, but, on the facts, the Court was satisfied that disclosure to 
the State social services body was necessary and in accordance with law to protect the
117financial well-being of the State. A woman’s health records dealing with her HIV 
status were held to be covered by Article 8(1) and the right to respect for private life,
| io
but limited disclosure was justified for the criminal court.
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine provides that everyone has the
right to respect for private life in relation to information regarding his or her health.
Recommendation (2004) 10 refers to the importance of confidentiality and clear 
110record keeping. It would seem that there are few clear guidelines at present on the 
limitation of disclosure of such information to a “need to know basis” to ensure that 
the principle of proportionality in the Convention is satisfied.140
Irish law and confidentiality of medical information
The Irish Constitution provides for protection of the right to privacy as an aspect of 
personal rights under Article 40.3.1, though there is no specific reference to medical 
confidentiality.141 The right to privacy is not absolute and is balanced against other 
factors.
The nature of the right to privacy must be such as to ensure the dignity and 
freedom of an individual in the type of society envisaged by the Constitution, 
namely, a sovereign, independent and democratic society.142
136 Gaskin v. United Kingdom (1990) 12 EHRR 36.
137 (1997) 28 EHRR 313.
138 Z v. Finland (1997) 25 EHRR 371.
139 Op. cit., 130, Articles 3(1) & (2).
140 Xv. Y [1988] 2 All ER 648, Wv. Egdell [990] 1 All ER 835.
141 Madden D., Medicine, Ethics and the Law, Butterworths, Dublin, 2002.
142 Kennedy & Arnold v. Ireland [1987] IR 587.
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The right to privacy in the context of health care decisions on behalf of an 
incapacitated person has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in In re a Ward o f  
Court (Withdrawal o f Medical Treatment) .143 There is no specific statutory provision 
governing the duty of confidence in the doctor patient relationship. The duty is 
governed by professional codes of practice as well as the common law duty of 
confidence. English law has persuasive authority in Ireland so it is likely that 
developments in the English common law would have an impact in Ireland. The Data 
Protection (Amendment) Act 2003 and the Freedom of Information Act 1997 
supplement the right to confidentiality by protecting personal information and 
providing safeguards for disclosure. The Irish Medical Council and An Bord 
Altranais, the Nursing Board, have ethical guidelines that refer to the requirements for 
confidentiality in professional relationships.144 The employment contract of staff in 
hospitals should require that patient information is kept confidential and disclosure of 
information can lead to an action by the patient for breach of contract.145
There is no absolute right to confidentiality between doctor and patient and the Irish 
Medical Council outlines the exceptions to this right based on the balance that has to 
be struck between the right to confidentiality and the interests of the patient, of other 
people and the public.146 In the absence of consent, the Council recognises that 
confidentiality may be breached in situations where it is ordered by a judge or 
tribunal, it is necessary in the interests of the patient, or to protect the welfare of 
society, or is necessary to safeguard the welfare of another person or patient.147 The 
Council emphasises the importance of informed consent to the sharing of information 
with third parties, before which the doctor must explain the nature and context of the 
report, the implications of the examination for this purpose and have patient consent. 
The significance, rather than the detail of the findings, should be conveyed to any 
third party under confidential cover.
143 In re a Ward o f Court (Withdrawal o f MedicalTreatment) [1995] 2 ILRM 401.
144Irish Medical Council, Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour Dublin, 2004. An Bord Altranais, 
The Code o f Professional Conduct for Each Nurse and Midwife, Dublin, 2000.
145 Xv. 7 [1988] 2 All ER 648.
146 Irish Medical Council, Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour, Dublin, 2004.
147 Ibid, para 16.3.
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Mental health legislation
There is no reference to the protection of medical information in the 1945 Act and the 
disclosure of such information is governed by the general right to privacy in the 
Constitution, the common law right of confidentiality and the ethical guidelines. Any 
sharing of information with outside agencies by the psychiatrist is governed by the 
Medical Council which advocates for prior informed consent. The principles in the 
2001 Act provide that, in making any decision under the Act regarding the admission, 
care and treatment of the person, regard must be had to the right to privacy.148 Where 
the patient is unable to consent to disclosure to family or others, there is no provision 
in the legislation for proxy decision-making. In other contexts, the disclosure of 
“written statements” as evidence before a mental health review tribunal is permitted 
with the consent of the patient or his legal representative.149 No guidance is given 
where a patient refuses to permit disclosure. The tribunal hearings will be in private, 
thus safeguarding this aspect of the right to privacy for the patient.150 In relation to the 
tribunal hearings, the second opinion will be required to report to the tribunal and will 
not be in breach of confidentiality where information is disclosed on the basis of 
protecting the interests of society.151 This would accord with the Medical Council 
exceptions and be justified by reference to Article 8(2) as satisfying the legitimate aim 
of protecting the interests of others.
The applicant for a detention order will usually be in a position to have access to 
information regarding the patient in this context and there are no clear guidelines on 
the safeguarding and limitation of information to a “need to know” basis. In this 
regard, the right to respect for private life of the patient and the right to respect for 
family life for the carer may come into conflict where the carer believes he needs 
information in order to act in the best interests of the patient and this is contrary to the 
wishes of the patient. Any information given without consent will have to withstand 
the necessity test, have a legitimate aim and be proportionate to the achievement of 
that aim in order to comply with Article 8(2).
148 Mental Health Act 2001, section 4(3).
149 Ibid, section 49(6)(b) & (d).
150 Ibid, section 49(9).
151 [1990] 2 WLR 471.
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Family life
The right to respect for family life overlaps with private life and some aspects of these
rights are dealt with in other Articles such as the right to marry and found a family
under Article 12 which deals with intimate issues that could also be addressed under 
1 ^ 0Article 8. The state is required to act in order to facilitate normal family life. The
recognition of family is a question of fact depending on the existence of close 
1 ,personal ties. The right also extends to the right to make decisions in relation to 
medical treatment on behalf of incapacitated minors.154 People who become mentally 
disordered may need to be moved away from family or the family may need 
protection from them. The state is required to make efforts to maintain ties and to try 
to reunite parents with children who have been in care.155 The Court, in K & T v. 
Finland, held that there must be extraordinarily compelling reasons before a baby can 
be physically removed from the care of its mentally ill mother against her will and 
immediately after birth as a consequence of a procedure in which neither she nor her 
partner had been involved.156 The reasons for the removal of the baby were not 
justified under Article 8(2) as the situation did not constitute an emergency and a less 
intrusive measure should have been found. There may have been “necessity” to take 
some precautionary measures to protect the child, but the interference in the 
applicant’s family life cannot be regarded as having been necessary in a democratic 
society.
Family life involves some authority of parents over their children and, in Neilsen v 
Denmark the Court said that it was normally for the parent to decide where the child 
should live and to take various decisions for him including medical treatment.157 The 
right to have contact must always be balanced against the welfare and best interests of 
the child. The Court has held that the restrictions on child visits to someone in a high 
security hospital who had committed murder, manslaughter and sexual offences were
152 See chapter 8 for full discussion of this issue.
m Z & E v .  Austria (1986) 49 DR 67, and K & Tv. Finland (2003) 36 EHRR 18 para 150.
154 Neilsen v. Denmark (1999) 11 EHRR 175, Application no. 6825/74 18th May 1976. Glass v. United 
Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15.
155 Erikson v. Sweden A 156 para 71 (1989), K& T v .  Finland 12th July 2001.
156 K & Tv. Finland Application no. 25702/94 12th July 2001.
157 (1989) 11 EHRR 175 para 61.
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not unlawful and did not breach Article 8 of the Convention unless the child was one 
of a permitted category.158 The relationship between an aunt or uncle and a nephew or 
niece did not automatically constitute family life within the meaning of Article 8 but 
was dependent on the facts of the individual case. The directions regarding child visits 
were not disproportionate to the aim of the protection of children.
Restrictions on the right of cohabitation arose in Re Jennifer Connor, a Northern 
Ireland Court of Appeal case.159 It concerned a woman with a cognitive impairment as 
a result of long-term alcohol abuse who had been receiving psychiatric treatment for 
many years. She was made the subject of a guardianship order in May 2002 following 
injuries she sustained while living in the community with her cohabitee, later her 
husband in November 2002. The order placed restrictions on the amount of time she 
spent with her husband and at the time of the hearing permitted four nights together. 
Mrs Connor challenged the proportionality of the restrictions under Article 8(1) and 
Article 12 of the Convention.160 She argued that the Trust had to demonstrate the 
necessity of the restrictions on living with her husband and to undertake an explicit 
analysis of her situation “through the prism of the European Convention.”161 This was 
rejected by the first instance judge, stating that,
While that ‘right’ [under Article 8(1)] may not be specifically mentioned in 
reports, it is clear that the trust were actively considering the relationship 
between the applicant and her husband and the question of overnight stays. In 
those circumstances the Trust were dealing with the substance of the issue in
| css
the context of where and with whom the applicant should reside.
This approach was rejected by the Court of Appeal, holding,
There is no evidence that the trust ever recognised, much less addressed, the 
interference with the applicant’s article 8 rights. In none of the documents 
generated by the trust’s consideration of her case can any reference to article 8 
be found. [The Trust’s barrister] claims that what the trust officers were 
embarked upon in considering Mrs. Connor’s case was ‘in essence’ an article 
8 exercise. We cannot accept that argument. The consideration of whether an 
interference with a convention right can be justified involves quite a different 
approach from an assessment at large of what is best for the person affected.
lSiR v. Secretary o f State for Health ex p  ML [2001] 1 FLR 406.
159 [2004] NICA 45 (14th December 2004).
160 See Chapter 8 p 267 et seq. for further discussion on the right to marry.
161 Ibid, at para 19.
162 Ibid, at para 20
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The trusts consideration of Mrs Connor’s case clearly partakes of the latter of 
these.163
The Court went on to say that the Trust should have considered Mrs Connor’s request 
to live permanently with her husband from an Article 8 perspective, being an 
interference with such rights. Such interferences would have to be justified as being 
the least restrictive possible to secure her welfare. The Trust was required to review 
Mrs. Connor’s request in light of Article 8 and the guidance from the Court of 
Appeal.
The issue of family and proxy decision-making arose in Glass v. United Kingdom 
where the mother of a minor with severe mental and physical disabilities acted as her 
son’s legal proxy.164 As a parent, she had authority to act on his behalf and to consent 
to treatment for him. The Court held that the decision to impose treatment in defiance 
of the mother’s objections gave rise to an interference with the son’s right to respect 
for his private life and, in particular, his right to physical integrity.165 The failure to 
obtain court authorization for the treatment resulted in a breach of Article 8(2) as 
there was no emergency to justify the intervention.166 The independent right to family 
life of the mother, even in the extreme circumstances where her child’s life was in 
danger of being ended by a particular treatment, was not addressed. Instead, the Court 
limited its attention to the mother’s right towards her child as a vehicle for his right as 
a vulnerable incapacitated child to self-determination.
Irish law and the right to respect for family life
Constitutional law
Article 41 of the Irish Constitution outlines the obligation to safeguard the family 
based on marriage and gives protection to legislative and other policies that positively
1 Afidiscriminate in favour of the marital family. The Constitution deals with the
163 Ibid, para 29.
164 (2004) 39 EHRR 15.
165 X  and Y v. Netherlands, 26 March 1985, A - 91, para 22; Pretty v. the United Kingdom (2002) 35 
EHRR 1 paras 61 and 63.
166 Ibid, para 10.
Xbl Glass v. United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15. Application no. 61827/00 9th March 2003 p72.
168 Nicolau v. An Bord Uchtala [1966] IR 567.
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protection of the family from external forces.169 This privileged legal position does 
not apply to non-marital families or to individuals in families, but rather to the family 
as a unit.170 Recommendations for reform confirm that the Constitution should 
guarantee all individuals a right to respect for their family life regardless of the legal 
formalities.171
Mental health legislation
The voluntary admission of children under both 1945 and 2001 Acts involves parents
179and neither statute provides guidance on the child’s rights in these circumstances. 
Children are compliant incapacitated patients and there are no safeguards for treating 
them as individuals apart from parental authority which is not subject to any 
supervision. Reliance on the decision in Nielsen v. Denmark would mean that this
1 7^situation is as it should be, the proper exercise of parental rights. The decision in 
Storck v. Germany, where the applicant was 15 years old on her first admission, 
confirms the state obligation to provide effective review and supervision of such 
admissions to ensure Articles 5 and 8 are not violated and applies to children as to 
vulnerable adults.174 The 2001 Act defines children as those up to 18 years and the 
treatment of the older competent child against his will may well raise proportionality 
issues under Article 8(2), taking into account the decision in Storck. Conflicts may 
arise between private and family life in relation to confidential information when the 
patient does not want to share information to which the family feel entitled. The 
information should be limited to what is necessary for the particular task in order to 
comply with Article 8(2).
Home
The interests protected by Article 8 are the peaceful enjoyment of the home and the 
right to occupy one’s home, including protection against unwarranted intrusion by
lb)L v . L [  1992] 2 IR 77 pl08.
170 Murray v. Ireland [1985] IR 523.
171 Report o f the Constitution Review Group (Pr 12632, 1996) p323.
172 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 191(2). See chapter 9 for full discussion on children.
173 (1989) 11EHRR 175.
174 Application no.61603/00 16th June 2005.
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public officials and private parties.175 There is no right to a home. Interference with the 
right to respect for home and private life may arise in relation to compulsory care in 
the community. However, to date, no breach of the Convention has been established
1 n /L
in this regard. In L v. Sweden, the Commission held that a decision to grant leave 
from detention with the imposition of treatment as a condition of leave constituted an 
interference with Article 8 and the right to respect for privacy unless it could be
1 77justified under Article 8(2). The interference was held lawful as necessary for the 
protection of health under Article 8(2) on the basis that the applicant would stop 
taking medication if left to her own devices. The Commission held that the restriction 
was necessary in a democratic society.
Out-patient treatment in the community has been held by the Commission, in W v. 
Sweden, not to amount to detention for the purpose of Article 5.178 The applicant was 
required to take medication and to have hospital treatment every two weeks. On the 
basis of these decisions, it would seem that conditional release does not per se amount 
to detention, nor does it breach Article 8 where there is justification under Article 
8(2). The principle of proportionality applies to the conditions of the release providing 
for the least restrictive alternative and ensuring there are safeguards against abuse.
Irish law and the right to respect for home
Constitutional law
The right to the inviolability of the “dwelling” is enshrined in Article 40.5 of the Irish 
Constitution and generally refers to the place where people live.179 The right is not 
absolute and forced entry can take place under statute and common law.180
Mental health legislation
175 Guerra and Others v. Italy 19 February 1998 Reports o f Judgments and Decisions 1998-1 para 57. 
Arondelle v. United Kingdom Application no 7889/77.
mL v. Sweden Application no. 10801/84 61 DR 62 (1988), Wv. Sweden [1988] 59 DR 158.
177 Application no. 10801/84 61 DR 62 (1988).
178 [1988] 59 DR 158.
179 DPP v. McMahon {1965] I IR 142.
180 Criminal Law Act 1997, section 6(1).
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The 1945 Act provides that, where the Gardai have reasonable grounds for believing a
person of unsound mind is in a house, they have the right to enter and place the person
181under care and control for the safety of the person and in the public interest.
Under the 2001 Act, the Gardai must have reasonable grounds for believing the 
person has a mental disorder and there is a “serious likelihood of the person causing 
immediate and serious harm to himself or others.”182 In order to comply with Article 
8(2) the interference in the dwelling will have to be justified as necessary and 
proportionate. The interpretation of words like “immediate and serious” harm are 
crucial to establish justification for the interference. This is particularly important in 
the case of Garda entry to the home which can be carried out without a warrant. Other 
informal intrusions on the home should be subject to a code of practice in order to 
comply with this right to respect for the home.
The 1945 Act provides for two forms of community control: absence on leave which 
can extend to 48 hours, and absence on trial, which can extend to 90 days following 
which a patient can be re-admitted or discharged.184 The 2001 Act provides that a 
patient may be given conditional or unconditional leave only for the unexpired period 
of the detention order and the safeguards applying to detention will apply as if the 
person were hospitalised.185 Neither Act gives details as to what interventions can 
take place during this time and how invasive of private, family or home life they 
might be. Interventions under community treatment orders have been found to be 
justified under Article 8(2).186 The intrusion by staff into the homes of patients in 
community residential facilities and the lack of privacy in such places might well 
engage Article 8 and the right to respect for private life and the home. Clearly, such 
interferences would have to stand the “necessity” test in Article 8(2), pursue a 
legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim.
181 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 165 and amended by Mental Treatment Act 1961, section 9.
182 Mental Health Act 2001, section 12(l)(b).
183 McLeod v. United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 493.
184 Mental Treatment Act 1945, sections 203 & 204.
185 Mental Health Act 2001, section 26. The Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill 2002 proposes Review 
Boards to deal with those coming within the narrow provisions of the Bill. The Boards will have power 
to discharge people conditionally or unconditionally and with supervision as appropriate.
186 L v. Sweden Application no. 10801/84 61 DR 62 (1988).
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Correspondence
The right to respect for correspondence includes letters and also protects telephone
conversations.187 It is likely that the protection extends to other forms of
communication, such as email.188 The right guaranteed is to “uncensored
communication with others.”189 This right to confidentiality, particularly in a doctor
patient relationship, is as much an aspect of private life as it is of correspondence. The
issue of correspondence is important in the every day life of patients in psychiatric 
1 0 0care. The Court is mindful of the need to ensure confidentiality in the 
correspondence of detained persons, recognising that such communication is vitally 
important.
The control of correspondence in a psychiatric hospital arose in Herzegefalvy v. 
Austria where the applicant was deprived of writing materials and unstamped letters 
and his letters were filtered through his guardian, who decided whether or not they 
would be sent to the addressees.191 Apart from those being sent to government 
authorities, the remainder were returned to him. The Government conceded that this 
was an interference with his correspondence, but argued that it was justified as the 
essential purpose had been to protect his health. The Court stated,
Any interference constituted a breach of Article 8 unless it was in accordance 
with law, pursued a legitimate aim or aims under paragraph 2 and was 
moreover ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for achieving those aims. The 
impugned measure should have some basis in national law; it also refers to the 
quality of the law in question requiring that it should be accessible to the 
person concerned who must moreover be able to foresee its consequences for
1 QOhim and be compatible with the rule of law.
The Court emphasised that there must be a measure of protection in national law 
against arbitrary interferences with the rights safeguarded by paragraph 8(1) in order 
to achieve compatibility with the rule of law. Where discretion is vested in a public 
authority, the authority must clearly indicate the scope of the discretion, to prevent too
187Klass v. Germany (1979) 2 EHRR 214.
188 Op. cit., 83 p807.
189 Op. cit., 3 p320.
190 R v. Ashworth ex parte N  [2001] EWHC Admin 339.
191 Herzegefalvy v. Austria (1992) 15 EHRR 437.
192 Ibid, para 88.
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much latitude, “although the degree of precision required will depend on the 
particular subject matter.”193 The Court referred to vaguely worded provisions that did 
not specify the scope of conditions of exercise of the discretionary power in this case,
... such specifications appear all the more necessary in the field of detention 
in psychiatric institutions in that the persons concerned are frequently at the 
mercy of the medical authorities, so their correspondence is the only contact 
with the outside world ... in the absence of any detail at all as to the kind of 
restriction permitted or their purpose, duration and extent or the arrangements 
for their review, the above provisions do not offer the minimum degree of 
protection against arbitrariness required by the rule of law in a democratic
194society.
The Court held that the system was not in accordance with the law and was not 
justifiable having regard to Article 8(2).
Irish law and the right to respect for correspondence
Constitutional law
The right to communicate was declared by the High Court to be included in Article 40.3 
of the Constitution as the exercise of a basic human faculty that “inheres in the citizen by 
virtue of his human personality.”195 The Irish courts have declared that like all other 
constitutional rights, this right is not absolute.
Mental health legislation
The 1945 Act provides for the right to send an unopened letter to the Minister for 
Health, the Inspector of Mental Hospitals, the President of the High Court, the local 
health board and, where relevant, the Ward of Court office.196 The Act provides that 
notices of such rights are at the discretion of the Inspector and Minister for Health, as 
provided in the Act, “if the Minister so directs ... and if the Inspector of Mental
193 Ibid, para 89.
194 Ibid, para 91.
195 Attorney General v. Paperlink [1984]_ILRM 373.
196 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 266.
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107 , .Hospitals indicates the positions where they are to be posted.” There is a 
presumption that, outside of this specific protection, correspondence can be restricted 
and there are no guidelines on the extent of the restriction. The Mental Treatment 
Regulations 1961, which provide that a person in charge may examine 
correspondence to and from patients where he “thinks fit,” appear extreme in their 
discretion, the scope of which is unclear and too vague to constitute a justifiable 
interference.198 It is not clear if the restrictions are carried out for the “protection of 
health or morals,” for the “rights or freedoms of others” and whether these intrusions 
are proportionate to the aim of the restriction or are foreseeable. The arbitrariness of 
such a system would appear to risk breaching Article 8(2).
The 2001 Act does not refer to the right to correspondence, although the principles 
section refers to the right to respect for the privacy of the individual, thereby 
embracing this provision.199 The right to respect for correspondence needs specific 
protection to prevent arbitrariness as there may be an unacceptable level of discretion 
otherwise. The Mental Health Commission will have the task of introducing a code of 
practice which should give guidance on the right to correspondence and the criteria on 
which restrictions may be based.
Conclusion
This chapter considered Article 8 rights, in particular the right of self-determination 
and the authority to treat persons for mental disorder. The 1945 Act does not contain 
any safeguards for the imposition of medical treatment and there is an assumption that 
detention includes the right to treatment, despite the fact that there is no express 
power in the Act to do so. Arguments in favour of this position are vague and would 
not satisfy Article 8(2) and the requirement of lawfulness, foreseeability of effect and 
precision. The recent Storck decision is clear that even a minor interference with the 
physical integrity of an individual must be regarded as an interference with private 
life in Article 8 when carried out against the will of the person.200 The provision of 
some safeguards for the imposition of seclusion and restraint is in contrast to the
197 Ibid, section 267.
198 Mental Treatment Regulations 1961, Article 7.
199 Mental Health Act 2001, section 4.
200 Application no. 61603/00 16th June 2005.
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imposition of treatment, but is reflective of the era when there was much greater 
reliance on such measures. The requirement of proportionality in Article 8 may well 
be breached in relation to treatment under the 1945 Act particularly in relation to 
addicts. Voluntary patients under the 1945 Act, who are incapacitated, are not legally 
recognized and the absence of safeguards for consent to treatment for these patients is 
likely to engage Article 8. The overall impression of the 1945 Act is one where the 
scope of the Act is unclear in relation to treatment and to the level of discretion 
permitted in many sections affecting patients’ rights and so is in breach of the 
requirement of lawfulness under the Convention by not providing adequate safeguards 
against interference.
In contrast, the 2001 Act has clear dividing lines between detention and treatment. 
There are safeguards for consent to treatment for detained patients, but some are open 
to question, such as the second opinion for consent to treatment which could not be 
regarded as independent. The patient would not be able to rely on having a Mental 
Health Commission approved second opinion psychiatrist, in contrast with the second 
opinion for the tribunal hearing, and this could well infringe the requirement of 
foreseeability of effect of the second opinion system. The second opinion doctor will 
not have to give reasons for the decision in contrast to the situation with an English
9n idecision on the matter. The question of proportionality arises in relation to the three 
months rule for medicine where no consent or second opinion is required until after 
this period, despite the section being flagged as requiring consent or a second opinion. 
The justification for this rule may be that it is necessary for the protection of health, 
but modifications could provide safeguards at the beginning of the imposition of 
medicine and throughout this period. There are no treatment safeguards for the 
voluntary incapacitated patient and so the decisions in HL and Storck arguably apply 
to some of these patients where they are deemed to be deprived of their liberty. 
Overall, the 2001 Act presents weaknesses in the safeguards for consent to treatment, 
has no safeguards for voluntary incapacitated patients and does not meet the 
requirement of lawfulness in Article 8(2).
"0I R v. Feggetter & MHAC, ex parte JW  [2002] EWCA 554.
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In the context of participation in clinical trials, the 2001 Act prohibits detained 
patients from involvement using the status test as an indicator of capacity and 
disregarding the notion of benefit.202 The safeguards in relation to clinical trials have 
improved and would appear to meet rights standards in relation to proxy decision­
making for incapacitated patients.203 There are no provisions for advance directives, 
but the Law Reform Commission has made proposals which would lead to a 
comprehensive system of proxy decision-making, as well as advance directives for 
health care and the extension of the enduring power of attorney to cover health care 
decisions.204 These proposals are influenced by developments in English and Scottish 
law.205 They emphasise the need to respect the right to private life by providing 
safeguards for the right to self-determination in advance directives.
The right of confidentiality in medical treatment is protected by a number of statutes, 
but there are concerns that information is shared too readily. This situation is unlikely 
to change without a code of practice. The Irish Medical Council provides limited 
guidance that does not include people who cannot give informed consent.
The protection of the right to respect for private life may present difficulties in 
balancing competing interests. The problem arises also with older children and raises 
concerns about the necessity and justification for imposing treatment on a competent 
older child under Article 8(2).206
The right to respect for the home extends to residential centres where people with 
mental disorders live, although these places are not often perceived as someone’s 
home. Interferences in these homes with intrusive visits by health personnel need to 
be justified under Article 8(2). The right to respect for correspondence is not referred 
to specifically in the 2001 Act, though the principles section, which provides for the 
right to respect for privacy and autonomy, may support this right. Moreover, 
interferences with the right must be justifiable by reference to Article 8(2).
202 Mental Health Act 2001, section 70.
203 Clinical Trials Legislation 1987-1991, Directive 2001/20/EC and European Communities (Clinical 
Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use) Regs. 2004.
204 Op. cit., 69 chapter 7.
205 Mental Capacity Act 2005 and Adults with Incapacity Act 2000.
206 See chapter 9 for further discussion.
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Chapter 4
ARTICLE 3 AND THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE, INHUMAN AND 
DEGRADING TREATMENT UNDER IRISH MENTAL HEALTH LAW
Introduction
This chapter considers the impact of Article 3 on the rights of mentally disordered 
people and the provisions in Irish law to prevent torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment. There are two mechanisms for the enforcement of rights under Article 3, 
one is an application before the Strasbourg Court and the second is through the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the CPT. This Committee was set up under 
the Convention for the Prevention of Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and 
Punishment and has a direct influence on medical care, defining what is inhuman or 
degrading in two key areas: detention in psychiatric care, and the adequacy of care for 
prisoners with mental disorder.1 Key questions under Article 3 and Irish law will be 
addressed throughout this chapter: whether the conditions in which mentally 
disordered people are detained could reach the minimum level of severity to come 
within the scope of Article 3, whether medical treatment could amount to inhuman 
and degrading treatment, whether the side effects of treatment could be severe enough 
to engage Article 3; and whether the failure to treat an individual could amount to a 
breach of Article 3.
Article 3 provides:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.
Article 1 of the Convention requires states to secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms contained in the Convention. This obligation, 
taken together with Article 3, requires states to take measures designed to ensure that 
individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by
1 Council of Europe, CPT Standards on Health Care Services in Prisons, Extract from the 3rd General 
Report [CPT/Inf (93) 12]
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private individuals.2 The state has a positive obligation to take all reasonable 
measures to protect children, the mentally disordered, the detained and other 
vulnerable individuals from the risk of a breach of Article 3. The obligation is 
engaged when the state knows or ought to know that there is a "real and immediate 
risk" of a breach which has a high threshold. The more vulnerable the individual, the 
lower the threshold of risk which engages the positive obligation and the greater the 
preventative measures required.3 According to Convention case law, children and 
other vulnerable individuals are entitled to effective deterrence against breaches of 
personal integrity.4 The Court, in Z v. United Kingdom, held that this includes 
protection against child abuse and the state is required to take reasonable steps to 
prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had, or ought to have had, knowledge.5 
In relation to psychiatric illness, this could mean state failure to recognise the risks to 
children of failing to provide treatment for a parent.
Obligations arising from Article 3 are imposed on states to carry out investigations 
and to ensure that those within their jurisdictions are not subject to treatment 
prohibited by Article 3. The main purpose of Article 3 is to protect “a person’s dignity 
and physical integrity.”6 It is a non-derogable Article that creates state obligations 
and, unlike other Articles, it does not have any limiting qualification. Harris states, 
“This can be understood to mean that ill-treatment within the terms of Article 3 is
n
never permitted, even for the highest reasons of public interest.” Freedom from 
torture is a fundamental human right and “holds a special place ... and many
O
international legal sources express support for such a right.” Article 3 “prohibits in 
absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective 
of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour.”9 The preventative nature of Article 
3 guarantees against ill-treatment and also encourages state compliance.
2 A V. United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 611 para 22.
3 Keenan v. United Kingdom (1998) 33 EHRR 913 paras 102, 110, and Herczegfalvy v Austria (1992) 
15 EHRR 437.
4 X  and Y v. Netherlands 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, para 21-27.
5 (2002) 34 EHRR 3 para 73.
6 Tyrer v. United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1. para 33.
7 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law o f the European Convention on Human Rights, Butterworths, 
London, 1995, p55.
8 UN Convention Against Torture 1984 and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment.
9 Labita v. Italy Application no. 26772/95, para 119.
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The Committee for the Prevention of Torture
The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1987 (Prevention of Torture Convention) was introduced as 
a supplement to Article 3, as a preventative measure to monitor the practical 
implementation of the human rights standards. The Convention provides a remedy for 
an individual or state victim when Article 3 has been breached, ex post facto and the 
Prevention of Torture Convention provides a preventative system. An independent 
Committee was established under the Prevention of Torture Convention, known as the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). This committee visits various public 
places of detention in the Contracting States and reports on its findings.10 It examines 
the treatment of individuals “with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the protection 
of such persons from torture and from “inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” Its findings may be used by the Court to assist in a judgment.11 The 
CPT “works outside the conventional human rights framework which is public,
17visible and binding on governments.” It operates outside public scrutiny, uses 
“moral persuasion” and depends on cooperation in response to its systematic 
monitoring of places of detention. It is interesting to note that the requirements in the 
Prevention of Torture Convention and in Article 3 are different. The CPT has a lower 
threshold because it can criticise states about conditions in places of detention that it 
visits that might not give rise to a finding of a breach under Article 3. It provides 
national reports, indicating findings and making consequential recommendations for 
reform of the protection of detained persons.
The objective of this Convention is preventative in nature and the CPT has a range of 
standards, including those applying to prisons and psychiatric hospitals.13 These 
standards relate, inter alia, to conditions of detention, seclusion and restraint,
10 The committee has a number of independent experts nominated by the contracting states but acting in 
an individual capacity and the basis of involvement with Contracting States in co-operation.
Allegations of consistent abuse can result in ad hoc visits and a more assertive approach in the face of 
non-co-operation.
11 Harding T., “The Application of the European Convention of Human Rights to the Field of 
Psychiatry” (1989) 12 IntJ. ofL. & Psych. pp245-262.
12 Gostin “Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities The European Convention of Human 
Rights” (2000) 23(2) Int. J.ofL. & Psych. P145.
13 Council of Europe, CPT Standards on Involuntary placement in Psychiatric Establishments Extract 
from the 8th General Report [CPT/Inf (98) 12].
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treatment plans, consent to treatment along with information and safeguards for 
patients.14 The Committee is of the view that people who are institutionalised are 
particularly vulnerable to abuse, so it is part of its mandate to ensure standards are 
met. The CPT may visit any hospital or institution which has a custodial character, 
such as geriatric hospitals or residences for those with intellectual disabilities.
Minimum level of severity
The Strasbourg Court recognises three distinct categories of “ill-treatment” under 
Article 3: torture, inhuman treatment and degrading treatment. These are separated on 
the basis of the degree of suffering experienced by the individual and were clearly 
demonstrated in the decision of the Court in Ireland v. United Kingdom}5 Ill- 
treatment must reach a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within Article 3. The 
assessment of this minimum level is relative and depends on all the circumstances of 
the case, the context and duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects on a 
person whose age, gender and state of health will be factors.16 The requirement of a 
minimum level of severity for the action to fall within the parameters of Article 3, 
regardless of the type of action involved, has the intention of eliminating a range of 
complaints apart from those that reach a level of severity in terms of suffering and 
degradation. The Court has stated that, in cases where the level of severity is not 
sufficient to engage Article 3, “there might be circumstances in which Article 8 could 
be regarded as affording a protection in relation to conditions during detention which
1 7do not attain the level of severity required by Article 3.”
The lower threshold of severity applies to inhuman and degrading treatment. The 
Court has held that treatment will be inhuman only “if it reaches a level of gravity 
involving considerable mental or physical suffering, and degrading if the person has 
undergone humiliation or debasement involving a minimum level of severity” and 
where it impacts adversely on his personality in a manner incompatible with Article 
3.18
14 Ibid, paras 40-48.
15 (1980) 2 EHRR 25.. This was the first time an inter-state application was brought before the Courts.
16 Ibid.
17 Raninen v. Finland [1997] 26 EHRR 563 para 63.
18 (1980) 2 EHRR 25 para 162.
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Such treatment arouses in the victims feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority, 
capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking moral 
resistance occasioning physical injury and psychiatric damage.19
The Court has acknowledged the inevitable element of suffering or humiliation 
connected with a legitimate deprivation of liberty, but Article 3 obliges the state to 
ensure that a person is detained under conditions which are compatible with respect 
for human dignity. Further, the state is obliged to ensure that the individual is not 
subject to distress or hardship exceeding that expected in detention and that the 
person’s health and well-being are adequately secured.20 The person must also be
provided with the necessary medical care and treatment.21 The cumulative effect of
22conditions must be considered in addition to the specific allegations by an applicant. 
More recently, the Court has ruled on breaches of Article 3 and found both conditions
O'X .iand treatment have amounted to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. The 
Court found a violation of Article 3 in Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, where the 
applicant’s health deteriorated significantly and the conditions had such an effect on 
his health and well-being that they amounted to degrading treatment.24 Prior to 
detention, the applicant had no skin disease and had normal health but contracted 
allergic dermatitis in custody which later proved to be microbic eczema and scabies. 
He received his first medical examination after 6 weeks of detention. It was 
recommended that he receive specialist treatment which was not done and for 6 
months, after his hunger-strike, he received no medical intervention. The Court held 
this was not “adequate and reasonable medical attention, given the hunger strike and 
the diseases from which the applicant was suffering.” The Court held Article 3 was 
violated with regard to lack of adequate medical treatment and assistance that 
amounted to degrading treatment. This decision has implications for the area of 
mental health care where the adequacy of medical treatment is in question, though the 
impact is much more difficult to establish compared to identifiable physical 
symptoms.
19 Ibid, para 167. Techniques employed included hoodwinking, wallstanding, food and sleep 
deprivation and sensory disorientation.
20 Kudla v. Poland Application no. 30210/96, para 92.
21 Aerts v. Belgium (2000) 29 EHRR para 64..
22 Dougoz v. Greece, Application no. 40907/98, para 46.
23 Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine Application 54825/00 5th April 2005.
24 Application 54825/00 para 87.
25 Ibid, para 105.
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The highest threshold applies to complaints of torture and evidence is rarely severe 
enough to satisfy Article 3. Torture is defined as deliberate and intentional inhuman 
treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. In Selmouni v. France, the Court 
acknowledged that the standard is not static and, in recognition of present-day 
circumstances, that actions which were not in the past regarded as torture may be 
recognised as such in the future.27 This indicates that the notion of torture is set to 
expand to include previously excluded forms of ill-treatment. The Court held that the 
physical and mental violence that caused severe pain and suffering and was serious 
and cruel was more properly categorised as torture. Gostin comments that torture is 
“unlikely to apply to mental health cases unless there is some anti-therapeutic, or 
unethical motive, such as political oppression.”
However, neither the Commission nor the Court has ever found that conditions in a 
psychiatric hospital were so severe as to breach Article 3 on torture grounds. The 
closest has been in Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, where the applicant alleged he had been 
force-fed five times a week while on hunger-strike by other detainees, not by trained 
staff. He was frequently handcuffed to a chair or a heating facility and forced to 
swallow a rubber tube that was connected to a special nutritional mixture. 
Justification by the government for the feeding was medical necessity and the Court 
reiterated that a measure which is of therapeutic necessity from the point of view of 
established principles of medicine cannot, in principle, be regarded as inhuman and 
degrading. The same can be said about force-feeding that is aimed at saving the life of 
a particular detainee who consciously refuses to take food when medical necessity is
9 0convincingly shown to exist The applicant claimed that there had been no medical 
necessity to force-feed him, as there had been no medical examination, tests or other 
documents that sufficiently proved that necessity. He alleged that the force-feeding 
had been aimed at his humiliation and punishment, as its purpose had been to make 
him stop the hunger strike and to subject him to severe physical suffering. The failure 
of the government to establish life-threatening circumstances meant medical necessity 
was not proven and the feeding was, therefore, arbitrary. The Court held that the 
means used to force-feed amounted to torture, where it was resisted, and there was no
26 Ireland v. United Kingdom (1980) 2 EHRR 25 para 167.
27 (2000) 29 EHRR 403.
28 Op. cit., 11 pl41.
J) Herczegfalvy v. Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437 para 83
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medical justification. Therefore, this constituted “treatment of such a severe character 
warranting characterisation of torture.”
Conditions of detention
Positive obligations apply in relation to conditions of detention and Article 3 applies 
to all categories of detention, including psychiatric detention. It applies to patients in 
hospitals who complain that their conditions are dirty or lacking in security or that 
they have been abused by staff or other patients. There is no specific basis in the 
Convention for questioning the conditions of detention or treatment, but these could 
be raised under Articles 3, 5 or 8. There have been many unsuccessful challenges to 
state practice using Article 3 involving psychiatric detention, including challenges to 
conditions of detention and medical treatment.31 In B v. United Kingdom, the 
applicant complained of grossly overcrowded conditions, poor sanitary facilities and 
the constant threat of violence. The Commission declared the complaint admissible 
and stated that, even if hospital staff do their best with the conditions, this would not 
exclude the possibility that the physical conditions of detention could in themselves 
give rise to a question under Article 3. In keeping with the deference shown in later 
cases, the Commission ruled against the applicant due to the absence of a single 
incident which was so grave as to warrant a finding of inhuman and degrading 
treatment.
In Pretty v. United Kingdom, the Court stated that physical and mental suffering may 
be covered by Article 3 where the illness is exacerbated by the conditions of 
detention, expulsion or other measures for which the authorities are responsible.33 In 
considering whether treatment is “degrading” within the meaning of Article 3, one of 
the factors which the Court will take into account is the question as to whether its 
object was to humiliate and debase the person concerned, although the absence of any 
such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of violation of Article 3.34
30 Application 54825/00 para 98.
31 Among the failed Article 3 cases are the Vagrancy cases (1979) 1 EHRR 373, Winterwerp v. 
Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387, Bozano v .France (1987) 9 EHRR 297, Aerts v. Belguim, (2000) 29 
EHRR 50, Herzgefalvy v. Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437.
32 Application no 6870/75 32 DR 5 (1981) Comm Rep p 29-30.
33 (2002) 35 EHRR 1 para 52.
34 Price v. United Kingdom^2002) 35 EHRR 1. Application no. 33394/96 10th July 2001 para 24.
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The Court has found evidence of inhuman and degrading treatment and a breach of 
Article 3 involving a mentally disordered person in the prison system. In Keenan v. 
United Kingdom, a prisoner was suffering from a severe mental disorder, with a 
history disclosing episodes of disturbed behaviour, including suicidal tendencies, 
particularly following his removal from the hospital wing to a normal prison 
location. The Commission stated that it could not be certain that his symptoms and 
suicide resulted from the conditions of his detention imposed by the authorities. The 
Court decided that this difficulty was not determinative of the issue as to whether the 
obligations of the State were fulfilled under Article 3, as there are circumstances 
where proof of the actual effect on the person may not be a major factor. In respect 
of a person deprived of his liberty, the Court said that recourse to physical force by 
staff where this is not strictly necessary in light of the detainee’s own conduct 
diminishes human dignity and is, in principle, an infringement of the rights set forth in 
Article 3.37
Similarly, treatment of a mentally ill person may be incompatible with the standards 
imposed by Article 3 in the protection of fundamental human dignity, even though 
that person may not be able or capable of pointing to any specific ill-effects. 
Referring to Herczegfalvy v. Austria and Aerts v. Belguim, the Court said that the 
assessment of whether the treatment or punishment concerned is incompatible with 
the standards of Article 3 has, “in the case of mentally ill persons, to take into 
consideration their vulnerability and their inability, in some cases, to complain 
coherently or at all about how they are being affected by any particular treatment.”39 
The lack of effective monitoring and specialist assessment and treatment were 
significant defects in the medical care of a mentally ill person known to be a suicide 
risk. These factors, along with the imposition of punishment and an extended 
sentence, may “have threatened his physical and moral resistance, and is not 
compatible with the standard of treatment required in respect of a mentally ill
35 (2001) 33 EHRR 38.
36 Ibid, para 109.
37 Ibid, para 112.
38 Ibid, para 113.
39 Ibid, para 111. Herczegfalvy v. Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437 and Aerts v. Belguim, (2000) 29 EHRR 
50.
169
person.”40 The Court held that these failures in Keenan met the severity standard to be 
regarded as inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment within Article 3.
The finding of a breach of Article 3 involving a physically disabled person is 
important by analogy for mentally disordered persons. In Price v. United Kingdom, 
the applicant, a thalidomide victim with numerous health problems including 
defective kidneys, committed contempt of court in the course of civil proceedings and 
was ordered by a judge to be detained for seven days for non-payment of fines 41 It 
appears that, in accordance with English law and practice, the sentencing judge took 
no steps, before committing the applicant to immediate imprisonment, to ascertain 
where she would be detained or to ensure that it would be possible to provide 
facilities adequate to cope with her severe level of disability. There was no evidence 
in this case of any positive intention to humiliate or debase the applicant. The Court 
held that, to detain a severely disabled person in conditions where she was 
dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or 
unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of 
difficulty, constituted degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention 42 
The same reasoning should apply, mutatis mutandis, to mentally disordered persons 
who are detained in hospital, strengthened by the additional factor of their 
vulnerability and their inability to complain about how they are being affected. 
Conditions which seriously threaten the mental health of the person, like those in 
Keenan should engage Article 3.
One of the important questions is whether inadequate and non-therapeutic conditions 
could breach Article 3. The Court has never found such a breach in psychiatric 
detention, only in relation to conditions in prison.43 Instead, the Court prefers that 
such conditions would be considered under Article 5, which imposes minimum 
therapeutic standards.44 Gostin comments on minimum standards applying to those 
detained in psychiatric care and he believes that,
40 Ibid, para 116.
41 (2002) 34 EHRR 53.
42 Ibid, para 30.
43 Price v. United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 53, Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine Application 54825/00.
44 Aerts v. Belgium (2000) 29 EHRR 50.
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... minimally adequate care and treatment should be a necessary precondition 
to detention on grounds of unsoundness of mind; otherwise it would be 
difficult to justify detention on those grounds alone. ... if a person is to be 
deprived of liberty, not as a punishment for a criminal offence, but because of 
the need for therapy, then the government should have a duty to provide 
minimally adequate treatment. Minimally adequate standards of treatment 
would help to assure that a person’s mental health does not deteriorate, but can 
actually improve.45
Conditions of detention were raised in Dhoest v. Belguim,'46 where the applicant was 
detained in a high security hospital and alleged a breach of Article 3. He was strapped 
to a bed, tranquillisers were put in his soup and coffee and he spent 14 years in 
extreme isolation, with no social contact. Part of his complaint was that he had not 
received treatment, other than drugs. The Commission held it did not violate Article 3 
because he was considered to be partly responsible for his own behaviour. There 
seemed to be little consideration of the extremely harsh conditions for someone who 
was mentally ill and in isolation. The decision in this case leads Fennell to conclude 
that “standards and conditions will have to fall very low for the therapeutic purpose to 
be destroyed.”47 He also maintains that where detention is based solely on 5(1 )(e) 
alone, complaints about conditions in the place of detention are better brought under 
Article 5 than Article 3.
The proportionality doctrine was raised in Aerts v. Belguim, where the Court held that 
there must be some connection between the ground of detention relied on and the 
place and the conditions of detention.48 The applicant was held for seven months in 
unsuitable conditions in the psychiatric wing of a prison, despite the psychiatrist’s 
reporting that he urgently needed transfer to a better equipped centre for his mental 
health 49 The applicant had not received any regular medical or psychiatric attention 
and he alleged that the conditions of detention had caused a deterioration of his mental
45 Op. cit., 11 pl44.
46 (1987) 12 EHRR 97. He alleged there was a breach of Article 5(1 )(e) because he was detained as a 
person of unsound mind and was entitled to appropriate treatment in order to ensure that he was not 
detained longer than absolutely necessary. ^
47 Fennell P., “The Third Way in Mental Health Policy: Negative Rights, Positive Rights, and the 
Convention”, (1999) 26(1) Journal o f Law and Society pp47-70.
48 (2000) 29 EHRR 50. See chapter 1 for full discussion of this issue.
49 Ibid.
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health. His allegations regarding the conditions were supported by a CPT visit to the 
place of detention.50
Aerts alleged violations of Articles 3, 5 and 6 and the Court held that Article 5(1) had 
been violated in that the necessary relationship of proportionality between the grounds 
of detention relied on and the place and conditions of detention did not exist. The 
psychiatric wing could not be regarded as an institution appropriate for the detention 
of persons of unsound mind. Detention on the grounds of unsoundness of mind had to 
be in a hospital, clinic or similar institution. The Court held the conditions were not so 
severe as to bring them within the scope of Article 3 and there was not enough 
evidence to establish inhuman and degrading treatment. The Court held that, where 
the sole basis of detention is unsoundness of mind, an anti-therapeutic environment 
may contravene Article 5(1) even if it is not severe enough to amount to inhuman and 
degrading treatment as to breach Article 3. The first sign of this attitude had arisen in 
Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, where the Court held that the detention of a person is 
“lawful” under Article 5(1 )(e) only if effected in an appropriate institution.51
Seclusion
Seclusion and restraint in mental health is not in itself a breach of Article 3, as it may 
be justified to prevent injury to the person or to others. The Commission distinguished 
between complete sensory deprivation, coupled with total social isolation, which 
could destroy the personality and was unjustifiable and removal from association for 
various reasons, including protective reasons, which would not amount to inhuman 
and degrading treatment. It will depend on the conditions, duration, purpose and the
c ^
effects on the person concerned. However, the conditions involving seclusion could 
breach Article 3 where it is a sufficiently disproportionate response. According to 
Gostin, “where a particular act of restraint is disproportionate or arbitrary and even if
50 The CPT considered that the standard of care given to the patients placed in the psychiatric wing at 
the prison fell below the minimum acceptable from an ethical and humanitarian point of view and that 
prolonging their detention for lengthy periods carried an undeniable risk of a deterioration of their 
mental health. Although the CPT had severely criticised these conditions, it had not asserted that the 
physical conditions of detention or the lack of medical attention constituted inhuman or degrading 
treatment of the inmates.
51 Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (1984) 6 EHRR 69 Para 44.
52 Dhoest v. Belgium (1987) 12 EHRR 97 para 117.
53 A v. United Kingdom Application no. 6840/74.
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restraint is generally necessary it may breach Article 3”.54 Its use will have to satisfy 
the test of “medical necessity” required by the Court in Herczegfalvy v. Austria in 
order to avoid breaching the Convention.55 The use of restraint against voluntary 
patients can be carried out under the common law and, though the precise nature is 
not clear and even allowing for the “medical necessity” test, there is scope for using 
restraint on such patients.56 Many of the cases concern prisoners. In all cases regard 
must be had to all the surrounding circumstances of the case, including the particular 
conditions and their severity, the duration and purpose and how the person was 
affected.
The issue of seclusion and restraint arose in A v. United Kingdom in the context of the 
conditions of the place of seclusion.57 The case was an important indication of the 
Commission’s willingness to look at such issues. A friendly settlement was reached 
and included the introduction of new guidelines providing for improved standards on 
seclusion. In this way, Article 3 provided the opportunity to have standards raised for 
all those in detention, not just the applicant. This was the closest the Court came to a 
finding of a breach of Article 3 arising from mental hospital conditions. Gostin 
comments that this case “implicitly recognises that certain forms of seclusion, even if
co
ordered by medical authority, could be inhumane.”
One of the leading English cases on seclusion, R v. Mersey Care NHS Trust Ashworth 
Hospital Authority & others Ex p  Munjaz, addressed the use of seclusion where the 
hospital had departed from the provisions of the Code of Practice.59 The Code 
requires that seclusion should be used as a last resort and for the shortest possible 
time; that it should not be used as a punishment or threat, as part of a treatment 
programme, or because of shortage of staff, or where there was any risk of self-harm; 
that a decision to seclude should be taken by a doctor or nurse in charge; and that the 
continued need for seclusion should be reviewed every two hours by two nurses and 
every four hours by a doctor.
540p. cit., 12 pl49.
55 (1992) 15 EHRR 437.
56 Bartlett & Sandland, Mental Health Law Policy and Practice, OUP, Oxford, 2003, p395.
37 Application no. 6840/74 July 1980.
58 Op. cit., l i p  143.
59 [2003] EWCA Civ 1036. See also R (S) v. Airedale NHS Trust and others [2002] EWHC 1521.
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The Court of Appeal in Munjaz found several legal bases in English law for seclusion. 
The power to seclude detained patients arises by necessary implication from the 
statutory power to detain. Seclusion is also capable of being "medical treatment" 
within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983 and, therefore, might also be 
authorised medical treatment under the Act and under the common law doctrine of 
necessity. Informal patients can be secluded under the common law where this is 
reasonably necessary and proportionate to protect others from the immediate risk of 
significant harm and, where a patient lacked capacity, to provide whatever treatment 
or care was necessary in the patient's own best interests.60
Adherence to the Code satisfied the State's obligation to avoid a contravention of 
Article 3 and met the requirements of legality where rights protected by Articles 5 or 
8 were interfered with. The Court of Appeal in Munjaz, held that hospitals should 
observe the Code unless they had a good reason for departing from it in relation to an 
individual patient or a group of patients sharing particular well-defined 
characteristics, and they were not free to depart from it as a matter of policy, or on an 
arbitrary basis. 61 The hospital must show that the use of seclusion is necessary and 
the reasons must be given.62 The seclusion of detained patients involves a "real and 
immediate risk" of inhuman or degrading treatment.63 Therefore, the State has a 
positive obligation to provide practical and effective protection for detained patients 
from the use or unnecessary prolongation of seclusion, by establishing and enforcing 
a national procedure that ensures the frequent medical review of seclusion.
Seclusion, not amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment within Article 3, may 
nevertheless breach Article 8.64 The power to seclude compulsorily detained patients 
should, as with the power to detain, be defined as a power to seclude only when 
necessary (as in the case of voluntary patients). Since seclusion constitutes a further 
interference with a detained patient's residual liberty, Article 5 requires that seclusion 
must be regulated by a procedure “prescribed by law.” The courts should, therefore, 
not only look at the quality of the decision-making, but should also consider the
60 Op. cit., 47 p395.
61 R (on the application o f Munjaz) v. Mersey Care NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1036 paras 45, 60 
and 72-76.
62 R (Wooder) v. Feggetter [2003] QB 219.
63 Xv. United Kingdom (1981)4 EHRR 188.
64 Raninen v. Finland (1997) 26 EHRR 563. See chapter 3 for further discussion of seclusion.
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factual basis of the decision and decide whether continued seclusion is justified. A 
lack of resources is not justification for a failure to review seclusion in accordance 
with the Code.65
Irish law and Article 3
The CPT and Ireland
The CPT has visited the Central Mental Hospital (CMH) and has made 
recommendations for change.66 The report of the CPT concentrated on conditions and 
on the activities of the people detained and commented on the inadequate facilities in 
the old buildings, making suggestions for immediate improvement. The lack of 
protection of the rights of mentally disordered prisoners was highlighted and the CPT
fJTwanted a government commitment that this would be resolved. It also stated that 
every competent patient, whether voluntary or involuntary, should be given the
/'O
opportunity to refuse treatment or any other medical intervention. Another issue 
raised by the CPT was the lack of independent review of detention under the current 
legal system. Patients sent by the courts or transferred from the prison are not 
included in the review system proposed in the 2001 Act, though it is envisaged that 
the proposed Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill 2002 will provide a form of independent 
review of those sent to the CMH by the courts.
In 2002, the CPT also visited a psychiatric hospital and residential centres for people 
with intellectual disabilities, focusing on the needs of the incapacitated who are in 
closed spaces and are de facto detained. They examined living conditions and 
safeguards around admission and review of continuing admission. The CPT expressed 
concern about the lack of “a clear legal or administrative framework for the 
involuntary admission to establishments for mentally disabled persons,” as such 
admissions are regarded as voluntary.69 They found such people are admitted usually
65 R (on the application o f Munjaz) v. Mersey Care NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1036.
66 Council of Europe, CPT Report to Government o f Ireland on the visit to Ireland carried out by the 
European Committee for the Prevention o f Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 20-28 May 2002 para 85.
67 Ibid, para 88.
68 Ibid, para 88.
69 Ibid, para 94.
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by a decision of a doctor, or referral from elsewhere. The CPT expressed concern that 
there were no avenues of appeal against such placements. Nor was there evidence of 
any decision-making process and plan for each individual or formal review by an 
independent authority as to the need for placement or supervision. The CPT 
recommended that the legal situation of persons placed in mental disability facilities 
be reviewed as a matter of urgency and that action be taken with a view to providing a 
comprehensive legal framework for such institutions, offering an adequate range of 
safeguards for people placed in them.70 The Law Reform Commission is proposing 
changes for vulnerable adults and decision-making, but it is not clear that this will 
resolve the problems raised in the CPT reports. The numbers of people with a learning 
disability, who are living in large psychiatric hospitals, remains a major source of
n  i
concern, all of whom would have voluntary status, regardless of capacity. The 
decision of the Strasbourg Court in HL v. United Kingdom and Storck v. Germany 
applies in these circumstances in relation to state obligations to ensure the rights of
77such individuals are protected with appropriate procedures and safeguards. 
Constitutional law
State responsibility involves positive obligations to take measures to protect vulnerable 
persons from abuse. The parens patriae prerogative of the State provides the Courts 
with jurisdiction, as does the Constitution, to ensure protection for adults themselves 
or their property and for children who are at risk in order to have their welfare
n-t
safeguarded. Article 40.3.1 of the Constitution provides for recognition of the right to 
bodily integrity in Ryan v. Attorney General74 and this right was broadened into a more 
general right not to have one's health endangered by the actions of the State.75 Failure to 
meet this obligation could be a breach of constitutional rights and a violation of 
Article 3. However, there is no case where a prisoner was released because of the 
conditions of detention.
70 Ibid, para 94.
7'Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending 
2003, Government Publications, Dublin, 2004.
72 (2005) 40 EHRR 32 and Application no. 61603/00 16th June 2005. See chapters 1 & 2 for discussion 
of these cases.
73 Lunacy Ireland Act 1871 and Child Care Act 1991, Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 34.
74 [1965] IR 294.
75 The State (C) v. Frawley [1976] IR 365.
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The High Court addressed the issue of endangerment of health in The State (C) v. 
Frawley, as well as the conditions necessary to infringe the mentally disordered 
prisoner’s rights and so taint his detention with illegality to deprive it of the character
7 _of detention in accordance with the law, thereby necessitating his release. The 
applicant sought an order of habeas corpus on the basis that the conditions of 
detention rendered his detention illegal. He was suffering from a severe sociopathic 
disorder, which caused him to seriously endanger his life by self-injuring and 
swallowing metal objects, and had to be handcuffed frequently and kept in solitary 
confinement. The prison authorities subjected him to an extremely rigid regime of 
restraint on the basis of his safety. One of his complaints was that he was not 
receiving the appropriate therapy that was shown to be highly specialised and not 
available in Ireland. The High Court did not believe that the State had an obligation to 
provide such a specialised regime of treatment for the applicant and the few others 
known to have this rare condition. The High Court accepted that the State had “a duty 
to protect the health of persons held in custody as well as is reasonably possible in all 
the circumstances.”77 Nor could the State without justification or necessity expose that 
person’s health to danger. The application of restraints on an individual in his own 
interests was regarded as constitutional.78 The High Court held that the conditions of 
detention did not amount to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and refused an 
order for release. In view of the decision of the Strasbourg Court in Nevmerzhitsky v. 
Ukraine, the Irish courts may well have to make a different decision faced with
7Qsimilar facts in future.
In The State (Richardson) v. The Governor o f Mountjoy Prison, the High Court 
discussed the right not to have one’s health endangered in relation to the deplorable 
sanitary conditions in the prison which the prisoner alleged were a threat to her 
health.80 The Court held that the State had failed in its duty to provide her with 
appropriate facilities for maintaining proper standards of hygiene. Other prisoners 
have sought release, unsuccessfully, through habeas corpus on the grounds, inter alia,
76 Ibid.
11 Ibid, at p i52.
78 Ibid.
79 Application no. 54825/00 5th April 2005.
80 [1980] ILRM82.
177
that they were beaten up in custody, that body searches and close supervision 
amounted to a breach of constitutional rights relating to human dignity, bodily
o 1
integrity and constituted inhuman and degrading treatment.
Mental Treatment Act 1945
A hospital inspection system is provided for in the 1945 Act, whereby at least one 
inspection is carried out annually and a report is compiled for the government with a 
view to being debated before the Houses of the Oireachtas.82 These reports receive 
scant attention from either the government or opposition parties. The reports highlight 
the seriously inadequate physical conditions in facilities, ranging from patients having 
to slop-out to unsafe observation areas and overcrowding, as well as poor attention to 
the health needs of patients. The 2001 report stated,
... psychiatric patients enjoy poorer health and have higher mortality rates 
than the general population. There are several factors contributing to this. The 
onus is on those responsible for the physical health of patients resident, 
particularly long-term, in psychiatric hospitals or community residences, is all 
the more pressing because of this consideration ... It is disquieting to the 
Inspectorate to have to record that physical health examination of in-patients, 
as documented in case note material, is often infrequent, desultory and 
superficial in nature. It is self-evident that some psychiatric patients may not 
complain of subjective distress.84
The 2003 report commented on the contrast in conditions between private and public 
hospital accommodation as being a cause for concern reflecting the social divide in
or
society. All recent reports refer to the lack of activities for patients particularly at 
weekends. The conditions of detention in psychiatric care, along with the isolation 
and lack of appropriate programmes, including, for children, the loss of education, 
could be severe enough to engage Article 3, when it involves a severe negative impact 
on the mental health of the individual.
81 The State (Harrington) v. Garvey High Court unreported 14th December 1976.
82 Mental Treatment Act 1945, sections 247 and 248.
83 Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending
2000, Government Publications, Dublin 2001. See also reports for the years, 2001, 2002, 2003.
84 Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending
2001, Government Publications, Dublin, 2002.
85 Op. cit., 71 p5.
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Seclusion
The practice of seclusion and restraint is not subject to any formal safeguards or 
access to review of the practice other than the entries in the Seclusion Register and 
subsequent inspection by the Inspector of Mental Hospitals. The 1945 Act refers 
only to restraint and provides that restraint must “be necessary for the purposes of 
medical or surgical treatment or to prevent the person of unsound mind injuring
on
himself or other persons.” Seclusion was included in later regulations requiring that 
each case of seclusion and restraint must be recorded and signed by the doctor who
QO
ordered it. Further regulations require that the patient must be visited every 15
OQ
minutes by a nurse. Guidelines on the practice of seclusion and restraint are outlined
in a Department of Health & Children document, Guidelines on Good Practice and
Quality Assurance in Mental Health Services 1998. Some of the guidelines have a
basis in the 1945 Act and in statutory instruments, while others are examples of good
practice. In addition to the statutory requirements of recording and observation, the
Guidelines require: a clear written seclusion policy incorporating procedures to be
followed, that staff are fully informed of the need for a separate nursing seclusion care
plan for the patient and information on events leading up to the seclusion, including
the actual behaviour, the patient’s response and reasons for seclusion. Seclusion is
required to be reviewed by the consultant psychiatrist on a six hourly basis in contrast
with the English Code of Practice requiring four hourly review. Presumably, these
guidelines could be used by the courts in assessing if the correct standard of practice 
00 . .had been followed. There is a summary of these guidelines appended to the annual 
reports of the Inspector of Mental Hospitals.
Mental Health Act 2001
The 2001 Act proposes a rigorous inspection system to ensure that minimum 
standards are met in all mental health centres and adherence to the standards will be a
86 Ibid, Appendix 1 confirms 3,585 incidents of seclusion involving 652 patients. See chapter 3 for 
discussion of seclusion.
87 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 263.
88 Mental Treatment Regulations (SI No. 261 of 1961), Article 24.
89 Ibid, Article 6(1).
90 R (on the application o f Munjaz) v. Mersey Care NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1036.
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condition for registration of the centres.91 The Inspector has a primary role in
reporting on the conditions of hospitals. The poor conditions in many of the
remaining hospitals and the urgent need for upgrading of some of the older
O')
psychiatric units attached to general hospitals are regarded as a priority. The 2001 
Act provides for an individual care plan with the individual being consulted as far as 
possible.94 The 2001 Act provides for seclusion as follows,
Section 69.-
(1) A person shall not place a patient in seclusion or apply mechanical 
means of bodily restraint to the patient unless such seclusion or 
restraint is determined, in accordance with the rules made under 
subsection (2), to be necessary for the purposes of treatment or to 
prevent the patient from injuring himself or herself or others and unless 
the seclusion or restraint complies with such rules.
(2) The Commission shall make rules providing for the use of
seclusion and mechanical means of bodily restraint on a patient.
(4) In this section “patient” includes-
(a) a child in respect of whom an order under section 25 is in force, 
and
(b) a voluntary patient.
The Mental Health Commission are obliged to draft rules for seclusion and restraint 
that will add some detail to the provisions of the section.95 It is likely that such rules 
will be included in a code of practice being drawn up under the Act. The decision of 
the English Court in Munjaz is significant persuasive authority on the application of 
the English Code to seclusion.96 The question of necessity applies to the use of 
seclusion, but this may not be adequate, as such necessity would have to be 
convincingly shown to exist. The Strasbourg Court’s statements on positive 
obligations regarding children and vulnerable adults necessitates safeguards in the 
application of seclusion, particularly where children are being secluded while 
detained in unsuitable conditions, like an adult ward, which may exacerbate the illness 
and increase the need for seclusion as a result.97 The lack of formal safeguards, of 
independent monitoring and review of seclusion, or an independent second opinion
91 Mental Health Act 2001, section 64.
92 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 237 as amended by Mental Treatment Act 1961, s 33.
93Op. cit., 71. See also reports for years ending, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999.
94 Mental Health Act 2001, section 66(2)(g).
95 Mental Health Act 2001, section 69(2).
96 R (on the application o f Munjaz) v. Mersey Care NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1036.
97 Z v. United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 3, A v United Kingdom 27 EHRR 611.
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before it commences, are also causes of concern having regard to the English decision 
in Munjaz?* The Court’s statements on positive obligations regarding children and 
vulnerable adults require the provision of safeguards in the application of seclusion.
Because the basis of psychiatric admission is therapeutic, it is important that the 
conditions of detention meet a standard that does not impact negatively on the health 
of the patient. The indications from the CPT visits and from the Inspector’s reports 
are that there are areas of concern regarding conditions. Rectification of such 
problems involves providing an appropriate environment in relation to physical 
conditions and a therapeutic milieu. Minimally adequate conditions relating to the 
treatment of mentally ill prisoners need to be addressed based on the decision in 
Aerts. This has become a critical issue following research indicating that the rate of 
severe mental illness among remand prisoners is 38 times higher than the general 
community, compared with sentenced prisoners whose rate is 13 times higher." The 
findings indicate that mentally-ill people are being placed in prison for often minor 
offences. The leading researcher stated that “prison is a toxic place for people with 
serious mental illnesses.”
Medical treatment
The Convention case law provides that medical treatment could, in theory, be 
inhuman and degrading, but not if it is therapeutically necessary.100 The vulnerability 
of mentally disordered people requires that the Court is satisfied that treatment is 
convincingly shown to be necessary. A wide range of interventions and extreme 
forms of treatment can be imposed in some cases and demonstrated to be 
therapeutically necessary. The Court has shown a great deal of deference to hospital 
authorities in consideration as to whether medical treatment and the side-effects can 
be regarded as inhuman and degrading and has never found a breach of Article 3 on 
these grounds. In Herczgefalvy v. Austria, medical justification was permitted to 
trump an objective consideration of the conditions of confinement.101 The applicant
98 R (Wooder) v. Feggetter [2003] QB 219.
99 Kennedy H., “Mental Illness in Irish Prisoners” report in Irish Times 6th December 2005. The 
research has not been formally published yet.
100 Herczegfalvy v. Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437.
101 Ibid.
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complained that the medical treatment he was receiving amounted to degrading 
treatment. He was suffering from paranoia and deemed not responsible for his acts. 
He was restrained because of the danger posed by him if left free. Following a 
diagnosis of mental illness, he was forcibly administered food and neuroleptics, 
isolated and attached with handcuffs to his security bed for several weeks. The 
Commission held that there had been a violation of Article 3 on the basis that the 
treatment went beyond what was necessary to serve its purpose, including a week 
when he was unconscious and handcuffed to his bed. The Court confirmed that 
psychiatric patients remain under the protection of Article 3, and recognised the 
vulnerability of patients who may not be able to protect themselves in such 
circumstances and stated,
... the position of inferiority and powerlessness which is typical of patients 
confined in psychiatric hospitals calls for increased vigilance in reviewing 
whether the Convention has been complied with ...102
While the Court considered that prolonged periods in the psychiatric wing would 
carry with them the risk of deterioration in a person’s mental health and despite the 
extreme conditions, the evidence was not sufficient for a finding of breach of Article 
3. The Court held that, according to the psychiatric principles accepted at the time, 
medical necessity justified the treatment in issue,
While it is for the medical authorities to decide, on the basis of the recognised 
rules of medical science, on the therapeutic methods to be used, if necessary 
by force, to preserve the physical and mental health of patients who are 
entirely incapable of deciding for themselves and for whom they are therefore 
responsible, such patients nevertheless remain under the protection of Article 
3, whose requirements permit of no derogation ... The established principles 
of medicine are admittedly in principle decisive in such cases; as a general 
rule, a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as 
inhuman or degrading. The Court must nevertheless satisfy itself that medicali mnecessity has been convincingly shown to exist.
Even with patients who are not capable of consenting, Article 3 requires that the 
treatment of the patient is necessary. There was no convincing evidence for the Court 
that his mental health had suffered and it was not established that he had suffered
Ibid, para 82.
103 (1993) 15 EHRR 437 para 82. Bolitho v. Hackney AHA [1997] 4 All ER 471 and the requirement 
that the professional opinion has a logical basis that can stand scrutiny.
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treatment classified as inhuman or degrading. The Court held that the imposition of 
food and drugs when he was on hunger strike did not breach Article 3 because such 
force could be justified “to preserve the physical and mental health of patients who 
are entirely incapable of deciding for themselves and for whom ...[the medical 
authorities] are therefore entirely responsible.”104 His incapacity to make decisions for 
himself was the deciding factor in accepting the necessity for imposition of the 
treatment.
The imposition of medical treatment on competent patients under the English Mental 
Health Act 1983 was raised under Article 3. This arose in R (on the application o f  
Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor Hospital, an English case, in which the claimant’s doctor 
and statutory second opinion determined to treat him with anti-psychotic medication 
despite his refusal. The patient sought judicial review of the decision and got an 
independent opinion disagreeing as to the nature of the mental disorder, his capacity 
to consent to the treatment and the benefits of the treatment.105 He also wanted to 
cross-examine medical witnesses, which is rare in judicial review proceedings. Where 
alleged breaches of human rights are fundamental under Articles 2 and 3 or raise 
questions of necessity and proportionality, the Court’s need to investigate and resolve 
medical issues is more acute.106 A decision had to be made as to whether the plaintiff 
was capable of consenting or refusing treatment or whether the forcible administration 
of such treatment would, inter alia, be degrading and so impermissible under Article
i07 ,,.i3. The Court, referring to the statement in Herczegfalvy concerning medical 
necessity and convincing evidence, stated,
Where there is an allegation of breach of the claimant’s Article 3 rights, it is 
important to bear in mind that the court cannot permit the forcible 
administering of medical treatment unless it is shown convincingly to be 
medically necessary. If the patient obtains independent medical evidence to 
the effect that the treatment is otherwise unsuitable, it may be clear to a court, 
even without oral evidence, that the case in favour of treatment has not been 
convincingly shown.108
104 Ibid, para 82.
105 [2001] EWCA Civ 1545.
106 Ibid, para 25.
107 Ibid, para 26.
108 Ibid, para 36.
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Where medical necessity cannot be convincingly shown to exist, a right to refuse 
treatment is imposed on the relevant section under the 1983 Act. In R (N) v. M, an 
English case, the Court did not hold that the standard of proof, “convincingly shown 
to be necessary” was the criminal standard, but said that it is high.109 One 
commentator states that the word “convincingly”’ does not allow for any doubt as to 
whether it has been shown that an argument is well founded.110
The issue of capacity arose in Wilkinson in reference to the increasing importance of 
the distinction between those who do not have capacity and those who do, but that the 
therapeutic necessity test applied to those without capacity also.111 One of the CPT 
reports was used in support of a modem approach to the issue. It stated,
Patients should, as a matter of principle, be placed in a position to give their 
free and informed consent to treatment. The admission of a person to a 
psychiatric establishment on an involuntary basis should not be construed as 
authorising treatment without his consent. It follows that every competent 
patient, whether voluntary or involuntary, should be given the opportunity to 
refuse treatment or any other medical intervention. Any derogation from this 
fundamental principle should be based upon law and only relate to strictly 
defined exceptional circumstances . . .112
Efforts to create a distinction between the rights of those with capacity and those 
without could engage Article 14. Hale LJ, in Wilkinson, pointed out that most people 
are able to appreciate that they are being forced to do something against their will
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even if they are not able to make the decision that it should or should not be done.
In determining what is in an incapacitated person’s best interests, their wishes and 
feelings are an important element and, where they are opposed to the plan, the 
benefits will have to be weighed against the disadvantages, particularly if force is 
required.114 Similar statements were made by the Court in Keenan v. United Kingdom, 
“there may be a breach of Article 3 even where the applicant is not able to understand
1UV [2002] EWCA Civ 1789.
110 Op. cit., 47 p363.
111/? (on the application o f Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor Hospital [2001] EWCA CIV 1545 para 31.
112 Council of Europe, Report o f the European Committee for the Prevention o f Torture and Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 2000 para 41. Also in the CPT Report on Ireland 2002 para 88 
on their visit to residential care centres for people with intellectual disability where no admission 
procedures are provided.
113 [2001] EWCA CIV 1545 para 79. Also Hale B., “Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision- 
Making: The English Perspective,” 20(1) International Journal o f Law and Psychiatry 59.
114 Ibid, para 64.
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any ill-effects of his or her treatment.”115 Hale LJ allowed that detained patients with 
capacity can, in certain circumstances, be treated against their will.116 Bartlett 
cautiously concludes that “treatment of doubtful benefit, which is strongly opposed by 
the patient, and which will, if administered, entail the use of force with possible 
detrimental effects to the overall health of the patient, be in breach of Article 3 of the 
Convention.”117
The obvious question that arises for resolution is what happens to those patients who 
are incapacitated and refusing treatment when a declaration from the court or some 
other authorisation is not sought? In these circumstances, how can the treatment be 
convincingly shown to be medically necessary? This is a deficit in legislation in 
relation to incapacitated people that must be addressed in order to avoid breaching the 
requirements of Article 3.
The standard of proof required in Article 3 is that the court should be satisfied that
1 1 o
medical necessity has been “convincingly” shown to exist. The Court outlined the 
factors relevant to such a decision to impose medical treatment as follows: the 
certainty of a treatable mental disorder, its seriousness, the risk to others, whether the 
treatment will alleviate the illness and how much alleviation, and the unfavourable 
and severe side effects of the treatment.119 If the treatment in question is not in 
accordance with Bolam, it cannot satisfy the test of medical necessity laid down in
Herczgefalvy. In addition to Bolam, the treatment has to be “convincingly” shown to
100be necessary to satisfy this test. There are particular considerations that doctors 
must take into account in discharging their duty of care for those who lack capacity to 
consent. Best interests are no longer limited to medical best interests, but are wider 
and embrace a range of factors, including the emotional and welfare interests. The 
doctor proposes a number of appropriate options for treatment in the patient’s best 
interests in accordance with a responsible body of medical opinion. The judge then 
makes the decision as to which of the proposed treatments is in the patient’s best
115 [1998] 26 EHRR CD 64 para 112.
116 [2001] EWCA CIV 1545 para 81.
117 Op. cit., 47 p365.
118Herczgefalvy v. Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437 para 82.
119 R v . N & M  [2002] EWCA para 19.
120 Ibid, para 29.
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interests weighing up the advantages and disadvantages.121 The court's jurisdiction is 
to declare the best interests of the patient on the application of a welfare test 
analogous to that applied in wardship.
Irish law and medical treatment
Mental Treatment Act 1945
The 1945 Act does not provide any guidance on consent to treatment and does not 
differentiate between patients who do not have capacity to consent and those who do. 
There is no consideration in the 2001 Act of the issue of capacity either in relation to 
admission or in relation to consent to treatment. There is no legal framework for 
treating compliant incapacitated individuals, many of whom are voluntary and have 
no idea what their legal rights involve and there is no requirement to have an advocate 
or representative for them. There are no safeguards, other than the common law duty 
of care applying to patients who are treated while detained. The medical necessity 
test, outlined in Herczegfalvy, requires that a much higher standard than that provided
199under the 1945 Act is required to avoid a possible breach of Article 3. This test 
should apply to all patients refusing treatment with or without capacity, according to
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the decision in Wilkinson. The Guidelines on Good Practice and Quality Assurance 
in Mental Health Services specifically exclude consideration of the medical treatment 
of patients as “this matter must remain the exclusive domain of individual 
clinicians.”124 This deference is difficult to comprehend along with the omission of 
any reference to polypharmacy and international best practice standards that would 
underline the importance of these issues for the individual patient. The 1945 Act does 
not provide any basis for showing the treatment is medically necessary. These issues 
are highlighted by the recent decision in Manweiler v. Burke and Eastern Region 
Health Authority, which held that the psychiatrist was negligent, inter alia, in failing
Ul Re S (Sterilisation) [2000] 2 FLR 389.
122 (1993) 15 EHRR 437 para 82.
123 [2001] EWCA CIV 1545 para 31.
124 Department of Health & Children, Guidelines on Good Practice and Quality Assurance in Mental 
Health Services, Government Publications, Dublin, 1998 p3.
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to diagnose the patient and then keeping the patient on anti-psychotic medication 
which was unnecessary.125
Mental Health Act 2001
Invasive medical treatment, which impacts seriously on the person’s bodily integrity 
and which is given without consent, unless convincingly shown to be necessary, is 
prohibited by Article 3.126 The 2001 Act would not appear to meet this standard in its
1 jn
consent to treatment provisions. Of particular concern with regard to Article 3 is the 
lack of independence of the second opinion doctor in consent to treatment, leaving 
open the question of satisfying the “convincing necessity” test. The notion of treating 
patients with capacity differently from those without capacity raises issues under 
Article 14 of the Convention and also under Article 40.1 of the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court, in In re a Ward(Withdrawal o f Medical Treatment), was unequivocal 
in its statements regarding the constitutional rights of an incapacitated person
1 98allowing of no differentiation, saying it would be discrimination. The Supreme 
Court statements add further to the responsibility of the State in providing safeguards
1 9 0
for the imposition of treatment and a proper framework for decision-making. This 
raises again the Herczegfalvy test and the comments by Hale U  in Wilkinson that 
most people are aware of being forced to do something against their will, even if they 
are unable to make that decision.130 There are no capacity assessments of compliant 
incapacitated voluntary patients, which means that treatment will be given to them 
without consent, thereby raising Article 3 rights in terms of degrading treatment and 
the right to dignity of the person.
Failure to treat
Medical treatment or the lack of it can breach Article 3 if it constitutes a “lack of 
proper care” and where it is delayed without good reason. It is difficult to reach the
125 Unreported High Court, May 6th 2005, Unreported Supreme Court, September 2005.
126 The provisions outlined in the 2001 Act regarding treatment are dealt with in chapter 3 in the 
context of self determination.
127 See chapter 3 for full discussion of consent to treatment provisions.
128 [1995] 2 ILRM 401.
129 [1996] 2 IR 79.
130 [2001] EWCA CIV 1545 para 79.
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severity standard required in Article 3. Article 3 not only protects against deliberate 
interventions that are inhuman and degrading, it also protects against the withdrawal 
of medical treatment where the consequences are suffering in an inhuman and 
degrading way. In D v. United Kingdom, the Court held that the withdrawal of 
treatment that would inevitably follow the deportation of the applicant, an AIDS 
sufferer, would involve a breach of Article 3 as it “would expose him to a real risk of 
dying under the most distressing circumstances and would thus amount to inhuman 
treatment.”131 The failure of the authorities to provide effective medical care may 
breach Article 3 where the patient is severely affected. A prisoner was prevented from 
having necessary treatment in Hurtado v. Switzerland and state obligations were 
questioned.132 The Court, relying on earlier decisions, reaffirmed that treatment must 
be provided in the place of detention, or in another place to which the person must be 
released temporarily. Where a failure to follow either course of action results in injury 
to the person, this may be inhuman treatment under Article 3. In Nevmerzhitsky v. 
Ukraine, the failure to provide adequate care and treatment that resulted in damage to
I
the individual’s health constituted a violation of Article 3.
The applicant in Bensaid v. United Kingdom, complained that his proposed 
deportation placed him at risk of inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 
3.134 The Court said that, in considering the expulsion of aliens, contracting states 
must have regard to Article 3, which enshrines one of the fundamental values of 
democratic societies.135 The Court considered that the suffering associated with a 
relapse of his schizophrenia could, in principle, fall within the scope of Article 3. The 
applicant faced a risk of relapse even if he stayed in the United Kingdom as his illness 
was long term and required constant management. Removal would arguably increase 
the risk, as would the differences in available personal support and accessibility of 
treatment. Even though the applicant's circumstances in Algeria would be less 
favourable than those enjoyed by him in the United Kingdom, treatment was 
available. The risk of deterioration following his return was speculative. The Court 
accepted the seriousness of the applicant's medical condition, but these did not
131 (1997) 24 EHRR 423, para 53.
132 (1994) A 280-A Commission Report.
133 Application 54825/00 5th April 2005.
134 Bensaid v. UnitedKingdom(200l) 33 EHRR 205, Application no. 44599/98 6th May 2001.
135 Ibid, para 37.
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disclose the “exceptional circumstances” of the D case, where the applicant was in the
1final stages of a terminal illness with no prospect of care or support on deportation. 
Having regard, however, to the high threshold set by Article 3, particularly where the 
case does not concern the direct responsibility of the contracting state for the 
infliction of harm, the Court did not find that there was a sufficiently real risk that the 
applicant's removal in these circumstances would be contrary to the standards of 
Article 3.137
Irish law and failure to treat
There is no absolute right to treatment under Irish law and the doctrine of the 
separation of powers would militate against the courts directing the provision of 
services, unless these were provided for in legislation as of right. The doctrine of the 
separation of powers is fundamental to all the provisions of the Constitution and 
involves for each of the three constitutional bodies, the judiciary, the executive and 
the legislature, “not only rights but duties also; not only areas of activity and function,
138but boundaries to them as well.” This doctrine has been invoked a number of times
to determine the extent of judicial power sometimes resulting in a negative response
1in identifying those tasks which are not justiciable. The doctrine has also influenced 
the manner in which legislation is interpreted by the courts and in two cases, Sinnott 
v. Minister for Education and TD v Minister for Education the Supreme Court has 
clearly indicated that issues of distributive justice fall within the remit of the 
executive and legislature, not the judiciary.140
There is a general obligation under the Health Act 1970 to provide medical services 
and the Health Services Executives must make available, without charge, a general 
practitioner, medical and surgical service for persons who are entitled to free medical 
care.141 Many people with long term mental disorders have free medical care. Article 
40.3.1 of the Constitution, dealing with the right to bodily integrity, raised the issue of
136 D V. United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423.
137 Ibid, para 40.
138 Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713. See also Hogan & White, JMKelly The Irish Constitution, 
Dublin, 2003, Chapter 3.
1391 v. I  [1992] IR 116.
140 [2001] 2 IR 545 and [2001] 4 IR 259.
141 Health Act 1970, section 58.
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negative rights to health with regard to state involvement in the life of the individual. 
In Ryan v. Attorney General, Kenny J. stated,
I understand the right to bodily integrity to mean that no mutilation of the 
body or any part of its members may be carried out on any citizen under the 
authority of the law except for the good of the whole body and that no process 
which is or may, as a matter of probability, be dangerous or harmful to the life 
or health of the citizen or any of them may be imposed (in the sense of being 
made compulsory) by an Act of the Oireachtas.142
A constitutional law commentator, Forde, stated that “it was not indicated in what 
circumstances the Court would order the State to adopt measures necessary to protect 
health.”143 The difficulty of compelling the State to provide is a recurring one and the 
Irish courts are reluctant to get involved in what would be regarded as a breach of the 
separation of powers. In The State(C) v. Frawley, regarding conditions of detention in 
prison, both the High Court and Supreme Court held that the State was not obliged to 
provide a specialist psychiatric service for a mentally disordered person.144 The 
English courts too have been reluctant to get involved in resource issues that they 
consider properly the domain of the executive.145
The negative obligation regarding bodily integrity could be applied to people with 
mental disorders who are unable to access adequate psychiatric care and suffer 
continuing relapse or reach the severity of impact to commit suicide. The annual 
reports of the Inspector of Mental Hospitals refer to the number of deaths of inpatients 
who commit suicide in psychiatric care. In 2002, there were 13 suicides or suspected 
suicides, nine in the hospital and four by patients who were on leave, one of whom 
was on unauthorized leave.146 In 2003, there were 15 suicides or suspected suicides 
and seven of these were on leave, including four without permission.147 The Inspector 
stated that formal audit procedures should be carried out in each case of suicide or 
suspected suicide among in-patients. Any out-patients who are known to the hospital
142 [1965] IR 294.
143 Forde M., Constitutional Law o f Ireland, Firstlaw, Dublin, 2004.
144 [1976] IR 365.
145 R v. Central Birmingham HA. ex parte Walker (1987) 3 BMLR 32, R v. Cambridge DHA, ex parte B 
[1995] 1 WLR 898. One patient with cancer went to the High Court to try and access treatment but no 
judgment was pronounced-though she got her treatment immediately. J.Byme - Irish Times 28th June 
2001 .
l46Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending 
2002, Government Publications, Dublin, 2003, pl4-15.
147 Op. cit., 71 pl3.
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to have committed suicide should be reported to the Inspector. It would not be 
difficult to see if a failure to treat these patients played any part in their subsequent 
suicides and whether it is possible to assess the contribution of inappropriate 
treatment.
The title of the 1945 Act states its purpose is “to provide for the prevention and 
treatment of mental disorders and the care of persons suffering therefrom ...” The 
duty of care in relation to the prevention of a known risk of suicide arose where a 
proper pre-discharge assessment was not carried out. The family of the patient in 
Healy v. North Western Health Board were successful in establishing negligence 
against the hospital and health board where the patient was discharged while still 
depressed and subsequently committed suicide.148 This case is similar to D v. United 
Kingdom, as Healy''s vital life-saving treatment was withdrawn from him on 
discharge, resulting in unnecessary suffering and avoidable death, which arguably 
could be a breach of Article 3.149 This application could also apply to other suicides 
that could be linked with foreseeable service failures.
The Guidelines on Good Practice and Quality Assurance in Mental Health Services 
state that “treatment plans should be discussed with patients, the nature of any 
treatment fully outlined and the treatment plan, including any medication, recorded in 
the case notes.” The reports of the Inspector of Mental Hospitals frequently refer to 
the failure to provide treatment plans for in-patients. Where patients are discharged to 
community services, the question arising in relation to frequent readmission is 
whether the failure to access out-patient facilities for treatment could be serious 
enough to engage Article 3. There is a 70% readmission rate to Irish psychiatric in­
patient services and this figure represents a serious impact on the lives of the 
individuals subject to readmission.150 It is arguable that, even if this lack of 
community care is not regarded as sufficiently severe to engage Article 3, it would 
very likely be a breach of Article 8 and the right to respect for private and family life.
148 Unreported High Court January 31st 1996.
149 (1997) 24 EHRR 423.
150 Health Research Board Report, Activities o f Irish Psychiatric Services 2003, Dublin, 2004.
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The 2001 Act requires that a treatment plan is in place for all who are in mental health 
centres.151 These plans help to identify progress and define responsibilities for care so 
when the treatment is not adequate the plans act as a reference point. The denial of 
treatment to a severely ill patient could be serious enough to engage Article 3, based 
on the D case. The high readmission rate and the suicide rate in Ireland are factors
1S9that need further examination in relation to a failure to treat.
Treatment side effects
Medical treatment with side-effects could involve a breach of Article 3 if the side- 
effects are sufficiently serious. The admissibility decision of the Commission in 
Grare v. France, concerning the imposition of medication with unpleasant side- 
effects, arose as an alleged breach of Article 3. The side-effects of the neuroleptic 
drugs produced tremors, trouble with vision, hypertension, shorter attention span and 
weight gain. It was accepted that the treatment could produce side-effects, but the 
Commission held that there was no evidence to indicate that the treatment had 
reached the level of gravity to engage Article 3.153 If the medication is therapeutically 
justified, the possibility of establishing a breach of Article 3 is more remote unless, as 
Jones suggests, it could be demonstrated that there was an equally effective 
alternative that produced less serious side-effects.154 This is echoed in the Council of 
Europe Recommendation (2004) 10 which provides that treatment which is 
particularly intrusive should be used only where no less intrusive means of providing 
appropriate care is available.155 It suggests that such treatment should be subject to 
appropriate ethical scrutiny, accord with international standards and safeguards and, 
where a person is unable to consent, be authorised by a court or competent body and 
documented in a register. The explanatory memorandum suggests that ECT is an 
example of such treatment.156
151 Mental Health Act 2001, section 66(2)(g).
152 Department of Health & Children, National Suicide Review Group Annual Report 2004, Dublin 
2004. Report confirmed 444 suicides in 2003.
153 (1992) 15 EHRR CD 100.
154 Jones R., Mental Health Act Manual, (9th ed), Thomson, London, 2004, p778.
155 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2004) 10 on the protection o f the 
human rights and dignity o f person with mental disorder Article 28.
156 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on Recommendation (2004) 10 concerning the protection o f 
the human rights and dignity o f person with mental disorder para 206.
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Irish law and treatment side effects
The issue of medication has been raised on a number of occasions by the reports of 
the Inspector of Mental Hospitals. The reports have “urged caution in relation to drug 
prescribing, the frequent review of the necessity for prescribed medication and of any
i c n ___
side effects deriving from it, and avoidance of poly-pharmacy.” These reports have 
highlighted the wide range and diversity of drug prescribing, with junior doctors 
particularly under pressure to prescribe new products, despite a lack of guidance for 
appropriate and effective prescribing in certain circumstances.158 Referring to the 
sudden deaths, 32 in 2002, including 13 suicides, one death was due to the toxic level 
of psychotropic drugs present, leading the Inspector to comment, “clinicians should 
bear in mind that some psychotropic drugs have the capacity to induce fatal cardiac 
arrythmias and carry out appropriate tests on individuals who they think may be 
medically compromised before prescribing these drugs, having obtained fully 
informed consent before doing so.”159 In 2003, the report referred to 19 sudden 
deaths, including 15 suicides, and stated that, of the sudden deaths, three died from 
causes that may have been drug related, including one from the gastro-intestinal 
effects of the newer atypical anti-psychotic drugs and two from sudden cardiac 
deaths, likely from cardiac arrythmias and possibly related to current medication.160 
Schizophrenia Ireland, a non-governmental organisation, carried out a survey of 
service users’ experience of medication and treatment and found polypharmacy was 
widespread.161 A large number of respondents were not given information on the 
medication and possible side-effects. This raises the question of informed consent for 
those who were treated and representation for those without capacity. Amnesty
1 fiOInternational has referred to this issue as a cause for concern in one of their reports.
The 2001 Act provides for an Inspectorate that will have power to attach conditions to 
the continued approval of a registered centre in order to enforce standards and can
Op. cit., 83.
158 Op. cit., 84.
159 Op. cit., 146 ppl4-15.
160 Op. cit., 71 ppl3-14.
161 Schizophrenia Ireland, A Question o f Choice Service Users Experience o f Medication and 
Treatment (Dublin 2002)
162 Amnesty International, Mental Illness The Neglected Quarter, Dublin, 2003.
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refuse to register the mental health centre as suitable for the admission of patients.163 
One of the principal functions of the Inspector is to write a report on “the quality of 
care and treatment given to persons in receipt of mental health services.”164 The issues 
of medication and side-effects are not specifically referred to, but would be an 
important quality of care issue that service users frequently raise. The evidence for 
concern about these issues is available, even to a limited extent. These inspections are 
not confined to in-patient services and include almost all mental health services, so 
they have a broad remit that includes out-patient treatment clinics.165
Conclusion
The conditions in psychiatric hospitals have been more closely examined in recent 
years, particularly with the visits from the CPT, which have highlighted many serious 
inadequacies in services for mentally disordered persons in high security hospitals and 
in residential care services for people with intellectual disabilities. The statutory 
reports of the Inspector of Mental Hospitals have continuously highlighted poor 
physical conditions in psychiatric hospitals, some of which would be regarded as 
degrading, particularly the requirement to slop-out in the CMH. The Irish courts have 
resisted placing an obligation on the executive to provide specialist services for 
mentally disordered prisoners.166
The standard in relation to the imposition of treatment on patients does not seem to 
meet the requirements of the Herczegfalvy necessity test. The decision in 
Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine will need to be considered in relation to inadeqeuate 
treatment, as will the need to establish medical necessity in order to avoid violation of
IA 7Article 3. The evidence for the imposition of treatment, particularly when the 
second opinion doctor is not required to be independent or approved by the Mental 
Health Commission, is of concern. In contrast, the second opinion for the tribunal 
hearing is independent and provided by the Commission. The Guidelines, provided in
163 Mental Health Act 2001, section 64.
164 Ibid, section 51(1 )(b)(ii).
165 Mental health services are defined in the Act as those carried on under the direction of a consultant 
psychiatrist and this may mean that those few independently provided services may not be subject to 
inspection.
166 The State C v. Frawley [1976] IR 365.
167 Application 54825/00 5th April 2005.
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lieu of a code of practice, specifically exclude any direction on medical treatment, 
believing that to be the remit solely of the medical profession. This gives full 
discretion to the profession, while failing to alert doctors to international best practice 
and the dangers of polypharmacy, leaving a significant gap in standard setting. 
Service users regard polypharmacy as a significant issue, which along with inadequate 
information about the interaction of different medicines, needs to be addressed, 
particularly from the informed consent perspective. This issue needs to be addressed 
by the new Inspectorate as a specific issue, as its impact goes beyond conditions of
treatment and includes the reported higher morbidity rates for people in psychiatric
168care. The safeguards around the use of seclusion would appear to be lax and, while 
minimal procedural requirements exist, the initiation of seclusion does not require a 
second opinion, or the application of the “convincing necessity” standard, even where 
children are concerned.
The failure to provide treatment services and supports for patients in the community, 
arguably leading to a breach of Article 3, might arise where there is frequent 
readmission to hospital and in the context of suicide, where treatment has been 
denied, or the patient has been discharged prematurely. The inhuman and degrading 
treatment associated with having to be hospitalised due to poor service provision 
could, in some cases, be severe enough to engage Article 3. The inadequacy of 
community provision and failure to provide a patient with a discharge plan is 
highlighted in many of the reports of the Inspector of Mental Hospitals. This will be 
redressed somewhat with the statutory requirement to have an individual care plan in 
the 2001 Act.169
168 Barry et al, Inequalities in Ireland-Hard Facts, Trinity College, Dublin, 2001.
169 Mental Health Act 2001, section 66(2)(g).
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Chapter 5
ARTICLE 6 AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING UNDER IRISH 
MENTAL HEALTH LAW
Introduction
This chapter considers the nature of civil rights and obligations under Article 6 and 
substantive issues related to the enforcement of specific civil rights for adults who 
have a mental disability under Irish law. The key feature of this chapter is an 
examination of the restriction on access to court under the 1945 and the 2001 Acts for 
compliance with the requirements of Article 6. The restrictions in the 1945 Act have 
effectively blocked civil action by patients in connection with their detention by 
placing insurmountable obstacles against such action. Apart from the significant 
burden or proof, the patient must seek leave in the High Court and establish the 
existence of either of two grounds, bad faith or want of reasonable care. The 2001 Act 
attempts to restate these obstacles in a less restrictive manner while retaining the 
requirement of High Court approval and the two grounds. The recent decision in 
Blehein v. Minister for Health & Children, Ireland & Attorney General changes this 
legal landscape by holding that the limitation on the High Court to the two grounds is 
unconstitutional.1 It is too early to assess if this decision will result in a less onerous 
burden on patients and be more Convention compliant. Chapter 6 will examine the 
civil rights and obligations under Article 6 to assess compliance under Irish law 
relating to the management of property and affairs of mentally disabled adults and the 
proposals for reform in this area.
Article 6(1) provides:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
This Article provides for a right to a fair hearing in civil and criminal proceedings in 
the laws of contracting states. The right has “a position of pre-eminence in the
1 [2004] IEHC 374.
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Convention”.2 This is due in part to the importance of the right and also to the large 
number of applications under the Article and the consequent jurisprudence. The 
importance of access to a court and of fair trial in a democratic society is recognised 
in many statements of the Strasbourg Court.4 In common with Article 5(2) (prompt 
provision of reasons for detention and rights of challenge) and 5(4) (speedy review of 
detention), Article 6(1) seeks to guarantee prompt access to a court and a hearing 
within a reasonable time. There are no strict rules determining what is a reasonable 
time. This depends on the facts and complexity of the case. Other obligations relate to 
the fairness of the proceedings and the independence and impartiality of the court or 
tribunal.
Article 6 does not apply to all rights and obligations available under domestic law, 
only to those categorised as civil.5 There is a large body of case law on what is or is 
not a civil right,
According to the well established case law of the Court, the concept of ‘civil 
rights and obligations’ is not to be interpreted solely by reference to the 
respondent State’s domestic law and Article 6(1) applies irrespective of the 
status of the parties, and of the character of the legislation which governs how 
the dispute is to be determined and the character of the authority which is 
invested with jurisdiction in the matter, it is enough that the outcome of the 
proceedings should be decisive for private rights and obligations.6
Article 6 cases involve civil and criminal litigation, as well as proceedings before 
disciplinary and administrative tribunals and administrative decisions on an 
individual’s rights and obligations. It is not always clear into which category some of 
these rights and obligations would fall and problems have arisen in categorising the 
relations between the state and the individual. This latter category has direct 
application to people with mental disabilities arising from a number of factors, 
including: detention in psychiatric care, decisions concerning the removal of personal
2 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law o f the European Convention on Human Rights, Butterworths, 
Oxford, 1995, pl64.
3 In 2000, there were 10,486 new applications registered by the Strasbourg Court and of these 7,264 
included complaints under Article 6.
4 Similar recognition is given to this right in relation to criminal proceedings under the Irish 
Constitution. Article 38.1 ‘No person shall be tried on any criminal offence save in due course of law’ 
embraces both procedural and substantive rights.
5 Clements et al, European Human Rights: Taking a Case under the Convention, (2nded.), Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1999.
6 Pudas v. Sweden (1998) 10 EHRR 380 at para 35.
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rights, wider aspects of the individual’s life in the community related to rights of 
autonomy, self-determination and participation in decisions, mainly concerning the 
right to manage one’s property.
Civil rights and obligations
The rights and obligations that are guaranteed speedy judicial enforcement under 
Article 6 must be “civil.” Initially, the boundary between civil and other rights and 
obligations was broadly synonymous with the distinction between private and public 
law. Rights and obligations arising in the private law relations between individuals 
and which could give rise to a money claim are clearly civil rights and obligations 
within Article 6. Rights and obligations in public law would not usually fall within 
Article 6. However, this has changed with the developing case law and the public law, 
private law distinction no longer provides a clear boundary, if it ever did. Public law
n
rights that could give rise to a money claim are now being included. In Aerts v. 
Belgium the Court held that the right to liberty is a civil right and, therefore, Article 
6(1) applies to reviews under tribunals.8 The actual lawfulness of the detention can be 
dealt with under Article 5(4) and does not need to be dealt with under Article 6. 
Wardship and guardianship proceedings are also subject to Article 6(1) because they 
determine civil rights.
In determining whether a right is civil, the Strasbourg Court looks at the “character” 
of the right or obligation and, in this way, some ostensibly public law rights have been 
regarded as civil rights for the purpose of Article 6.9 In Z v. United Kingdom, the 
Court said that Article 6(1),
does not itself guarantee any particular content for civil rights and obligations 
in the substantive law of the Contracting States. It will however apply to 
disputes of a ‘genuine and serious’ nature concerning the actual existence of 
the right as well as to the scope or manner in which it is exercised.10
7 Aerts v. Belgium (2000) 29 EHRR 50.
8 Ibid.
9 Konig v. FRG A 27 para 90 (1978).
10 (2002) 34 EHRR 3 para 87.
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In relation to property, where state action is “directly decisive” for property rights, it 
will be determinative of civil rights and subject to Article 6 and the right to a fair
hearing.11 Article 6 clearly applies where a person with a mental disorder is being
12divested of his power to administer his property and affairs. Administrative 
decisions must be subject to challenge before a tribunal or court to ensure compliance 
with Article 6. Article 6 will also be engaged where state action is directly decisive 
for the right of a person, who has been in psychiatric care, to maintain contact with 
their children.13 The right to compensation for illegal state acts resulting in pecuniary 
loss is regarded as a civil right. Even where the right or obligation is in the public law 
domain, the impact of the loss may be decisive for private rights and obligations.14
The Court of Appeal in England considered if second opinions in treatment could be 
categorised as “civil rights and obligations” in R (on the application o f Wilkinson) v. 
Broadmoor Hospital } s The second opinion system is not subject to a hearing by any 
impartial tribunal. Simon Brown LJ, held that if the second opinion procedure were 
the only form of review of an RMO open to the patient, it would breach Article 6(1). 
He said it was open to a patient to bring an action in tort for assault in relation to past 
treatment. In addition, it was held in Wilkinson that a patient can seek a full merits 
review of the legality of past and future treatment, thereby satisfying Article 6(1).16 
Brown LJ said that “Article 6 does not entitle a mental patient in every case to 
challenge a treatment plan before being subjected to it.”17 As a result of this and other 
cases in English law, there is a more rigorous approach to the second opinion 
procedure, “fairness requires that a decision by a SOAD which sanctions the violation 
of the autonomy of a competent adult patient should be accompanied by reasons.”18 It 
is not clear though that Article 6 applies to this second opinion procedure.
11 Le Compte v. Belgium (1982) 4 EHRR 1.
12 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387. The Irish State has the right to take over the 
property of the person through the courts in wardship proceedings.
13 Keegan v. Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342.
14 Xv. France A  234-C (1992).
15 [2001] EWCA Civ 1545. Bartlett & Sandland, Mental Health Law Policy and Practice, Oxford, 
2003, p369.
16 R v. Wilkinson v. Broadmoor Hospital [2001] EWCA Civ 1545 para 34.
17 Ibid, para 35.
18 Ibid, para 25.
199
The right to have a matter determined before a tribunal may be subject to restrictions 
as long as the restriction does not impair the very essence of the right, has a legitimate 
aim and there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means used 
and the aim sought to be achieved. These questions can be raised in relation to the 
limitation on access to court for psychiatric patients where such leave is rarely granted 
in Irish decisions.19
Article 6 will only apply where there is a dispute over civil rights and obligations said 
to exist under domestic law and where civil rights and obligations are being
90determined in the proceedings. In H  v. Belgium, the requirement regarding a dispute 
was outlined by the Court,
Article 6(1) extends only to ‘contestations’ (disputes) over (civil) ‘rights and 
obligations’ which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised 
under domestic law; it does not in itself guarantee any particular content for
9 1(civil) ‘rights and obligation’ in the substantive law of the contracting states.
The dispute must be justiciable and capable of judicial resolution. Article 6 is a 
procedural guarantee of a right to a fair hearing in determining the civil rights and 
obligations the state provides,
Whether a person has an actionable domestic claim may depend not only on 
the substantive content ... of the relevant civil right as defined under national 
law but also on the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting 
possibilities of bringing potential claims to court.22
Where the purpose of the proceedings is not primarily about the civil rights and 
obligations but has a decisive impact on them, the Court held, in Ringeisen v. Austria, 
that even this will fall within the ambit of Article 6.23
19 Ashingdane v. United Kingdom 1 EHRR 528. Mental Treatment Act 1945, Section 260. Mental 
Health Act 2001, section 73.
20 Le Compte v. Belgium Series (1982) 4 EHRR 1..
21 A 127-B para 40.
22 Fayed v. United Kingdom 18 EHRR 393.
23 (1979) 1 EHRR 455.
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Right of access to court
Part of the right to a fair hearing in Article 6(1) is the right of access to a court. The 
right of access requires that it is “practical and effective” and not “theoretical or 
illusory.”24 This right is particularly important in the case of vulnerable adults with 
mental disabilities where there is an even greater onus to ensure their rights are
9 ^protected. This right to a court is not absolute and can be limited in the interests of 
society. However, there are specific restrictions in relation to mentally disordered 
people that do not apply to others. The restrictions are to be found in legislation in the 
United Kingdom and have a long history stretching back to section 330 of the English 
Lunacy Act 1890, passed in order to protect those operating the lunacy legislation 
from vexatious or unfounded claims. There is no evidence base for the assertion in 
Pountney v. Griffiths that mentally disordered people are “inherently likely” to take 
unfounded legal action against those caring for them, although some illnesses with a 
paranoid component may create a litigious disposition in the sufferer.
The right of access to court, the conduct of the proceedings and the right to institute 
them were discussed in Golder v. United Kingdom?* This right of access is regarded 
“as a key feature of the concept of the rule of law.”29 The applicant in Golder was a 
prisoner. He challenged the refusal of the Home Secretary to allow him to consult a 
solicitor and this was held to be a violation of the right of access to a court. The Court 
stated that Article 6(1) contained an inherent right of access to a court,
In civil matters one can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there 
being the possibility of access to the courts ... The principle whereby a civil 
claim must be capable of being submitted to a judge ranks as one of the 
universally recognised fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the 
principle of international law which forbids the denial of justice. Article 6(1) 
must be read in the light of these principles.30
24 Airey v. Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305.
25 Herczgefalvy v. Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437. Keenan v. United Kingdom (1998) 26 EHRR CD 64.
26 Mental Health Act 1983, section 139.
27 Poutney v. Griffiths [1976] AC 314.
28 (1979) 1 EHRR 534.
29 Op. cit., 2 at p. 196.
30 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 524.
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The Court stated that “Article 6(1) secures to everyone the right to have any claim
X 1relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal.” This 
“right to a court,” of which the right of access is an aspect, may be relied on by 
anyone who considers on arguable grounds that an interference with the exercise of 
his rights is unlawful and complains that he has not had the possibility of submitting
X O  _that claim to a tribunal meeting the requirements of Article 6(1). The Court stated,
it must be established that the degree of access afforded under the national 
legislation was sufficient to secure the individual’s right to a court, having 
regard to the rule of law in a democratic society.33
The right of access must be effective in reality, as well as in law. In Keegan v. 
Ireland, the applicant, a non-marital father, complained that there was no procedure 
whereby he could challenge his daughter’s adoption.34 The absence of a right to a 
court to challenge these specific issues was held to violate Article 6(1). Even a partial
i f
or temporary interference with the right may breach Article 6(1).
The right of access to a court is not absolute and it may be restricted according to the 
needs and resources of the community and individuals.36 In this regard, the state is 
allowed some margin of appreciation, as long as the restrictions are such that the
XIessence of the right is not impaired. In Airey v. Ireland, the very essence of the right 
was impaired where a woman was refused legal aid for a High Court application for a
n o
separation order. In order for her right of access to be effective, she needed legal 
representation and legal aid due to her financial circumstances. The Court referred to 
the need for legal aid as part of the right of access to court in specific circumstances 
where the person cannot plead his case effectively or where it is compulsory to have 
such representation.
31 1 EHRR, 524 para 36.
32 Le Compte v. Belgium, (1982) 4 EHRR 1 para 44.
33 Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 528 para 57.
34 (1994) 18 EHRR 342.
35 Op. cit., 2 p i97.
3* Golder v. United Kingdom (1979) 1 EHRR 534..
3' Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 528.
38 (1979) 2 EHRR 305.
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Rules limiting the access of particular groups to the court may breach Article 14 and 
Article 6. In Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, the Court held that there would be a 
breach of Article 14, taken together with Article 6(1), unless an objective and 
reasonable justification put forward for the difference in treatment meted out 
compared with other churches.39 Since no justification could be found, such a 
limitation was held to impair the very substance of the applicant church’s “right to a 
court” and deemed a breach of Article 6(1). This raises the question of whether 
restrictions on access to a court, based on whether the defendant is acting pursuant to 
mental health legislation, can be viewed as an objective and reasonable justification 
for the purposes of Article 14.
Fair and public hearing
Individuals are entitled to a judicial procedure but the precise procedure is not 
specified, though the words “fair and public” are used and intended to include 
procedural safeguards and the right to be heard and represented. This requires judicial, 
rather than administrative, control in these matters. The overriding requirement is that 
the proceedings are fair. The open-ended nature of the provision gives the opportunity 
to add specific rights not listed that are essential to a fair hearing. Greater latitude 
applies to civil hearings compared with criminal ones. For example, the right to be 
present in non-criminal cases is not rigidly applied and, as long as the individual or 
his representative has an opportunity, it may not be absolutely necessary to be present 
at an oral hearing.40
The ingredients of fair proceedings include: the right to representation, procedural 
equality, judicial process, a reasoned decision, appearance in person where possible 
and access to information necessary to take the case. The procedural equality requires 
a fair balance between the parties and applies to civil and criminal cases. In 
Winterwerp v. Netherlands, the Court stated that “special procedural safeguards may 
prove called for in order to protect the interests of persons who, on account of their 
mental disabilities, are not fully capable of acting for themselves.”41 The right is not
39 (143/1996/762/963) 16th December 1997.
40 Xv. Sweden 2 YB 354 at p370.
41 Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 para 60.
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absolute and there may be competing interests, but only those measures restricting the 
rights of the applicant that are strictly necessary are permissible under Article 6(1). A 
reasoned decision is implicit in a fair hearing and this must involve access to all 
information that would assist in the decision, indicating with clarity the grounds for 
the decision in order for the accused to exercise the right of appeal.42 In Winterwerp, 
an emergency detention did not afford the opportunity to be heard and this was held 
not to satisfy the requirement of fair hearing 43
The word “determination” in Article 6(1) refers to the legal adjudication of the 
dispute, not necessarily the forum by which that decision was reached. The Court 
said, in Ringeisen v. Austria, that the nature of the legislation that sets out how the 
matter is to be determined and the forum are not very significant.44 In R (on the 
application o f Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor, an English case, the right to cross examine 
medical witnesses arose where the applicant argued that the refusal to allow him to 
cross examine deprived him of the right to a fair trial which, in turn, denied him the 
protection that a substantive merits hearing would afford to his rights under other 
Articles of the Convention.45 The Court of Appeal held that given the importance of 
the Convention rights allegedly breached, (Articles 2, 3, 6, 8 and 14), it was necessary 
to suspend the application of the normal rule in judicial review that expert witnesses 
are not subject to cross-examination.
Legal Representation
There is no automatic right to legal aid in the determination of civil rights and 
obligations, but in Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, the Court recognised the right of 
access to court and,
to be heard in person or where necessary, through some form of representation 
failing which, he will not have been afforded the fundamental guarantees of 
procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty.46
42 Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19.
43 (1979) 2 EHRR 397.
44 (1971) 1 EHRR 455 para 94.
45 [2001] EWCA Civ 1545. Op. cit., 13 p369.
46 (1979) 2 EHRR 387para 60.
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The right to legal representation in Article 6 in civil cases is found in the right of 
access to court, rather than under the right to a fair hearing. In Airey v. Ireland, the 
Court held that the right to court must not only be accessible, but must also be 
effective and, for the applicant this meant having legal representation in the court. 47 
The Court recognised that the case was complex and she would be unable to act as a 
lay litigant in person. Arising from this case, there appears to be an obligation to 
provide legal assistance where “such assistance proves indispensable for an effective 
access to court.”48 Even where someone is represented in court, the question of 
fairness may arise as a separate issue.49 The vulnerability of people with mental 
disorder requires that a legal representative is made available to ensure the right of 
access to court.
Reasonable time
The Convention wording in Article 5(4) differs from Article 6(1) in that “speedily” is 
used in the former and “within a reasonable time” in the latter. The person must be 
brought before a court or tribunal within a reasonable time. The word “reasonable” 
means that the person should not be caused unnecessary suffering while waiting for 
the proceedings to commence and “to protect all parties against excessive procedural 
delays.”50 Time begins to run from the initiation of court proceedings and, in 
legislation, requirements for maximum time limits for tribunal hearings are often 
specified.51 The Court found that a delay of five and half years in paternity 
proceedings was in breach of Article 6.
The Court has stated that in considering “reasonableness”, it had to consider various 
factors including: the complexity of the factual or legal issues, the conduct of the 
applicants, the conduct of the competent authorities and the issues at sake for the 
applicant. The state is responsible for delays caused by administrative or judicial
47 (1979) 2 EHRR 305 para 26.
48 Ibid. The civil legal aid system was subsequently put on a statutory footing in Ireland in the Civil 
Legal Aid Act, 1995.
49 P, C &Sv.  United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 31.
50 Stogmuller v. Austria (1969) A 9 p 40.
51 Mental Health Act 2001, section 18.
52 Mikulic v. Croatia 11 BHRC 689.
53 Pelissier & Sassi v. France (2000) 30 EHRR 715 para 67.
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authorities.54 Delay in the completion of wardship proceedings has been raised as an 
issue by a number of researchers and writers.55 In one retrospective study carried out 
in the area of Old Age Psychiatry, involving 31 wardship cases over a six-year period 
between 1989-1995, the authors found that the procedure was time-consuming and 
took months, rather than weeks, to complete.56 They regarded this aspect as a serious 
deficiency where a rapid response was required having regard to the paramountcy of 
the care of the individual.
Independent and impartial tribunal
The important feature of a tribunal is that it must be have the power to take legally 
binding decisions. Simply giving advice or making a recommendation is not 
enough.57 The word “independent” is held to mean independent of the executive and
f  o
also of the parties to the case. The tribunal must be established by law to ensure 
independence of the executive and particular rules are set out in legislation to limit 
executive discretion. Appeal proceedings too are governed by the requirements of 
Article 6. In order to arrive at a determination of independence, the Court must look at 
“the manner of appointment of its members and the duration of their term of office, 
the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the 
independent body presents an appearance of independence.”59 The appointment of 
members by the executive is normal and the length of time, even short term for some 
tribunals, is acceptable.
Impartiality is related to and dependent on independence. It means a lack of 
“prejudice or bias” and involves satisfying both a subjective and objective test. In R 
(PD) v. West Midlands & NW London MHRT’ an English case, the difficulties in 
finding suitably qualified members for a tribunal was a relevant factor in considering
54 R (On Application o f KB, MK, JR, GM & others) v. MHRT & SOS for Health (2003) EWHC Admin. 
193.
55 Me Loughlin, “Wardship : a Legal and Medical Perspective”, (1998) 4(4) M LJI61. McCarthy & 
Wrigley, “Ward of Court -  A Review of Utilisation in a Psychiatry of Old Age Service”, 4(2) MLJI 24.
56 Me Carthy & Wrigley, “Ward of Court-A Review of Utilisation in a Psychiatry of Old Age Service” 
4(2) MLJI, 60.
57 Xv. United Kingdom (1981)4 EHRR 188.
58 Ringeisen v. Austria (1979) 1 EHRR 455.
59 Campbell & Fell v. United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 165 para 78.
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the disqualification of someone on account of bias, where in an exceptional case it 
might otherwise be impossible to constitute a tribunal.60
Article 6 and mental health detention
Two issues are raised here: the automatic presumption of incapacity based only on the 
fact that the person has been detained and the restrictions on the right under mental 
health legislation to litigate. The Court, in Winterwerp v. Netherlands, stated that 
Article 6 applies in cases where mentally disordered people are divested of the 
capacity to administer their property.61 This issue arose under Dutch law and the 
applicant alleged that there had been a “determination of his civil rights and 
obligations” without the guarantees of a judicial procedure as laid down in Article 
6(1). The Court stated that the capacity to deal personally with one’s property 
involves the exercise of private rights and hence affects “civil rights and obligations 
within the meaning of Article 6(1).” Divesting the applicant in Winterwerp of that 
capacity amounted to a “determination” of such rights and obligations.
The automatic presumption of loss of capacity to contract due to mental illness was 
the line of argument used by the government in Winterwerp. The government further 
argued that his property needed protection because of his mental illness. The Court 
did not agree with the justification for taking over in the absence of the guarantees in 
Article 6(1). While acknowledging that mental illness may “render legitimate certain 
limitations upon the exercise of ‘the right to a court’, it cannot warrant the total 
absence of that right as embodied in Article 6(1).”62
Patients frequently lose out when in hospital through a system failure to ensure their 
property and other economic interests are protected adequately. This has a negative 
impact on their return to the community. The right to deal personally with one’s 
property involves the exercise of private rights, and so affects civil rights and 
obligations under Article 6(1). Where the state divests the individual of such control 
over his property, this amounts to a determination of such rights and is subject to
60 [2004] EWCA Civ 311 para 11.
61 (1979) 2 EHRR 387.
62 Ibid, para 75.
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Article 6(1) and, without proper procedures for doing so, involves a possible breach 
of Article 6(1). Where an individual’s right to carry out these activities is interfered 
with, there must be a hearing and a determination by an independent body to decide 
the individual’s capacity in this regard in accordance with Article 6(1). These rights 
include rights to make a will, to contract, to give gifts of property and to vote and sit 
on a jury.
The restrictions on access to a court for those suffering from mental illness arose in 
Ashingdane v. United Kingdom.63 The English Mental Health Act 1959 provided that 
there was no civil liability for acts done pursuant to the 1959 Act in the absence of 
bad faith or reasonable care. A claim could only be brought with leave of the High 
Court, which would only be granted if there were substantial grounds for believing the 
condition was met. The Court stated that the right of access is not absolute, but may 
be subject to limitations. These are permitted by implication, since the right of access, 
“by its very nature calls for regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time 
and place according to the needs and resources of the community and of 
individuals.”64
The Court referred to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States, 
but pointed out that the limitations applied must not restrict or reduce the access left 
to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the “very essence” of the right 
is impaired.65 In addition, the limitation will not be compatible with Article 6(1) if it 
does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved,
Whilst the final decision as to observance of the Convention’s requirements 
rests with the Court, it is no part of the Court’s function to substitute for the 
assessment of the national authorities any other assessment of what might be 
the best policy in this field.66
The Court agreed that the mischief the section sought to avoid was the protection of 
staff from being unfairly harassed by litigation and this was, in itself, legitimate in
63 (1985) 7 EHRR 528.
64 Ibid, para 57.
65 Ibid, para 57.
66 Ibid, para 57.
208
relation to hospital staff, but commented that the protection from suit enjoyed by the 
officials in the social services needed closer scrutiny. The availability of the claim 
where there was bad faith or lack of reasonable care meant that the very essence of the 
right remained intact and complied with the principle of proportionality. The 1983 
Act subsequently relaxed the restrictions, so that the requirement for “substantial 
grounds” has been removed and now permission for access will be granted where 
there is a reasonable case to answer. The protection that the section offered to the 
statutory bodies was removed, so that normal rights of action would apply to those 
bodies while maintaining the aim of protecting the staff working in the psychiatric 
services.
Irish law and the right to litigate
Constitutional law
The right to litigate and the right to have access to the courts under the Constitution
cn
are regarded as separate rights. The right of access was the basis of the decision in 
Macauley v. Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, which held that the requirement of 
the fiat of the Attorney General to take actions against a Minister was an infringement 
of the personal right to have recourse to the courts in Article 40.3. In that case, the 
Court drew on the “full original jurisdiction” of the High Court, derived from Article 
34.3.1 to have access to the High Court to defend and vindicate a legal right. In 
Murphy v. Greene, McCarthy J. said that the right of access to the courts was an 
unenumerated right deriving from the interaction of Article 40.3.1 with Article 
34.3.1.68 These Articles provide,
Article 34.3.1
The Courts of First Instance shall include a High Court invested with 
full original jurisdiction in and power to determine all matters and 
questions whether of law or fact, civil or criminal.
Article 40.3.1
The State guarantees in its laws to respect and vindicate the personal 
rights of the citizen.
67 Tuohy v. Courtney [1994] 3 IR 1.
68 [1990] 2 IR 566. See also Hogan & White, JM Kelly The Irish Constitution, Butterworths, Dublin, 
2003, para 6.2.06.
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There are limitations on the right of access to court including where there is an abuse 
of court processes and it is established that the proceedings are vexatious or 
frivolous.69 The Supreme Court, in Riordan v. Ireland (No. 4), justified the restraint 
on the institution of proceedings without first obtaining the consent of the respective 
court where this was necessary to prevent abuse of court processes on the grounds 
that,
The court is bound to uphold the rights of other citizens, including their right 
to be protected from unnecessary harassment and expense, rights which are 
enjoyed by the holders of public offices as well as by private citizens. This 
court would be failing in its duty ... if it allowed its processes to be repeatedly 
invoked in order to reopen issues already determined or to pursue groundless 
and vexatious litigation.70
This applies also to legal actions by people who have been detained in psychiatric 
care, necessitating that leave is obtained from the High Court to do so.
Mental Treatment Act 1945
The 1945 Act contains a restriction on access to the courts to take civil action in 
connection with detention, similar to section 141 of the English Mental Health Act 
1959.71 This section originated in the Lunacy Act 1890 and provides,
Section 260-(l)
No civil proceedings shall be instituted in respect of an act purporting 
to have been done in pursuance of this Act save by leave of the High 
Court and such leave shall not be granted unless the High Court is 
satisfied that there are substantial grounds for contending that the 
person against whom the proceedings are to be brought acted in bad 
faith or without reasonable care.
The section applies specifically to civil proceedings and does not include omissions, 
but refers to positive acts. The Act refers to “persons” proceeded against, but does not 
refer to bodies like health authorities, though it is accepted that such bodies are 
included. The assumption has been that public authorities are covered by the section.
69 Barry v. Buckley [1981] IR 306.
70 [2001] 3 IR 365 at 369.
71 Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 528.
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Arguably, they are not. The High Court must grant leave where there are substantial 
grounds and there is no liability without either of the two grounds, bad faith or want
of reasonable care. The provision does not affect the right to apply for habeas corpus,
10which is open to anyone who is detained to test the legality of the detention. In 
relation to judicial review, the Rules of the Superior Court 1986 confirm that the only 
requirement is that the plaintiff has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the 
application relates. In Blehein v. St John o f God Hospital, the Supreme Court ruled 
that section 260 does not apply to a constitutional challenge to that section. The 
English Mental Health Act 1983 has a somewhat similar provision, section 139, and, 
in R v. Hallstrom and anor Ex p. W, an English case, the Court of Appeal held that 
leave under this section is not required for judicial review.74
The Supreme Court stated in Murphy v. Greene that a statutory restriction on the right 
of access to court would not be unconstitutional where there were objective reasons 
for such a restriction and where the restriction was not of itself unduly oppressive.75 
Under Article 6(1), any restriction must not be such that the very essence of the right 
is impaired. In addition, it must have a legitimate aim and comply with the principle 
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that section 260 was,
a curtailment of the constitutional right of every individual to have access to 
the courts to the extent that it requires a pre-condition of leave of the court for 
the bringing by him of a claim for damages for an asserted wrong.76
The Court has stated on a number of occasions that such legislation, being an 
exception to Article 34 of the Constitution, must be strictly construed in the sense that 
it must not be availed of except where it is essential to do so.77
The burden of proof requires that there are “substantial grounds” for the allegation 
that the proposed defendant acted in bad faith or without reasonable care, in order to 
be given leave. This has varied in cases from higher than the civil standard to the civil
72 See chapter 2 for full discussion of the use of habeas corpus.
73 Unreported Supreme Court, 31 May 2002.
74 [1985] 3 All ER 785.
75 [1990] 2 IR 566.
76 [1990] 2 IR 566 at 572.
77 B. v. Gallagher [1995] 2 ILRM 433, Murphy v Greene [1990] 2 IR 566.
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standard.78 The Supreme Court has refused leave in a number of cases based on the 
failure to meet the burden of proof of substantial grounds. In O ’Dowd v. North 
Western Health Board, the applicant was required to establish,
... that the grounds relied on must be real and not imaginary, and must 
be supported by credible evidence. ...these grounds must be such as to 
indicate either bad faith or want of reasonable care, and, accordingly, to 
call for an answer or explanation on the part of the person sought to be 
sued.... the section requires the applicant for leave to sue to establish 
something approaching a prima facie case before he can obtain such 
leave. ... He is not to be permitted to mount a vexatious or frivolous 
action or one based on imagined complaints. ... the section does no more 
that to require the applicant ... to discharge the same onus of proof as he 
would be required to discharge in pursuing a claim for damages outside 
the Act but to discharge it at an earlier point in time. ... As the action 
deals with the mentally ill or those thought to be so, it does not seem ...
7Qthat this limitation is unduly restrictive or unreasonable.
However, the proof requirement was somewhat confused with one judge stating that 
the use of “satisfied” indicated that the legislators had in mind a somewhat higher 
standard of proof than that which a plaintiff must ordinarily discharge in a civil case. 
The dissenting judgment of Henchy J. stated that the grounds were established by the 
applicant in that the psychiatrist had signed the detention order three hours after the
O 1
patient had been admitted and sedated. The second point raised in the case was that 
the option of voluntary admission had not been offered to the patient as required 
under the 1945 Act.82
Leave to take civil action was granted by the High Court in Murphy v. Greene, an 
action for neglect, false imprisonment and defamation in connection with admission 
and detention in hospital. The case was overturned in the Supreme Court, by a full 
sitting of that Court, which required that the plaintiff had to prove as a “matter of 
probability” the existence of facts establishing the substantive grounds of bad faith or 
lack of reasonable care on the part of the defendant. The Court held that the standard
78 M. v. Greene, [1990] 2 IR 566, O ’D. v. NWHB [1983] ILRM 186. Only a handful of cases have 
sought leave to take civil action since 1945.
79 [1983] ILRM 186 pl90.
80 Ibid, p i94 per Griffin J.
81 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 171(l)(a) requires the patient to be examined on arrival and the 
order made forthwith.
82 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 184(4)(a)(iii).
83 [1991] ILRM 225.
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of proof is the normal civil standard and there was no need to go beyond this standard. 
Griffin J. stated that it was beyond question that “every individual, be he a citizen or 
not, has a constitutional right of access to the courts. Stated in its broadest terms, this 
is a right to initiate litigation in the courts.”84 He admitted that the standard imposed 
in O ’Dowd was too high and that, for leave to institute proceedings, the applicant 
must establish, as a matter of probability, that there are substantial grounds for the 
contention that the proposed defendant acted in bad faith or without reasonable care. 
He described the provision as a “form of partial curtailment of the right of access to 
court.”85 It is not necessary for the court to conclude the applicant is likely to succeed 
in the proposed action. O’Flaherty J’s statement in this case is worth noting in terms 
of the difficulties piled on such applicants,
The court has to hear both sides at this stage of the proceedings. Or, more 
accurately, it must hear both sides before the proceedings can be launched. 
Because of the nature of the legislation the court will of necessity look at the 
individual seeking to sue. Is he a crank? Is he paranoid? Has he a case of any 
description? These are the first questions that must be asked and, it may be 
very often, the only questions that need to be answered.”
This statement indicates that the focus of the judge was on the personality of the 
applicant, rather than the substance of the legal issue at hearing. Me Carthy J. stated 
that the context of the detention was a matter for consideration and that, where an 
emergency existed, “the law does not require a standard of precision such as might be 
appropriate to other aspects of medical practice ... and that the standard of reasonable 
care under the Act may be quite different from such standard in ordinary medical 
practice.”86
The standard required for an “examination” for detention arose in O ’Reilly v. 
Moroney & Mid Western Health Board, in an application for leave to take civil action 
in connection with detention. The Supreme Court held that an examination by the 
certifying doctor from a distance satisfied the requirement of examination for a
on
recommendation for reception under the 1945 Act. It was argued, both in the High 
Court and in the Supreme Court, that the defendant doctor had not “examined” the
M Ibid, pl91.
85 Ibid, p i90.
86 Ibid, p i92 per McCarthy J.
87 Unreported Supreme Court, November 16th 1993.
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applicant in any real sense. Murphy J., in the High Court, “not without some 
hesitation” accepted that it was an adequate examination for the purposes of the 
certificate. In the Supreme Court, Court Egan J. dealt with the question of the 
adequacy of the examination in his judgment as follows,
There is no definition of the word 'examine' in the section and the fact that Dr 
Moroney himself agreed that there was no physical examination or interview 
does not conclude the matter. Here was a case where the doctor had evidence 
which he considered to be reliable ... This observation, having regard to what 
he had been told, constituted a form of 'examination' in my opinion and
oo
justifies the doctor in pursuing the course which he did.
The Court quoted with approval dicta from McCarthy J. in Murphy v. Greene 
regarding the standard of care in an emergency being different from ordinary medical
OQ
practice. The sole dissenting judgment of Blayney J. stated that the applicant should 
have been examined physically to ascertain her physical and emotional well-being
QOand should have been given an opportunity to be heard.
In one of the few cases granted leave, Bailey v. Gallagher, the Supreme Court held 
that there was no evidence of bad faith or want of reasonable care on the part of the 
doctor in certifying the detention.91 The medical examination had taken place 8 days 
prior to the removal of the patient to the Garda station, one day over the permitted 
time for removal to hospital, after which the order is null and void. The detention at 
the Garda station was without legal justification and the defendant doctor was aware 
that the plaintiff was being detained. The lack of reasonable care applied to the failure 
to notify the Gardai that the order was out of date and bring the detention to an end. 
The Court stated,
The Court cannot condone the abridgement of an innocent citizens’ liberty for 
however short a period, save where it is authorised by law ... S,260 ... had to 
be given full effect. However, it is prima facie a curtailment of the 
constitutional right of every citizen of access to the courts, it must be strictly 
construed so as to ensure the citizen’s right of access is not unnecessarily 
restricted 92
88 Ibid p9.
w Ibid, p i92.
90 Ibid.
91 [1996] ILRM 433.
92 Ibid, p446.
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Apart from O ’Dowd, all reported applications for leave took place during the 1990s 
when awareness of patients’ rights was growing. Only four of the reported cases have 
succeeded in being granted leave based on lack of reasonable care, Kieman v. Harris, 
Midland Health Board & Ors,n  where there was a failure to carry out any 
examination or offer a second opinion, Bailey v. Gallagher94 where the 
recommendation for the detention was out of date; Melly v. Moran & North Western 
Health Board,95 where telephone conversations were held not to form part of the 
actual examination for the recommendation for detention and, therefore, no 
examination had taken place within the previous 24 hours as required, and Manweiler 
v. Bourke & HSE for failure to diagnose and imposition of unnecessary treatment.96 
The Court, in Melly, held there was a lack of reasonable care and if the matter had 
been tested by way of an application under the habeas corpus provisions of the 
Constitution then the document justifying detention would be “clearly defective on its
Q7face,” though the Court expressed sympathy with the doctor and hospital authorities.
The situation with regard to section 260 has changed as a result of the decision in 
Blehein v. Minister for Health & Children, Ireland & Attorney General. This case 
involved a constitutional challenge to section 260 of the 1945 Act by a plaintiff who 
had sought leave unsuccessfully to take civil action on a number of occasions between 
1997 and 2001.98 In the last of these proceedings, the plaintiff sought to include a 
constitutional challenge to section 260 at a late stage of the proceedings, but this was 
not permitted and the plaintiff was advised to commence new proceedings to 
challenge the constitutionality of the section.99 Subsequently, the plaintiff argued that 
section 260 was a legislated denial of justice contrary to Articles 6 and 34 of the 
Constitution. These Articles deal with the separation of powers and the independence 
of the judicial function respectively. He alleged that the imposition of the conditions
93 [1998] IEHC 71 12th May 1998.
94 [1996] ILRM 433.
95 Unreported Supreme Court 28th May 1998.
96 In Manweiler v. Bourke & HSE Eastern Region Unreported High Court, March 2005, the applicant 
was given leave to take civil action following which he succeeded in a negligence action against the 
health authorities.
97 Unreported Supreme Court 28th May 1998. plO.
98 [2004] IEHC 374, Blehein v. Murphy & Ors. [2000] 3 IR 359, Blehein v. St John o f Gods Hospital 
& Anor Unreported High Court 30th May 2002.
99 Blehein v. St John o f Gods Hospital & Anor Unreported High Court, 30th May 2002.
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“bad faith” and “without reasonable care” was a “disability imposed by statute” for 
those seeking redress against the provisions of the 1945 Act.100 He alleged there was 
no objective criteria laid down by the Court where bad faith could be established and 
it was an impossible condition. Lack of reasonable care was difficult to establish if the 
profession is under attack, and had no place in the vindication of human rights in the 
Constitution. He said that the subordination of the courts to the legislature is not 
permitted by Article 6, as the independence of the judiciary is an essential cornerstone 
of democracy.
The State contested the application on the basis that section 260 is a legitimate 
restriction of rights of applicants having regard to the equality provision in Article 40 
of the Constitution, which permits different treatment based on different social 
functions. The High Court stated that, in this kind of application, the court is confined 
to two grounds, bad faith and want of reasonable care, and its only discretion is in 
determining whether either ground is substantial. The Court held that this restriction 
constituted an impermissible interference by the legislature in the judicial domain, 
contrary to Article 6 and Article 34 of the Constitution. The High Court held that 
“[T]he legislature is not entitled to limit access to the High Court on specific grounds 
as provided in Section 260” and so, the section was declared unconstitutional on these 
grounds.101 The effect of this decision is that the two grounds no longer apply and, 
therefore, the court is not limited to these grounds. This means that the High Court 
will grant leave where it is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for doing so. 
This also moves Irish law closer to the requirements on access to court in Article 6(1) 
by ensuring that the very essence of the right is preserved.102
It is possible, but not stated, that the High Court intended that the whole section, and 
not just these two restrictions, is unconstitutional, thereby removing this barrier to 
accessing the courts. It must also be remembered that this is a High Court decision 
and, while this particular issue has not been litigated before, there are Supreme Court 
decisions, including that of a full Supreme Court in Murphy, basing their decisions on 
the section which had enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality.
100 Blehein v. Minister for Health & Children, Ireland & Attorney General [2004] IEHC 374 p2.
102 There has been no appeal to date.
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Mental Health Act 2001
The impact of this decision on the 2001 Act will now be considered. The replacement 
of section 260 in the 2001 Act is as follows,
Section 73(1) provides,
No civil proceedings shall be instituted in respect of an act purporting 
to have been done in pursuance of this Act save by leave of the High 
Court and such leave shall not be refused unless the High Court is 
satisfied:
(a) that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, or
(b) that there are no reasonable grounds for contending that the 
person against whom the proceedings are brought acted in bad faith 
or without reasonable care.103
The burden of proof has been reduced to “reasonable grounds.” In tandem with the 
change in emphasis from “leave shall not be granted” in section 260 to “leave shall 
not be refused” in section 73, this has created a more favourable situation for the 
applicant. Applying the decision in Blehein to section 73 will eliminate “bad faith and 
without reasonable care” from the section. If so, the test for the High Court is that 
leave will not be refused, unless the High Court is satisfied that the proceedings are 
vexatious or frivolous and there are no reasonable grounds for taking the action.
The aim of the provision is to protect those staff and authorities involved in the 
compulsory admission to hospital from unfair harassment. The English provision, 
section 139, was modified in the Mental Health Act 1983 to exclude proceedings 
against the Secretary of State, Health Authorities and National Health Service 
trusts.104 Despite pressure during the passage of the 2001 Act, public authorities in 
Ireland are not excluded from the section and it is arguable that the section is even 
more inclusive by the omission of the word “person” as used in the 1945 Act, leaving 
it to the courts to interpret the section. Having regard to the decision in Ashingdane v. 
United Kingdom, which was held not to transgress a patient’s right to a fair trial under 
Article 6 ,1 believe the limitation in the 2001 Act will withstand breach of Article 6 if
103 Mental Health Act 2001, section 73(1).
104 Mental Health Act 1983, section 139(4).
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it can be objectively justified.105 The justification can be found in the relaxation of the 
burden on the patient under the 2001 Act to a greater extent than existed under the 
1983 Act, so it is unlikely that the new provision will result in a breach of the right to 
to a court.106 It must not infringe Article 14 and must be proportionate to the aim of
107protecting people from being sued in connection with compulsory admission. It 
could be argued that there is no objective justification for the over-inclusive 
application of the section. The statement of Donaldson J. in Winch v Jones, an English 
case, is worth noting in regard to section 141 of the 1983 Act on the purpose of such 
section,
Is intended to strike a balance between the legitimate interests of applicant to 
be allowed, at his own risk as to costs, to seek the adjudication of the courts on 
any claim which is not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process and the 
equally legitimate interests of the respondent to such an application not to be 
subjected to the undoubted exceptional risk of being harassed by baseless 
claims by those who have been treated under the Mental Health Acts.108
The minimal right of access to the Court under section 260 exists but it could be 
argued that granting leave to four known cases since 1945 is, in effect, destroying the 
very essence of the right.109 In addition, this provision, particularly where it relates to 
public authorities, may involve a breach of Article 14 by treating detained people 
differently, unless there is an objective and reasonable justification for protecting 
these bodies. The failure to exclude them is disproportionate to the aim of protecting 
individuals involved in the detention process. The number of potential applicants for 
leave that have been discouraged by such a result is unknown, but is a factor worth 
bearing in mind. Undoubtedly, the reconstituted section 73 in the 2001 Act is also 
overbroad as it contains no exclusions compared with section 139 of the 1983 Act. 
The impact of the Blehein decision on access will be awaited.
105 (1985) 7 EHRR 528.
106 Mental Health Act 1983, section 141.
107 (1979) 2 EHRR 387.
108 [1985] 3 AER 97pl02.
109 This includes the Manweiler case in addition to the cases already discussed at fn 91.
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Legal aid
The 1945 Act has no express provision for legal aid in taking civil action under 
section 260, but an applicant would be entitled to apply for civil legal aid, though this 
service is extremely difficult to access where it is not an urgent family law matter.110 
The 2001 Act provides a right to legal representation, though this right is limited to 
tribunals and for appeals to the Circuit Court.111 There is no express reference to the 
provision of legal aid outside these specific circumstances for an individual who 
wants to take a civil action and the very limited provision under the civil legal aid 
system will apply. If one applies the reasoning in Airey v. Ireland that the right to 
court must be effective, and taking into account the vulnerability of persons with 
mental disabilities, the failure to provide a comprehensive civil legal aid system 
directly impacts on effective access to court and potentially transgresses the very
119essence test by destroying access. There is an alternative provision in the Human
Rights Commission Act 2000 whereby an individual may apply for legal assistance
1 1
for legal proceedings relating to human rights. However, this is not stated in terms 
of an automatic right, but is dependent on the nature of the issues and many other 
limiting factors.
Conclusion
The limitations on the right of access to the court under the 1945 Act acts as a 
deterrent to taking such action and, based on the record to date, it is effective in 
ensuring the highest level of restriction. The aim of protecting staff from vexatious 
actions is a legitimate one, but the extent of the restriction is disproportionate as it 
protects corporate bodies and it is not clear from the wording if the section was 
intended to protect them. The High Court decision in Blehein, where it was declared 
that the limitation on the High Court as to the grounds for appeal,i.e. bad faith and 
lack of reasonable care, is unconstitutional, and modifies the section dramatically,
110 Civil Legal Aid Act 1995.
111 Mental Health Act 2001, section 16(2)(b) as arranged by the Mental Health Commission under 
section 33(3).
112 Airey v. Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 505.
113 Human Rights Commission Act 2000, section 2.
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unless the decision is overturned in the Supreme Court.114 If the decision is upheld, 
this will impact on the 2001 Act creating a fairer situation for applicants and making 
the section more Convention compliant.
114 Blehein v. Minister for Health & Children, Ireland & Attorney General [2004] IEHC 374.
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Chapter 6
ARTICLE 6 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE PROPERTY OF 
VULNERABLE ADULTS UNDER IRISH LAW
Introduction
This chapter considers the ward of court system as it applies to the protection and 
management of the property rights and affairs of the individual against the 
background of Article 6. The requirements of Article 6 in relation to the determination 
of civil rights, in this instance, the property rights of the individual, are that there is 
speedy access to a fair hearing and right to representation before an independent and 
impartial tribunal. While there is a margin of appreciation enjoyed by contracting 
states, the limitations applied must not restrict or reduce the access left to the 
individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is 
impaired.1 In addition, the limitation will not be compatible with Article 6(1) if it does 
not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.2 The 
wardship procedure, regarded as an extreme measure that effectively removes all 
decision-making from the ward, is outlined and considered in relation to speed of 
access and fair procedures along with the right to an independent hearing. The issue 
of proportionality is raised in relation to the protection of either property or personal 
rights based on the extreme impact of a declaration of wardship. The impact on other 
rights, such as the right to marry and the right to make a will, is considered.
The Power of Attorney Act 1996, which provides for an enduring power of attorney 
as an alternative system permitting some control by an adult in anticipation of future 
incapacity, is also considered. This power is limited to property, finance and personal 
care decisions.3 The Law Reform Commission (LRC) recognises the need for law
1 Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 528 para 57.
2 Ibid.
3 Powers of Attorney Act 1996 Section 4(1), the definition of personal care includes, where the donor 
should live and with whom, whom the donor should see and not see, the training and rehabilitation the
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reform in relation to vulnerable adults and decision making.4 These reforms propose 
to have a comprehensive system of proxy decision-making for incapacitated adults, as 
well as proper procedures for the removal of an individual’s capacity to make 
decisions.5 The trend in common law jurisdictions, seen in the Scottish Adults with 
Incapacity Act 2001 and the English Mental Capacity Act 2005, is to expand and 
adapt the current provisions regarding property and affairs to include proxy decision­
making about care, treatment and welfare.
Origins of the ward of court system in Ireland
Originally, the jurisdiction to protect individuals, known as the parens patriae or 
Royal Prerogative, was vested in the Lord Chancellor of England, and when Ireland 
achieved independence in 1922 it was, by virtue of the Courts Act 1922, vested in the 
Chief Justice. The Chief Justice was relieved of the responsibility by the Courts of 
Justice Act 1936 when the jurisdiction was vested in the High Court for the purpose 
of exercising that jurisdiction.6
The ancient prerogative jurisdiction of the Crown over idiots and persons of unsound 
mind extended to the person, as well as to the property of those brought into its 
jurisdiction. There have been long standing disagreements as to the existence of the 
royal prerogative in Ireland. The question of the survival of the prerogative is 
important in determining the jurisdiction of the judge in dealing with wardship 
matters. If the prerogative continues to exist, there are very wide powers to make 
decisions for wards outside of the limits of legislation. It is argued that the prerogative 
did not survive the constitutional changes in Ireland in 1922, as decided in Byrne v 
Ireland, involving an action against the State for negligence, where the Crown
donor should get, the donor’s diet and dress, the right to inspect the donor’s papers and housing, social 
welfare and other benefits for donor.3
4 Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper, The Law and the Elderly (LRC CP 23-2003).
Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper, Vulnerable Adults and the Law: Capacity, (LRC CP 37- 
2005).
5 Law Reform Commission, Law and the Elderly (LRC CP-23 2003) recommends the abolition of the 
wardship system and replacement with a whole new system. The operation of the wardship system in 
relation to the welfare of the person and medical treatment is dealt with under Article 8. See chapter 3 
for discussion of Article 8 implications.
6 Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 section 9.
1 In re D[19S1] IR 449.
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• 8prerogative of immunity from suit was held to be unconstitutional. In Webb v 
Ireland, the Supreme Court stated,
All royal prerogatives to be found in the common law of England and the 
common law of Ireland prior to the enactment of the Constitution of Saorstat 
Eireann 1922, ceased to be part of the law of Saorstat Eireann because they 
were based on concepts expressly repudiated by Article 2 of that Constitution
9
If the parens patriae prerogative did not survive past 1922, it can be argued that the 
legislation then provided a statutory basis for a new and similar jurisdiction in the 
High Court. It is clear that the Court will rely on the legislation where appropriate, but 
will call on the inherent jurisdiction and apply the parens patriae principle without 
any discussion as to whether it had survived the constitutional changes in 1922.10 The 
Supreme Court, in In re ED, a Ward o f Court, made reference to the wide discretion 
possessed by the President of the High Court when exercising the wardship 
jurisdiction when the welfare of the ward was an issue.11 The High Court applied the 
parens patriae principle and held that jurisdiction in the matter had not been 
circumscribed by the Lunacy Regulation Act 1871, thereby implying a level of 
flexibility.
Sources of law
The criteria for wardship are set out in the Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871 
(1871 Act) and in the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 (1961 Act). The 
procedure is set out in Order 67 of The Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 (1986 
Rules).12 The 1961 Act grants jurisdiction in lunacy matters to the President of the 
High Court. Article 34 of the Constitution provides the High Court with inherent 
jurisdiction to adjudicate on all matters of law and fact. In addition, Article 40.3.2 of 
the Constitution imposes on the State the obligation to protect and vindicate the 
personal and property rights of every citizen.
8 [1972] IR 241.
9 [1988] IR 353.
10 JM  v. The Board o f Management o f St. Vincent’s Hospital (ex parte PM) Unreported High Court 
(Finnegan J.) 24 October 2002.
11 Unreported Supreme Court, March 4th 1998.
12 Rules of the Superior Courts Order 65, deals with procedures for applications for minors, those under 
18 years.
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The purpose of the 1871 Act was to amend the law relating to Commissions of 
Lunacy and to provide more effectively for the visiting of persons “found or supposed 
lunatic” and to “make the other provisions for the institution, speeding, and deciding 
of inquiries de lunatico ...”13 Subsequently, the 1986 Rules governed the procedure 
leading to wardship. The ward is the respondent in the inquiry and is the person 
alleged to be of unsound mind in respect of whom a petition for inquiry has been 
presented. The 1986 Rules seem to envisage that the judge has powers, which do not 
derive from the legislation,
All originating applications to the Judge for the exercise by him of all or any 
of the powers by the Act or otherwise conferred upon or possessed by him 
(emphasis added) in respect of the persons or property of persons of weak or 
unsound mind ... 14
It is clear from the foregoing that the authority of the Court originates from a variety 
of sources: the parens patriae prerogative, the legislation, the inherent jurisdiction of 
the Court under the Constitution, and the obligation to protect personal rights.15 The 
authority of the President of the High Court should be grounded in the inherent 
jurisdiction of the Court under Article 34, where the Court is empowered to step in to 
protect an individual’s personal rights under Article 40.3 of the Constitution. The 
inherent jurisdiction of the Court leaves the 1871 Act, which sets out the criteria for 
wardship and some procedures, unclear. In In re a Ward (Withdrawal o f Medical 
Treatment), Hamilton CJ outlined the paramountcy principle and vesting in the High 
Court from the Crown as follows,
When a person is made a ward of court, the court is vested with jurisdiction 
over all matters relating to the person and estate of the ward and in the 
exercise of such jurisdiction is subject only to the provisions of the 
Constitution: there is no statute which in the slightest degree lessens the 
court’s duty or frees it from the responsibility of exercising that parental care 
... In the exercise of this jurisdiction the court’s prime and paramount 
consideration must be the best interests of the ward.16
13 Lunacy Regulations (Ireland) Act 1871, in the introduction to the Act.
14 Rules of the Superior Courts Order 67, Section 3(1).
15 Bunreacht na hEireann, The Irish Constitution, Article 34.
16 [1996] 2 IR 79 at 106.
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This statement emphasises the predominance of the Constitution with regard to the 
inherent jurisdiction and the primary focus of the best interests of the ward.77
The 1871 Act limits the discretion of the Court in setting out the circumstances in 
which the ward’s property may be sold, although in practice the section is interpreted 
liberally. It deals with the property issues and does not deal with any specific issues 
related to welfare, such as the withholding of medical treatment. There is no 
legislation dealing with how the Court is to determine issues about the person as 
opposed to the property of the ward.18 The Court, in In re D (Midland Health Board 
wardship application), made it clear that the right to protection in wardship is not 
limited to persons of unsound mind who are entitled to property that needs 
protection.19 In the absence of legislation, the Court has to rely on either the parens 
patriae principle or the inherent jurisdiction. The President of the High Court 
exercises that jurisdiction and only on rare occasions, when he is not available, is that 
responsibility delegated by him to another judge of the High Court.
The 1961 Act confers concurrent jurisdiction on the Circuit Court in limited matters 
where the property of the person, who is alleged to be of unsound mind and incapable 
of managing his affairs, does not exceed a particular amount. It is very rare for 
applications to be made in the Circuit Court and the procedure is far more expeditious 
in the High Court.21
Eligibility for wardship in the 1871 Act required that the person was a “lunatic” 
defined as “any person found by inquisition idiot, lunatic, or of unsound mind, and
99incapable of managing himself or his affairs.” The terms used in the 1871 Act, 
widely regarded as archaic and pejorative, are no longer used and the 1961 Act 
replaced the word lunatic with person of unsound mind.23 The 1986 Rules refer to the 
“respondent” as a person alleged to be of unsound mind and incapable of managing
17 [1996] 2 IR 79.
18 In re D (Midland Health Board Wardship application) [1987] IR 449.
19 Ibid para 455.
20 This amount is currently €6,500 in value or if the income from the sum does not exceed €375 per 
annum.
21 Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 section 8(2).
22 Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871, c 22, sections 3 & 118
23 Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 section 9(4)(a).
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his person or property.24 The language of wardship such as “lunacy” and “person of 
unsound mind,” though not in current use, have survived in the absence of up to date 
legislation. These terms stigmatise persons who are wards and cause upset. This is 
an aspect that can be dealt with by legislators becoming aware of the damage that 
such language can do to vulnerable people and their families.
In Dolan v. Registrar o f Wards o f Court, the parents of a disabled adult who had
received an award of damages for injuries, challenged the court’s authority to have a
0(\second medical examination which would lead to him being made a ward of court. 
They objected, inter alia, to the language in the 1871 Act and were adamant that their 
son was not going to be labelled an “idiot, lunatic or person of unsound” as a 
condition of getting protection for him. They also objected on the grounds that 
wardship would interfere with their constitutional rights as a family and that their son 
would be restricted in relation to travel. They failed in their efforts due to a 
jurisdictional issue, and Kelly J referred to the making of a wardship order as a 
“judicial function which [had to be] exercised in accordance with the Constitution and 
with constitutional propriety.” The judge noted that the terms objected to were no 
longer used because they were terms of a bygone age.28 Seeking to reassure the family 
when making the order, Kelly J. quoted from Denham J. in Eastern Health Board v. 
MK, where she stated,
Wardship proceedings must be fair and in accordance with constitutional 
justice. The constitutional rights of all parties the children and the patients 
must be protected. Where rights are in conflict they must be balanced 
appropriately. The Court, while exercising this unique jurisdiction must 
observe due process. Consequently, if a legal right or a constitutional right is 
to be limited or taken away by a court this must be done with fair 
procedures.29
24 Rules of Superior Court, Order 67, section 1.
23 Dolan v. Register o f Wards o f Court Unreported High Court, 19th March 2004. See also Irish Times 
20th March 2004.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid p i4.
28 The Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 section 9(4)(a) permits the substituting of other 
expressions for the word ‘lunatic’.
29 [1999] 2 IR 99 at 111.
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Unsound mind
In order to be admitted to wardship, two factors must be present: the person must have 
an unsound mind and must also be incapable of managing his person or property and 
each condition must be satisfied. There are problems with the concept of unsound 
mind. In some cases, the lack of capacity is obvious where the person is unconscious 
or in advanced stages of dementia and unable to communicate. In other situations, the 
President relies almost totally on medical evidence. The individual’s psychiatric 
history is relevant to the question of capacity, but cannot be determinative of 
incapacity. The courts have, on occasion, held a person not to be of unsound mind, 
but still incapable of managing their affairs.
The High Court addressed, for the first time, the double criteria for wardship in In re 
Catherine Keogh. The jury found the proposed ward was not of unsound mind, but 
was incapable of looking after her person or property.31 The respondent had been 
awarded a large sum for personal injuries and an application to make her a ward was 
supported by two medical affidavits to the effect the respondent was of unsound mind 
and was incapable of managing her affairs. An order taking her into wardship was 
made, but had to be discharged on discovery of an objection lodged prior to the order 
and unknown to the Court. A hearing was ordered to take place before a judge and 
jury and the test applied was whether the person is “of unsound mind and incapable of 
managing himself or his affairs.” They held that the word “and” was conjunctive and 
orders for wardship could be made only where both requirements are satisfied. No 
details were provided in the court report as to how the jury found the individual did 
not have an unsound mind, but was incapable of managing her affairs. The decision 
may have been influenced by the large award of damages involved.
This case raises the prospect of lack of future management where someone does not 
fit the criteria in use and safeguards are needed. Even where the criteria are set out, 
the High Court has discretion as to whether wardship is the appropriate course of 
action and must be satisfied that the ward needs protection and will benefit from being
30 In re Catherine Keogh Unreported High Court, Finnegan J., 15th October 2002.
31 Unreported High Court, Finnegan J., 15th October 2002.
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admitted to wardship. These additional criteria of “appropriateness” and “benefit” are 
not included in the 1871 Act and arise from the operation of the parens patriae power.
Despite the vagueness of unsound mind, the policy of the Ward of Court Office is to 
refuse to issue an inquiry unless the medical evidence has the term unsound mind on 
the affidavit. It is not adequate to state that the respondent suffers from a learning 
disability as this will not satisfy the Act.32 The vagueness of the criteria means that the 
assessment is open to a very broad interpretation of incapacity. This may breach 
Article 6 arising from the proportionality test and the need to have a reasonable 
relationship between the aim of the intervention and the means used.
The Court, in Masterman-Lister v. Brutton & Co. & the Home Counties, an English 
case concerned with the right to litigate, held that the capacity required by the law is 
issue specific, i.e. the capacity to understand the nature of the transaction when it is 
explained.33 Kennedy U  stated,
It is common ground that all adults must be presumed to be competent to 
manage their property and affairs until the contrary is proved, and that the 
burden of proof rests on those asserting incapacity. ... if there is clear 
evidence of incapacity for a considerable period then the burden of proof may 
be more easily discharged, but it remains on whoever asserts incapacity. 
Furthermore, it has to be recognised that when a person is treated as a patient, 
whether or not as a result of an order of the court, he is thereby deprived of 
civil rights, in particular his right to sue or defend in his own name, and his 
right to compromise in litigation without the approval of the court. They are 
important rights, long cherished by English law and now safeguarded by the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In Re Cummings [1852] I De GM&G 
537 Knight Bruce LJ said at 557-
It is the right of an English person to require that the free use of his 
property, and personal freedom, shall not be taken from him on the 
ground of alleged lunacy, without being allowed the opportunity of 
establishing his sanity or denying his insanity before a jury as a 
contesting party, not merely as a subject of inquiry.34
The Court went on to state that this requirement is underlined by Articles 6 and 8 of 
the Convention. This means that, even when the issue did not seem to be contentious,
32 In In re Catherine Keogh Unreported High Court, Finnegan J., 15th October 2002. The court was 
reluctant to use this term for an incapable person. ‘Learning disability’ alone is not enough to establish 
support for the petition without more. Affidavits for medical reports also cause problems.
33 [2002] EWCA Civ 1889.
34 Ibid para 17.
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a district judge who was responsible for case management would almost certainly 
require the assistance of a medical report before being able to be satisfied that 
capacity existed. A litigant in personal injuries may be able to decide about the 
proceedings and to settle his claim but not have the capacity to manage money. This 
should not exclude him from the proceedings, but he may have to be made a ward of 
court in Ireland, preventing any involvement in legal matters. Until the Masterman 
case, there was a shortage of information about criteria for assessing whether 
someone is mentally capable of managing and administering his property and 
affairs.35 In Masterman, Kennedy U  approved a test of capacity in relation to specific 
decisions,
... a person’s ability to manage his or her property and affairs requires an 
ability to make and communicate, and where appropriate give effect to all 
decisions required in relation to them. So the mental abilities required include 
the ability to recognise a problem, obtain and receive, understand and retain 
relevant information, including advice; the ability to weigh the information 
(including that derived from advice) in the balance in reaching a decision, and 
the ability to communicate that decision.36
Reference was made to White v. Fell, a case with similar facts, in which Boreham J. 
stated that that very few people are able to manage all their affairs without some help 
and that the expression “incapable of managing her own affairs and property” must be 
construed in a common sense way and does not require proof of complete
t 7
incapacity. In Masterman, Wright J. said the court should only take over the 
individual’s function of decision-making “when it is shown on the balance of 
probabilities that such person does not have the capacity sufficiently to understand, 
absorb, and retain information (including advice) relevant to the matters in question 
sufficiently to enable him or her to make decisions based upon such information.” 
This guidance is directly relevant to the determination of civil rights and obligations 
under Article 6.
35 Masterman Lister v. Brutton & Co and Jewell & the Home Counties Dairiies [2002] EWCA Civ 
11889 para 17.
36 Ibid, para 26.
37 Unreported 12th November 1997, Australia.
38 Masterman Lister v. Brutton & Co and Jewell & the Home Counties Dairies [2002] EWCA Civ 
11889 para 20.
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The ward of court assessment relies on reports from medical assessors confirming that 
the person has an unsound mind and is unable to manage his person or affairs. The 
assessment for unsound mind in wardship is usually carried out by psychiatrists, 
though the legislation does not require specialist expertise, so there is an element of 
arbitrariness in terms of the forseeability of the law. The terms “unsound mind” are 
not defined in the legislation and are likely to be left to the discretion of medical 
experts applying the standard of practice in that area. The use of unsound mind as the 
single criteria that results in a finding of general incapacity removes the person’s total 
decision-making power is over-broad, denies the right to specialist assessment, takes 
no account of the ward’s or carer’s wishes and may well transgress the proportionality 
requirement in Article 6. What is needed is a clear understanding of capacity. The 
Court, in Winterwerp v. Netherlands, said there was no definition of unsound mind 
and stated in relation to psychiatric detention,
... the Convention does not state what is to be understood by the words 
‘person of unsound mind’ ... it is a term whose meaning is continually 
evolving as research in psychiatry progresses, an increasing flexibility in 
treatment is developing and society’s attitude to mental illness changes, in 
particular so that a greater understanding of the problems of mental patients is 
becoming more widespread.39
The difference between the use of unsound mind for wardship and that used to assess 
unsound mind for psychiatric detention is the scope of the terms for wardship which 
must include other conditions, such as head injuries and dementias, that do not 
necessarily have associated mental disorders. The test used by the Court of Protection 
in England is, having considered the medical evidence, “that a person is incapable, by 
reason of mental disorder, of managing and administering his property and affairs.”40 
The use of word “incapable” is indicative of a more proportionate response, taking the 
patients actual abilities into account. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides that, “A 
person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is unable to 
make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or
39 Ibid para 37. This interpretation of person of unsound mind was followed by Budd J. in the High 
Court in Croke v. Smith & Eastern Health Board [1995] IEHC 6 31st July, 1995.
40 Mental Health Act 1983, section 94(2).
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disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain.”41 The criteria for admission to 
wardship in Ireland needs to be clarified.
Procedures for wardship
The standard procedure is the most common procedure leading to wardship and arises 
under section 15 of the 1871 Act. In the absence of rules, the next of kin are regarded 
as the most appropriate applicants for wardship. Each application is supported by two 
medical affidavits. The medical visitor from the Office of Wards of Court may visit 
and report on any aspect of the respondent’s life and an inquiry by the High Court 
may be initiated on foot of the report of the medical visitor. An inquiry order is made 
if the medical evidence is satisfactory. A court appointed medical visitor makes an 
independent report to the President on the nature and origin of the mental illness and 
assesses the prospect of recovery. The report is then referred to the President for a 
decision. This report is confidential and does not have to be shown to the respondent. 
There is no requirement for a multi-disciplinary assessment.
The proposed ward is given notice and informed of his right of objection which must 
take place within seven days of the application. The proposed ward must make this 
objection without any access to the report indicating why it is being proposed to take 
him into wardship. This is clearly an issue relevant to Article 6 and the requirement of 
‘‘equality of arms.” If there is no objection, the case is listed for hearing.42 It is very 
unusual to have objections to petitions for admission to wardship.43 Notice of any 
objection must be signed and witnessed by the solicitor. A hearing must then take 
place before a judge or judge and jury. The lack of a mandatory requirement that such 
vulnerable adults are legally represented raises serious issues under Article 6, even 
allowing for the practice of having representation in all cases.44
The judge may require a personal examination of the respondent and may then order 
that the inquiry be held before a jury, formerly known as the de lunatico inquirendo45
41 Section 2(1).
42 Ward of Court Office, Information Document on Wardship www.court/wards.ie
43 In re Catherine Keogh Unreported High Court, (Finnegan J.) 15th October 2002.
44 Airey v. Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305.
45 Rules of Superior Courts, Order 67, rules 10-16.
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This involves the judge laying out the requirements regarding the conduct of the 
inquiry, the time, venue, procedure and general conduct of the inquiry. Alternatively, 
the respondent will be asked to appear before the judge for a personal examination 
and the judge can order that an inquiry before a jury would take place when satisfied 
that the respondent is not competent to “form and express a wish in that behalf.”46 The 
hearing is in public, but no publication of the names of those involved is permitted. 
When a decision has been made taking the person into wardship the committee, the 
person to whom the ward’s affairs are committed, is the contact between the Wards of 
Court office and the ward.
One respondent to a wardship application successfully challenged efforts to have him 
made a ward of court before a jury.47 He convinced the jury he was not of unsound 
mind or unable to manage his person or his affairs. He also succeeded in having the 
case heard in open court. The case arose because his solicitor was pressured into 
making an application for wardship in the context of a family will dispute and 
following the respondent’s admission for psychiatric care. The case highlights the 
importance of due process, the right to a hearing and representation for the individual. 
There is no requirement advising an individual that he should seek an independent 
solicitor or get an independent second medical opinion.
The issue of independence and bias was raised in In re ED, A Ward o f Court and 
concerned an appeal by the daughter of a ward against a number of orders made by 
the President.48 The appellant also raised the issue of jurisdiction in the case. At the 
time of the hearing, the President was a governor of the hospital in which the ward 
lived and the appellant believed he was biased and should have disqualified himself 
from hearing the case. The President stated that the motivating force of the judgment 
was the welfare of the ward. The perception of bias is not what one particular person 
considers to be bias, but what a reasonable person would consider biased. 
Furthermore, he was satisfied that no reasonable person would be justified in 
considering that the President of the High Court, who is involved in the hospital and 
charities, would be influenced in reaching such a decision. The Supreme Court held
46 Ibid, section 19.
47 Irish Times report, 22nd July 1997. (No title available)
48 Supreme Court IESC 4th March, 1998.
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that the orders made by him were within his jurisdiction and there was evidence 
which justified him in exercising his discretion and no bias. The question of 
impartiality in Article 6 is relevant. Impartiality means a lack of prejudice or bias and 
the court must comply with the subjective and objective test,
... the existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6(1) must be 
determined according to a subjective test, that is on the basis of the personal 
conviction of a particular judge in a given case, and also according to an 
objective test, that is ascertaining whether the judge offered guarantees 
sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.49
The involvement of the President in the institution is difficult to divorce from the 
judgment, but the Supreme Court was of the view that the judgment of the President 
was acceptable based on the reasonable person test.
Urgent Procedure
There are a number of alternative procedure used in situations where the standard 
procedure is not appropriate, such as urgent situations or where the family do not 
want to petition for an inquiry.50 In these circumstances, the Registrar initiates the 
petition and asks a medical visitor to examine the respondent and report back.51
Limited Assets Procedure
In situations where the person owns little property, there is a less complex procedure 
involved.52 This involves a petition and one medical certificate or affidavit and the 
Registrar can initiate the proceedings. A report from a medical visitor must be 
provided, as well as any other the Registrar thinks necessary for evidence and the 
judge can make an order without further inquiry. The notice and objection rules are 
similar to the standard procedure.
49 Hauschildt v. Denmark {1989) A 154 para 46.
50 Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871, section 12. JMv. St. Vincent’s Hospital (exparte PM) 
Unreported High Court (Finnegan J.) 24 October 2002.
31 There were 35 such applications from a total of 191 in 2001 and 13 out of a total of 131 in 2002.
^Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871, section 68. Where the value of the property is less that 
€6,350.00, or the income from the property is less than €380.00.per annum. These applications are rare 
and there were none in 2001-2002.
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Temporary procedure
This procedure is used where medical evidence confirms that the person is “of weak 
mind and temporarily incapable of managing his affairs.” The 1871 Act does not 
refer to the management of the person. The nature of the incapacity, the reason for it 
and its expected length of time must be explained. There is a right of objection within 
four days of the documents being served but without any access to the report on 
which the application is based. A “guardian” will be appointed to act for a specific 
period, up to six months, and this period can be renewed only once after which the 
person is discharged or admitted under the standard procedure. A medical visitor must 
visit one month prior to the expiration of the order and report on the person’s mental 
and physical condition. There is limited information on the operation of the temporary 
procedure on how guardians are appointed and their role.54
New procedure
During the past year, 2004-2005, the President has adopted an approach designed to 
afford protection to an adult with limited assets found on medical evidence to be 
incapacitated, without subjecting the person to the full consequences of wardship. 
Where the amount involved is less than €30,000 and the President is satisfied with an 
undertaking from the family or carer of the person that they will apply the amount for 
the benefit of the ward and will account to the Registrar of Wards for the funds when 
asked, authorisation will be given to this effect. The procedure is initiated and 
completed by correspondence, no formal order is required and it follows the usual 
background check by the Registrar. This is a really useful and practical development 
as an interim solution to the gaps. Presumably the safeguards rest with the Registrar 
of Wards. There are many questions that could be raised if the definition of incapacity 
is the same as for wardship, what rights of appeal or complaint are open to the person 
who may object to particular relatives being involved.
The courts have on occasion creatively used the parens patriae power under the 
wardship jurisdiction to create a third party right. In In the Matter o f JR, a Ward o f
53 Ibid, section 103.
54 Few applications are made using this provision.
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Court the right to residency of the ward’s cohabitee arose in the context of the 
proposed sale of the ward’s dilapidated house when the ward needed residential 
care/5 The High Court held that the cohabitee of a ward was entitled to rely on the 
promise made by the ward that she would have a right of residence in the house. The 
ward had made a will in favour of the cohabitee and High Court ordered a sale of the 
house and the purchase of another suitable one giving a right of residence to the 
cohabitee.
The Committee
The committee is the person to whom the affairs of the Ward are committed and is 
commonly, though not always, a family member. It is the duty of the committee to 
ensure the care, treatment and comfort of the ward. To this end, the committee is 
required to visit the ward or, if residing with the ward, report on his needs and permit 
visits by the medical visitors.56 The President can appoint a committee of the person 
separately from a committee of the estate, but usually the affairs of the person and 
property are committed to one person. Where there is opposition to the committee, or 
where there is a disagreement, or conflict of interest, or where no relative resides in 
the country, the President can appoint the General Solicitor for Minors and Wards to 
act as committee. The committee can only do what is permitted by the Court and has 
no inherent power or authority. Typically, the role of the committee involves 
collecting the pension, letting a farm or selling a house.
... the Committee of the Person has rights and duties and these may include 
litigation on behalf of the ward. Indeed, this is especially so if the Committee 
of the Estate is taking a view which the Committee of the Person believes is 
having a detrimental effect on the person of the ward. In such a conflict it is 
open to the President of the High Court to sanction proceedings on behalf of 
the ward by the Committee of the Person.57
55 [1993] ILRM 657.
56 It is accepted that these medical visitors do not exist due to lack of resources.
57 In re K (Ward o f Court) [2001] 1 IR 339.
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The committee is bound by rules regarding the management of the ward’s money and 
an annual account is held in the Office of Wards of Court of all monies received and 
disbursed.58
Standard of proof
The onus of proof regarding incapacity rests on the person asserting the need for 
wardship and, while the standard of proof lacks clarity, it appears to be the civil 
standard. The level of incapacity and the basis on which it is judged is not set out in 
the legislation, but depends on current practice. The 1871 Act requires the judge to 
conduct an inquiry and hearings are inquisitorial. The rules of evidence are relaxed 
and the hearing is administrative in nature.59
Effect of a declaration of wardship
Wardship is a very extreme measure that takes no account of the functional approach 
to decision-making, thus leading to a “one size fits all” approach. The most significant 
aspect of admission to wardship is that the individual loses all rights to make any 
decisions about his person or property and this may apply for life.
By and large wardship is for life, although there are cases (especially where a 
person has recovered damages for a brain injury and is quite young when the 
Declaration Order is made) where the ward recovers sufficiently to apply 
successfully to be discharged from wardship and remitted to the management 
of own affairs.60
The court is vested with jurisdiction over all matters relating to the person and estate 
of the ward.61 The declaration of wardship results in a significant loss of liberty for 
the individual, both personally and in relation to his property and affairs. The ward is 
not allowed to move at will from his agreed residence and may be required to live in a 
particular setting. All changes, such as hospital care, must be notified to the Office of
~8 Rules of the Superior Courts, Section 62 of Order 67 rule 57.
A discussion on the standard of proof arose in the In re a Ward (No 2) [1996] 2 IR 79 and there was 
considerable divergence on the standard of proof, even though the case was not about the status of 
wardship, but the legality of withdrawal of treatment.
60McLoughlin N.,“Wardship: A Legal and Medical Perspective” (1998) 4(2) MLJI, p64.
61 In re a Ward o f Court(Withdrawal o f Medical Treatment) [1996] 2 IR 79 pl06.
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the Ward of Court. In effect, the Court takes over all decision making for the ward 
and the committee carries out day to day matters, including specific areas directed by 
the Court. This effectively removes the ward from participation in any legal matters, 
such as buying or selling property. A ward can only be a plaintiff in legal proceedings 
if the President of the High Court authorises the committee to bring those proceedings 
on behalf of the ward. The ward may be able to make a will if the President confirms 
that he has testamentary capacity to do so based on medical evidence and the opinion 
of his solicitor. Being a ward does not prevent a person from being sued or facing 
criminal prosecution and the Court can authorise representation of the ward in those 
proceedings.
The ward retains ownership of any property and money although these may be dealt 
with or used in accordance with the orders made by the Court. On the death of the 
ward after a Grant of Probate or Administration is issued, his estate is distributed 
according to his will or under the rules of intestacy. The 1871 Act sets out 
circumstances in which the property can be sold. One of the criticisms of this aspect is 
that there is no provision for long-term investment in property or to prevent 
diminution in the value of property.63
There are a limited number of safeguards provided in the current system. The 
Registrar can request the committee to report on the “residence, physical and mental 
condition, maintenance, comfort and such other matters in relation to the ward as he 
may wish to be informed of.”64 The Act mandates that medical and legal visitors have 
a duty to visit the ward but this is not done due to lack of resources.65 The committee 
has no authority to change the residence of the ward without the permission of the 
judge or Registrar.66 A further concern is that there is no obligation to inform the 
ward’s GP, any organisations, carers, other doctors, or local health services that the 
person is a ward, though in practice this happens when services are being organised.
62 Succession Act 1965.
63 It has been reported that there is €420m held by the various courts for minors and wards. Reviewed 
in 2001 to advise on best practice and Investment Committee set up as advisory group for investment 
strategies and best practice guidelines. This has been improved with the new legislation, Trustee 
(Authorised Investments) Order 1998.
64 Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871, sections 57-58.
65 This provision is not applied due to resource constraints.
66 Rules of Superior Courts, Order 67, rule 59.
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The omission is a significant deficit in relation to the management of the ward and 
can lead to arbitrariness and inconsistencies. It also adds to the disconnectedness 
between the centralised system around the formality of being a ward and the day to 
day life of the ward.
Where the ward is in psychiatric care, part of the order is that he stays there until 
further order from the Court.67 Wards in psychiatric detention have no specific rights 
under the 1945 Act although the President of the High Court can request the Inspector 
of Mental Hospitals to visit and report on their circumstances.68 Patients have a right 
to send an unopened letter to the President, though this is a bit unrealistic in view of 
the level of incapacity of wards and the saving section regarding wards in the 1945 
Act is not clear on whether the rights in the Act clearly apply to wards or not. 69 The 
2001 Act will not change anything in this regard due to the saving clause carried over 
from the 1945 Act regarding the power of the High Court.70 The matter of review of 
wards in psychiatric detention rests with the High Court, but raises issues under 
Article 5(4) and Article 14, unless there is objective and reasonable justification for 
the difference in treatment of wards compared with fellow patients who have a right 
to review of detention in the 2001 Act.
The individual will always have legal representation even though this is not based on 
statute. The capacity assessment for entry to wardship is a general one rather than 
issue specific and where the person satisfies the criteria of unsound mind and is 
incapable of managing himself or his affairs, then autonomy is removed. This would 
seem to be disproportionate to the aim of protecting the property or welfare of the 
individual and not in keeping with the least restrictive alternative principle. In this 
sense it may not satisfy the requirements based on the Winterwerp tests. The length of 
time to complete a wardship application is regarded as too long at a minimum of three 
months.
6/ Department of Health & Children, Report o f the Inspector for Mental Hospitals for year ending 
2003, Dublin, 2004, recorded a total of 100 wards of court detained in psychiatric care.
68 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 241.
69 Ibid, section 266.
70 Schedule to the Mental Health Act 2001 Act and Mental Treatment Act 1945 section 283.
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The principal purpose of wardship is to protect the property and welfare of the adult 
and manage it for his benefit. The majority of wardship applications relate to the 
management of property and affairs and fewer are solely about personal welfare.71 
The law governing wardship originated at a time when there was little understanding 
of mental disability and when there was no recognition of the right to autonomy, self- 
determination, or of the principle of the least restrictive alternative. The situation is 
different now with recognition of these important human rights.
Wardship and other civil rights
Marriage
The statutory prohibition on the ward entering marriage dating from Marriage of 
Lunatics Act, 1811 has been repealed in England, but not Ireland. If the person does 
not have contractual capacity, it is difficult to contract a valid marriage.72 Where a 
married person is made a ward of court, this does not automatically invalidate the 
marriage if the person at the time of the marriage had the requisite capacity. Article 
6(1) requires that any limitations on this civil right are proportionate to the aim of 
protecting incapacitated people. The restrictions must not be such that the very 
essence of the right to marry is impaired unless this accords with a legitimate aim. 
"Some people who are wards might quite possibly be able to understand the nature of 
the marriage contract and this is one of the many aspects of the wardship jurisdiction
7^which would merit revision.” The related right to a sexual relationship and to 
reproduction are discussed in chapter eight.
Testamentary capacity
There is no automatic right to ensure a ward is enabled to make a will and the onus is 
on the ward to contact the Registrar of Wards if he wants to make a will. Where the 
President has medical evidence of testamentary capacity, the ward can be authorised 
to instruct a solicitor to make a will, provided the solicitor is satisfied that the ward is
71 Information from the Ward of Court Office 2004.
72 See Chapter 8 for discussion of the right to marry.
73 Op.cit., 60 at p62.
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capable of doing so. After the ward’s death, the assets are distributed according to the 
will or under the rules of intestacy.74
Voting
There is no statutory restriction on voting, but there is a common law rule that people 
who are mentally incompetent are not entitled to vote. This does not appear to be 
enforced and there are no arrangements for assessing capacity. Those wards who live 
in psychiatric hospital or residential centres may be unable to establish residency for 
the purpose of being on the Register of Electors. This issue is raised from time to 
time, remains fundamental to citizenship and needs to be clarified.
Discharge from wardship
An application can be made to be discharged from wardship based on medical 
evidence to the effect that the ward is of sound mind and capable of managing his 
affairs. There is no automatic review of wardship unless the committee or 
representative of the ward takes the initiative to apply to the President. This would 
appear to conflict with fair procedures, as the requirement to initiate the review is 
quite onerous. The Court, in Matter v. Slovakia, said that “it may be appropriate ... 
that the domestic authorities establish after a certain lapse of time whether such 
measure continues to be justified. Such a re-examination is particularly justified if the
75person concerned so requests it.”
The legislation gives no guidance on the level of capacity to be arrived at for 
discharge, other than being of sound mind and capable of managing one’s affairs 
generally. Based on the Keogh case, it appears that if both requirements are not
76present, the person should not be in wardship. Reliance is placed on family or 
medical personnel to identify any change and initiate proceedings. This is obviously 
an arbitrary approach to continuing incapacity and may not be justifiable as being 
proportionate to the aim of the protective jurisdiction. The gap in the statutory
74 Succession Act 1965.
75 (2001) 31 EHRR 32 para 68.
76 In re Catherine Keogh Unreported High Court, (Finnegan J.) 15th October 2002.
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obligation to review the continuing incapacity contrasts with the decision in the
77 .English case, Masterman-Lister v. Brutton & Co. & the Home Counties. The 
presumption of continuance of incapacity is no longer acceptable, as ruled by 
Kennedy LJ in the Masterman.78 If there is clear evidence of incapacity for a 
considerable period, the burden of proof may be more easily discharged.
The 1871 Act mandates regular visits to the ward by medical or legal visitors, 
involving four visits annually for those in the community and one visit annually for
70those in residential care. The purpose of the visit to the wards is to “make inquiries 
and investigations as to their care and treatment and mental and bodily health, and the
on
arrangements for their maintenance and comfort, and otherwise respecting them ...” 
These visits do not take place due to resource constraints. Clearly, this is a breach of 
statutory requirements, perhaps causing people to remain in wardship longer than 
necessary.81
Conclusion on wardship
The criteria used for wardship, “unsound mind” and “weak mind,” coupled with the 
lack of a specialist assessment, need to be revised to a narrower more specific 
criterion taking account of individual difference. The relationship of proportionality 
between the interference, taking no account of individual difference, and where 
precise criteria for values like autonomy and self-determination are not part of the 
assessment of capacity, would not seem to accord with the aim of protecting the 
individual and property. The procedure does not acknowledge partial capacity or an 
ability to carry out some tasks and not others and is not in keeping with maximising 
autonomy and enabling participation. Criticisms of the wardship system centre on the 
complexity and inflexibility of the procedures. The results of one study found that the
77 Masterman-Lister v. Brutton & Co. & the Home Counties [2002] EWCA Civ 1889.
78 Ibid, para 17. This is an important statement in view of the rigid ward of court system where the 
burden of release from warship rests on the ward or his representative rather than having a statutory 
based periodic review of continuing incapacity
79 Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871, section 57.
80 Ibid, section 56.
81 These visits would have provided an important connection between the ward and the High Court 
instead the limited connection through the committee who may have only very limited contact. Even if 
this system, of two centuries ago, were in operation it would probably eliminate many doubts regarding 
the continuing incapacity of the ward and concerns regarding the day to day life of the Ward.
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89system does not lend itself to rapid response. Whether this might breach the 
requirement of reasonable time in Article 6 is not clear, but one of the frequent 
complaints relates to the length of time to complete wardship proceedings. The lack of 
automatic review of the need to continue with wardship adds to the arbitrariness of the 
system with the onus on the allegedly incapacitated person or the committee to initiate 
a review of continuing wardship, rather than having an automatic periodic review 
built into the system. This gap is heightened for the 100 wards currently in psychiatric 
detention who are not entitled to review of their continuing detention under either
8 'XAct. These failures are in breach of Article 6 and the right to a fair hearing, as well 
as breach of Article 5(4) and the need for review of continuing detention.
Wardship is used as a method of last resort, but in the absence of less extreme or once 
off interventions, questionable arrangements have arisen for dealing with persons in 
order to avoid wardship. When a person is detained in hospital, he is often denied the 
right to deal with his property on the assumption of incapacity due to detention, but 
without an assessment of his actual capacity. This situation occurs also in relation to 
the voluntary admission of the compliant incapacitated patient. The automatic 
presumption of incapacity may stem from the 1945 Act, which provides that patients 
incapable of deciding to enter hospital voluntarily should be detained.84 This Act also 
provides that when a person “becomes mentally incapable of expressing himself as 
willing or not willing to remain” in the hospital, he should be discharged or 
detained.85 The implication from these sections is that detention is equated with 
mental incapacity and, as a result, informal arrangements are made for dealing with 
their affairs.
There are advantages to informal arrangements, such as flexibility and lack of 
bureaucracy, but it is likely that these situations are open to abuse, loss of property 
and exploitation, in the absence of even minimal control. Alternatively, where nothing 
is done, the patient may lose his home, job and security. Even when a person is a 
ward, that person is not necessarily protected from abuse, nor are the authorities
82 McCarthy & Wrigley, “Ward of Court -  A Review of Utilisation in a Psychiatry of Old Age 
Service”, 4(2) M U 124.
83 Op.cit., 67.
84 Mental Treatment Act 1945 sections 163 and 184 as amended by Mental Treatment Act 1961 section 
7.
85 Ibid, section 195.
242
forced to provide services such as residential care, and it is not clear if wardship can 
be used to assert rights to particular services that the court believes are appropriate.86 
The recent initiative by the President of the High Court to have an ad hoc system that 
provides a level of protection without subjecting the individual to the full wardship 
proceedings is welcome. The modem legal response to the problem of capacity lays 
great emphasis on maximising autonomy and the Law Reform Commission has 
proposed a number of changes to deal with these difficulties.87 One way in which this 
can be done is by having in place a broader enduring power of attorney.
Powers of Attorney
At the other end of the scale from wardship and the protection of the right to 
autonomy and self-determination lies the enduring power of attorney. The Powers of 
Attorney Act 1996 (1996 Act) provides for an enduring power of attorney (EPA) 
system that permits the adult to control what happens in future and acts as an advance 
directive in anticipation of a state of incapacity. This power is limited to property and 
finance, business affairs and some personal care decisions. The personal care 
decisions include where the donor should live and with whom, but it specifically
oo
excludes health care decisions. This is the only legal mechanism, apart from 
wardship, that provides for the proxy management of an incapacitated person’s 
affairs. The EPA intends power to be effective during any subsequent mental 
incapacity of the donor. Mental incapacity is defined as “incapacity by reason of a
OQ
mental condition” to manage and administer his property and affairs. The right to 
self determination is upheld in this process to the extent that people can choose who
QA
they wish to act for them in the event of incapacity. An assessment by a doctor is
86 Op.cit. ,60 p 63.
87 Law Reform Commission, Vulnerable Adults and the Law: (Capacity LRC CP 37-2005.)
88 Powers of Attorney Act 1996 Section 4(1), the definition of personal care includes, where the donor 
should live and with whom, whom the donor should see and not see, the training and rehabilitation the 
donor should get, the donor’s diet and dress, the right to inspect the donor’s papers and housing, social 
welfare and other benefits for donor.88
89 Powers of Attorney Act 1997, section 4(1).
90 Since the introduction of the legislation, 448 EPAs have been registered in contrast with the English 
system of 15,000 annually though these do not deal with personal decisions. (Approximate figures 
given by Ward of Court Office.) The figures for Ireland are low and it is likely that some of the reasons 
are, that the population at large is unaware of the existence of such a procedure, or do not understand 
that they maintain full control over their lives unless and until they become mentally incapacitated. 
There has never been a public awareness campaign.
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required at the time of creating the power and the individual’s capacity to do so must 
be affirmed by a solicitor.
There are various rights included in the 1996 Act, the right to object, for example, to 
the appointment of a particular attorney.91 This issue arose in In re the Powers o f  
Attorney Act 1996 Hamilton and Williams, involving an objection that the attorneys 
were unsuitable and the High Court held that the lack of a business skill was not a 
valid objection because “unsuitable” in the Act has no connection with the ability to
92 , .manage property. This lack of suitability would arise only if it impacted adversely 
on the administration of the estate of the donor. The attorney must act in the donor’s 
best interests, taking account of wishes and must permit and encourage the donor to 
participate, applying the least restrictive alternative principle.93 While there are 
prohibitions from being appointed as an attorney, these are quite narrowly drawn and 
do not prevent relatives of the donor from acting as solicitor, doctor and attorney 
respectively.94
There is no express provision regarding the degree of incapacity that is needed to 
establish a power of attorney. Nor is there any information on how a power might be 
revoked prior to registration. There is no obligation in the legislation to inform the 
donor that he is entitled to revoke the EPA.95 The law must be predictable in its 
effects, so that patients will know the circumstances in which their rights may be 
removed and the grounds relied on, such as the protection of health.96 There are 
difficulties with the categories of nominated persons who must be consulted and the
0 7  _ .lack of guidance for separated persons and cohabitees. The right to self­
91 These grounds include: that the power is not valid, the power is no longer valid and subsisting, the 
donor is not mentally incapable, the attorney is unsuitable, that fraud or undue pressure was used to 
induce the donor to create the power
92 [1999] 3 IR 310. In Re W (Power o f  Attorney) [2000] 1 All ER 175, an English case, the Court held 
that hostility towards the attorney on the part of other interested parties did not mean the attorney was 
unsuitable
93 Ibid, section 6(7).
94 Anyone connected with the owner of the nursing home where the donor resides.
95 It is likely that this may breach the right to private life of the individual under Article 8 where the 
laws are not sufficiently clear.
96Glass v. United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15. Law Reform Commission, The Law and the Elderly 
(LRC CP 23-2003) p71.
97 Enduring Power of Attorney Regulations, SI No. 196, 1996 Reg 5.
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determination could be enhanced further with more flexibility regarding who can be
QQ
nominated by the donor.
While the Office of the Wards of Court and the High Court have general supervisory 
powers in relation to EPAs, few questions are asked about the EPAs. There are 
concerns about the lack of supervision of attorneys. This calls into question the rights 
of vulnerable adults and the need for a higher standard of protection." Improved 
supervision of the attorneys to eliminate the possibility for exploitation is a priority.100 
This includes the lack of independent monitoring of the acts of the attorney, along 
with lack of an independent medical assessor and legal advisor. Although some 
safeguards exist, these are not adequate to ensure that those appointed act in the best 
interests of the incapacitated person. Some of these issues are the subject of current 
law reform.101
Law reform
The protection of individuals in the determination of civil rights and obligations in 
Article 6 highlights the need for reform of Irish law in this area. This applies in 
particular to the lack of a reasonable relationship or proportionality in the level of 
interference or means used having regard to the aim of the protection of property and 
personal affairs under the ward of court system. This is recognised by the Law 
Reform Commission (LRC) with the publication of two Consultation Papers that are 
concerned “with legal mechanisms and responses to the needs of vulnerable 
people.”103 These reforms propose to replace the wardship system with a 
comprehensive structure that will assess capacity, enhance and enable decision­
making capacity and provide proxy decision-making where necessary. The LRC
98 Ibid.
99 Herczgefalvy v. Austria (1992) 15 EHRR 437.
100 Department of Health and Children, Protecting our Future, Dublin, 2002. Report of the Working 
Group on elder abuse Government Publications, Dublin. Enduring Power of Attorney Regulations SI 
No. 196 (1996) para 5. Article 8 issues may be engaged in relation to private life and bodily integrity 
and the failure to ensure that the procedures accord with the law.
101 Op. cit., 87.
102 Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 528 para 57. See chapter 3.
103Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper, The Law and the Elderly (LRC CP 23-2003) and 
Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper, Vulnerable Adults and the Law (LRC CP 37-2005). The 
Reports endorsed the recommendations of the Working Group on Elder Abuse the “the response to 
elder abuse be placed in the wider context of health and social care services for older people.” 
Government Publications, Protecting our Future, Dublin, 2002.
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second report stresses that the law on capacity should reflect capacity, rather than lack 
of capacity, ensuring that it would be enabling rather than restrictive in nature thereby 
complying with constitutional and human rights standards.104
Law Reform Commission Proposals -General Principles
The principles proposed in the LRC Report to underpin reforms include respect for 
human and constitutional rights, a co-ordinated and integrated service and legislation 
which should be simple, usable and allow for flexibility to meet individual needs.105 
These rights include rights to equality and non-discrimination, to bodily integrity, to 
protection of the person, to liberty, family rights, privacy, property rights and the right 
not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment.106 The interests and welfare 
of the adult concerned should be the paramount consideration. Other principles that 
should be included in legislation on this area include the presumption of capacity, 
assistance to decision-makers and carers, the maximum preservation of capacity, 
flexibility in legal response, informal measures for one-off decisions and joint 
representation.107 In this regard, Clive states,
The legal framework must ensure that inappropriate consequences are not 
attached automatically to measures of protection. In particular, a measure of 
protection should not result in an automatic restriction of legal capacity unless 
that is necessary.108
Many of these principles are included in the English Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
including the presumption of capacity and the requirement that a lack of capacity 
cannot be established unless all practicable steps to help the person to make a decision 
have been taken without success.109 The LRC recommends that a predominantly 
functional approach should be taken to the assessment of legal capacity. This would
104 Op.cit., 87 p211.
105 Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper, The Law and the Elderly (LRC CP 23-2003)
106 Ibid, para 6.09.
107 Law Society of England, the British Medical Association and Making Decisions Alliance Joint 
Charter on Mental Capacity and Decision Making 1998.
108 Clive E., Council o f  Europe Report o f Specialists on Incapable and Other Vulnerable Adults 
Scottish Law Commission 1997 para 3.34.
109Mental Capacity Act 2005, section 1 See also chapter 3 for discussion of self-determination and 
mental capacity.
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involve issue specific decision-making, but it recognizes that where an adult’s lack of 
capacity is profound and enduring, a new functional determination may be 
unnecessary in every situation in which a decision has to be made.110 The proposed 
definition of lack of capacity is as follows,
A person will lack capacity if they are unable to communicate their choice by 
any means where communication to a third party is required to implement a 
decision.111
In these circumstances, the principle of the least restrictive alternative or 
proportionality must be observed and the protective mechanisms should be the 
minimum in order to ensure the maximum preservation of the right to autonomy and
119self-determination and this should uphold the doctrine of proportionality. It should 
ensure that those with legal capacity should have the right to make choices, even if 
these are risky or perhaps irrational. The wishes of the person should be taken into 
account in any decision about him and other interested parties, including relatives, 
should have a say consistent with the best interests of the person. In keeping with the 
requirements under Article 6(1), there should be a right to legal representation before 
an independent body and a right of appeal.
Recommendation (2004) 10 provides that member states should ensure that there are 
mechanisms to protect vulnerable persons who do not have the capacity to consent or 
who may not be able to resist infringements of their human rights.113 It also states that 
the law should provide measures to protect, where appropriate, the economic interests 
of persons with mental disorder. The explanatory memorandum to the 
Recommendations states that any arrangements by another person regarding the 
vulnerable person’s finances should be carefully regulated and be subject to review by 
monitoring bodies to ensure the interests and welfare of the person concerned remain 
the paramount consideration.114 This point is particularly relevant to Irish
110 Op.cit., 87.
111 Op.cit., 87 para 3.49.
112 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2004) 10 on the protection o f human 
rights and dignity o f persons with mental disorder, Article 7. Article 8 supports the principle of the 
least restrictive intervention.
113 Ibid.
114 Council of Europe Recommendation (2004) 10 Explanatory memorandum para 56 & 57.
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arrangements, formal and informal, for managing the property of incapacitated 
individuals.
Law Reform Commission proposals for assessing capacity
While the concentration of the LRC first report was on the elderly, many aspects of 
the report are applicable to other vulnerable adults and decision-making.115 The 
removal of civil rights in the same manner for all people in wardship is not 
proportionate to the aim of protecting the individual’s right to protection of property. 
The LRC proposes that any interferences should involve the least restrictive 
alternative in keeping with human rights principles and, as a result, a decision on 
incapacity may not always be necessary. It would also accord with the requirement of 
proportionality in decision-making.
Law Reform Commission proposed structures
The LRC proposes a unified system for persons and property where more than one 
guardian could be appointed for different aspects of the person’s life. There would be 
four levels in the substitute decision-making process in ascending order: the Personal 
Guardian, the Public Guardian, the Tribunal and the Court. A new independent Office 
of the Public Guardian as overall supervisor of the guardians and attorneys in the 
enduring power of attorney system is proposed. There would be a right of appeal to a 
tribunal against any decision by the Public Guardian.
The LRC proposes that the Personal Guardian should be entitled to take minor 
emergency health care decisions on behalf of the protected adult. The LRC considers 
that attorneys under the enduring power of attorney system should also be entitled to 
make these decisions if the specific authority is contained in the EPA. They believe 
there should be provision for the donor to establish the nature of such authority and its 
extent, unless it is excluded by the donor.116 If the donor becomes a ward, this would 
not automatically invalidate the power, but the court could invalidate it. The LRC has
115 The Law Reform Commission has published a follow-up report that includes all vulnerable adults. 
Vulnerable Adults and the Law (LRC CP 37-2005).
116 Op.cit., 87 at para 3.14, 15.
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stated that the EPA would only be displaced by a guardianship order if this were 
absolutely necessary, as the scope of the attorney would be limited by the terms of the 
EPA and this limitation could be overcome by a court order if necessary.
The LRC suggests that a tribunal is the most appropriate system for making decisions 
regarding capacity and would provide greater flexibility in procedures, such as the
117strict rules of evidence and would also be less formal and intimidating. The main
functions of the tribunal would be to decide issues of general legal capacity, make
Guardianship orders, appoint Personal Guardians, make Adult Care Orders and
receive appeals from decisions of the Public Guardian. Applications to the tribunal for
the various orders could be made by anyone in need of protection and by bodies like
the Health Services Executive, the Public Guardian or the Mental Health
Commission. There will be a range of decisions to be made on the vulnerable adult’s
behalf and as a once-off decision or on a continuous basis. The procedures will be as
informal as possible, but in line with administrative law and rules of constitutional
justice. This would involve being informed about the application and the right to
object, to have an advocate to explain the issues as well as legal representation, to
produce witnesses, to be notified of relevant hearings, to be given access to
1 1 8documents and to be provided with reasons for decisions. A right of appeal to the 
Circuit Court is also an essential part of the system. The LRC recommends that 
certain major health care decisions, such as the removal of life support or organ 
donation, would only be made by the President of the High Court. These proposals 
seem to accord with the requirements of Article 6 and the right of access to an 
independent and impartial tribunal and to have a fair hearing with the attendant rights, 
including legal representation and a hearing within a reasonable time.
Conclusion
The criteria for entry to wardship are very broad and not legally defined in terms of 
current practice in psychiatry and do not specify requirements for a capacity 
assessment. This situation runs the risk of being disproportionate to the aim of 
protecting the person or property of the individual. The lack of a legal requirement
117 Ibid, at para 1.47.
118 Ibid, at para 6.52.
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regarding a specialist medical assessment permits a degree of discretion. While there 
is a right of access to a court in the determination of the removal of civil rights for the 
purpose of wardship, as required by Article 6, many aspects are arbitrary and unclear. 
The right to legal representation is dependent on accepted practice, rather than having 
a sound basis in statute. This places the proposed or current ward at a disadvantage in 
seeking to object to wardship or challenge its continuity. The notification 
requirements are not clearly laid out and while, in practice, proposed wards may be 
given information, there is no provision requiring this in law. The time scale for 
objections is inadequate and creates a significant burden if the initiating report is not 
available. There should be a representative such as a proxy, who would receive such 
information on behalf of an incapacitated person and who would assist in making 
decisions during hearings or afterwards. The procedure is not regarded as speedy and 
this aspect has been subject to criticism within the care service.119 These factors need 
to be addressed in terms of compliance with Article 6. The continuity of wardship for 
an individual should be accompanied by a substantive review based on his best 
interests. A review is also needed for wards receiving inpatient psychiatric care.
The wardship system is in need of significant reform to ensure the right to autonomy 
and self-determination of the incapacitated person is respected and to comply with the 
requirement of proportionality under Article 6. There are many difficulties, most 
importantly the total removal of the individual’s decision-making capacity based on 
vague criteria rather than a capacity assessment. The language used is anachronistic 
and as a consequence of this stigmatising terminology and the total removal of legal 
personhood people may be deterred from using the procedure in appropriate cases. 
The system for the management of property and affairs is haphazard and random, 
involving loose procedures and limited safeguards. Unless large sums of money and 
property are involved, informal systems of hospital management of a patient’s affairs 
apply and in general there is no code of practice or clear procedures for 
accountability. The new procedure may fill the gap, but compliance with Article 6 on 
this procedure is difficult to assess.
119 Op.cit, 82 p60.
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The lack of a legal framework for individuals without capacity raises issues under 
Article 6 in the context also of the informality of current decision-making in Irish law 
in relation to property and affairs. In law reform on capacity in Scotland, England and 
Australia, emphasis is on appointing an attorney to manage property and affairs and 
make welfare decisions for the individual. In other international contexts, the Hague 
Convention on the International Protection of Adults concerns the protection of adults 
in “international situations” who cannot protect their own interests due to an 
impairment or insufficiency of their personal faculties. The measures that can be 
applied involving the Hague Convention include the following: the determination of 
incapacity and the institution of a protective regime, the placement of such adults 
under the protection of a judicial or administrative authority, the appointment of 
guardianship and a body or person to take charge of the adult’s affairs for 
representation or assistance and placement of the adult in a protective environment. 
Generally, the judicial and administrative authorities of the Contracting State where 
the person has habitual residence will have a preference over others in exercising such 
protective jurisdiction.
The LRC proposes a comprehensive structure focusing on the needs of the individual 
in order to enhance autonomy and self-determination in relation to property and other 
welfare matters. The LRC recommends that proposed capacity legislation would 
involve the formulation of a code of practice for health care professionals. The code 
of practice would provide guidelines in relation to assessing a person’s capacity to 
make a healthcare decision. It could also provide guidance on urgent situations where 
treatment can be carried out without the consent of the adult concerned. It is 
envisaged that the code of practice would specify which major healthcare decisions 
would require court approval where a patient lacks capacity to make the decision.120 It 
is proposed to expand the enduring power of attorney to include some medical 
decisions by the attorney, thereby further enhancing the right to self-determination. 
The LRC proposals will contribute to a comprehensive human rights based approach 
to the determination of the civil rights of incapacitated adults. While these proposals 
are at an early stage they would appear to meet the standard required under Article 6 
by providing for fair procedures in access to court, representation, rights of appeal and
20 Ibid. See chapter 3 for full discussion of medical decision-making.
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by ensuring that interferences with an individual’s civil rights will be proportionate 
and based on actual ability.
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Chapter 7
ARTICLE 2 AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE UNDER IRISH LAW 
Introduction
This chapter considers the right to life and the obligations on the state to safeguard 
this right under Article 2 and examines the enforcement of these rights in Irish law in 
relation to people with mental disorder. It has long been accepted that individuals in 
detention are in a vulnerable position, thereby creating a greater onus on the state to 
protect the lives of such people. This is particularly important in relation to death in 
custody because of the knowledge both of the vulnerability of such individuals and 
the higher suicide risk associated with them. These obligations on the state to prevent 
the arbitrary deprivation of life will be examined with regard to the action of state 
agents, non-state agents, individuals taking their own lives and the risk to the public 
from mental disorder. The corresponding duty on the state to investigate such deaths 
and the rights of families is also examined.
Article 2 provides,
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived 
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following 
his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this 
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely 
necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or 
insurrection.
The right to life is regarded as the most fundamental right of all and cannot be 
derogated from at any time and, as such, its provisions must be strictly construed.1 
The state is required to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life and to 
take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.2 Article 2
1 McCann v. United Kingdom 31 EHRR 97 para 147.
2 Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19 para 54.
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does not confer a right to die or “create a right to self determination” in choosing to 
die.3 It does not give an unconditional protection for life and it is not concerned with 
the quality of life. A whole range of complaints have been considered under Article 2, 
including risks from a public health programme, as well as criminal actions resulting 
in the death of a detainee.4 Article 2 does not require ruling out all possible medical 
risks to individuals where the overriding good of the general community is at stake, 
such as a vaccine programme which contains recognised minimal risks.5 However, the 
failure to protect against known risks from a violent in-mate may be sufficient to 
engage Article 2.6 The purpose of the Article is to ensure that the safeguards provided 
therein are practical and effective.
Positive obligations
Both positive and negative obligations arise in the requirement to protect life and not 
to take life except in exceptional circumstances. This means that states must provide 
in law for the protection of human life and in general the taking of life must be illegal. 
Article 1, Protocol 6 provides for the abolition of the death penalty and a prohibition 
on its reintroduction, but permits states to make provision in its law for the death 
penalty in war or threat of war situations. This creates an additional obligation on the 
state to refrain from extraditing a person to a state where there is a real risk that the
o
death penalty will be imposed. It is necessary for the sending state to get agreement 
that the death penalty will not be used before extradition goes ahead. The Article, 
therefore, has an extraterritorial application to protect those liable to deportation from 
serious risk to life apart from the death penalty. Most of these cases are dealt with 
under Article 3, but it is probable that Article 2 extends to cases where the loss of life 
is likely to take place outside the state’s territory.9
3 Pretty v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1, para 39.
4 Association X  v. United Kingdom 14 D & R 31, Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19.
5 Association X  v. United Kingdom 14 D & R 31.
6 Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19.
7 McCann v. United Kingdom 31 EHRR 97 paras 146-147.
8 Cyprus v. Turkey (1976) 4 EHRR 482.
9 Ovey & White, Jacobs and White European Convention on Human Rights, (3rded.), OUP, Oxford, 
2002, p47.
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Positive obligations arise in relation to the protection against unlawful killing by 
agents of the state10 and by non-state agents, such as other patients or prison in­
mates.11 The obligation also requires protection against suicide, in circumstances
10where the risk is known to the state. The obligation also extends to the protection of
1 ^the public against a known risk from a mentally disordered person. These 
obligations increase in relation to people with mental disorder in detention. There is a 
duty on the state to carry out an investigation following loss of life in such 
circumstances, to establish the facts, assign responsibility and accountability for the 
death.
The deportation of a severely ill prisoner was raised in D v. United Kingdom, and was 
opposed on the basis that he would not be able to access medical treatment and 
therefore his life expectancy would be shortened.14 He alleged his removal to St Kitts 
would violate Articles 2, 3 and 8, and deny him an effective remedy under Article 13. 
He alleged a violation of Article 2 on the basis that there would be a direct causal link 
between his expulsion and his accelerated death such as to give rise to a violation of 
the right to life. The Court held that the threat to his life stemmed not from factors for 
which the government could be held responsible, but from his own fatal illness in 
conjunction with the lack of medical treatment in St Kitts. The complaints raised 
under Article 2 were not divisible from the complaints under Article 3, regarding the 
consequences of the decision for his life, health and welfare. Following a finding by 
the Court of a breach of Article 3, it was not thought necessary to examine his 
complaint under Article 2.
Action by state agents
Article 2 places a positive duty on the state to protect life against the unlawful use of
force by agents of the state, which is no more that “absolutely necessary.”15 The use
of the terms “absolutely necessary” means that a stricter and more compelling test of
10 McCann v. United Kingdom 31 EHRR 97.
11 Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19.
12 Keenan v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 38 para 92.
13 Osman v. United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245 para 56.
14 (1997) 24 EHRR 423.
15 McCann v. United Kingdom 31 EHRR 97. See p 257 et seq for discussion of positive duty to 
investigate suspicious deaths.
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necessity must be used when the right to life is engaged.16 The Court in McCann v. 
United Kingdom, said that the use of force must be strictly proportionate to the
17achievements of the aims set out in Article 2.
Harris believes that Article 2 could require the state to take positive steps to make 
adequate provision for medical care or for food and shelter or a healthy working
I o
environment. If this were established such a duty could have significant benefits for 
community care for mentally disordered people in recognition of the associated 
benefits to society. The public vaccination scheme aimed at the health of the total 
population was held to trump any negligence action from the resultant few deaths.19 In 
this case, the Court held that where a small number of fatalities occur in the context of 
a vaccination scheme with the sole purpose of protecting the health of society by 
eliminating infectious diseases, this cannot be said to be an intentional deprivation of 
life within the meaning of Article 2(1). Nor could it be said that the state has failed to 
take adequate and appropriate steps to protect life. This case was declared 
inadmissible on the grounds that appropriate steps had been taken with a view to the 
safe administration of the scheme. The word “intentional” should be given its 
ordinary meaning, i.e. where the purpose of the prohibited action is to cause death.20
The duty of medical staff in emergencies arose in Glass v. United Kingdom and the 
Court stated that in a situation where there are adequate provisions for high 
professional standards and for the protection of the lives of patients, then,
errors of professional judgment (even if established) on the part of a health 
professional in the treatment of a particular patient are not of themselves 
sufficient to call that State to account from the standpoint of its positive*71obligations under Article 2 of the Convention to protect life ...
The applicant in X  v. Ireland, complained that the refusal to grant a medical card 
providing for free treatment for her disabled child, along with additional welfare
16 Ibid, para 149.
17 Ibid, para 214.
18 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law o f the European Convention on Human Rights, Butterworths, 
London, 1995, p40.
19 Association X  v. United Kingdom (1978) 14D&R31.
20 Re A (Conjoined Twins)(Surgical Separation) [2004] 4 All ER 961.
21 (2004) 39 EHRR 15.
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benefits, breached her child’s right to life under Article 2.22 The Commission left 
open the question of whether the negative prohibition on the taking of life could, in 
certain circumstances, lead to positive action to provide health care. The complaint 
could not be substantiated as the child had received medical care, so her life was not 
actually endangered. A related issue arose in Scialacqua v. Italy, where the 
Commission stated that,
even assuming that Article 2 can be interpreted as imposing on States the 
obligation to cover costs of certain medical treatments or medicines that are 
essential in order to save lives, ... this provision cannot be interpreted as 
requiring states to provide for financial cover for medicines that are not 
officially recognised medicines.23
The requirement for hospitals to have regulations for the protection of their patients' 
lives is an aspect of state obligations under Article 2. This includes an obligation to 
establish an effective judicial system for ascertaining the cause of a death which 
occurs in hospital and any liability on the part of the medical practitioners 
concerned.24
Duty o f the state to protect the public from risk o f unlawful killing by a mentally 
disordered person
The nature of the state’s positive obligations under Article 2(1) following the death of 
a member of the public was outlined by the Court in Osman v. United Kingdom. The 
applicant complained that the police had failed to protect the lives of her husband and 
son as required by Article 2. The Court stated that there was an obligation on the State 
under Article 2 that extended beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life and to 
refrain from killing intentionally and unlawfully. That obligation also included taking 
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. This decision 
established a three part obligation on the state to protect the person’s right to life by: 
(a) creating effective criminal law measures, (b) providing policing and criminal 
justice systems to enforce those measures and (c) taking reasonable operational
22 Application no. 6839/74 7 DR 78
23 (1998) EHRR CD 164.
24 Erikson v. Italy 29 (2000) EHRR CD 152 p7.
25 (2000) 29 EHRR 245.
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measures where there is a “real and immediate risk to the life of a particular 
individual from the criminal acts of another private person.”26 In order to establish a 
breach of this Article, it must be established,
that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence 
of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or 
individuals from criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take 
measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, [they] 
might have been expected to take to avoid that risk.2
This obligation is required to be interpreted in a way which does not impose “an 
impossible or disproportionate burden” on the resources and choices of the
• * 28  t * iauthorities. The impact of the Osman decision is that there are positive obligations 
on professionals with responsibilities under mental health legislation “to take 
appropriate preventative measures in respect of patients whom they know (or ought to 
have known) to be so dangerous as to be a threat to the lives of others.”29
Duties to protect mentally ill detainees from suicide
There is also a duty to take reasonable care to protect detained patients from suicide 
and where there is “a real and immediate threat of suicide.” This duty arises from 
the complete control which police and prison authorities have over prisoners along 
with the known special danger associated with suicide among this population. In the 
prevention of suicide by the mentally disordered in detention and seclusion, Article 3, 
rather than Article 2, is engaged. The reason for this is that the killing is carried out by 
the individual, not the state or others. Under English law, there is a common law duty
• • • "XIto take reasonable steps to prevent the suicide of a detainee. In Knight v. Home 
Office the Court held that the standard of care provided for a mentally prisoner in a 
prison hospital was not required to be as high as the standard provided in a psychiatric
26 Ibid, para 115.
2' Ibid, para 116.
28 Keenan v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 38 para 90.
29 Jones R., Mental Health Act Manual (9th ed.), Thomson, London, 2004, p773.
30 Keenan v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 38 para 92.
31 Knight v. Home Office [1990] 3 All ER 237.
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hospital outside prison. The judge did not elaborate on what was the appropriate 
standard.
The issue of self-determination and capacity are aspects that must be bome in mind 
when any treatment is being imposed even with the intention of preventing suicide. 
There are conflicts and dilemmas in overriding the wishes of the competent adult but 
in principle the law has engaged in a balancing exercise and resolve the balance where 
the conflict is between self determination and the right to life by overriding the right 
to self-determination in favour of life.33 More recently the case law has upheld the 
absolute right of the competent adult to refuse any medical treatment. However, 
societal interests are often weighted in the balance against absolute rights to self 
determination.34
The applicant in Keenan v. United Kingdom, alleged breaches of Articles 2 from the 
failure to protect her son’s life following his death in prison from suicide and that she 
had no effective remedy for her complaints.35 He had a history of severe mental 
illness and recurrent imprisonment requiring special care and was often in the health 
care centre of the prison for observation. Following a proposal to move him to the 
ordinary prison area, he deteriorated, became aggressive and was placed in an 
unfurnished cell in the health centre on 15 minute watch. A doctor with limited 
experience in psychiatry certified him as fit for segregation within the prison 
punishment block and he was locked up for 23 hours out of 24. He was later 
transferred to a cell in the hospital and put on observation, but sent back to the 
segregation unit again and received extra time due to earlier assaults on prison 
officers. He committed suicide during this time.
The advice given to the family was that they would not succeed in an action in 
negligence because he was already mentally ill and there was no indication that he 
suffered any worsening in his condition or that he had developed any new condition 
due to his segregation and treatment in prison. His mother’s legal aid application was
32 Ibid, p 243.
33 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] All ER 821.
34 Kennedy & Grubb, Medical Law 3rd ed., Dublin, 2000, p 917.
35(2001) 33 EHRR 38.
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discharged on the basis of no reasonable prospect of success in her legal action. The 
forensic psychiatrist for the family confirmed that paranoid schizophrenia was not 
compatible with segregation and he should have been in the hospital wing. In the 
opinion of the forensic psychiatrist, the notes were inadequate in that there was no 
information as to why the decision to leave him in the health centre was reversed, 
even though he had been suicidal. There were good reasons for regular monitoring of 
his mental state and this was not done. The second prison doctor did not apply the 
correct standard of care, did not have psychiatric qualifications and should not have 
taken a different course than that recommended by the attending psychiatrist. The 
remedies available to prisoners were discussed and included: complaints procedures; 
the Prison Ombudsman; judicial review; and an action for negligence, assault and 
misfeasance in public office.
The Court referred to the primary duty on the state to secure the right to life which 
also extends, in appropriate circumstances, to a positive duty on the authorities to take 
preventative operational measure to protect an individual whose life is at risk. The 
Court stated,
... not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention 
requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from 
materialising. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the 
authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real 
and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts 
of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their 
powers which judged reasonably might have been expected to avoid that 
risk.36
The authorities are under an obligation to protect the health of persons deprived of 
liberty.37 In the context of prisoners, the Court emphasised that persons in custody are 
in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect them. The 
Court was struck by the lack of medical notes on Keenan, who was an identifiable 
suicide risk and undergoing the additional stresses that could be foreseen from the 
application of segregation and disciplinary punishment. The Court said that it was 
incumbent on the state to account for any injuries suffered in custody and that the
36 Keenan v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 38 para 90.
37 Hurtado v. Switzerland Comm. Report 8 July 1993 Series A No. 280 para 87.
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obligation is particularly stringent where that individual dies. The prison authorities 
are required to discharge their duties in a manner compatible with the rights and 
freedoms of the individual concerned. The Court said that there are general measures 
and precautions to diminish the opportunities for self-harm without infringing on 
personal autonomy. Whether any more stringent measures are necessary in respect of 
a prisoner and whether it is reasonable to apply them will depend on the 
circumstances of the case. The Court held that the issues raised regarding the standard 
of care with which Keenan was treated in the days before his death fall to be 
examined under Article 3, not Article 2. These issues apply mutatis mutandis to 
people detained in psychiatric care who are generally more vulnerable than prisoners.
Duty to protect a detainee from being killed by non-state agents
The third issue involving detainees is the protection against the homicidal assault by 
private individuals. The applicants in Edwards v. United Kingdom, alleged a breach of 
Article 2 arising from the failure of the authorities to protect the life of their son, who 
had been killed by another detainee while in prison on remand.40 They also 
complained that the investigation into their son’s death was not adequate or effective 
as required by the procedural obligations under Article 2. He had a serious mental 
illness and was arrested by police for inappropriate behaviour towards other people. 
Following a mental health assessment by an approved social worker and phone calls 
with a psychiatrist, it was decided he was fit to be detained in the police station. No 
‘‘exceptional risk” form was filled in, but note was taken of the risk to females if he 
was not treated by the mental health team. He demonstrated disturbed behaviour in 
court, but there was no consideration even of a hospital assessment and no psychiatric 
reports were ordered. His parents were concerned about his mental state. Information 
about his mental state was given to some, but not passed on to essential members of 
the prison staff, such as the health screening officer in prison.
Another mentally disturbed prisoner, Linford, was placed in the same cell and killed 
the applicant’s son. The applicants were awarded a small sum as compensation for
38 Keenan v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 38 para 91.
39 Ibid, para 98.
40 Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19.
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funeral expenses. A private non-statutory inquiry was set up to examine the events 
around the death, the practice and proceedings, care and treatment of Edwards. The 
conclusion of the inquiry was that both Linford and Edwards should not have been in 
prison or sharing a cell and there was a collapse of the protective mechanisms that 
ought to have operated to protect this vulnerable prisoner. The shortcomings 
identified by the inquiry included poor record keeping, inadequate communication, 
limited agency cooperation and missed opportunities to protect Edwards. No doctor 
was asked to see him, he should have been admitted to the health care centre, and he 
should have been remanded to hospital for assessment. There was a failure to notify 
prison staff that he was mentally ill. The prison health care worker was inadequately 
trained to recognise his mental state. The mental state of the second prisoner, Linford, 
was ignored, despite knowledge of risk.
Following the inquiry, the family was advised that no civil remedy was available to 
them. The family alleged there was a breach in the positive obligations imposed on 
the authorities to protect the life o f their son and while the scope might vary, “it was 
particularly stringent where an individual died in custody.”41 The essential question 
was whether the prison authorities knew or ought to have known of the extreme 
danger in placing Linford in same cell as Edwards. The Court was satisfied that 
information was available to confirm Linford’s history of violence and should have 
been brought to the attention of the prison authorities. The Court concluded that the 
failure of the agencies, the medical staff, the police, the prosecution and the court to 
pass on information to the prison staff and the inadequate screening on arrival in 
prison constituted a breach of Article 2.
Duty to carry out an investigation
The positive duty to protect life includes the effective enforcement of the law. This 
involves the proper investigation of suspicious deaths, including death in custody, 
followed by prosecution where appropriate. There is a requirement to have some form 
of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the
41 Ibid, para 56.
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use of force/2 The purpose of the investigation is to secure the effective 
implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and in those cases 
involving state agents or bodies to ensure accountability for deaths in their 
responsibility. The form of the investigation may vary with the circumstances. The 
authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention 
and cannot leave it to the initiative of next of kin to lodge a complaint.43
The investigation must also be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to a 
determination of whether the force used in such cases was or was not justified in the 
circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those responsible.44 This is 
not an obligation of result, but of means. The authorities must have taken the 
reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, 
including inter alia eye witness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, 
a visit to the scene of the crime and a ballistics examination as well as an autopsy 
which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of 
clinical findings, including the cause of death. The Court has said that the 
investigation must be independent, effective and reasonably prompt. It must have a 
sufficient element of public scrutiny and the next of kin must be involved to an 
appropriate extent.45
The essential purpose of such investigation is to secure the effective 
implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in 
those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure accountability for
deaths occurring under their responsibility. What form of investigation will
achieve those purposes will vary in different circumstances.46
Any deficiency in the investigation, which undermines its ability to establish the 
cause of death or the person responsible, will risk falling foul of this standard.47 The
lack of power to compel witnesses, along with the private character of the
42 McCann & Others v. United Kingdom (1996) 21 EHRR 97.
43 Ibid, para 69.
44 Ayhan & Ayhan v. Turkey Application no. 41964/98 26th June 2006 para 88. See page 268 of this
chapter for reference to inadequate investigation of murder of two women, former patients.
45 Jordan v. United Kingdom Application no. 23954/94 May 24th 2001 paras 106-109.
46 Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19 para 105.
41Jordan v. United Kingdom May 24th 2001 para 120.
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investigation, was held to have excluded next of kin in Edwards and failed the test of 
an effective investigation.48
The Court in Edwards held that a procedural obligation arose to investigate the 
circumstances of the death. He was a prisoner and the State was under an obligation to 
initiate and carry out an investigation which fulfilled the requirements set out. Civil 
proceedings would not satisfy the state’s obligation in this regard. No inquest had 
been held and criminal proceedings did not involve a trial at which witnesses were 
examined. The Court regarded the lack of compulsion of witnesses, who were either 
eye witnesses or had material evidence related to the circumstances, as a diminishing 
factor in the effectiveness as an investigating mechanism. The parents were not 
represented nor able to question witnesses and had to wait for the report to see the 
evidence. They were not regarded as involved in the procedure to the extent necessary 
to safeguard their interests. The lack of power to compel witnesses failed to comply 
with the requirements of Article 2 and, to that extent, there was a violation of this 
Article.49
Where the incident lies within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as with 
people in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and 
death. The burden of proof rests with the authorities to provide a satisfactory and 
convincing explanation.50 The Court asserted that the standard of proof in such cases 
is “beyond reasonable doubt” and, where the events are within the exclusive 
knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of people in custody, strong presumptions 
of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during detention. There 
was no evidence that his injuries had been examined carefully by the medical 
profession at any time while in custody. No effort had been made to investigate the 
complaints for some years, despite efforts by the applicant. The Court concluded that 
the injuries Edwards sustained were inflicted while in custody and the responsibility 
of the state was engaged. There had been a violation of the State’s obligations under 
Article 2 with regard to conducting an effective investigation.
48 Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19 para 87.
49 Violation of Article 13 and the right to an effective remedy.
50 Op.cit., 28 p774.
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Irish law and Article 2
Constitutional law
The right to life is protected as a personal right in Article 40.3.1 of the Constitution 
and Article 40.3.3 protects the right to life of the unborn. The protection of life in 
Article 2 of the Convention is complementary to the protection of life under the 
Constitution. The right to life in the Constitution has been raised mainly in relation to 
abortion,51 but also in relation to a variety of other situations, such as the protection of 
the lives of witnesses in a trial. None have involved psychiatric detention. The 
Constitution was amended in 2001 to enter a new provision, Article 15.5.2, which 
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty under any circumstances. The 
consequent amendment to Article 28.3.3 permits no derogation, even in war or
c 'y
national emergencies. On the basis that the last execution took place in 1954, these 
amendments were largely symbolic. The death penalty was finally abolished by the 
Criminal Justice Act 1990. While Article 15.5.2 reflects Article 1 of the Sixth 
Protocol, it goes further by not permitting any exception in either war or emergency 
situations.
Legislation
The Mental Treatment Act 1945 obliges that a report on the death of any patient in a 
mental institution be given to the coroner within twelve hours of the death.54 There is 
no obligation on the coroner to hold an inquest if he is satisfied in relation to the 
circumstances of the death, provided the death is due to natural causes. Where he 
decides to hold an inquest, it should be held before a jury.55 There is also an 
obligation on the hospital to inform the Inspector of Mental Hospitals about the 
death.56 The coroner cannot investigate any matter which might lead to a finding of
51 McGee v. Attorney [1974] IR 284 at 312.
52 Burke v. Central Independent Television pic [1994] 2 IR 61, involving the upholding of a claim for 
privilege in order to the protect the identity and lives of informants who had contributed vital 
information in a libel trial.
53 Hogan & Whyte, JMKelly: The Irish Constitution, Butterworths, Dublin, 2003, para 4.2.115.
54 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 268.
55 Coroners Act 1962.
56 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 272(e).
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culpability. Coroners were restricted in relation to findings of suicide until the 
enactment of the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993 when the act of suicide was 
decriminalised, permitting coroners to return such a verdict.
There is no express provision in the Coroner’s Act 1962 requiring the family of the 
deceased to be in attendance at the inquest. The High Court, in State(McKeown) v. 
Scully, held, inter alia, that the rules of natural and constitutional justice were 
departed from in failing to give the widow and next-of-kin an opportunity to be heard
CO
at the inquest. The General Prisons (Ireland) Act 1877 provides that the coroner 
holding an inquest “on the body of a prisoner” must allow sufficient time for the 
attendance of the “nearest relative” at the inquest.59 Notice of the time and place must 
be given to the spouse or family or personal representative. The coroner may write to 
the family to inform them of the inquest and should be prepared to adjourn an inquest 
if he believes they have not been properly notified. These provisions are in keeping 
with the requirements under Article 2 in providing that the family do not have to 
initiate the involvement.60 The family should have an opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses, address the jury and give any evidence that may be of assistance to the 
inquest.61
Investigation
The Barr Inquiry was set up by the government to examine the circumstances leading 
to the death of John Carthy who was shot dead by a Garda Emergency Response Unit 
(ERU) in March 2000. He had a history of psychiatric illness and was living in his 
own home at the time. The Gardai were aware he had a gun and the situation they 
were addressing escalated leading to his death. The ongoing inquiry is wide-ranging 
and involves his family.62 The question as to whether the force used was “absolutely 
necessary” was not satisfied by the evidence at the Coroner’s Inquest due to a conflict 
between the evidence of the State Pathologist and members of the ERU. At the 
inquest, the test applied was whether the killings were “reasonably justified,” which is
57 Greene v. McLoughlin Unreported Supreme Court, 26th January 1995.
58 [1984] ILRM 133.
59 General Prisons (Ireland) Act 1877, section 56.
60 Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 5 para 69.
61 State(McKeown) v. Scully [1984] ILRM 133.
62 The Inquiry was expected to report by July 2005.
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a lower and less stringent standard than the “absolutely necessary” standard in Article 
2.63 There is considerable doubt as to whether the actions of the Gardai could have 
met the Article 2 test of absolutely necessary or that the actions were proportionate to 
the actual threat involved. It remains with the final report to ascertain whether the 
Article 2 test is satisfied in the case.64
Two independent non-statutory inquiries have published reports following the deaths 
of children who were earlier denied hospital care.65 These cases would not normally 
engage Article 2 unless a finding of criminal negligence were made or the families 
were denied a proper investigation.
Death in detention
During 2003, there were 249 deaths in psychiatric care, including 13 by suicide.66 
This figure includes 19 sudden, or unexplained, deaths of inpatients in hospital or 
while on leave. The Mental Treatment Act 1945 requires that each of these deaths
f k lmust be reported to the Minister for Health and Children. All cases are reported to 
the coroner and all were the subject of post-mortems, but not all would have involved 
inquests. The report of the Inspector of Mental Hospitals has raised the issue of 
hospital deaths and urged caution in relation to drug prescribing, frequent review of 
medication and its side-effects and the avoidance of polypharmacy to avoid deaths of 
patients.68 The Inspector’s report emphasised the importance of thorough medical 
examination of all patients with physical health problems before prescribing anti­
psychotic or anti-depressant medication. The issue of the protection of patients from 
the fatal side-effects of prescribed medication may engage Article 2 where their 
physical vulnerability is a known factor. The 2001 Act does not have specific 
obligations, like the 1945 Act, to report deaths to the Department of Health and
63 Irish Council for Civil Liberties, Submission to Joint Oireachtas Committee on Justice, Equality, 
Defence and Womens ’ Rights on the Garda Investigation o f  the Shooting ofMr. John Carthy at 
Abbeylara on 2(fh April, 2000 30th November, 2000.
64 As of February 2006 this report has not been published.
65 Department of Health and Children, Report into the death ofBronagh Livingstone,2003. Report into 
the death ofRoisin Ruddle 2004.
66 Health Research Board Report, Activities o f  Irish Psychiatric Services, Dublin, 2003.
67 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 272.
68 Department of Health and Children, Report o f  the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending 
2001, Government Publications, Dublin, 2002, p i2.
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Children or to the Mental Health Commission. This deficit will have to be remedied 
in the review of the 2001 Act or included in the code of practice to be prepared by the 
Mental Health Commission.
The Commission has said they will investigate the circumstances surrounding the 
choking to death of a patient from an untreated infection to her throat following the 
ingestion of part of a coat hanger.69 The Inquest brought in a verdict of death from 
misadventure, but the Commission want more detail regarding the action taken at the 
time.
Two women, former psychiatric patients, living in sheltered housing adjacent to a 
psychiatric hospital were murdered in 1997.70 The State has failed to find anyone 
responsible, following a botched attempt to prosecute an innocent homeless man. 
Following increased media attention during 2005, the Minister for Justice decided that 
a Senior Counsel would chair an Inquiry into the facts surrounding the Garda 
investigation. There is clearly a positive State duty to investigate these deaths and an 
inquiry into Garda activity does not properly investigate or assign responsibility for 
their deaths. The Court has pointed out that the obligation to investigate is not 
confined to cases where the suspects are agents of the state. Accordingly, even if the 
authorities are not involved in the killing that does not exclude the procedural 
obligation under Article 2 to carry out an effective investigation into the
71circumstances surrounding such deaths.
In the reported cases from prisons during the 1999/2000 period there were 16 deaths 
in custody, including nine suicides by hanging, one by overdose and five from natural 
causes. One prisoner was stabbed to death by another who was known to have a
77violent disposition and who received life imprisonment as a result. A new set of 
Prison Healthcare Standards were introduced in 2004 and provide a comprehensive 
strategy for suicide and self-injury in prison consistent with national guidelines.73 On
69 Irish Times Report, 7th February 2005.
70 Irish Times Report, 23rd June 2005.
71 Tanrikulu v. Turkey, Application no. 23763/94, para 103. See page 262 et seq. for requirements in 
such investigations.
72 Department of Justice, Annual Report o f Prison Services, Government Publications, Dublin, 2003.
73 Department of Justice, Prison Health Care Standards, Government Publications, Dublin, 2004, para 
3.3.
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the death of a prisoner, Rule 140 of the Rules for the Government of Prisons, 1947 
provides that the Governor will immediately notify the coroner, the Minister for 
Justice and nearest relative where possible. The word “prison” is interpreted widely 
and includes any place where a person is in legal custody. There is a mandatory 
requirement to have an inquest into the death of every prisoner.74
There is some evidence that not all such deaths are actually reported.75 The death of a 
fourteen year old boy, Brian Rossiter, in September 2002, who was allegedly 
assaulted while in Garda custody and died in hospital some days later, is to be the 
subject of an inquiry ordered by the Minister for Justice following a campaign to have 
his death investigated. Witnesses confirm that an assault occurred in Garda custody. 
Even though the case does not concern a person with a mental disorder, it concerns a 
child who is treated similarly to a vulnerable adult under the Convention.76 The Court 
in Edwards emphasised that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the 
authorities are under a duty to protect them, a duty that is even greater when children
77are involved. The obligation requires the State to account for any injuries suffered 
and this involves an even greater obligation when the person dies. The Rossiter case 
raises issues that would seem to engage Article 2.
Conclusion
The positive obligations on the state under Article 2 to take appropriate steps to 
protect life from the actions of the state and others and to carry out proper 
investigations indicate that that there is evidence of compliance in some aspects, such 
as family involvement in the inquest, and uncertainty in relation to others, like failure 
to have robust investigation of deaths in psychiatric care or Garda custody. The 
identification of these inadequacies are arising almost by default, as a result of a lack 
of a comprehensive approach to the management, investigation and publication of 
information of deaths in psychiatric care or in Garda custody. No information is 
available from the Inspector of Mental Hospitals on these deaths, apart from a few
74 Prisons (Ireland) Act 1877, section 56.
75 Browne, “Inaccurate Garda records on deaths in custody,” The Village Magazine, 8th -14th July 2005 
p5.
76 Z v. United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 3.
77 Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19 para 54.
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comments on the need to tighten up the approach to medication. Questions arise 
regarding the responsibility for deaths resulting from the practice of polypharmacy 
and inadequate examination prior to prescribing medication, as highlighted in some 
reports. There is a minimalist approach to information concerning these deaths and 
they receive little attention in what are otherwise detailed reports.
This lack of information applies also to homicidal killings of members of the public 
by people with mental disorder about which there are no statistics. Such deaths result 
in criminal prosecution and, if found guilty but insane, the mentally disordered person 
is committed to the Central Mental Hospital. Recent developments in Ireland, such as 
the Carthy Inquiry and the concern with rates of suicide, have engendered a greater 
focus on avoidable deaths involving mentally disordered people. The Carthy Inquiry 
provided the family of the dead man with a forum to be heard, whereas in other deaths 
in psychiatric care, there is no guarantee of involvement unless an inquest is held. The 
State has not adequately or effectively investigated murders to find the person 
responsible. The approach to cases lying outside the boundary of the criminal law or 
the coroner’s remit is unsatisfactory with regard to independent, effective 
investigative obligations or to have a sufficient element of public scrutiny. These 
deficiencies may be serious enough to engage Article 2.
78 Jordan v. United Kingdom May 4th 2001 para 107.
270
Chapter 8
ARTICLE 12 AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY AND FOUND A FAMILY 
UNDER IRISH LAW
Introduction
This chapter considers the right to marry and found a family under Article 12 and 
examines Irish law against the requirements of Article 12 in relation to people with 
mental disorder. Two key issues are considered in this chapter. First is the legal basis 
of the right to marry and the scope of the restrictions imposed on people who have a 
label of mental disorder or mental disability. The second is the right to found a family, 
which is a broader question and involves consideration of limitations that may be 
imposed on mentally disordered people exercising reproductive rights, that embraces 
a right to a sexual relationship and a right not to be sterilised. The tension between 
benign paternalism and the right to autonomy is at the core of law reform in this 
difficult area that also falls within Article 8 and the right to respect for private and 
family life.1 The Law Reform Commission has tentative proposals for changes that 
will impact on such rights in Ireland and these will be considered.
Article 12 provides:
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a 
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.
This Article is closely connected with Article 8 and the right to respect for private and 
family life. The Court regards the two parts of Article 12 as being closely related. In 
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, the Court stated that Article 12 “secures the 
fundamental right of a man and woman to marry and to found a family.”4 The scope 
of the obligation is not clear, but the rights guaranteed in national law must recognise 
the right to marry and found a family in principle. The right to marry is confined to
1 See chapter 3 for discussion of private and family life.
2 Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper Vulnerable Adults and the Law: Capacity, (LRC CP 
37-2005).
3 Rees v. United Kingdom (1986) 19 EHRR 56, Cossey v. United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR 622.
4 (2002) 35 EHRR 18 para 98.
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legally formalised heterosexual relationships, but there does not have to be the 
prospect of cohabitation.5 The role of national laws is to govern the exercise of the 
right to marry. Any restrictions imposed by national law must be for a legitimate 
purpose, be proportionate to the aim of the restriction and not impair the very essence 
of the right.6 The precise detail of such rights, such as the age of marriage, will vary 
from state to state. Harris refers to the “limited” approach of the Court to this Article
n
by comparison with their “imaginative” interpretation of Article 8. The jurisprudence 
of the Commission and the Court has given a narrow margin of appreciation to 
national authorities in matters involving intimate aspects of private life, such as rights,
• ftto a sexual relationship, to marry and found a family.
The right to marry
The issue of the suspension of the right to marry arose in F  v. Switzerland in 
accordance with the Swiss Civil Code because the applicant was held to be primarily 
at fault with regard to the dissolution of an earlier marriage. The Court held that the 
temporary suspension o f the right to marry was a disproportionate means to achieving 
the aim of stability of marriage.9 Applying the “very essence of the right” test, the 
Court stated that,
The exercise of the right to marry gives rise to personal, social, and legal 
consequences. It is subject to the national laws of the Contracting States but 
the limitations thereby introduced must not restrict or reduce the right in such 
a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired.10
The Court refused to accept the argument by the government that the temporary 
prohibition of remarriage is designed to preserve the rights of others, namely those of 
the future spouse of the divorced person. The Court ruled that Article 12 was 
breached in Goodwin v. United Kingdom, where a biological male, who had
5 Rees v. United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 56. Hamer v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 139.
6 Cossey v. United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR 622.
7 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law o f the European Convention on Human Rights, Butterworths, 
London, 1995, p 433.
8 Norris v. Ireland {1989) 13 EHRR 186, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149.
9 F  v. Switzerland (1988) 10 EHRR 411.
10 Ibid, para 32.
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undergone gender reassignment surgery and was living as a woman, was precluded 
from marrying a male partner.11
Detention and the right to marry and found a family
Most of the case law concerns prisoners. The Commission, in X  & Y v. Switzerland, 
rejected a complaint under Articles 8 and 12 by two fellow prisoners who were 
married to each other and objected to the denial of conjugal facilities.12 The Court 
placed particular emphasis on the necessity to restrict these rights for the prevention 
of disorder or crime. The refusal to allow the prisoner to marry, either in prison or on 
temporary release, arose in Hamer v. United Kingdom, and was held to violate Article 
12 due to the length of imprisonment, as a result of which the right to marry would
1 'Xhave been unacceptably delayed. National authorities may not deprive “a person or 
category of persons of full legal capacity of the right to marry.”14 The Commission 
left open whether it might, exceptionally, be possible to prohibit a patient’s marriage 
on the grounds of special dangerousness and the consequential risk posed to the 
partner. Personal liberty is not a precondition to the exercise of the right.
A long-term prisoner complained in X  v. United Kingdom of being deprived of 
conjugal rights, in the sense of being able to found further family and of being able to 
exercise his parental rights.15 The Commission stated that,
... Although the right to found a family is an absolute right in the sense that 
no restrictions similar to those in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention 
are expressly provided for, it does not mean that a person must at all times be 
given the actual possibility to procreate his descendants. It would seem that 
the situation of a lawfully convicted person detained in prison in which the 
applicant finds himself falls under his own responsibility, and that his right to 
found a family has not otherwise been infringed.16
11 (2002) 35 EHRR 18 para 98.
12 (1978) 13 DR 241.
13 (1982) 4 EHRR 139.
14 Ibid, para 60.
15 (1975) 2 D & R  105.
l6J v .  United Kingdom (1975) 2 D & R 105.
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Other issues that have arisen in the context of prison include the right to artificial 
insemination by a wife where the husband is serving a life sentence for murder.17 The 
refusal to allow the procedure was held in the English courts not to breach Article 12.
Different considerations apply to mentally disordered persons in detention where, 
unlike prisoners, they have no control over their illness that led to the detention. Any 
prohibitions in general terms would be in danger of breaching Article 12.18 Where 
there are limitations on sexual relationships between patients, or a patient and spouse, 
these would have to be strictly justified. Jones believes that it may be necessary for a 
policy to be formulated which permits sexual relationships, but includes well defined 
exceptions.19 There are no specific restrictions on a mentally disordered person 
marrying as long as he has capacity to contract a marriage. This can take place in 
prison and hospitals in the United Kingdom.
Subject to a mental patient having the mental capacity to contract a marriage, 
and the level of understanding required is basic, there is now no restriction on 
patients whether detained or not, marrying with a fellow-patient or a non­
patient and any interference with the right would normally violate Article 12. 
The need for capacity to understand the responsibilities normally attaching to 
marriage is unlikely to offend Article 12.20
Thorold refers to the importance of maintaining relationships, including conjugal 
visits for marital relationships, that contribute to positive long-term prognosis in 
mental health.21 Any limitations on such relationships would have to be strictly 
justified and a general prohibition “would be in danger of breaching Article 12.”22
Restrictions on the right of a married person to cohabit arose in Re Jennifer Connor 
who was placed on a mental health guardianship order under the Mental Health 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1986 on the basis of cognitive impairment and history of 
mental disorder.23 The hospital trust believed it was necessary for her safety and
17 R v. Secretary o f  State fo r  Home Dept, ex parte Mellor (2001) 59 BMLR 1.
18 Jones R., Mental Health Act Manual(9**^.), Thomson, London, 2004, p812.
™ Ibid, para 5-057 p812.
20 Thorold O., ‘The Implications of the European Convention on Human Rights for United Kingdom 
Mental Health Legislation’, [1996] EHRLR, pp619-636, p634.
21 Ibid, p 635.
22 Op.cit., 18 p812.
23 [2004] NICA 45 (14th December 2004).
274
welfare to restrict her periods of cohabitation with her husband and she challenged the 
necessity and proportionality of such decision based on Articles 8 and 12 of the 
Convention, dealing mainly with the issues raised under Article 8.24 The Court of 
Appeal commented, in relation to Article 12, that it would be slow to accept there was 
an absolute right to unlimited cohabitation with a spouse, regardless of the 
circumstances. There may be situations of “real and immediate threat” to the life of a 
spouse, so that the right to life would take precedence over the cohabitation right
• • 9 cunder state obligations. The Court of Appeal held the right of cohabitation as a 
qualified right which could be interfered with where it was necessary in a democratic 
society and was proportionate.
Irish law on right to marry and found a family
Constitutional law
There is no express guarantee of the right to marry and found a family in the 
Constitution. Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution recognise the family as the most 
important fundamental unit in the Irish State holding special rights and duties vested 
in it that do not apply to the non-marital family. The right to procreate was held not to
derive from Article 41, but the High Court held, in Murray v. Ireland, that this Article
protected only those rights which can properly be said to belong to the institution of 
the family itself as distinct, from the personal rights which each individual member 
might enjoy.27 The right to beget children is an unspecified right protected by Article 
40.3, the personal rights provision. The right is not absolute and can be lawfully 
restricted.28 In Murray v. Ireland a married couple, both long term prisoners, wished
9 Q
to engage in conjugal relations and have a child. The Supreme Court held that there 
was an unspecified constitutional right to procreate, but certain constitutional rights 
were not available to those in prison. This right was limited by the need to maintain 
the integrity of the prison system and could not be provided.
24 See Chapter 3 p 152 for discussion of the Article 8 implications of this case.
25 [2004] NICA 45 (14th December 2004) para 31.
26 The Constitution Review Group recommended that such a provision be included in Article 41 of the 
Constitution.
27 [1985] IR 352.
28 Ryan v. Attorney General [1965] IR 294.
29 [1991] ILRM 465.
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The equality provision of the Constitution prohibits invidious or unjustifiable 
discrimination by the State between different classes of people, but expressly permits 
the State to have due regard to difference in capacity and social function. However, 
the Supreme Court, in In re a Ward (withholding medical treatment), held that the 
loss of capacity did not result in the reduction of personal rights under Article 40.3.1 
and 40.3.2 of the Constitution. These rights include the right to privacy including 
self-determination. These rights are important in the context of Article 12.
Common law
Under the common law if  a person is capable of understanding the legal consequences 
and responsibilities which form an essential part of the concept of marriage; that the 
relationship of marriage is monogamous, interminable, except by death, or divorce, 
capacity is present. The free and informed consent of both parties is essential for a 
valid marriage. This involves an understanding of the nature and responsibilities of 
marriage at the time of the marriage. Where facts become known after the marriage 
that would have deterred one party from entering the contract of marriage, this may 
result in a nullity decree.31 Nullity of marriage can be sought where a person did not, 
at the time of the marriage, have the requisite capacity. The burden of proof is on the 
party alleging the incapacity. It is rare for nullity to be granted on the grounds of 
incapacity to consent.33 In ME v. AE, one spouse was suffering from paranoid 
schizophrenia at the time of the marriage and was unable to give full and free and 
informed consent.34 It is much more common to rely on the ground of inability to 
form and sustain a normal marital relationship. Where capacity is at issue in nullity 
proceedings, psychiatrists or psychologists may carry out examinations for the court. 
Psychiatric evidence has been very persuasive in establishing that paranoid 
schizophrenia existed at the time of the marriage in a number of cases where nullity
30 [1995] 2 ILRM 401.
31 0 ’M(M) v. 0 ’C(B) [1996] 1 IR 208.
32 Durham v. Durham (1965) 10 PD 80.
33 Legeyt v. O Brien (1834) Milw. Rep. 325.
34 [1987] IR 147 (HC).
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decrees were granted. A decree of nullity can also be sought on the basis of the 
petitioner’s own mental disorder at the time of the marriage.36
There is no presumption that a person with an intellectual disability or a mental 
disorder does not have the capacity to marry. The required understanding of the nature 
of marriage is not pitched at a high level. In an English case, Sheffield City Council v. 
E, a 21 year old woman functioning at a 13 year old level wanted to marry a 37 year 
old man with a history of sexually violent crimes and the local authority wanted to 
prevent the marriage. The Court rejected the assertion that capacity should be 
assessed in relation to the particular marriage proposal in question, but that, in 
assessing a person’s capacity to marry, the Court is not concerned with the wisdom of 
the decision, which has nothing to do with the nature of the contract of marriage the 
person has chosen to enter.
There are many people in our society who may be of limited or borderline 
capacity but whose lives are immensely enriched by marriage. We must be 
careful not to set the test of capacity to marry too high, lest it operates as an 
unfair, unnecessary and indeed discriminatory bar against the mentally 
disabled.37
He emphasised the nature of the contract as the relevant factor and is the same in all
■>Q
cases. The Court said the appropriate test to be applied in such a case was whether E 
had the capacity to marry and the appropriate test was that proposed in Re Park's 
Estate, Park v. Park.39 The Court had no jurisdiction to consider whether it was in E's 
best interests to marry, or to marry S, and it was not concerned with the wisdom of 
her marriage in general or her marriage to S in particular. A person had to understand 
the nature of the marriage contract, meaning that he or she had to be mentally capable 
of understanding the duties and responsibilities that normally attached to marriage. It 
was not enough that someone appreciated that he or she was taking part in a marriage 
ceremony or understood its words. The contract of marriage was, in essence, a simple 
one, which did not require a high degree of intelligence to comprehend. There were, 
therefore, two aspects to the inquiry into whether someone had capacity to marry: (i)
35 R v. R Unreported High Court, December 1984, DC v. DIF [1987] 7 ILRM 58, WK v. MC 
Unreported High Court, July 1992.
36 DC v. DW  [1987] 7 ILRM 58.
37 [2004] EWHC 2808 Fam para 144.
38 Ibid, para 85.
39 [1953] 2 All ER 1411.
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did he or she understand the nature of the marriage contract? and (ii) did he or she 
understand the duties and responsibilities that normally attached to marriage? The law 
was set out by Singleton LJ in In the Estate o f Park deceased, Park v. Park,
Was the deceased ... capable of understanding the nature of the contract into 
which he was entering, or was his mental condition such that he was incapable 
of understanding it? To ascertain the nature of the contract of marriage a man 
must be mentally capable of appreciating that it involves the responsibilities 
normally attaching to marriage. Without that degree of mentality, it cannot be 
said that he understands the nature of the contract.40
Capacity to marry was raised in M  v. B & Others, an English case, where the local 
authority sought a declaration that the adult, S, with severe learning disabilities, 
lacked capacity to marry and also sought an injunction preventing her parents from 
removing her from the jurisdiction for an arranged marriage.41 Evidence indicated that 
S did not understand what was involved in marriage and would not be able to cope 
with the responsibilities involved. The Court held she did not have capacity to give a 
valid consent to marry. An injunction was also justified to protect her from harm and 
justified under Article 8 to prevent her private life from being jeopardised by the 
arranged marriage.
Marriage legislation
The Marriage of Lunatics Act 1811 was passed to prevent the marriage of “lunatics” 
and provides that where a person has been found to be lunatic by “inquisition” or 
where, as a “lunatic or person under a phrenzy,” his person or estate has been 
committed to the care or custody of trustees, and such person marries before being 
declared sane, that marriage is void, even if it occurs during a lucid period. The Law 
Reform Commission has recommended that that this Act be repealed on the grounds 
that it renders void a marriage which could be valid if judged by the common law test 
of insanity and is over-inclusive.42 This Act is still on the statute books as its purpose 
is to render void the marriage of a person who was a ward of court at the time of the 
marriage This legislation assumes that all wards would not understand the nature of
40 [1954] P 112 at p 127.
41 [2005] EWHC 1681 (Fam) July 28th 2005.
42 Law Reform Commission, Report o f Nullity o f Marriage (LRC 9 1984) recommended repeal of this 
Act as it does not address the issue of capacity to marry and is over inclusive.
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the marriage contract. It is of current concern as it is referred to in the recent 
legislation, the Civil Registration Act 2004. It appears to be lacking in proportionality, 
having regard to the aim of the provision, the protection of wards of court from 
exploitation. The lack of issue specific capacity assessment for wards of court which, 
is based only on a general capacity assessment, means the provision is excessive. This 
law is anachronistic, does not accord with current thinking on autonomy and appears 
to impair the very essence of the right to marriage for those wards of court with 
capacity to contract a marriage. The Marriages (Ireland) Act 1844 provides for the 
entry of a caveat against granting a marriage certificate to a named person.
The Civil Registration Act 2004 provides for marriages to take place in locations 
other than the Registry Office provided such locations are approved by the Minister 
and expenses are paid by those seeking the separate location.43 This would indicate 
that marriages can take place in hospitals, although, if the location must be open to the 
public, this would be unlikely to include prisons. The UK Marriage Act 1983 permits 
patients detained under long-term powers in the Mental Health Act 1983 to be 
married in hospital.44 The Law Reform Commission has recommended that the 
Marriage of Lunatics Act 1811 be repealed.45
Criminal law the right to have sexual relationship
Rights to sexual relations and to found a family are matters of much greater 
controversy in relation to incapacitated adults. These rights are directly linked to 
Article 8 and the right to have privacy in sexual relationships and the right to family 
life but are important for Article 12 rights also.46 It is an issue that raises great 
controversy and tension between the individual right to greater autonomy and the 
paternalism of either the family or the state in protecting the individual against any 
exploitation or exposure to trauma. Many of the sterilisation cases reported in the 
1990s in England in relation to people with an intellectual disability are an indication
43 Civil Registration Act 2004, section 52.
44 DHSS Circular No. HC (84) 12.
45 Op. Cit., 2 para 6.51.
46 See chapter 3 for discussion of family life.
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of the extent of parental concern about the possibility of pregnancy.47 In recent years, 
the English courts have been less willing to exercise the inherent jurisdiction and 
permit such procedures, unless there is clear evidence of exposure to risk.48
The Criminal Law Sexual Offences Act 1993, section 5, provides that it is an offence 
where a person has or attempts to have sex with a person who is “mentally impaired,” 
unless they are married to each other. A defence is available to a person who did not 
know and had no reason to suspect that the person was mentally impaired. Mental 
impairment is defined as,
suffering from a disorder of the mind, whether through mental handicap or 
mental illness, which is of such a nature or degree as to render a person 
incapable of living an independent life or of guarding against serious 
exploitation.
The definition of mental impairment in the Act is regarded as outmoded and 
unsatisfactory. The test of ability to guard against serious exploitation constitutes a 
better measure of the ability to consent than the does the second test, the ability to 
lead an independent life. Where someone is partially dependent, this does not in any 
way preclude him from being capable of giving consent. The Law Reform 
Commission Report on Sexual Offences Against the Mentally Handicapped stated that 
a sexual relationship between persons with an intellectual disability or a mental illness 
should not in itself constitute an offence.49 The effect of section 5 is that, apart from 
marriage, a sexual relationship between two mentally impaired people may constitute 
a criminal offence, as there is no defence of consent where both are presumed to give 
real consent. Difficulties also apply to a relationship between two people, one of 
whom had a mental impairment and one who does not. The question here is whether 
the difficulties and barriers in the legislation are a proportionate response to the 
mentally disordered person who wants to exercise his right to a relationship, to marry 
and found a family. The barriers may impact on the very essence of the right under 
Article 12, unless they are justifiable as being for the legitimate aim of protecting the
47 Re LC (Medical Treatment: Sterilisation) [1997] 2 FLR 258, Re S (Medical Treatment: Adult 
Sterilisation) [1998] 1 FLR 944, Re A (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) C.A. 20 Dec. 1999.
48 Re S (Medical Treatment: Adult Sterilisation) [1998] 1 FLR 944.
49 Law Reform Commission, Report on Sexual Offences against the Mentally Handicapped (LRC 33- 
1990).
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individual against exploitation. The criminal law needs to achieve a balance between 
paternalism and autonomy,
It may swing the balance too far in the direction of depriving mentally ill or 
disabled persons of the right to a sexual life compatible with their physical, 
mental and emotional capacities. The policy adopted in s.5 of the Act of 1993 
may be faulted on this ground. Even allowing for the tacit assumption that 
prosecutorial discretion will diminish the incidence o f ‘hard cases’, the section 
fails to reflect the right of persons who are mentally impaired ... to have a 
sexual life.50
The Law Reform Commission is considering this issue and how section 5 might be 
amended “to ensure that relationships between adults with limited decision-making 
ability would be lawful where there is real informed consent.”51
Sterilisation
Compulsory sterilisation and abortion are interferences with the right to found a 
family in Article 12. Article 8 could be engaged in this regard in relation to the right 
to respect for private and family life. The Irish courts possess inherent jurisdiction in 
relation to sterilisation of the mentally disabled based on Article 34 of the 
Constitution, which gives the High Court full original jurisdiction to decide all 
matters of law and fact. The focus for justification in cases of non-consensual 
sterilisation should be on the rights and interests of the individual rather than on 
broader issues, like benefit to society, in order to comply with Article 12.
Article 40.3.1 of the Constitution guarantees to protect and vindicate the personal 
rights of the citizen and this extends to adults without capacity,
The loss by an individual of his or her mental capacity does not result in any 
diminution of his or her personal rights recognised by the Constitution, 
including the right to life, the right to self-determination, and the right to 
refuse medical care or treatment.53
30 O’Malley, Sexual Offences: Law, Policy and Punishment, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, Dublin, 
1996, pl33.
51 Op. cit., 49 para 6.26.
52In re D (Application by The Midland Health Board) [1988] ILRM 251. Also Cooney T., "Sterilisation 
of the Mentally Handicapped", (1989) 11 D.U.L.J. pp56-73, Donnelly M., “Non-Consensual 
Sterilisation of Mentally Disabled People: The law in Ireland” (1997) IR Jurist 297.
53 In Re a Ward o f  Court [1995] 2 ILRM 401.
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The Report of the Commission for the Status of People with Disabilities assumed that, 
despite the lack of specific legislation, sterilisations that take place are authorised on 
the basis of medical and psychological opinion and with parental agreement, though 
the extent of the procedure is not known.54 No case involving non-consensual 
sterilisation has come before the courts in Ireland to date. Generally, in other 
jurisdictions, a distinction is drawn between therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
sterilisation, with leave of the courts being necessary for non-therapeutic sterilisation 
for a mentally disabled person. The Canadian Supreme Court has affirmed this 
distinction in In re Eve, stating,
The grave intrusion on a person’s right and the certain physical damage that 
ensues from non-therapeutic sterilisation without consent, when compared to 
the highly questionable advantages that can result from it, ... it can never be 
safely determined that such a procedure is for the benefit of that person. 
Accordingly, the procedure should never be authorised for non-therapeutic 
purposes under the parens patriae jurisdiction.55
The Law Reform Commission’s Report on Sexual Offences against the Mentally 
Handicapped stated that the approach in Eve would be preferred on this issue, that 
non-consensual sterilisation would only be sanctioned for therapeutic purposes.56 A 
decision based on best interests would not be regarded as sufficient having regard to 
the constitutional rights outlined in In re a Ward (withdrawal o f medical treatment).57 
The Report of the Commission on the Status of People with Disabilities recommended 
that there should be a legal prohibition on sterilisation on the basis of disability alone. 
Where it was to take place, every effort should be made to ensure that informed and 
free consent exists.58 Where this is not possible, the courts should be involved, taking 
account of a range of issues including: necessity, least restrictive alternative, ensuring 
that fair procedures are observed by having an assessment of the person’s welfare and 
that full consultation with parents, carers and advocates takes place. The General 
Medical Council in England struck off a practitioner from the medical register based 
on a finding of professional misconduct in relation to cases where non-therapeutic
54 Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Report of the Commission for the Status of People 
with Disabilities, A Strategy fo r  Equality, Government Publications, Dublin, 1996.
55 (1986) 31 DLR (4th) 1.
56Op. cit., 49 para 41.
57 In Re a Ward o f  Court [1995] 2 ILRM 401.
58 Op. cit., 54.
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sterilisation procedures were carried out on a number of adults with intellectual 
disability.59 The decision was upheld by the Privy Council, which said that not 
enough consideration had been given to a number of issues, including: alternatives to 
sterilisation, consulting other professionals, the women’s capacity or their best 
interests.
The Scottish Adults with Incapacity Act 2004 provides that the Court of Session must 
approve any sterilisation where there is no serious malfunction or disease of the 
reproductive organs.60 The treatment must be required to safeguard and promote the 
physical or mental health of the adult. The adult, must not oppose the treatment or 
resist its being carried out. The Law Reform Commission recommends that,
proposed capacity legislation should provide that any proposed non- 
consensual sterilisation of a person with limited decision-making ability where 
there is no serious malfunction or disease of the reproductive organs would 
require an application to the court.61
The wording used is similar to that in the Scottish Act. Interference with personal 
rights of a mentally disabled person with or without capacity would need “strict 
justification” to avoid breaching Article 12. Mental capacity legislation will address 
some of these issues and provide a legal framework within which decisions can be 
made along with, or on behalf of, individuals with mental disability.62
Conclusion
This chapter examined Irish law on the right to marry and found a family and the 
related rights to a sexual relationship and to be protected from non-therapeutic 
sterilisation. Irish law faces challenges in relation to these matters. The law relating to 
marriage and the automatic deprivation of the right of some people, such as wards of 
court, is in need of reform. The assumption that all wards are incapable of 
understanding the requirements of marriage is disproportionate to the aim of
59 Pembrey v. The General Medical Council [2003] UKPC 60, 97 of 2002.
60 Adult with Incapacity Act 2000, section
61 Op. cit. 2 para 6.62.
62 Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper Law and Elderly (23-2003), Consultation Paper 
Vulnerable Adults and the Law: Capacity (LRC CP 37-2005).
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protection. In effect, the Marriage of Lunatics Act 1811 destroys the very essence of 
the right to marry without proper justification and is in breach of Article 12. Related 
to this issue is the right of people with mental disabilities to have a sexual 
relationship, a complex and difficult area. The challenge is to achieve the correct 
balance between the paternalism of the State, through protective mechanisms like the 
criminal law, and the right to autonomy and self-determination required by the 
individual with mental disability. Interventions in this intimate area of personal 
relationships must be strictly necessary to comply with Article 12.
The Law Reform Commission is examining this area and intends to have proposals 
for appropriate reform o f the criminal law that might contribute to the achievement of 
the requisite balance. The Commission is also addressing the issue of sterilisation, an 
important aspect of the right to found a family. Individuals with mental disability may 
be the subject of applications to the courts for declaration as to legality of non- 
therapeutic sterilisation. No application has come before the Irish courts to date, but 
the Report of the Commission for the Status of People with Disabilities addressed this 
issue in 1995 and made recommendations that would provide significant and badly 
needed safeguards.63 The Law Reform Commission has also recommended that all 
non-therapeutic sterilisations of people without capacity to consent must be the 
subject of a court hearing that would ensure the individual’s rights and interests are 
protected.64 These proposals would accord with the requirements of Article 12, as 
they would pursue the legitimate aim of protecting the individual against arbitrary 
action and be proportionate to this aim.
63 Op.cit., 54.
64 Op. cit., 2.
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Chapter 9
ARTICLE 3, ARTICLE 5, ARTICLE 8 AND THE PROTECTION OF 
CHILDREN WITH MENTAL DISORDER UNDER IRISH LAW
Introduction
This chapter considers the admission and treatment of children with mental disorders 
to hospital and the safeguards in Irish law to meet the requirements of the Convention 
in this regard. A number of factors place children in a different context from 
vulnerable adults, one of which is the application of different statutes to children in 
addition to mental health legislation. Another factor is that Convention case law, 
particularly Nielsen v. Denmark, recognises parental authority as a predominant factor 
in consenting to care and treatment for children.1 Although there is increasing 
recognition of children’s rights regarding consent to medical treatment, there is still a 
strong element in both the Convention and domestic case law recognising parental 
authority to make decisions for children. The question that may arise as a result of 
having various legal bases for the admission of children is how to ensure the standard 
of safeguards is adequate, having regard to the Convention.3 International Covenants, 
such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine, recognise the decision making autonomy of children as a 
factor associated with age and maturity.4 These covenants also require that children 
are treated in an appropriate environment.5 In common with vulnerable adults, 
children may need independent representation where they are receiving psychiatric 
treatment and also may need a range of safeguards to prevent them from being 
exposed to unwarranted interferences by the state or other individuals in their lives. 
This chapter will address the enforcement of Convention rights in Ireland for children 
with mental disorder in relation to the deprivation of liberty, the right to respect for
1 (1988) 11 EHRR 175.
2 HW & CWv. NWHB [2001] 3 IR 622.
3 Children can be admitted by parents and by means of a court order.
4 Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 12 and Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
1997 Article 6(2).
5 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation 2004 (10) on the protection o f the 
human rights and dignity o f  persons with mental disorder.
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private and family life, including the right to self-determination and the right to 
protection from inhuman and degrading treatment.
Article 5 and deprivation of liberty
There are two routes for child admission to mental health care: one is by means of 
parental authority and the other is through mental health legislation. Parental 
responsibility is a significant factor in any decision to admit a child for mental health 
care. In Nielsen v. Denmark, a mother with sole custody of a 12 year old child, 
consented to his voluntary admission against the child’s and his father’s wishes and, 
as a result, he had no rights under Danish legislation.6 The Court held that this was not 
a deprivation of liberty such as to engage Article 5, but was a legitimate exercise of 
parental rights over the child,
... the rights of the holder of parental authority cannot be unlimited and that it 
is incumbent on the State to provide safeguards against abuse. However, it 
does not follow that the present case falls within the ambit of Article 5 ... The 
restrictions imposed on the applicant were not of a nature or degree similar to 
the cases of deprivation of liberty specified in paragraph 1 of Article 5. In 
particular, he was not detained as a person of unsound mind so as to bring the 
case within paragraph (l)(e).7
The Court held there was no evidence of bad faith on the mother’s part and that she 
had expert medical advice. It must be possible for the holder of parental rights to have 
such a child admitted to hospital and this was a responsible exercise by the mother of
o
her custodial rights in the interest of the child. The question raised by one 
commentator was whether detention by a private person, not the State, may fall within 
Article 5, or at least require regulation by the State.9 Further to this is the question as 
to whether confinement in a hospital does not involve a deprivation of liberty in the 
sense of Article 5, solely because it involves a private person, in this case a parent. 
Applying the test for deprivation of liberty, the concrete situation of the child in 
Nielsen was that he was subject to the total control of the staff.
6 Nielson v. Denmark {1988) 11 EHRR 175.
7 Ibid, para 72.
8 Ibid, para 72-73.
9 Mowbray A., Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights, Butterworths, 
Bath, 2001, p i58.
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The Commission decision was completely at odds with that of the Court, having held 
that the child was detained, as the doctor in charge of the hospital had taken the 
decision to admit him and so State responsibility was engaged. The Commission did 
not believe that parental responsibility was unrestricted in decisions regarding their 
children. This view accorded with the dissenting judgment of Pettiti J. in the Court, 
who commented that in a field as sensitive as psychiatric committal, unremitting 
vigilance was required to avoid abuse of both legal systems and hospital structures.10 
Due to their vulnerability, persons subject to committal decisions must be entitled to 
the protection of the law. This was even more important in the case of a minor who 
was already the victim of parental conflict. Many commentators believe that this 
decision is inconsistent with the decision in Ashingdane v. United Kingdom and 
suggest that “the better approach would have been to hold that the hospitalisation 
constituted a deprivation of liberty but that it was lawful and justifiable.”11 Jones
17suggests that Nielsen may not be followed.
Insofar as the judgment of the Court creates a further exception to the right to 
liberty where a child is detained with parental consent, Nielsen creates a clear 
disparity in the way in which Article 5 applies to children, as opposed to 
adults ... It is arguably of greatest concern that parental consent to detention, 
in the face of complete opposition by a child, can cancel out the protection 
which Article 5 offers.13
This case highlights the limited protection available to children who are not formally 
admitted or provided with safeguards.14 The situation may change following the 
decision in HL v. United Kingdom, where the Court recognised that the applicant, a 
vulnerable adult, was subject to the complete control of the staff and lacked recourse 
to the safeguards enjoyed by detained patients.15 The Court held that HL was 
effectively deprived of his liberty and was subject to the requirements of Article 5 on 
this basis. It is likely that similar arguments could be made in relation to children
10 Nielsen v. Denmark (1988) 11 EHRR 175.
11 (1985) 7 EHRR 528. Ovey and White, Jacobs & White European Convention on Human Rights 
OUP, Oxford, 2002, pi 06. Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick in Law o f the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Butterworths, London, 1995, argue that Article 5 may involve positive obligation to control 
‘private detention’ p i02.
12 Jones R., Mental Health Act Manual (9th ed.), Thomson, London, 2004.
13 Kilkelly U., The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights, Ashgate, Dartmouth, 1999, 
pp36, 37.
14 (1988) 1 EHRR 373.
15 HL v. United Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 32. See chapter 3 for full discussion.
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admitted voluntarily and subject to similar levels of control. Harris argues that Article 
5 could involve a positive obligation to control private detention.16 This might involve 
ensuring that parental decisions regarding detention are subject to testing as to 
whether detention is in the child’s best interests, necessary, legal and not arbitrary.
The decision of the Court in Storck v. Germany changes the Nielsen situation by 
requiring that there is adequate supervision of all deprivations of liberty.17 The 
responsibility of the state is engaged if  the state fails to secure rights and freedoms 
under the Convention and is required to take appropriate steps to provide protection 
against an interference with those rights either by state agents or by private parties. 
This applies to the right to liberty and the requirement on the state to take measures to 
provide effective protection of vulnerable persons. This includes reasonable steps to 
prevent a deprivation of liberty about which the authorities have or ought to have 
knowledge.18 The applicant in Storck was 15 years old when first admitted to a 
children and young person’s unit. She spent 7 months there. She was subsequently 
admitted, with the assistance of her father, to a private psychiatric clinic with no 
formal authorisation and placed in a locked ward from 1977-1979. The Court held she 
was deprived of her liberty on the basis that those caring for her exercised complete 
and effective control over her, including her assessment, treatment, contacts, 
movements and residence. These control factors are similar to those applied in 
Nielsen. There was evidence that she resisted her stay in hospital and had escaped, but 
was forced to return and had to be “fettered” to prevent her leaving. The notion of 
compliance in admission, where the person does not have capacity to resist admission, 
is recognised by the Court and does not result in loss of safeguards,
The right to liberty is too important in a democratic society for a person to lose 
the benefit of the Convention protection for the single reason that he may have 
given himself up to be taken into detention19
16 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law o f the European Convention on Human Rights, Butterworths, 
London, 1995.
17 Application no. 61603/00 16th June 2005.
18 Ibid, para 102.
19 Storck v. Germany Application no.61603/00 16th June 2005 para 75.
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Such individuals are not to be equated with consenting capable adults in relation to 
deprivation of liberty. The State was held to have failed in its duty to protect the 
applicant’s right to liberty and violated Article 5.
Parental rights as a distinct category arose again in Koniarska v. United Kingdom in 
which the Court distinguished the position of the applicant, a 17 year old girl with a 
personality disorder placed in local authority accommodation, from Nielsen on the 
grounds that Koniarska’s detention was ordered by the courts, which did not have 
parental rights over her. This reasoning would appear to have ruled out the 
possibility of the state being bound to take measures to shield children from 
unjustified deprivations o f liberty carried out by parents or other private individuals. 
The grounds for the decision might suggest by extension that Article 5(1 )(e) does not 
incorporate any positive obligation on the state to protect children against 
interferences with liberty carried out by private persons.21 This conclusion would 
leave a serious gap in the protection from arbitrary detention of children.22 However, 
the decision in Storck v. Germany refers to the positive obligation on the state to 
protect the right to liberty under Article 5 and the right to personal integrity under 
Article 8 against infringements by private persons. To this end, the state is obliged 
to exercise supervision and control over private psychiatric institutions.
Adults are entitled to a review of detention under Article 5(4), but where this does not 
apply to children, it does not appear to amount to discrimination under the 
Convention. This issue arose in Bouamar v. Belgium, where the applicant complained 
that he was not entitled to a review following arrest. Both the Commission and the 
Court held that, because the arrest stemmed from a protective rather than a punitive 
procedure for minors, the different application of the criminal justice regime was 
objective and reasonable and met Article 14 requirements.24 Where there is a 
deprivation of liberty coming within Article 5(1) of the Convention, it is unavoidable
20 Application no.33670/96 12th October 2000.
21 Ovey and White, Jacobs & White European Convention on Human Rights, (3rd ed.), OUP, Oxford 
2002, pl06.
22 Fennell P., “Informal Compulsion: “The Psychiatric Treatment of Juveniles under Common Law”, 
(1992) JSWFL 311-333 at 332.
23 Storck v. Germany Application no.61603/00 16th June 2005 para 150.
24 Bouamar v. Belgium (1989) 11 EHRR 1.
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that the individual is entitled to a regular review of that detention under Article 5(4), 
whether a vulnerable adult or a child.
Irish law and Article 5
Constitutional law
Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution recognise and favour the married family as the 
natural, primary and fundamental unit group of society possessing inalienable and 
imprescriptible rights, which the courts have actively protected from intrusions by the 
State. By virtue of the powerful protections that the family as a unit receives, the 
protection of children as individuals within the family is more problematic. The rights 
of parents were endorsed in HW  & CW  v. North Western Health Board by the 
Supreme Court in holding that the State could not subject a child to a medical test 
against the wishes of the parents,
The Constitution plainly accords a primacy to the parent and this primacy ... 
gives rise to a presumption that the welfare of the child is to be found in the 
family exercising its authority as such.25
In a dissenting judgment, Keane CJ held that the Court had an inherent jurisdiction, 
derived exclusively from the Constitution and distinct from its parens patriae 
jurisdiction, to protect the personal rights of the child where such rights are not 
protected by other organs of the State or by the child’s parents. Article 42.5 of the 
Constitution provides for State involvement in the care of children in certain limited 
circumstances where the parents cannot care or they have “failed in their duty to their 
children.” In such circumstances, the State can take over and make arrangements for 
the children. According to Martin, this case is “proof of the assertion that there is a 
near-automatic presumption that parents’ rights cannot generally be interfered with by 
the Courts in matters of medical treatment where the risk to the child from not 
receiving the treatment is minimal.”26 The Strasbourg Court, until recently, adopted a 
similar approach, holding that parental rights in the voluntary admission of a child lay
25 [2001] 3 IR 622.
26 Martin F., “Parental Rights to withhold consent to medical treatment for their child: A conflict of 
Rights”, (2001) 7 ILT, p i 14-119 at 117.
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outside the scope of Article 5, falling instead within the sphere of private parental
• • • 27 rp lresponsibility. The decision in Storck v. Germany clarifies state responsibility 
regarding the supervision of all deprivations of liberty, whether public or private.28
Mental Treatment Act 1945
There is no express provision in the 1945 Act for the detention of children, defined as 
those under 16 years old. This age group can only be admitted as willing or unwilling 
voluntary patients with the consent of their parents or guardian and then only with a 
letter from a doctor indicating that he has examined the child and confirming the child 
will benefit from the admission. The issue of capacity to consent to admission or 
treatment does not arise and the common law applies instead. While enjoying 
voluntary status, the child has no express rights in terms of leaving hospital or 
refusing treatment, and is effectively under the control of the hospital staff and is de 
facto detained. Parents can give written notice of their intention to remove the child
•>A
and they are then at liberty to do so at any time. In these circumstances, the 1945 
Act makes no provision for detaining such children if it is in their best interests, where 
there is a risk to themselves or to others. Where the parents of such child are 
incapable, or refuse, or neglect to perform parental duties, the 1945 Act requires the 
doctor in charge to inform the Minister for Health and Children who may make 
directions on this basis.31 There is no information as to what “directions” the Minister 
can make or if the Minister has power to have the child detained, or even if this 
provision is ever used.
It is more likely in practice, that the provisions of the Child Care Act 1991 (1991 Act) 
would be used to place a child at risk in the care of the HSE and, if appropriate, in the 
psychiatric hospital. The 1991 Act provides that the welfare of the child is the
^9paramount consideration in all decisions. In addition, the 1991 Act requires that, as
27 Nielsen v. Denmark (1988) 11 EHRR 175.
28 Application no.61603/00 16th June 2005.
29 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 191(3).
30 Ibid, section 194(2).
31 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 196.
32 Child Care Act 1991, section 24.
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far as practicable, due consideration be given to the wishes of the child having regard 
to his age and understanding.33
Where there is conflict in the family, due to separation or for other reasons that may 
impact on the admission, the only statutory safeguard provides that the doctor 
recommending the admission must confirm there is a benefit to the child.34 What 
“benefit” means is not known, but it could simply be that there is no other more 
appropriate service. This is further borne out by the Reports of the Inspector of 
Mental Hospitals indicating that children as young as 11 years are being admitted to 
adult wards in the absence of suitable services.35 During 2003, there were 24 
admissions to psychiatric care of children under 16 years and 685 admissions of those 
aged 16-19 years.36 The question must be raised as to whether the de facto detention 
of these children in inappropriate places with no safeguards could be proportionate to 
the aim of the detention, the treatment of mental disorder, having regard to the
5 7
decision in Aerts v. Belgium. The Nielsen case would not support such a view, 
except that these admissions must be sanctioned by the admitting psychiatrist and, to
70
this extent, it is arguably a public action and subject to Article 5. Jones comments 
that the Nielsen case might not be followed and that it is likely that the Court would 
hold that “a parental consent to the admission of a mentally competent 16 or 17 year 
old child to a psychiatric hospital violates Article 5 if the child objects to the 
admission.”39 The decision in Storck v. Germany clarifies uncertainties following 
Nielsen by effectively placing responsibility on the state to ensure there are 
Convention safeguards for all who have been deprived of their liberty.40
33 This requirement is in keeping with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Article 6 
of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers 
Recommendation (2004) 10 Article 29(2).
34 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 191(3).
35Department of Health and Children, Report o f  Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending 2003, 
Government Publications, Dublin, 2003, pl32. Irish College of Psychiatrists 2005 confirms there are 4 
inpatient beds for children for the whole of Dublin.
36 Health Research Board, Activities o f  Irish Psychiatric Services 2003, Dublin, 2004.
37 (2000) 29 EHRR 50 para'46.
38 Nielsen v. Denmark (1989) 11 EHRR 175.
39 Op. cit., 12 p463.
40 Application no.61603/00 16th June 2005.
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Mental Health Act 2001
The principles section of the 2001 Act will apply to decisions about the admission, 
care and treatment of persons admitted to psychiatric care.41 The word “person” is not 
defined in the Act and, because there is no express reference to the exclusion of 
children from the principles, it is likely that they apply to both the voluntary 
admission and the detention of children.42 This is further borne out by other sections 
of the Act that have expressly included or excluded children43 These principles 
require that the “best interests” of the person are the principle consideration balanced 
against the rights of others.44 The 2001 Act requires that due regard is to be had to 
respect the right of the person to dignity, bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy.45 
Where the person is being admitted and treated, “as far as reasonably practicable,” he 
must be notified and entitled to make representations in relation to it and 
consideration must be given to these representations. The District Court will be 
expected to bear these principles in mind when making detention orders for children, 
as will the hospital in the case of the voluntary admission of a child. The principles 
are the only source of safeguards for the child in the 2001 Act. The interpretation of 
best interests in English cases has established that a patient’s best interests are not 
limited to medical best interests and encompass “medical, emotional and all other 
welfare issues.”46 When adults are being compulsorily admitted under the 2001 Act, 
there is a benefit requirement associated with the admission while no such 
requirement applies to children. This may engage Article 14, unless there is objective 
and reasonable justification for the difference.
The 2001 Act provides for voluntary admission but does not have an express 
provision dealing with the voluntary admission of children. A child is defined as a 
person under 18 years.47 A voluntary patient is defined as someone “receiving care 
and treatment in an approved centre who is not the subject of an admission or a
41 Mental Health Act 2001, section 4.
42 Ibid, sections 23 and 69 specify inclusion or exclusion of children.
43 Mental Health Act 2001, section 23(1).
44 Ibid, section 4(1).
45 Ibid, section 4(3).
46 Re MB (Medical Treatment)[1991] 2 FLR 426, Re A (Male Sterilisation)[2000] 1 FLR 549.
47 Mental Health Act 2001, section 2(1). Unless he has been married.
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renewal order.”48 The Act does not provide any guidance on the involvement of 
parents in the voluntary admission of the child. The English Mental Health Act 1983 
provides that any 16 or 17 year old “capable of expressing his own wishes” can admit 
himself as an informal patient to hospital, irrespective of the wishes of his parent or 
guardian.49 The Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice provides that, where the 16 
or 17 year old is incapable of expressing his own wishes, the consent of the parents 
should be obtained or consideration given to the use of the 1983 Act.50 These 
provisions meet human rights standards to a greater extent that the 2001 Act, pursuant 
to which no choices are offered or differentiations made between younger children 
and the competent 16 or 17 year old.
Where the parents want to remove the child and the child has a mental disorder, the 
child may be detained and placed in the custody of the Health Service 
Executive(HSE). This detention can continue for three days during which an 
application for a detention order must be made to the court.51 The Mental Health Act 
provides,
Section.-23(3)
Where a child is detained in accordance with this section, the health 
services executive shall, unless it returns the child to his or her parents, 
or either of them, or a person acting in loco parentis, make an 
application under section 25 at the next sitting of the District Court 
held in the same district court district or, in the event that the next such 
sitting is not due to be held within 3 days of the date on which the child 
is placed in the care of the health services executive, at a sitting of the 
District Court, which has been specially arranged, held within the said 
3 days, and the health services executive shall retain custody of the 
child pending the hearing of that application.
In this regard, the 1991 Act applies as if the child is being taken into care on an initial 
emergency care order, which will have to be obtained within three days. There is no 
express reference in the 2001 Act to the applicant for the order, but under the 1991, 
Act this would normally be a social worker from the HSE. The problem with this 
provision is that, at present, no out of hours or weekend social workers are available.
48 Ibid, section 2(1).
49 Mental Health Act 1983, section 131(2).
50 Para 31.9.
51 Mental Health 2001, section 24(3). Under the Health Act 2004 the Health Service Executive (HSE), 
replaced the health boards in January 2005.
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The section also suggests that the HSE may return the child to his parents, even 
though the psychiatrist and staff may believe the child should not be discharged. This 
is an ambiguity that needs further explanation to avoid conflict and confusion about 
responsibilities, as well as the lack of forseeability of effect in the provision.
The criteria for detention is the presence of mental disorder and the provisions 
applying in the 2001 Act for adults apply also to children.52 It will be necessary to 
meet the Winterwerp criteria and ensure the detention is in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law. The District Court will be involved in all detentions of 
children under 18 years, but will be limited to deciding on the initial or continuing 
detention order and to permitting some treatments also.53 The following provisions of 
the 2001 Act are relevant. The procedure for admission where a child needs detention 
is as follows,
Section 25 (1)
Where it appears to a health board with respect to a child who resides 
or is found in its functional area that -
(a) the child is suffering from a mental disorder, and
(b) the child requires treatment which he or she is unlikely to receive 
unless an order is made under this section, then, the health services 
executive may make an application to the District Court for an order 
authorising the detention of the child.
The question that arises here is the interpretation of “unlikely.” Does this relate to the 
child’s unwillingness to be admitted or the parents’ refusal to allow the child to be 
admitted? There may be implications for treatment in the community if the child is in 
an area where there are no day care facilities and he may, therefore, be unlikely to 
receive treatment. Children living in an area with good services are less likely to be 
detained than children from areas with limited services. Without further guidance, this 
section could be interpreted very liberally, permitting arbitrary intervention. Section 
25(2) requires that the applicant for the order, the HSE, must not make an application 
without a report from a consultant psychiatrist subject to the following section,
Section 25(3)
32 Mental Health Act 2001, section 3. See chapter 1 for a full discussion of the definition of mental 
disorder.
53 Mental Health Act 2001, sections 25 & 61.
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Where -
(a) the parents of the child, or either of them, or a person acting in loco 
parentis refuses to consent to the examination of the child, or
(b) following the making of reasonable enquiries by the health board, 
the parents of the child or either of them or a person acting in loco 
parentis cannot be found by the health board,
then a health services executive can make an application under 
subsection (1) without any prior examination of the child by a 
consultant psychiatrist.
Where a child has a mental disorder and requires treatment, a detention order can only 
be made if the parents refuse to consent to an examination or cannot be found. The 
above section, therefore, applies only if the parents are unwilling to admit the child on 
a voluntary basis, refuse the examination or cannot be found. These sections provide 
for making a detention order in the absence of parental involvement and where the 
parents are unwilling or unavailable to consent to the examination of the child. The 
presumption seems to be that, where the HSE is not involved, parents are only 
permitted to make voluntary admission applications. Parents who believe their 
children need a secure admission are not in a position to apply to the Court. Even 
though they may have consulted with various professionals who support the 
admission, they are prevented from making an application and must involve the health 
authorities as applicants. This may be regarded as an excessive and unnecessary 
interference which is not justifiable. It may also violate Article 8 if a decision is made 
without giving parents an opportunity to be involved in the decision-making process. 
There is no provision in the Act to give parents copies of court orders or to give them 
to the child, where appropriate, having regard to age and understanding.
Section 25(8)
Between the making of an application for an order under this section 
and its determination, the court, of its own motion or on an application 
of any person, may give such directions as it sees fit as to the care and 
custody of the child who is the subject of the application pending such 
determination, and any such direction shall cease to have effect on the 
determination of the application.
Following an application without an accompanying psychiatric assessment, the court 
can “give such directions as it sees fit as to the care and custody of the child,” which 
can mean detention. There is no specific time scale in the legislation for the provision 
of a report in such circumstances or the period a child might be in detention pending a
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final determination. Where there is no “objective medical expertise” confirming 
mental disorder, unless there is an emergency, this could engage Article 5(1). In Litwa 
v. Poland, the Court said that detention is such a serious intrusion that it is only 
justified where other less severe measures have been found to be insufficient to 
safeguard individual or public interest and that deprivation of liberty must be 
necessary in the circumstances.54 The child should be seen at least by a general 
practitioner prior to a court application and the 1991 Act should be invoked as a first 
option and as a least restrictive alternative. The 2001 Act does not make provision for 
detained children to choose to be voluntary, in contrast to adults, and there is no 
requirement to return to court to have the order struck out in such circumstances, in 
contrast to the least restrictive alternative. These issues raise concerns about the law 
being overly intrusive, lacking in forseeability in its effect, even allowing for a margin 
of appreciation and the importance of some flexibility.
The Children Act 2001 provides mainly for children involved with the criminal justice 
system and it contains provisions that could usefully be included in the 2001 Act. One 
such provision is the family conference that might guard against inappropriate 
placement of children with behaviour problems in the mental health care system.55 
The English Mental Health Act Code of Practice recognises the difficulty of using 
mental health legislation instead of children’s legislation and the importance of 
identifying the primary purpose of the proposed intervention. A seriously mentally ill 
child may need to be detained under the 2001 Act, whereas a behaviourally disturbed 
child may need secure accommodation under the Children Act 2001. This is an 
important issue in light of the limited resources for behaviourally disturbed children. 
The English Code also states that any intervention in the life of the child should be the 
least restrictive possible and result in the least segregation from family, friends, 
community and school. Amnesty International highlights the lack of appropriate 
services and refers to the inappropriate placement of children who have behaviour
54 [2001] 33 EHRR 53.
55 An example of such case DG v. Ireland, (2002) 35 EHRR 1153. See also report in Irish Times 3rd 
April 2003 for report o f case involving a 17 yr old who was psychotic and was sent to Mountjoy Prison 
in the absence of more appropriate accommodation because the Court does not have power to make a 
hospital order-it can merely recommend that such person will get treatment while in prison.
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problems, but do not have a mental disorder as a serious cause of concern and a 
breach of Articles 20 and 37(c) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.56
The periods of detention under the 2001 Act are for 21 days in the first instance, 
followed by three months and periods of six months.57 The court must sanction each 
extension to the detention order. A psychiatrist must examine the child and give a
58report to the court. There is no provision to challenge a detention in between the 
admission and renewal order, or between each renewal order, which could last for six 
monthly intervals, raising the issue of proportionality in relation to the aim of the 
detention. There is provision for absence on leave at the discretion of the consultant 
psychiatrist for the unexpired period of the detention order.59 This permission can be 
subject to such conditions as the psychiatrist considers appropriate and can be 
withdrawn in the interests of the child. If the child is absent without leave, the clinical 
director “may” arrange to bring the child back and, if unable and there is “a serious 
likelihood of the person causing immediate and serious harm to himself or herself or 
other persons,” the clinical director can request Garda assistance.60 The Garda are 
empowered to enter any dwelling or premises and take all “reasonable measures 
necessary for the return of the patient ... including, where necessary, the detention or 
restraint of the patient.”61
A number of provisions of the 1991 Act will apply to children detained under court 
order and sent into mental health care. The 1991 Act provides that, in any decision 
before a court, the welfare of the child is the first and paramount consideration and 
that the child’s wishes must be considered, having regard to age and understanding.62 
The child’s rights in the 1991 Act include the power of the court: to join the child as a
party to the proceedings, to appoint a legal representative for the child, or to appoint
(\\guardian-ad-litem where appropriate. There is no statutory right to legal 
representation for the child, it is left to the court to ensure representation. This is
56 Amnesty International, Mental Illness, The Neglected Quarter, Dublin, 2003, p67.
57 Mental Health Act, sections 25(9) & (10).
58 Ibid, section 25(11).
59 Ibid, section 26(1).
60 Ibid, section 27(1).
61 Ibid, section 27(1 )(2).
62 Child Care Act 1991, section 24.
63 Ibid, sections 26(1) & 25(1).
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contrary to requirements in UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and in 
Recommendation (2004) 10 providing that, “a minor subject to involuntary placement 
should have the right to assistance from a representative from the start of the 
procedure.”64 There is no express provision for the regulation and involvement of the 
Garda in the removal of a mentally disordered child to hospital and their involvement 
will have to be included in the proposed code of practice.
The admission and detention of children in adult psychiatric hospitals may fail to 
satisfy the relationship between the grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty relied 
on and the place and conditions of detention as outlined in Aerts v. Belgium.65 
Recommendations (2004) 10 states that children must not be detained in an adult 
facility, unless it would benefit the child.66 This requirement of benefit applies to the 
child being admitted voluntarily under the 1945 Act, but not the 2001 Act. The 
District Court is not required to take “benefit” into account when making a detention 
order for a child, but it is taken into account for adult admission. This effectively 
treats such children differently from adults without any justification and might engage 
Article 14 of the Convention where the impact of the omission is significant, such as 
detention in an inappropriate place. In Pretty v. United Kingdom, the Court stated,
For the purpose of Article 14 a difference in treatment between persons in 
analogous or relevantly similar positions is discriminatory if it has no 
objective and reasonable justification, that is if it does not pursue a legitimate 
aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.67
The rights applying to adults with regard to information about the detention, including 
information about the treatment, do not apply to children, even taking account of age 
and understanding. This clearly conflicts with the principle of respecting dignity and 
autonomy. It may not be a breach of Article 5(2), as the purpose of that Article is to 
enable the person to challenge the detention and this is automatically provided for in 
the courts. On a broader view, information is part of the empowerment of a person
64 Council o f Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2004) 10 on the protection o f the 
human rights and dignity o f  persons with mental disorder, Article 29(3).
65 (2000) 29 EHRR 50. See also, Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental 
Hospitals fo r  year ending 2003, Government Publications, Dublin, 2004, referred to the increasing 
number o f children in adults wards, some as young as 11 years.
66 Article 29(4).
67 (2002) 35 EHRR para 88.
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that enhances his right to autonomy and self-determination and, while the failure to 
provide information to the child or representative may not breach Article 5(2), it may 
be serious enough to engage Article 8 as an aspect of respect for private life. The 
Guiding Principles o f the English Code of Practice Mental Health Act 1983 indicate 
that children should be kept as fully informed as possible about their care and 
treatment and their views and wishes should be considered, having regard to age and 
understanding.
Article 8 and the right to self determinaton
The Court, in Nielsen v Denmark, held that the right to consent to treatment is part of 
family life under Article 8.68
Compulsory medical treatment, however minor, may constitute an interference 
with the right to respect for private life. However, such treatment will not 
infringe the Convention as long as there is proportionality between the 
interference which it creates and the need to protect the public interest which it 
serves. This has been found to be particularly important where children are 
concerned, because they have limited possibilities to protect their own rights.69
In Storck v. Germany, the Court referred to persons in need of psychiatric treatment, 
“in particular,” and the obligation on the State to secure to its citizens their right to 
physical integrity under Article 8 of the Convention. “The State cannot completely 
absolve itself of its responsibility by delegating its obligations in this sphere to private 
bodies or individuals” 70 The use of the words “in particular” indicates that the Court 
had in mind wider application than psychiatric facilities, that there are also other areas 
of care where the state may have obligations to secure the right to physical integrity 
under Article 8. With regard to children this might include residential centres where 
children or adults with intellectual disability are found to be deprived of their liberty 
without a court or other authorisation. The Court held that the State remained under a 
duty to exercise supervision and control over private psychiatric institutions. Such 
institutions, in particular those where persons are held without a court order, need not 
only a licence, but also competent supervision on a regular basis of whether the
68 (1989) 11 EHRR 175 para 61.
69 Op. ch., 13 p i50.
70 Application no. 61603/00 16th June 2005 para 103.
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confinement and medical treatment is justified. This statement indicates that 
institutions caring for children, deprived of their liberty must have state supervision as 
to whether treatment and detention should continue.
Parental rights were raised in Glass v. United Kingdom, a case involving medical 
treatment in which the Court held that where there is no emergency and the parents of 
the child object to the course of action planned by the doctors, the case should be 
referred to the High Court for determination based on its inherent jurisdiction.71 
Otherwise, it would constitute a violation of the right to respect for the private life of 
the child under Article 8. The Court, in Johanssen v. Norway, held that parental rights 
may be overruled in the child’s best interests, as long as the interference is justified 
under Article 8(2) because “the parent cannot be entitled under Article 8 to have such 
measures taken as would harm the child’s health and development.”72 This decision is 
strengthened by the outcome in Storck requiring the state to exercise supervision and 
control over the actions of private individuals.
Article 25 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires state parties to 
recognise the rights of the child, who has been placed by the competent authorities for 
the purpose of care, protection, or treatment of his physical or mental health, to a 
periodic review of the treatment provided. Some of the issues that need consideration 
in this regard are that children often have voluntary status, even though they are 
admitted against their will to hospital. There are no safeguards in these 
circumstances, even though the children are de facto detained. The common law 
applies to consent to treatment for such children with parents or those in loco parentis 
giving proxy consent. Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine both require that the 
opinion of the minor be taken into consideration as an increasingly determinative 
factor in proportion to age and maturity. This latter Convention states in the 
Explanatory Report that the minor’s opinion could even lead to the conclusion that his 
consent should be necessary, or at least sufficient, for some treatments.74 Fennell
71 (2004) 39 EHRR 15.
72 (1996) 23 EHRR 33.
73 Nielsen v Denmark (1989) 11 EHRR 175.
74 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report for Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, 1996, 
para 44.
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comments that “the rhetoric of autonomy has been notably absent from case law on 
treating children without consent” and he questions “whether the correct balance has 
been struck between children’s rights to make their own treatment decisions and the 
need to protect their health.” 75 The question that is raised following the decision in 
Storck is whether the child is independently autonomous or subject to parental veto. 
The applicant was 15 years old and a minor when first admitted for psychiatric care 
and the decision in this case regarding supervision and control over private 
institutions would seem to apply to children as well as vulnerable adults.
Irish law and Article 8
Mental Treatment Act 1945
There is no provision for consent to treatment for a child who is admitted as a 
voluntary patient and the common law will apply to admission and treatment, which 
will be given on the basis of best interests and in accordance with the professional 
standard.76 Nor are there any safeguards for the imposition of treatments. If a parent 
disagrees with a treatment regime, then he can remove the child, or the HSE will 
activate the 1991 Act if the child is at risk. In relation to consent to treatment, a 
person becomes an adult for the purpose of decision-making for medical treatment at 
16 years under the Non Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997.77 In Gillick v. 
West Norfolk and Wisbech Health Authority, an English case, the House of Lords held 
that the mature minor or “Gillick competent” child under 16 years could make 
decisions about medical treatment and parental rights had to yield to the child’s right 
“when he reached a sufficient intelligence and understanding to be capable of making 
up his own mind on the matter...”78 A Gillick competent child must be able to 
understand the nature of the proposed treatment, its side effects and the consequences 
of not receiving it and, where the child has a mental disability, that must be taken into 
account, particularly if it is fluctuating.79 The refusal of treatment by such child can be
75 Fennell P., Treatment without Consent, Routledge, London, 1995, p277.
76 Dunne v. National Maternity Hospital [1989] IR 91.1
77 Non Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997, section 23.
78 [1986] AC 112 pl86.
79 Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 190 p200.
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overridden by the courts or by parents.80 The Gillick decision would have to be 
balanced against parental rights in the Irish Constitution. An aspect of the right to 
privacy is the child’s right to confidentiality, which is not considered in either the 
1945 Act, or the 2001 Act. The English Mental Health Act Code of Practice provides 
that children’s rights to confidentiality should be strictly observed and that any limits 
on this obligation should be made known to the child who has capacity to understand 
them.81
Mental Health Act 2001
The presumption in the 2001 Act is that children, defined as those under 18, are not 
capable of consenting to medical treatment, despite the provisions of the Non Fatal 
Offences against the Person Act 1997. There is no express provision in the 2001 Act 
for refusal of treatment for mental disorder, so it is not clear what might happen if a 
competent child who is voluntary refuses treatment, particularly those between 16 and 
18 years. The common law will apply and permit treatment to be given on the basis of 
parental consent and the best interests of the child. The best interests are no longer 
limited to medical best interests under English law and include “medical, emotional
o9
and all other welfare issues.” Where a parent wishes to remove a child against the 
advice of the consultant psychiatrist, the child can be detained subject to the 1991 Act 
until there is a hearing in the District Court. The 2001 Act has no express provision on 
whether treatment can be administered during this time and, therefore, the common 
law will continue to apply.
Where children are detained the requirement laid down in Herczgefalvy v. Austria, 
that where treatment of a competent adult without consent must be convincingly
Q1
shown to be necessary, applies. In the absence of decisions on this area in Irish law, 
persuasive authority may be found in Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health 
Authority84 and in Re R,85 both English cases, holding that a minor under 16 may give 
valid consent based on intelligence and understanding. Jones advocates that blanket
80 Re W [ 1992] 4 All ER 627.
81 Mental Health Act Code of Practice 1983 para 31.21.
82 Re MB(Medical Treatment)[l997] 2 FLR 426, Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549, p555.
83 (1993) 15 EHRR 437.
84 [1985] 3 All ER 402.
85 [1991] 4 All ER 177.
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consent forms should not be used and that consent should be sought for each 
component of a child’s care and treatment.86 In relation to consent to treatment for 
children who are under court order, the 2001 Act provides,
Section 61.—
Where medicine has been administered to a child in respect of whom 
an order under section 25 is in force for the purposes of ameliorating 
his or her mental disorder for a continuous period of 3 months, the 
administration of that medicine shall not be continued unless either—
(a) the continued administration of that medicine is approved 
by the consultant psychiatrist responsible for the care and 
treatment of the child, and
(b) the continued administration of that medicine is authorised 
(in a form specified by the Commission) by another consultant 
psychiatrist, following referral of the matter to him or her by 
the first-mentioned psychiatrist,
and the consent or, as the case may be, approval and 
authorisation shall be valid for a period of 3 months and 
thereafter for periods of 3 months, if, in respect of each period, 
the like consent or, as the case may be, approval and 
authorisation is obtained.
The section does not guarantee independence in the second opinion provided, nor is 
there any requirement o f authorization by a child psychiatrist with a second opinion 
from another child psychiatrist. The section permits medication to be given to the 
child for three months without any reference to a second opinion at the outset. This 
provides a lower standard of protection than that applying to adults who are asked to 
consent. It is not clear what happens if different medications are used and whether 
time runs from the start of each treatment or from the start of the first treatment. It is 
arguable that the “stabilising period” of three months is excessive, particularly where 
children are concerned, and also in view of the long periods of detention provided for 
in the legislation. The imposition of medication in English law may involve 
reasonable force and can be used where valid consent has been obtained in relation to
* 87 ■ ' i  •a refusing mentally capable or incapable child. The decision to use force may 
involve a balance between continuing treatment, which is forcibly opposed, and
86 Op. cit., 12 p744.
87 Re MB (Medical Treatment)[ 1997] 2 FLR 426 p439.
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deciding not to continue with it. It is arguable that the government has a positive 
obligation to ensure the right to both private and family life is protected for these 
children under Article 8, even where the admission is carried out by parents. There is 
no representative to act for the child in these circumstances, leaving them more 
vulnerable. Fennell posits the need for the second opinion safeguards to apply to 
informally admitted children who are given neuroleptic or major tranquillisers with 
potentially long lasting side-effects.88 Under Irish law, this recommendation would 
also need to apply to children under court order.
The decision in Storck requires a higher standard of safeguard applying to children 
with regard to state supervision and control over treatment to protect against
OQ
interferences with private life under Article 8. The Court stated in that case that even
a minor interference with the physical integrity of an individual must be regarded as
an interference with the right to respect for private life under Article 8, if carried out
00against the will of the person. Fennell argues that the control required for the 
imposition of serious treatments on incapacitated adults, which arguably could 
include neuroleptics for children who do not resist but do not consent and are not 
otherwise deprived of liberty, could “tip the balance” in favour of establishing a 
deprivation of liberty requiring use of the Mental Health Act to ensure effective 
protection of Article 5 and Article 8 rights.”91
Section 25
(12) Psycho-surgery shall not be performed on a child detained under 
this section without the approval of the court.
(13) A programme of electro-convulsive therapy shall not be 
administered to a child detained under this section without the approval 
of the court.
There is no detail provided on what reports are required by the court for 
psychosurgery or ECT approval and whether one report from the child’s consultant 
psychiatrist will be adequate. This is a situation where independent opinions are 
essential. This indicates that parents can consent to both these treatments without
88 Op. cit., 75 p276.
89 Application no. 61603/00 16th June 2005.
90 Ibid,, para 143.
91 Fennell P., “The Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Mental Health Act 1983, and the Common Law”, 
Journal o f  Mental Health Law 2005.
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court approval where the child is voluntary. The safeguards in the 2001 Act for 
treatment of children are extremely limited and may not conform to the requirements 
under Article 8(1) with regard to family consultation and having an independent 
representative, or advocate. There is no recognition in the legislation of the capacity 
of a 16 year old with regard to consent, yet common law decisions in other 
jurisdictions permit those under 16 to make decisions based on maturity and
0*7understanding. This applies also to those 16-18 year olds, most of whom are 
competent to consent. This is out of step with many of the international human rights 
documents and the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine on the recognition 
of the capacity to consent, where the opinion of the minor should be taken into 
consideration as an increasingly determining factor in proportion to his or her age and 
degree of maturity.93 As a result of this sparsely drafted law, it is likely that there will 
be unnecessary interference with the private lives of older children with regard to the 
right to self determination, unless such interference is convincingly shown to be 
necessary as required by Article 8.94
Article 3 and children
Children are entitled to protection and effective deterrence against serious breaches of 
personal integrity.95 In Z v. United Kingdom, the applicant alleged that the local 
authority had failed to protect four children from inhuman and degrading treatment 
contrary to Article 3.96 There was a positive obligation on the Government to protect 
children from abusive treatment contrary to this provision. The authorities had been 
aware of the serious ill-treatment and neglect suffered by the four children over a 
period of years at the hands of their parents and failed, despite the means reasonably 
available to them, to take any effective steps to bring it to an end. The Court held that 
the State had failed to provide the applicants with adequate protection against 
inhuman and degrading treatment. The measures in Article 3 should provide effective 
protection, in particular, of children and other vulnerable persons and include 
reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have
92 Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1985] 3 All ER 402.
93 Article 6(2).
94 Herczgefalvy v. Austria (1993) 15 437.
95 Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom(1995) 19 EHRR 112,Xand Y v. the Netherlands 26 March 
1985, Series A no. 91, para 21-27.
96 Z & others v. United Kingdom Application no. 29392/95 10th May 2001.
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had knowledge. The children of parents, who have a mental disorder and are not 
receiving care or treatment, resulting in severe neglect of the family, may claim a 
breach of Article 3, where the state had or ought to have had knowledge of the 
neglect. Treatment in an environment that is seriously inappropriate for children may 
also raise Article 3 concerns where the impact on the child is severe as occurred in 
Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine?1 In that case, the inadequate medical treatment had a 
serious impact on the health of the applicant and was regarded as degrading treatment 
that violated Article 3.
Irish law and Article 3
There is no guarantee that children will be entitled to detention in an appropriate place 
that will ensure their protection from inhuman and degrading treatment. It is likely 
though that admission to an adult ward might not reach the level of severity to engage 
Article 3. Admission to adult wards is inappropriate for many reasons, such as the 
ethos of adult treatment units, lack of staff with child treatment skills, the lack of 
ready access to child psychiatrists, as well as the lack of an appropriate treatment 
environment, raising State obligations in this regard based on Aerts v. Belgium.98 The 
lack of facilities for the treatment of children and their admission as voluntary patients 
to adult wards, as well as the inappropriate placement of behaviourally disturbed 
children, including juvenile offenders, in psychiatric care is highlighted annually in 
the Inspector of Mental Hospitals Reports. There are only two centres specialising in 
the admission of children for psychiatric care, with no services developed for 16 and 
17 year olds, who are classified as children under the 2001 Act." The Irish College of 
Psychiatrists have stated that the lack of specialised services for adolescents is having 
an impact on the ability of children’s services to treat younger children, thereby 
creating waiting lists for all children.100
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, which monitors compliance with the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, has expressed concern about the incidence of
97 Application no. 54825/00 5* April 2005.
98 (2000) 29 EHRR 50.
99 Department of Health & Children, Working Group on Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Services, 2nd 
Report, Dublin, 2003.
100 Irish College of Psychiatrists, “Position Statement on Psychiatric Services for Adolescents” 2001.
307
teenage suicide and the widespread gap in adolescent services.101 The lack of 
appropriate facilities has been highlighted in a number of reports, including a
i msubmission to the CPT. Recommendation (2004) 10 advises against detention in 
adult wards.103 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child stated in 1998 that it 
was concerned about the lack of a national policy to ensure the rights of children with 
disabilities and the lack of adequate programmes and services addressing the mental 
health of children and their families. Amnesty International, concerned at Ireland’s 
failure to comply with international obligations towards children with mental illness, 
commented in 2001 that significant advances have been made in the mental health 
care system, but that psychiatric services for children and adolescents remain 
underprovided in most areas of the country.104
The right to education must be safeguarded while in hospital. Athough this is not 
included in the 2001 Act, it is provided for in the Child Care Act 1991.105 The 
Constitution affirms the right to free primary education with a cut off point at 18 years 
for children with mental disabilities as established by the Supreme Court in Sinnott v. 
Ireland}06 This right is enshrined also in Article 2 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention and, while this right is not absolute, it has been interpreted by the Court
107as protecting a right to access effective education. Further support for the right to 
education can be found in Recommendation (2004)10, which states that children with 
mental disorders should have a right to free education and to be reintegrated into the 
general school system as soon as possible. Where possible, they should be 
individually evaluated and receive an individualised educational or training
I ORprogramme. This recommendation reflects Article 28 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which provides for a child’s right to education, and that such 
education should be accessible and available to all children. Where children are
101 Concluding Observations o f  the Committee on the Rights o f the Child: Ireland, 4/02/98 CRC/C/15.
102 Children’s Rights Alliance, Submission to the European Committee for the Prevention o f Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 17* May 2002.
103 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2004)10 on the protection o f the 
human rights and dignity o f  persons with mental disorder, Article 15.
104 Op. cit., 56 p60.
105 Article 2 of the First Protocol to the Convention This is also required in many human rights 
documents particularly the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
106 Sinnott v. Minister fo r Education [2001] 2 IR 545. Also Quinlivan & Keys “Official Indifference 
and Persistent Procrastination: An Analysis of Sinnott”, (2002) 2(2) Judicial Studies Institute Journal.
107 Belgian Linguistic Case (No 2) 1 EHRR 252.
108 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation 200410 on the protection o f  the 
human rights and dignity o f  persons with mental disorder, Article 29(5).
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admitted to adult wards, the culture of such an environment may not ensure that 
education is a significant factor.
Conclusion
The 1945 Act has a statutory basis for the voluntary admission of children, i.e. those 
under 16 years, but the common law applies to their treatment in the absence of any 
guidance in the Act. There is a requirement in the 1945 Act that the admission would 
benefit the child, but this is not defined. The benefit requirement is not replicated in 
the 2001 Act for children, although it must be applied to the detention of adults.109 
The 2001 Act has statutory principles that apply to all admissions. These principles 
must influence any action taken in connection with admission and treatment. There is 
no express guidance on the voluntary admission of children in the 2001 Act, other 
than that applying to adults. The statements of the Court in HL v. United Kingdom and 
in Storck v. Germany should apply mutatis mutandis to children being admitted as 
voluntary patients to psychiatric care where they are subject to the level of control and 
supervision required for a deprivation of liberty. Unless safeguards are provided, 
Ireland will breach Article 5. The decision in Storck requires the state to provide 
supervision and control over detention by private individuals in contrast with the 
decision in Nielsen.110
In the 2001 Act, the District Court is involved in all compulsory admissions of 
children. There is no automatic right under the 2001 Act to legal representation for the 
child. This right may be provided under the Child Care Act 1991. There are concerns 
regarding the scope of the discretion open to the court with regard to the time-scale 
for the provision of expert reports and the continuing detention of the child in the 
meantime. The role of parents is minimal in this regard and they have no express 
rights associated with such hearings, such as access to copies of detention orders. 
Another concern is the lack of express provision for Garda involvement with the 
removal of a child to inpatient care. One of the most serious issues is the admission of 
a child, whether voluntary or compulsory, to adult wards in the absence of more
109 Mental Health Act 2001 section 3(l)(b)(ii).
110 HL v. United Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 32. Application no. 45508/99 5th October 2004 para 120, 
Storck v. Germany Application no. 61603/00 16th June 2005 and Nielsen v Denmark (1989) 11 EHRR 
175.
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appropriate services, raising similar issues to those in Aerts. There are gaps with 
regard to the provision of information, despite Article 5(2) and many human rights 
standards, particularly having regard to age and understanding. Some of these issues 
may engage Article 14 on the basis of the different treatment meted out to children, 
particularly the competent older child when compared with adults.
The right to self-determination regarding consent to treatment is not protected in 
either Act for the child with voluntary status. The common law will apply and parents 
or guardians will consent on the child’s behalf with no other requirement. This seems 
to apply to all treatments available, thereby offering no safeguards, while the 2001 
Act provides the court will be the safeguard in deciding for the child regarding ECT 
or psychosurgery. It is not clear if any second opinion will be included in this 
procedure and there is no recommendation that children will be treated by a child 
psychiatrist. This is an important issue given that there are only 20 specialist inpatient 
beds for children in Ireland and adult services are often used. The imposition of the 
three month stabilising period for medicine before consent or a second opinion 
applies. The lack of independence of this second opinion applies to children, as well 
as adults and, therefore, it is doubtful if the convincing necessity standard in Article 3 
can be reached. The right to self-determination of those between 16 and 17 years is 
not considered, even though the statutory right to consent to general medical 
treatment applies at 16 years. This raises the question of unnecessary interference and 
a possible violation of Article 8 and the right to respect for private life, particularly 
with capable minors. It may also engage Article 14, unless there is objective and 
reasonable justification for the difference between medical and psychiatric treatment. 
However, the decision in Storck may lead to greater State involvement in the 
supervision of such treatment. These gaps may well reach the inhuman and degrading 
treatment standard in Article 3 when linked with an inappropriate hospital 
environment.
The 2001 Act requires a proper system of safeguards including: proper procedural 
safeguards, recognition of the compliant incapacitated child, appropriate and 
beneficial placement, representation for the child, protection of their his to privacy, 
and recognition that his capacity to consent grows with increasing maturity.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis set out to examine the compatibility of Irish mental health law with the 
European Convention on Human Rights and considered the following rights: to liberty, to 
self-determination, to protection from inhuman and degrading treatment, to have access 
to court, to protection of life, to marry and children’s rights. The findings on each of 
these rights are summarised and issues needing special attention are highlighted. The 
overall conclusion is that the 2001 Act should be fully implemented as a matter of 
urgency and further matters in relation to incapacitated patients also must be addressed.
Right to liberty
Chapter One considered the provisions of the 1945 and 2001 Acts as they apply to 
admission to psychiatric care in the light of the obligations arising under Articles 5(1) and 
5(2) of the Convention. Chapter Two considered the right to review of detention in Irish 
law against the background of Article 5(4) to see if Ireland is meeting its obligations. 
Alternative review procedures were also examined and included a study of the use of 
habeas corpus in Ireland.
Deprivation of liberty under the 1945 Act can take place on the basis of social 
considerations, such as neglect, cruel treatment and perverted conduct contrary to the 
Winterwerp criteria and in breach of Article 5( 1 )(e).1 Modem medical practice does not 
adhere to these criteria, thereby creating a gap between law and practice. There is a real 
risk of arbitrariness and unpredictability, where the rule of law does not apply in 
contravention of Convention requirements. It also creates difficulties for professionals 
attempting to match current practice with inadequate legislation.
The criteria for detention in the 2001 Act define mental disorder to include three 
categories: mental illness, severe dementia and significant intellectual disability, where 
failure to admit the person would lead to a serious deterioration or prevent appropriate
1 Winterwerp v. Netherlands [1979] 2 EHRR 387.
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treatment being given. The requirement of a “benefit” from the admission forces some 
consideration of the potential impact on the individual. The use of the words, “serious,” 
“immediate,” “significant” and “severe” throughout the criteria for detention indicate that 
a more exacting standard and higher level of proof will be required for any detention. As 
drafted, the criteria in the 2001 Act seem to comply with Article 5(1 )(e).
Many of the procedures under the 1945 Act are vague, unforeseeable in their effect, have 
unlimited discretion and would not meet the “fair and proper procedure” requirement in 
the Convention. The broad range of applicants and the mixing of mandatory and non­
mandatory words like “may” and “shall” in relation to the examination requirement in the 
1945 Act, depending on which category of doctor is involved, leads to confusion.2 The 
Irish courts have held that the failure to carry out any examination prior to making a 
recommendation for detention as in Kieman v. Harris, Kieman & Midland Health 
Board, or where an examination for such recommendation for detention was based partly 
on a telephone conversation as in Melly v. Moran & North Western Health Board does 
not comply with national law, resulting in lack of reasonable care.3 Procedural 
differences under the 1945 Act between private and public patients raise many questions, 
some of which may engage Article 14. The Supreme Court, in Gooden v. Waterford 
Regional Hospital, referred to these as “unnecessary and invidious.”4 Such differences 
were highlighted in the decision in Storck v. Germany, which held that the state has 
positive obligations to ensure the interests of the patient deprived of his liberty are 
safeguarded in both the public and private area.5
The 2001 Act procedures are more clearly defined and exclude certain categories of 
applicant from the detention procedure.6 The Act places a greater onus on the doctor in 
the examination for detention to provide objective medical evidence of mental disorder,
'  Mental Treatment Act 1945, Section 163(l)(bX0-
3 Melly v. Moran & North Western Health Board, Unreported Supreme Court, 28th May 1998, and Kiernan 
v. Harris, Kieman & Midland Health Board, Unreported High Court, 12th May 1998.
4 Gooden v. Waterford Regional Hospital [2001] IESC 6 21st February 2001 para 54.
3 Application no 61603/00 16th June 2005.
6 Mental Health Act 2001, section 2(1).
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thereby complying with the Winterwerp criteria.7 The person must be informed of the 
purpose of the examination, but there is no second opinion option prior to detention. The 
principles in the Act, however, may ensure some consideration of the individual’s wishes.
There is no obligation in the 1945 Act to communicate promptly the factual and legal 
basis of the detention so that the patient can challenge the detention. The 2001 Act places 
significant emphasis on the provision of information to the patient, but does not include 
the substantive reasons for the detention as established in Van der Leer v. Netherlands.8 
The Act provides that the patient be given information about the detention and right to 
review' within 24 hours of an admission or renewal order being made, complying with the 
“prompt” requirement. The information must be in writing, raising concerns about real 
compliance with Article 5(2) where there are literacy, language, or a representative is 
needed.
The 1945 Act formalises the admission of voluntary patients, but does not adequately 
consider the situation of the incapacitated voluntary patient. While the Act recognises 
that a patient may not be truly voluntary and mandates that such patient is either detained 
or discharged within 28 days, this clearly is not the practice. During this 28 day period, 
the patient is effectively under the control of the hospital. This seems disproportionate to 
the aim of safeguarding the patient. The current failure to comply with this statutory 
procedure amounts to a breach of national law and of the Convention. All of the factors 
required to establish a deprivation of liberty and necessitating safeguards were outlined in 
HL v. United Kingdom and Storck v. Germany and these rulings clearly have application 
to Ireland, raising possible breaches of Article 5.9 Where such admissions meet the 
requirements to establish a deprivation of liberty, the Irish State has a positive obligation 
to ensure there are safeguards in place. These safeguards include the presentation to a 
competent authority of objective medical evidence of a true mental disorder, which is of a 
kind or degree justifying detention and regular rights to review of detention. The 2001
Winterwerp v. Netherlands [1979] 2 EHRR 387.
8 (1990) 12 EHRR 567.
9 (2004) 40 EHRR 32. Application no. 45508/99 5th October 2004, para 9, Application no.61603/00 16th 
June 2005.
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Act does not have any formal admission requirements for voluntary patients or specific 
safeguards, but has a 24 hour holding power. The key question is whether those who are 
compliant and incapacitated will be treated as if truly voluntary, even when under the 
total control of the hospital staff, raising the same issues as apply to the 1945 Act.
The 1945 Act is clearly in breach of Article 5(4) by failing to have any independent 
review mechanism available, despite the extensive and unlimited detention periods. 
Habeas corpus is the only option to challenge the legality of the detention and, as a result, 
occupies a position of fundamental importance, which the Irish State has relied on 
discharge its responsibilities under Article 5(4).10 It is well established that both judicial 
review and habeas corpus are not adequate remedies to test the legality of the detention 
since they go to the lawfulness in a less substantive sense than is required by the 
Convention and are commonly used to challenge procedural irregularity, not medical 
evidence.11 However, habeas corpus can be used as an effective check against 
arbitrariness for emergency measures, provided the measures are of short duration.
The results of an empirical study into the use of habeas corpus by psychiatric patients
established the low rate of applications for habeas corpus from patients in psychiatric
1 ?hospitals, compared with applications from prisoners. Reasons for the low rate may 
include, the lack of information as to the rights available to people in detention, the lack 
of a rights culture in psychiatric hospitals, the lack of rights based mental health 
legislation with no access to information regarding the rights available in the 1945 Act. 
Judicial review is restrictive in Ireland and reliance on both these provisions means that 
the safeguards of the 1945 Act do not conform to Article 5(4).
The 2001 Act partially complies with Article 5(4) by providing a right to review by a 
tribunal of the initial decision to detain and of each decision to extend an order, but
10 Croke v Ireland Application No. 33267/96.
11 Fennell P., “Doctor Knows Best Therapeutic Detention under Common Law, The Mental Health Act and 
the European Convention,” (1998) 7 Med. L. Rev. p 349.
12 There were 111 applications from psychiatric detainees from 1923-1999 and 113 from prisoners from 
1998-1999.
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excluding wards of court is a breach of Article 5(4).13 There is a right to legal 
representation before the tribunal, but there is no statutory right to an independent 
medical report for the hearing. The initial review will take place within 21 days of 
detention and at each extension to a detention order. The statutory time scales will 
provide for a speedy review provided the system is adequately resourced.14 Unlike the 
Mental Health Act 1983, the tribunal has no statutory power to make a conditional 
discharge, defer a discharge or direct that a patient’s disorder be reclassified. In the right 
of appeal to the Circuit Court against the tribunal decision the burden of proof will rest 
with the individual that he no longer has a mental disorder. This is almost certainly in 
breach of Article 5(4), having regard to the decision in Reid v. United Kingdom}5
The right to self determination
Chapter Three considered the nature of the right to respect for private life, family life, 
home and correspondence under Article 8 and the enforcement of these rights in Irish 
law. The main focus of the chapter was on private life, with particular emphasis on the 
right of self-determination in relation to consent to treatment, including seclusion and 
advance directives.
The Irish Courts held, in In re a Ward o f Court(Withdrawal o f medical treatment), that 
the constitutional rights of every person, the well and infirm, include the right to privacy, 
autonomy and self-determination, part of which is the right to refuse treatment.16 Where 
patients are unable to consent, the common law doctrine of necessity provides a defence 
for doctors acting in their best interests.17 Where an individual is incapable of managing 
himself or his affairs, he may be made a ward of court and loses all self-determination
13 Mental Health Act 2001, section 18. Wards are not entitled any other system of regular review of their 
detention.
14 Ibid, section 18(2).
13 Hutchinson Reid v. United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 9.
16 In re a Ward [1995] 2 ILRM 401 p404.
17 Bo lam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 Dunne v. National Maternity 
Hospital [1989] IR 91.
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rights.18 Serious medical treatment decisions are then made by the President of the High 
Court and minor decisions made by the “committee,” subject to the principle that in an 
emergency a doctor is entitled to take urgent action to preserve life and health.19 This 
system is extreme and disproportionate to the aims of the protective jurisdiction and is 
likely to breach Article 8 in its private life aspects. The Power of Attorney Act 1997 
provides for an enduring power of attorney that does not include medical treatment 
decisions by the attorney.
The 1945 Act contains no safeguards for consent to treatment which is imposed on the 
basis of the common law, regardless of patient capacity. There are no safeguards when 
treatment is being given to a resisting patient. Voluntary patients should be able to give 
legally effective consent to treatment and there is nothing in the Act or common law to 
suggest otherwise. Those who are admitted voluntarily, but who lack capacity, are treated 
without any particular consideration of their status or incapacity. These provisions do not 
provide adequate safeguards to comply with Article 8.
The 2001 Act principles support the right to self-determination, requiring respect for the 
dignity, bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy of the individual.20 Safeguards for 
consent apply only to those who are formally detained and not to voluntary incapacitated 
patients. These require that the consultant is satisfied regarding the patient’s “capacity to 
understand,” which may not mean actual understanding 21 The second opinion safeguard, 
where the patient refuses ECT treatment or medicine, is not required to be independent of 
the service and can be requested by the patient’s psychiatrist. These omissions are 
significant in relation to the imposition of treatment on a mentally competent resisting 
adult. There is no requirement that reasons are given for the decision to override the self- 
determination of a mentally competent adult and no right of appeal lies against the second 
opinion other than judicial review. Patients can be given medicine forcibly for a three
18 Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871 and in the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961. The 
procedure is set out in Order 67 of The Rules of the Superior Courts 1986.
19 JM  v. St. Vincent’s Hospital [2003] 1 IR 321. Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871 (1871 Act) . In re an 
Application by the Midland Health Board [1988] ILRM 251.
20 Mental Health Act 2001, section 4(3).
21 Jones R., Mental Health Act Manual (9th ed.), Thomson, London, 2004, p 298.
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month period before the second opinion safeguard applies. When different medications 
are used, there is no guidance on when the time begins. This constitutes an interference 
with private life under Article 8(1) and can only be justified under Article 8(2) if it can 
convincingly shown to be necessary for health and safety. In Storck v. Germany, the 
Court held that even a minor interference with the right to bodily integrity can breach 
Article 8.22
The protection of the confidentiality of patient information can arise when the needs of 
the patient and carer have to be balanced and, while governed by the common law, there 
is no reference to confidentiality in the 1945 Act, but the 2001 Act requires respect for 
the right to privacy.23 Any information given without consent will have to stand the 
necessity test, have a legitimate aim and be proportionate to the achievement of that aim 
in order to comply with Article 8(2). Similarly, rights to privacy of the home or 
correspondence are not specifically protected in the legislation and the intrusion by staff 
into the homes of patients in community facilities and the lack of privacy in such places 
or with correspondence might well engage Article 8, unless it is justifiable as pursuing a 
legitimate aim and is proportionate to that aim.
Protection against inhuman and degrading treatment
Chapter Four considered the impact of Article 3 and the safeguards in Irish law to prevent 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. The main issues addressed were whether the 
conditions of detention could reach the minimum level of severity to come within the 
scope of Article 3, whether medical treatment could amount to inhuman and degrading 
treatment and whether the side-effects of medication or the failure to treat could amount 
to a breach of Article 3.
Government reports highlight the seriously inadequate physical conditions in facilities, 
ranging from patients having to slop-out, to unsafe observation areas and overcrowding,
22 Storck v Germany Application no.61603/00 16th June 2005 para 144.
23 Mental Health Act 2001, section 4(3).
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as well as poor attention to the general health needs of patients, in contrast with private 
hospital accommodation. The lack of appropriate facilities for children, including those 
with an intellectual disability, most of whom have voluntary status, could be severe 
enough to engage Article 3 where it results in inhuman and degrading treatment. The 
2001 Act proposes a more rigorous inspection system than the 1945 Act to ensure that 
minimum physical standards and staffing needs are met in all mental health centres as a 
condition for registration of the centres.24 Inadequate or non-existent community services 
and a high readmission rate to in-patient facilities with loss of liberty represents a serious 
impact on peoples’ lives and, where this is not regarded as sufficiently severe to engage 
Article 3, it would very likely be a breach of Article 8 and the right to respect for private 
and family life. The denial of appropriate treatment to a severely ill patient could be 
serious enough to engage Article 3.25 The 2001 Act requires that a treatment plan is in 
place for all in-patients.26
The practice of seclusion and restraint is not subject to any formal safeguards or access to 
review of the practice in either the 1945 or the 2001 Acts. The lack of formal safeguards, 
or independent monitoring and review of seclusion, or an independent second opinion 
before it commences, is also a cause of concern, having regard to the decision of the 
English Court of Appeal in Munjaz.27
Medical treatment could involve a breach of Article 3 if the side-effects are sufficiently 
serious.28 If the medication is therapeutically justified, the possibility of establishing a 
breach of Article 3 is more remote, unless there was an equally effective alternative that 
produced less serious side-effects.29 The Inspector’s reports have highlighted the wide 
range and diversity of drug prescribing, along with the lack of guidance for appropriate
24 Mental Health Act 2001, section 64.
25 D v United Kingdom (1997)24 EHRR 423.
26 Mental Health Act 2001, section 66(2Xg).
27 R (on application o f  Munjaz) v. Mersey Care National Health Service Trust & Others [2003] EWCA Civ 
1036, [2005] UKHL 58.
1%Grare v. France (1992) 15 EHRR CD 100.
29 Jones R., Mental Health Act Manual, (9th ed.), Thomson, London, 2004, p778.
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and effective prescribing.30 Referring to sudden deaths, the Inspector has commented on 
the need for greater care in examination and getting informed consent to treatment. 
Polypharmacy is widespread and individuals are not given information on the medication 
and possible side-effects, raising the question of informed consent for those who were 
treated and the possibility of degrading treatment under Article 3.31
Civil rights and obligations
Chapter Five considered the nature of civil rights and obligations under Article 6 and the 
obligation to have speedy access to a fair hearing and right to representation and 
concentrated on the legal provisions affecting access to the courts. The access restrictions 
to take civil action under the 1945 and the 2001 Acts were examined for compliance with 
Article 6.
Under Irish law, a statutory restriction on the right of access to court would not be 
unconstitutional where there were objective reasons for the restriction and where it was 
not of itself unduly oppressive.32 Under Article 6(1) while there is a margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by contracting states, the limitations applied must not restrict or 
reduce the access left to the individual to such an extent that the very essence of the right 
is impaired.33 In addition, the limitation will not be compatible with Article 6(1) if it does 
not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.34
The 1945 Act contains a restriction (section 260) on taking civil action in connection with 
detention and, because it is regarded as a curtailment of the constitutional right of every 
individual to have access to court, such legislation must be strictly construed in the sense
30 Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending 2003, 
Government Publications, Dublin, 2004.
31 Schizophrenia Ireland A Question o f Choice Service Users Experience o f Medication and Treatment 
(Dublin 2002) Amnesty International, Mental Illness The Neglected Quarter, Dublin, 2003.
32 Murphy v Greene [1990] 2 DR. 566.
33 Ashingdane v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 528 para 57.
34 Ibid.
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that it must not be availed of, except where it is essential to do so.35 Leave to take civil 
action will be granted by the High Court if there are substantial grounds for alleging bad 
faith or want of reasonable care. The Irish courts have stated that that the standard of 
reasonable care under the Act may be quite different from such standard in ordinary 
medical practice.36 Only four cases have succeeded in being granted leave based on lack 
of reasonable care: where there was a failure to carry out any examination or offer a 
second opinion, where the recommendation for the detention was out of date, where 
telephone conversations were held not to form part of the actual examination for the 
recommendation for detention and for failure to diagnose.37
In a constitutional challenge to the section in Blehein v. Minister for Health & Children, 
Ireland & Attorney General, the plaintiff argued successfully that section 260 was a 
legislated breach of the separation of powers and independence of the judicial function. 
The High Court held that this restriction constituted an impermissible interference by the 
legislature in the judicial domain, contrary to the Constitution, and that the legislature 
was not entitled to limit access to the High Court on specific grounds as contained in 
section 260.38 This means that the High Court will grant leave where it is satisfied that 
there are substantial grounds for doing so, thereby making it easier for mental health 
patients to take civil action and for accessing court. Under the 2001 Act, the burden of 
proof has been reduced to reasonable grounds creating a more favourable situation for the 
applicant. Applying the decision in Blehein to the 2001 Act means that the High Court 
can grant leave if satisfied that no reasonable grounds exist that the proceedings are 
vexatious or frivolous. The burden will remain on the applicant to show the application is 
reasonable and it is likely that this aspect will meet Article 6 requirements on access to 
court. The failure to exclude public authorities from the section is disproportionate to the 
aim of protecting individuals involved in the detention. Neither Act has any express 
provision for legal aid in taking civil actions and, having regard to the reasoning in Airey
33 B. v. Gallagher [1995] 2 ILRM 433, Murphy v Greene [1990] 2 IR 566.
36 Murphy v Greene [1990] 2 IR 566 per McCarthy J pl92.
37 Kiernan v. Harris, Midland Health Board & Ors [1998] IEHC 71 Melly v. Moran & North Western 
Health Board 12th May 1998 Bailey v. Gallagher Unreported Supreme Court 28th May 1998, In 
Manweiler v. Bourke & HSE Eastern Region Unreported High Court, March 2005, Unreported Supreme 
Court, September 2005.
38 Blehein v. Minister for Health & Children, Ireland & Attorney General [2004] IEHC 374 p5.
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v. Ireland, the right of access to court must be effective.39 The failure to provide a 
comprehensive civil legal aid system directly impacts on effective access to court and, 
taking into account the particular vulnerability and powerlessness of persons with mental 
disorders, this potentially transgresses the very essence test by destroying access resulting 
in a breach of Article 6.
Chapter Six considered the ward of court system as it applies to the removal of legal 
capacity to manage one’s person or property. At the opposite extreme is the enduring 
power of attorney as an example of an advance directive in anticipation of incapacity, 
which was considered as were the Law Reform Commission proposals for a 
comprehensive system for the protection of vulnerable adults.40
The removal of legal capacity for decision making under the ward of court system by the 
High Court, which protects and manages the property and person of legally incapacitated 
individuals, is extreme and automatically divests the individual totally of decision­
making capacity through a court procedure and usually lasts for life.41 The consequences 
are so severe that the procedure is avoided where possible and this results in many 
informal and arbitrary interventions in managing the property of the individual in the 
absence of a less extreme measure. The Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871 does not 
deal with specific issues related to welfare, such as the withholding of medical treatment, 
although the right to protection in wardship is not limited to the protection of property.42 
The High Court relies on either the parens patriae principle or the inherent jurisdiction 
under the Constitution to make these decisions.
The criteria for entering wardship require that the person must be of “unsound mind” and 
must also be “incapable of managing his person or property.” The assessment is open to a 
broad interpretation of incapacity and the term “unsound mind” is not defined. It is left to 
the discretion of medical experts, even though a specialist assessment is not required.
39 Airey v. Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 505.
40 Law Reform Commission, Law and the Elderly (LRC CP-23 2003) recommends the abolition of the 
system and replacement with a whole new system.
41 The ward may be permitted to make a will.
42 In re D (Midland Health Board Wardship application) [1987] IR 449.
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These factors, along with the failure to take account of the ward’s or carer’s wishes, may 
well transgress the proportionality requirement in Article 6. The capacity assessment for 
entry to wardship is a general one, rather than issue specific, and where the criteria are 
satisfied autonomy is removed. This would seem to be disproportionate to the aim of 
protecting the property or welfare of the individual and not in keeping with functional 
approach and the least restrictive alternative or proportionality principle. There is no 
statutory requirement to have a legal representation, though in practice this is ensured. 
The ward may be able to make a will if the High Court confirms that he has testamentary 
capacity to do so based on medical evidence and the opinion of his solicitor.
The legislation imposes a mandatory duty on medical and legal visitors to visit the ward, 
but this is not done due to lack of resources. Clearly, this is a breach of statutory 
requirements, perhaps causing people to remain in wardship longer than necessary. The 
wards who are in psychiatric detention have no specific rights under either the 1945 or 
2001 Acts, particularly with regard to review of detention. This is in breach of Article 
5(4) and also raises Article 14 issues, unless the difference in treatment can be justified. 
The length of time to complete a wardship application is regarded as too long at a 
minimum of three months and may not comply with the speedy requirement in Article 6. 
There is no automatic review of continuing wardship and the presumption of continuing 
incapacity is no longer acceptable, but there is no guidance on the level of capacity 
necessary for discharge from wardship. This is obviously an arbitrary approach to 
continuing incapacity and may not be justifiable as being proportionate to the aim of the 
protective jurisdiction.
The Power of Attorney Act 1996 provides for an enduring power of attorney permitting a 
measure of control by an adult in anticipation of future incapacity. This power is limited 
to property and finance and personal care decisions that specifically exclude health care 
decisions.43 While the High Court has general supervisory powers in relation to enduring
43 Powers of Attorney Act 1996 Section 4(1), the definition of personal care includes, where the donor 
should live and with whom, whom the donor should see and not see, the training and rehabilitation the 
donor should get, the donor’s diet and dress, the right to inspect the donor’s papers and housing, social 
welfare and other benefits for donor.43
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powers of attorney, there are concerns about the lack of supervision of attorneys. 
Although some safeguards exist, these are not adequate to ensure that those appointed act 
in the best interests of the incapacitated person. Some of these issues are the subject of 
current law reform.
The Law Reform Commission (LRC) recognises the need for change in relation to 
decision making and vulnerable adults.44 These reforms propose to replace the wardship 
system with a comprehensive structure that will assess capacity, enhance and enable 
decision-making capacity and provide proxy decision-making where necessary. The LRC 
propose that the law on capacity should reflect capacity, rather than incapacity, ensuring 
that it would be enabling, not restrictive, in nature and, therefore, compliant with 
constitutional and human rights standards.
Right to life
Chapter Seven considered the positive obligations on the State under Article 2 that arise 
in relation to the protection against unlawful killing by agents of the state45 and the 
protection against unlawful killing by non-state agents, such as other patients or prison 
in-mates.46 The obligation also requires protection against suicide in particular 
circumstances where the risk is known to the state47 and protection of the public against 
the known risk from a mentally disordered person.48 These obligations increase in 
relation to people with mental disorder in detention. Obligations arise in relation to the 
investigation of such deaths and to ensure family involvement in inquiries. Hospitals are 
obliged to establish an effective judicial system for ascertaining the cause of a death in 
hospital and any liability on the part of the medical practitioners concerned.49 In the
44 Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper, The Law and the Elderly (LRC CP 23-2003).
Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper, Vulnerable Adults and the Law: Capacity, (LRC CP 37- 
2005).
43 McCann v. United Kingdom 31 EHRR 97.
46 Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19.
47 Keenan v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 38 para 92.
48 Osman v. United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245 para 56.
49 Erikson v. Italy 29 (2000) EHRR CD 152 p7.
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context of prisoners, the authorities are under a duty to protect vulnerable mental health 
patients.
The 1945 Act mandates that a report on the death of any patient in a mental institution be 
given to the coroner within twelve hours of the death.50 There is no obligation to hold an 
inquest if the coroner is satisfied the death is due to natural causes. There is also an 
obligation on the hospital to inform the inspector of mental hospitals about the death.51 
There is no express provision in the Coroner’s Act 1962 requiring the family of the 
deceased to be in attendance at the inquest, but the rules of constitutional justice require 
that the family be given the opportunity to be present at the inquest. Drug prescribing 
and hospital deaths has been highlighted in reports from the Inspector, who emphasised 
the need for caution by having thorough examination and review of medication and side- 
effects and avoiding polypharmacy.53 The protection of patients from the fatal side 
effects of prescribed medication may engage Article 2 where their physical vulnerability 
is a known factor. The 2001 Act does not have specific obligations, like the 1945 Act, to 
report deaths to the Department of Health and Children or to the Mental Health 
Commission.
The General Prisons (Ireland) Act 1877 provides that the coroner must allow sufficient 
time for the attendance of the “nearest relative” at an inquest.54 These provisions are in 
keeping with the obligations under Article 2 and provide that the family do not have to 
initiate the involvement.55 There is a mandatory requirement to have an inquest into the 
death of every prisoner.56 The word “prison” is interpreted widely and includes the death 
of a person in Garda custody. In practice, such deaths are normally reported to the 
coroner and a post-mortem and inquest will always be held. There is some evidence that
30 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 268.
31 Ibid, section 272(e).
32State (McKeown) v. Scully [1984] ILRM 133.
33 Department of Health and Children, Report o f the Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending 2001, 
Government Publications, Dublin, 2002, p i2.
34 General Prisons(Ireland) Act 1877, section 56.
33 Edwards v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 5 para 69.
36 General Prisons(Ireland) Act 1877, section 56.
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not all such deaths are actually reported, which would raise Article 2 obligations.57 The 
obligation requires the state to account for any injuries suffered and this involves an even 
greater obligation when the person dies.
In the recent Ban" Inquiry, the test applied in an inquest into the shooting dead of a man 
who had a history of depression by Gardai was whether the killings were “reasonably 
justified,” which is a lower and less stringent standard than the “absolutely necessary” 
standard in Article 2.58 There is considerable doubt as to whether the actions of the 
Gardai could have met the Article 2 test of “absolutely necessary” or that the actions 
were proportionate to the actual threat involved.59 It remains with the final report to 
ascertain whether the Article 2 test is satisfied in the case.
Right to marry
Chapter Eight considered the right to marry under Article 12, which raises two important 
issues: the restrictions imposed on people who have a mental disorder, and consideration 
o f the limitations on people exercising reproductive rights that include a right to a sexual 
relationship and a right not to be sterilised. Article 12 overlaps with Article 8 in these 
private and family life areas. The rights guaranteed in national law must recognise the 
right to marry and found a family in principle and this right is confined to legally 
formalised heterosexual relationships.60 Any restrictions on the right must be for a 
legitimate purpose, must be proportionate to the aim of the restriction and must not 
impair the very essence of the right.61 A narrow margin of appreciation is granted to 
national authorities in matters involving intimate aspects of private life, such as the right
f t  9to sexual relationship, to marry and found a family.
3 Browne, “Inaccurate Garda records on deaths in custody”, The Village Magazine, 8th -14th July 2005 p5.
38 Irish Council for Civil Liberties, Submission to Joint Oireachtas Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence 
and Womens ’ Rights on the Garda Investigation o f the Shooting o f Mr. John Carthy at Abbeylara on 2&h 
April, 2000 30th November, 2000.
59 As of February 2006 the final report has not been published.
60 Rees v. United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 56. Hamer v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 139.
61 Cossey v. United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR 622.
62 Norris v. Ireland (1989) 13 EHRR 186, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149.
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The Constitution recognises the right to marry and the right to procreate, but it can be 
limited in specific circumstances. The equality provision of the Constitution expressly 
permits the State to have due regard to difference in capacity and social function. The 
loss of capacity does not result in the reduction of personal rights, including the right to
fx'Xprivacy and self-determination. The common law understanding of the nature of 
marriage is not pitched at a high level. The appropriate test to be applied is whether the 
person had the capacity to marry and to understand the nature of the marriage contract, 
and was mentally capable of understanding the duties and responsibilities that normally 
attached to marriage.
There is a statutory prohibition on wards of court entering marriage. Article 6(1) requires 
that any limitations on this civil right be proportionate to the aim of protecting 
incapacitated people and the restrictions must not be such that the very essence of the 
right to marry is impaired. Some people who are wards of court might be able to 
understand the nature of the marriage contract. The Law Reform Commission has 
recommended that the statute be repealed due to being over inclusive and may well 
breach Article 12 as destroying the very essence of the right to marry.
A related right to sexual relations and to found a family are important aspects of Articles 
8 and 12 rights. A sexual relationship with a person who is “mentally impaired” is a 
crime, unless they are married to one another, subject to a defence of not knowing of the 
impairment. The definition of mental impairment is unsatisfactory as it is based on the 
ability to lead an independent life. The effect is that, apart from marriage, a sexual 
relationship between two mentally impaired people may constitute a criminal offence, as 
there is no defence of consent where both are presumed to give real consent. These 
barriers may be disproportionate to the aim of protecting against exploitation and may 
transgress Article 8 rights to privacy in sexual relationships, unless the restrictions can be 
justified.
63 In re a Ward (Withdrawal o f Treatment) [1995] 2 ILRM 401.
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Compulsory sterilisation or abortion are interferences with the right to found a family in 
Article 12, and Article 8 could well be engaged in this regard in relation to the right to 
respect for private and family life.64 The focus for justification in cases of non-consensual 
sterilisation should be on the rights and interests of the individual, rather than on broader 
issues, like “benefit to society,” in order to comply with Article 12. Generally, in other 
jurisdictions, a distinction is drawn between therapeutic and non-therapeutic sterilisation, 
with leave of the courts being necessary for non-therapeutic sterilisation for a mentally 
disabled person.
Children
Chapter Nine considered the admission and treatment of children and necessitated a 
separate chapter due to the application of additional statutes to children and also the 
dominant role of parental authority.65 The admission and treatment of children with 
mental disorders and the minimalist approach by the 1945 and 2001 Acts to safeguarding 
both their Article 5 rights and their Article 8 privacy rights, as well as exposing them to 
the possibility of inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3, were considered. By 
virtue of the powerful protections that the family in Ireland as a unit receives, there is a 
near-automatic presumption that parents’ rights cannot generally be interfered with by the 
courts where the risks are minimal.66 The children of parents, who have a mental disorder 
and are not receiving care or treatment resulting in severe neglect of the family or even 
mental disorder in the children, may engage Article 3 where the state had or ought to 
have had knowledge of the neglect.
Parental involvement is limited to making voluntary admission applications under both 
Acts. Under the 2001 Act, a detention order can only be made by the court where the 
parents refuse to consent to an examination or cannot be found. The District Court can, 
exceptionally, make an order for detention without a medical report, but there is no
64In re D (Application by the Midland Health Board) [1988] ILRM 251.
6:>Nielsen v. Denmark, (1988) 11 EHRR 175.
66 Martin F., “Parental Rights to withhold consent to medical treatment for their child: A conflict of 
Rights”, (2001) 7 ILT pi 14-119 at 117.
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specific time scale in the legislation for its provision or the period a child (under 18 
years) might be in detention pending a final determination. Where there is no “objective 
medical expertise” confirming mental disorder, unless there is an emergency, this could 
engage Article 5(1). There is no statutory right to legal representation for the child, 
contrary to international human rights law.67 The 2001 Act does not make provision for 
children who are detained to choose to be voluntary, in contrast to adults and in keeping 
with the least restrictive alternative. The rights applying to adults with regard to 
information do not apply to children, even taking account of age and understanding. 
Parents will have to be given the opportunity to be involved in the decision-making 
process to avoid a breach of their Article 8 rights, unless exclusion can be justified under 
Article 8(2). Similarly, there is no provision in the Act to give parents copies of court 
orders or to give them to the capable child.
The place in which children are admitted and treated is significant where it fails to satisfy 
the relationship of proportionality between the grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty 
relied on and the place and conditions of detention.68 Adult wards with no specialist 
facilities, where there is no clear benefit to the child so as to satisfy the proportionality 
requirement, may well breach the child’s Article 3 rights to be protected from inhuman 
and degrading treatment or, if not, could breach Article 8 and the child’s right to respect 
for privacy.69 In the 2001 Act, the District Court, in making a detention order, is not 
required to take “benefit” into account. In relation to adult detention, “benefit” must be 
considered and such difference in application, without objective or reasonable 
justification, could well engage Article 14.
Children, despite being voluntary patients, are often not given choices in admission and 
treatment and the Court stated that the right to liberty is too important for a person to lose 
the benefit of the Convention because he has been compliant in admission, especially
67 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2004) 10 on the protection of the human 
rights and dignity o f persons with mental disorder, Article 29(3).
68 Aerts v. Belguim (2000) 29 EHRR 50. See also, Department of Health and Children, Report o f the 
Inspector o f Mental Hospitals for year ending 2003, Government Publications, Dublin, 2004, referred to 
the increasing number of children in adults wards, some as young as 11 years.
69 Op. cit., 67 Article 29(4).
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when he does not have the capacity to consent to what is proposed, nor can those in this 
situation be treated the same as consenting capable adults. Children can only be admitted
70as voluntary patients under the 1945 Act with the consent of their parents. Parents can 
give written notice of their intention to remove the child and they are then at liberty to do 
so, subject to the provisions of the Child Care Act 1991 where there is a risk to the child. 
The child has no express rights in terms of leaving hospital or refusing treatment, she is 
effectively under the control of the hospital staff and is de facto detained.
The statements of the Court in HL v. United Kingdom and in Storck v. Germany apply 
when children are subject to the extreme control necessary to establish a deprivation of 
liberty and require the state to provide supervision and control over detention by private 
individuals which would apply to parental action. These decisions confirm state 
obligations to provide effective review and supervision of all such admissions to ensure 
Articles 5 and 8 are not violated.71 The Court, in Storck, referred to the obligation on the 
state to secure to its citizens their right to physical integrity under Article 8 of the 
Convention. The Court may have had in mind a wider application than psychiatric 
facilities to include residential centres, where children with intellectual disability are 
found to be deprived of their liberty without authorisation. The common law applies to 
consent to treatment for voluntary admission with parents giving proxy consent. Human 
rights standards require that the opinion of the minor be taken into consideration as an 
increasingly determinative factor in proportion to age and maturity, although 
commentators have recognised that Article 8 rights to self determination do not feature in 
case law.72
Children have no self determination rights regarding treatment under either the 1945 or 
the 2001 Acts. The 2001 Act has no requirement for any children to be consulted in 
relation to any matter, including consent to treatment. When children are detained, 
medication can be given to the child for three months without any reference to a second
0 Mental Treatment Act 1945, section 191(3).
1 HL v. United Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 32. Application no. 45508/99 5th October 2004 para 120, Storck 
v. Germany Application no. 61603/00 16th June 2005 and Nielsen v Denmark {1989) 11 EHRR 175.
'  Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 6 of the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine Human rights
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opinion safeguard until three months have elapsed. This second opinion does not 
guarantee independence, nor is there any requirement that it might be authorised in the 
first instance by a child psychiatrist, with a second opinion from another child 
psychiatrist. This provides a lower standard of protection than applies to adults, who at 
least are asked to consent. It is arguable that the “stabilising period” of three months is 
excessive, particularly where severe medications are used. The decision to use force may 
involve a balance between continuing treatment, which is forcibly opposed, and deciding 
not to continue with it. The court must approve psychosurgery and ECT, but there is no 
detail on what reports are required by the court in an area where independent opinions 
and representation are essential. The Act fails to consider the capacity of a 16 year old, 
yet common law decisions and statutes permit consent at this age and most 16-18 years 
are competent to consent.73 This is also out of step with human rights standards that the 
opinion of the minor should be taken into consideration as an increasingly determining 
factor in proportion to his or her age and degree of maturity.74 As a result of this sparsely 
drafted law, it is likely that there will be unwarranted interference with the Article 8 
rights of children, unless such interference are convincingly shown to be necessary.75 The 
treatment of older children under the Act is particularly vulnerable to a breach of Article 
8, taking into account both the decision in Storck and the requirement of proportionality.
Other aspects of Article 8 rights, such as confidentiality, not specifically included in the 
Act, may be raised where conflicts arise and the older child does not want information 
disclosed to family, even when he is living with them. The information should be limited 
to what is necessary for the particular task in order to comply with Article 8(2).
Conclusion
The findings of this thesis clarify the areas of mental health law that breach Convention 
requirements in both Acts and highlight the areas of the 2001 Act that need special
3 Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1985] 3 All ER 402, Non. Fatal Offences Against the Person 
Act 1997, section 23.
4 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Article 6(2).
73 Herczgefalvy v. Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437.
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attention as a priority. It is clear that the 1945 Act is in breach of the Convention to a 
significant extent and seems not to meet the requirements on several important grounds, 
such as non-compliance with Winterwerp and failure to respect rights of self- 
determination for all patients. The findings show the urgent need to introduce the 2001 
Act under which many of these compliance problems will be resolved. However, many 
other aspects of the Act will continue to breach the Convention, such as, the exclusion of 
wards from the right to review and the total failure of the 2001 Act to recognise the 
incapacitated voluntary patient. Significant work will have to be done to ensure that the 
vague provisions in the Act are clarified sufficiently to comply with the Convention. The 
rights of children need specific attention in almost all aspects under the Convention due 
to the failure to have even the most minimal protections in the Act. Even if Ireland does 
achieve compliance with the Convention, it still is only a minimum standard that confines 
itself mainly to civil and political rights.
The 2001 Act provides for a review of its operation in 2007, so that the deficiencies with 
regard to the Convention can be addressed and necessary amendments made to the Act.76 
The issue of capacity and the failure to recognise the incapacitated voluntary patient need 
to be addressed and safeguards introduced to apply to all aspects of their care and 
treatment. The safeguards should include regular monitoring of treatment with an element 
of independent representation. The rights of children and appropriate procedures and 
safeguards need to be introduced as a priority because currently, there are no effective 
safeguards to protect Convention rights. These should include independent second 
opinions, the involvement of child psychiatrists and a re-examination of the lack of 
safeguards for medicine for three months to apply to both adults and children. The impact 
of drug treatment practices like polypharmacy and powerful neuroleptics on adults and 
children, is recognised. Greater accountability is needed for outcomes of such practices, 
particularly where the person dies. Clear breaches of the Convention by the 2001 Act 
need to be addressed such as exclusions of categories from review mechanisms and the 
requirement to shift the burden of proof in the Circuit Court appeals from tribunal 
decisions.
6 Mental Health Act, section 75.
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The final question remains as to why it has taken so long to have law reform in this area. 
There are many reasons for this delay, the lack of a service-user movement to drive 
reform, a paternalistic state approach to mental health care and little recognition of 
human rights obligations, perhaps foremost among them. The Irish government has 
managed to avoid contentious proceedings by agreeing to the introduction of the 2001 
Act. This Act is now partially in force, but key parts have not been implemented. 
Ultimately, if these parts are not introduced, the chances are that there will be further 
applications to Strasbourg or to the Irish courts to enforce the legislation and conform 
with human rights obligations.
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